












IN A CHANGING CLIMATE  





About ReSAKSS   |   www.resakss.org
Established in 2006 under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) 
supports efforts to promote evidence- and outcome-based policy planning and implementation. In particular, ReSAKSS provides data and related analytical and knowledge products 
to facilitate CAADP benchmarking, review, and mutual learning processes. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) facilitates the overall work of ReSAKSS in 
partnership with the African Union Commission, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), leading regional economic communities (RECs), and Africa-based 
CGIAR centers. The Africa-based CGIAR centers and the RECs include: the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) for ReSAKSS–WA; the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) for ReSAKSS–ECA; 
and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for ReSAKSS–SA.
ReSAKSS is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Netherlands (MFAN). Earlier, ReSAKSS also received funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
Editors




De Pinto, A., and J. M. Ulimwengu (Eds). 2017. A Thriving Agricultural Sector in a Changing Climate: Meeting Malabo Declaration Goals through Climate-Smart Agriculture. ReSAKSS Annual Trends and 
Outlook Report 2016. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Copyright
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (CC-BY-NC-ND), available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Contributors 
Carlo Azzarri, Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) | Patrick Bell, Adjunct Professor, Ohio State University | Samuel Benin, Deputy 
Division Director, West and Central Africa Office, IFPRI | Elizabeth Bryan, Senior Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Francisco Ceballos, Senior Research Analyst, Markets, Trade, 
and Institutions Division, IFPRI | Nicola Cenacchi, Senior Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Jowel Choufani, Senior Research Assistant, Environment and Production Technology 
Division, IFPRI | Alessandro De Pinto, Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Shahnila Dunston, Senior Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, 
IFPRI | Wiebke Förch, Programme Advisor, SADC Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural Areas in Southern Africa Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH | Beliyou Haile, 
Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Benjamin Henderson, Economist, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development | Mario 
Herrero, Chief Research Scientist, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization | Aziza Kibonge, Adjunct Professor, Department of Economics, Ohio University | Jawoo Koo, Senior Research Fellow, 
Spatial Data and Analytics Team Leader, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Christine Lamanna, Climate Change Decision Scientist, Climate Change Unit, World Agroforestry Centre | Tsitsi 
Makombe, Senior Program Manager, West and Central Africa Office, IFPRI | Greenwell Matchaya, ReSAKSS Coordinator, International Water Management Institute | Daniel Mason-D’Croz, Scientist, Environment and 
Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Robert Mgendi, Adaptation Policy Expert, United Nations Environment 
Programme | Richard Munang, Africa Climate Change and Development Policy Expert, United Nations Environment Programme | Ephraim Nkonya, Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology 
Division, IFPRI | Claudia Ringler, Deputy Division Director, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Miguel Robles, Advisor to Executive Director, World Bank | Mark W. Rosegrant, Division Director, 
Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Todd Rosenstock, Climate Change and Environmental Scientist, World Agroforestry Centre | Timothy B. Sulser, Scientist, Environment and Production 
Technology Division, IFPRI | Wondwosen Tefera, Research Officer, Eastern and Southern Africa Office, IFPRI | Sophie Theis, Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Philip K. 
Thornton, Flagship Leader and Principal Scientist, CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, International Livestock Research Institute | John M. Ulimwengu, Senior Research Fellow, 
West and Central Africa Office, IFPRI | Keith Wiebe, Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI | Ho Young Kwon, Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology 
Division, IFPRI | 
Cover design: Joan Stephens/JKS Design and Shirong Gao/IFPRI
A THRIVING AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
IN A CHANGING CLIMATE










2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    iii
Contents
LIST OF TABLES   vii
LIST OF FIGURES  viii




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  xvii
1| INTRODUCTION  1
2|  THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY 
 IN AFRICA 5
 Keith Wiebe, Timothy B. Sulser, Daniel Mason-D’Croz, and Mark W. Rosegrant
3|  THE EFFECTS OF WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE
 IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA UNDER CHANGING CLIMATE REGIMES 22
 Alessandro De Pinto, Ho Young Kwon, Nicola Cenacchi, and Shahnila Dunston
4|  CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE OPTIONS IN MIXED CROP-LIVESTOCK
 SYSTEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 40
 Philip K. Thornton, Todd Rosenstock, Christine Lamanna, Patrick Bell,  
 Wiebke Förch, Benjamin Henderson, and Mario Herrero
iv   resakss.org
5|  TRADE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE 54
 Beliyou Haile, Carlo Azzarri, Jawoo Koo, and Alessandro De Pinto
6|  INSURANCE OPPORTUNITIES AGAINST WEATHER RISKS FOR SMALLHOLDER FARMERS IN AFRICA   69
 Francisco Ceballos, John M. Ulimwengu, Tsitsi Makombe, and Miguel Robles
7|  CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE PRACTICES BASED ON PRECISION AGRICULTURE: 
 THE CASE OF MAIZE IN WESTERN CONGO 86
 John M. Ulimwengu and Aziza Kibonge
8|  THE UNHOLY CROSS: PROFITABILITY AND ADOPTION OF CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE PRACTICES IN 
 AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 103
 Ephraim Nkonya and Jawoo Koo
9|  GENDER-SENSITIVE, CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE FOR IMPROVED NUTRITION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 114
 Elizabeth Bryan, Sophie Theis, Jowel Choufani, Alessandro De Pinto, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Claudia Ringler
10|  A STRATEGIC APPROACH AND BUSINESS MODEL FOR SCALING UP ECOSYSTEM-BASED ADAPTATION FOR 
 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 136
 Richard Munang and Robert Mgendi
11|  TRACKING CAADP INDICATORS AND PROCESSES   146
 Tsitsi Makombe, Wondwosen Tefera, Greenwell Matchaya, and Samuel Benin 
12|  CONCLUDING REMARKS 158
 
Contents Continued
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    v
Contents Continued
CHAPTER APPENDICES 
 CHAPTER 3 38
 CHAPTER 9 132
ANNEXES| CORE CAADP M&E AND SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATORS 162 
 ANNEX 1a:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.1.1 165
 ANNEX 1b:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.1.2 166
 ANNEX 1c:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.1 167
 ANNEX 1d:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2A 168
 ANNEX 1e:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2B 169
 ANNEX 1f:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2C 170
 ANNEX 1g:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.3 171
 ANNEX 1h:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.1A 172
 ANNEX 1i:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.1B  173
 ANNEX 1j:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.3 174
 ANNEX 1k:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.4 175
 ANNEX 1l:  Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.5 176
 ANNEX 2a:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.1 177
 ANNEX 2b:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.2 178
 ANNEX 2c:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.3 179
 ANNEX 2d:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.4 180
 ANNEX 2e:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5A 181
 ANNEX 2f:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5B 182
 ANNEX 2g:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5C 183
 ANNEX 2h:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5D 184
 ANNEX 2i:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5E 185
vi   resakss.org
ANNEXES| CORE CAADP M&E AND SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATORS continued 
 ANNEX 2j:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.1A 186
 ANNEX 2k:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.1B 187
 ANNEX 2l:  Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.2 188
 ANNEX 3a:  Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.1 189
 ANNEX 3b:  Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.2 190
 ANNEX 3c:  Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.3 191
 ANNEX 3d:  Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results  192
 ANNEX 4:  Distribution of countries by year of signing CAADP compact and level of CAADP implementation reached 
                    by end of 2015 198
 ANNEX 5:  Supplementary Data Tables 199
REFERENCES 212
Contents Continued
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    vii
List of Tables
T2.1 IMPACT projections of cereal and meat production, consumption, and trade to 2050 13
T2.2 IMPACT projections of food production, consumption, and hunger to 2050  15
T2.3 Percentage change in yields for maize, rice, and wheat in Africa south of the Sahara, compared with baseline without adoption of improved 
 technologies, 2050  17
T2.4 Average crop yields in 2030 (indexed, 2010 = 1.0), by region and scenario  19
T2.5 Average food supply (kilocalories per capita per day) in 2010 and 2030, by region and scenario  19
T2.6 Prevalence of hunger in 2010 and 2030 (millions of people)  19
T2.7 Prevalence of hunger in 2010 and 2030 (as a share of the total population, percentage) 20
T3.1 Climate-smart agriculture technologies considered in this study  30
T3.2 Adoption rate by crop under various climate and adoption scenarios 32
T3.3 Percentage change in 2050 world prices under two scenarios, compared with business-as-usual 34
T4.1 Climate-smart options available to smallholders in mixed crop-livestock systems in developing countries: Potential impacts and 
 strength of evidence 43
T4.2 Constraints to the widespread adoption of climate-smart options available to smallholders in mixed crop-livestock systems in 
 developing countries 50
T4.3 Agricultural system domains where climate-smart options may be suitable for smallholders in mixed crop-livestock systems in Africa 
 south of the Sahara 51
T5.1 Summary of climate-smart agricultural practices considered 61
T5.2 Net agricultural exports (in millions of US dollars) and gross value of agricultural production, selected African regional economic 
 communities,1993–2010 65
T5.3 Climate-smart agriculture production value and net exports, selected African regional economic communities, 2018–2025 projections 66
T6.1 Pilot agriculture insurance projects in Ethiopia 76
viii   resakss.org
T6.2 Expansion of Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project / R4 Rural Resilience Initiative 76
T6.3 Summary of key agricultural insurance initiatives in Africa 79
T7.1 Soil characteristics 93
T7.2 Fertilizer application recommendations 95
T7.3 Descriptive statistics, fertilizer recommendations, kg/ha 96
T7.4 Distribution of expected long-term yield under precision agriculture practices 97
T7.5 First-year input costs with and without precision agriculture 99
T7.6 Maize yield with and without precision agriculture 100
T7.7 Income with and without precision agriculture 100
T8.1 Maize yield trend, 1976–1993, Kenya long-term experiment 105
T8.2 Value of off-farm benefits (climate mitigation) of adopting integrated soil fertility management on maize plots 108
List of Figures
F2.1 Changes in demographics will influence the level and nature of demand for food 6
F2.2 Undernourishment remains a challenge in Africa, even while overconsumption increases 7
F2.3 Africa lags behind other regions in agricultural productivity growth  8
F2.4 Crop yields in Africa remain a fraction of those in other parts of the world 9
F2.5 Temperatures are projected to rise and precipitation patterns to change 10
F2.6 Maize yields will be hard hit by climate change 11
F2.7 The IMPACT system of models 12
F2.8 Percentage change in population at risk of hunger in Africa south of the Sahara, compared with baseline without adoption of improved 
 technologies, 2050 17
Tables Continued
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    ix
F3.1 Changes in production, prices, undernourished children younger than five years, and population at risk of hunger, 2010–2050, 
 under two climate scenarios with business-as-usual farming practices 26
F3.2 DSSAT calibration results for the world (left) and Africa south of the Sahara (right), business-as-usual scenario 29
F3.3 Percentage change in production (total output) in 2050, climate-smart agriculture scenarios compared with business-as-usual scenario 33
F3.4 Change in greenhouse gas emissions from baseline under two adoption and two climate scenarios 34
F3.5 Effects of adoption of the best climate-smart agriculture practice during the period 2040–2050 on total annual yield and 
 greenhouse gas emissions 35
F4.1 Mixed crop-livestock systems in Africa 41
F5.1 Linkages between climate change, agricultural production, and agricultural commodity trade 57
F5.2 Historical per capita gross production value (left axis) and growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (right axis), selected 
 African regional economic communities, 1993–2010  59
F5.3 Historical total agricultural net exports, selected African regional economic communities, 1993–2010 60
F5.4 Historical (1993–2010) and simulated (2018–2025) yields under the smart farmer option, ECOWAS 62
F5.5 Historical (1993–2010) and simulated (2018–2025) yields under the smart farmer option, COMESA 63
F5.6 Historical (1993–2010) and simulated (2018–2025) yields under the smart farmer option, SADC 64
F5.7 Simulated total agricultural net exports with smart farmer option, maize, selected African regional economic communities, 2018–2025 67
F5.8 Simulated total agricultural net exports with smart farmer option, rice, selected African regional economic communities, 2018–2025 67
F6.1 Complementarity between drought-tolerant seeds and drought index insurance 81
F8.1 Percentage decline in yield and soil organic carbon, 1972–1993, Kenya long-term experiment 105
F8.2 Yield change due to long-term continuous maize cropping under integrated soil fertility management and other land management practices, 
 1980–2010 106
F8.3 Impact of soil and water management on maize and millet yield variance, 30-year DSSAT simulation results, Mali 107
F8.4 Adoption rate of improved seeds and soil fertility management practices, Kenya, 2015 108
Figures Continued
x   resakss.org
F8.5 Adoption rate of integrated soil fertility management, Zambia 109
F8.6 The unholy cross: Inverse relationship between profitability and adoption of soil fertility management practices, Africa south of the Sahara 110
F8.7 Types of messages given to farmers by extension agents in Nigeria and Uganda 111
F9.1 Integrated framework for climate resilience, gender, and nutrition, general 124
F9.2 Household-level framework for climate resilience, gender, and nutrition  125
F9.3 Policy-level framework for climate resilience, gender, and nutrition  126
F9A.1 Resilience assessment framework 132
F9A.2 Framework on gender, agricultural development, and climate change 133
F9A.3 Agriculture-to-nutrition pathways 134
F9A.4 Conceptual links between climate change and nutrition 135
List of Boxes
B9.1 Examples of key gender differences likely to affect climate change adaptation 117
B9.2 The food, social/work, health, and living environments  128
Figures Continued
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    xi
ASEZ agricultural special economic zones
ATOR Annual Trends and Outlook Report
AU African Union
AUC African Union Commission
AWD alternate wetting and drying
BAU business-as-usual 
BL Bukanga Lonzo 
BR Biennial Review
Ca calcium
CA conservation agriculture 
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme
CC climate change
CEN-SAD  Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CO2 carbon dioxide
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COV coefficient of variation
CSA climate-smart agriculture
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
DSSAT Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer 
EAC  East African Community
EbA ecosystem-based adaptation
EBAFOSA  Ecosystem Based Adaptation for Food Security 
Assembly
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations
GAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security Support 
Program
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
HadGEM2-ES Hadley Centre Global Environment Model version 
2—Earth System
ICT information and communications technology
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
IMPACT  International Model for Policy Analysis of 
Agricultural Commodities and Trade
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISFM  integrated soil fertility management
K potassium
KCI potassium chloride
LGP length of growing period
M&E monitoring and evaluation




NAIP national agriculture investment plan
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NPCA  NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
P phosphorus
PA precision agriculture 
Abbreviations
xii   resakss.org
PES payment for ecosystem services
PPP purchasing power parity 
R&D research and development
RCP representative concentration pathway 
REC regional economic community 
ReSAKSS Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support 
System
SPAM Spatial Production Allocation Model 
SADC Southern African Development Community
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SOC  soil organic carbon
SPI standardized precipitation index 
SSA Africa south of the Sahara
UDP urea deep placement
UMA  Arab Maghreb Union
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
Abbreviations Continued
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    xiii
Acknowledgments
T
he 2016 Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) has benefited from the research and efforts of the many 
authors and contributors whose work is presented in this report. We express our deepest gratitude to all the 
authors and co-authors. ReSAKSS node teams comprising Paul Guthiga, Joseph Karugia, Stella Massawe, 
Greenwell Matchaya, Charles Nhemachena, Sibusiso Nhlengethwa, Manson Nwafor, Maurice Taondyandé, and Mbaye 
Yade collected and updated data on CAADP indicators that are tracked in Chapter 11 and the Annex of this report.
This report was produced under the overall leadership of Ousmane Badiane. Tsitsi Makombe managed and 
coordinated the production process. 
We are grateful to the valuable and thorough reviews and feedback provided by several reviewers. They include 
Senthold Asseng (University of Florida),  Andy Jarvis (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture), Philip Thornton 
(International Livestock Research Institute), Todd Benson (IFPRI), Joseph Karugia (ReSAKSS), David Schimmelpfennig 
(US Department of Agriculture), Todd Rosenstock (World Agroforestry Centre), Patti Kristjanson (World Agroforestry 
Centre), Jessica Fanzo (Johns Hopkins University), John Ulimwengu (IFPRI), Richard Munang (United Nations 
Environment Programme), Ephraim Nkonya (IFPRI), Henry Neufeldt (World Agroforestry Centre), Aslihan Arslan 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development), Sonali McDermid (New York University), Eva “Lini” Wollenberg 
(University of Vermont), Pablo Pacheco (Center for International Forestry Research), and Joseph Glauber (IFPRI). 
Special thanks go to Samuel Benin, who managed the peer-review process and the processing of data on CAADP 
indicators, as well as to Julia Collins and Wondwosen Tefera, who supported the peer-review process and data 
processing, respectively. 
We appreciate the outstanding editorial support from Tsitsi Makombe, administrative support from Terra Carter 
and Pamela Dogbe, and research support from Julia Collins. Excellent editorial support from IFPRI’s editorial team, 
under the leadership of Pamela Stedman-Edwards, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Joan Stephens for the design 
and layout of the report. 
Finally, we would also like to acknowledge the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for 
providing financial support for the 2016 ATOR. 
xiv   resakss.org
Foreword
C
limate issues have taken on increasing importance in recent years, both in Africa and globally. African farmers are already 
experiencing the negative effects of climate change, including shifts in weather patterns and greater frequency of extreme 
events. Increased climate variability was evident in the unusually strong El Niño event of 2015–2016, which resulted in a 
severe and widespread drought that put millions of people across eastern and southern Africa in need of emergency food aid in 2016. 
The ramifications of climate change will only increase in the future. While impacts will vary across crops and regions, overall 
effects on food production are expected to be negative if the response is inadequate. In Africa, where yields are already much 
lower than global averages and large numbers of poor people remain vulnerable to shocks, a failure to address climate change will 
endanger recent gains in raising living standards and increasing food security. 
In particular, climate change will affect Africa’s efforts to meet the commitments of the 2014 Malabo Declaration, including 
those to increase agricultural productivity and intraregional trade, halve poverty, and end hunger. The Declaration recognized the 
importance of responding to and anticipating new sources of climate risk with its commitment to enhancing resilience of liveli-
hoods and production systems to climate variability and other related risks. Under this commitment, African leaders resolved to 
increase households’ resilience to climate- and weather-related risks, enhance investments for initiatives to build the resilience of 
people and ecosystems, and mainstream resilience and risk management in policies, strategies and investment plans. In addition, 
the African Union is committed to supporting its member states in implementing the Paris Agreement on climate change, focusing 
on their nationally determined contributions.
Efforts to meet the Malabo commitments must include the adoption of climate-smart agriculture practices. Climate-smart 
agriculture (CSA) refers to agricultural practices and approaches that serve three objectives: (1) sustainable agricultural produc-
tivity increases; (2) increased resilience of food systems and farming livelihoods; and (3) reduction or removal of agricultural 
greenhouse gas emissions, when possible. This concept reflects both the vulnerability of agriculture to the effects of climate change 
and the position of agriculture as a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.
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Although CSA represents a vital strategy in the fight against the potential damage of climate change, much work remains to 
be done to examine in detail the impacts and conditions for success of different CSA tools. The 2016 Annual Trends and Outlook 
Report (ATOR) presents research on CSA in order to understand and evaluate a range of potential techniques and approaches. 
The ATOR examines the likely effects of climate change on agricultural productivity, hunger, and trade; provides evidence on 
the impacts of CSA practices; and explores policy frameworks linking CSA with other development concepts. The report finds 
that climate change threatens to slow Africa’s progress in raising crop yields and reducing hunger, but these effects can be offset 
through adoption of CSA tools as well as through investments in agricultural research and development, natural resource man-
agement, and market access. Despite tradeoffs in some cases between the three objectives of CSA, CSA practices can significantly 
increase crop yields and enhance resilience to weather variability while also lowering greenhouse gas emissions.
This report, as well as the 2017 ReSAKSS Annual Conference, should help to advance knowledge on CSA and aid in the 
successful adoption of CSA practices, increasing Africa’s ability to consolidate development gains and achieve the Malabo com-
mitments. The African Union plans to use findings of the 2016 ATOR in supporting its member states with domesticating the 
Malabo commitments in their revised or new national agriculture investment plans.
xvi   resakss.org
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Evidence continues to mount that climate change will play an increasingly important role in Africa, especially in agriculture.  Indeed, rising temperatures and increased frequency of extreme 
dry and wet years are expected to slow progress toward increasing the 
productivity of crop and livestock systems and improving food security, 
particularly in Africa south of the Sahara (SSA). Recent food production 
projections show that climate change will have a negative impact on 
production, although the effects will vary by crop; negative effects are likely 
to be felt in roots and tubers production but more strongly for cereals, which 
are expected to see reductions in production of 2.9 percent by 2030 and 5.1 
percent by 2050 (Sulser et al. 2015). Central and southern Africa show the 
largest projected negative effects on cereal production, with declines of more 
than 11 percent compared with the baseline. Although oilseed production in 
SSA may see a slight benefit from the effects of climate change, in northern 
Africa it will be negatively impacted, declining by 14 percent. 
Given its heavy reliance on rainfed agriculture and projected climatic 
and weather changes, SSA faces multidimensional challenges in ensuring 
food and nutrition security as well as preserving its ecosystems. In this 
regard, climate-smart agriculture (CSA) can play an important role in 
addressing the interlinked challenges of food security and climate change. 
CSA practices aim to achieve three closely related objectives: sustainably 
increase agricultural productivity, adapt to climate change, and mitigate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The CSA objectives directly contribute to 
achieving the 2014 Malabo Declaration goals, which include commitments 
to (1) end hunger in Africa by 2025, (2) halve poverty by 2025 through 
inclusive agricultural growth and transformation, and (3) enhance the resil-
ience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and other 
related risks. These linkages underscore the importance of including CSA in 
country and regional plans to achieve overarching development objectives 
in Africa, in particular food security and poverty reduction. 
The 2016 Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) examines the 
contribution of CSA to meeting Malabo Declaration goals by taking stock 
of current knowledge on the effects of climate change, reviewing existing 
evidence of the effectiveness of various CSA strategies, and discussing 
examples of CSA-based practices and tools for developing evidence-based 
policies and programs. The findings and related policy recommendations 
are summarized below.
Major Findings and Policy 
Recommendations 
CSA practices have on-farm and off-farm benefits that often far outweigh 
their investment costs. However, off-farm benefits can represent a signifi-
cant fraction of the total benefits generated by CSA practices and benefits 
Executive Summary
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might accrue with a time lag while the necessary investments must be made 
up front. It is therefore important to design policies and strategies that favor 
the uptake of CSA technologies and practices. These include mechanisms 
such as ecosystem services payments and strengthening of the capacity of 
extension agents to provide the required advisory services.  These strategies 
will simultaneously serve food security and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation objectives.
Widespread adoption of CSA practices has a positive effect on production 
and total agricultural output, with a consequent reduction in prices and 
decrease in the number of people at risk of hunger and the number of 
children, younger than five years, at risk of malnutrition. Adoption of 
CSA practices is also expected to increase soil organic carbon content, or at 
least reduce soil organic carbon losses, indicating that these practices can 
increase productivity in a more sustainable manner than current practices. 
Taken together, all of this evidence suggests an increase in resilience to 
climate change. However, the effects on prices might not lead to reduced 
pressure for cropland expansion. Given increased productivity, producers 
might increase cultivated land even with the projected decrease in prices, 
potentially endangering environmentally sensitive and carbon-rich areas. 
The effects on GHG emissions are mixed and mostly depend on how much 
emphasis is placed on reducing emissions. Finally, although beneficial, the 
adoption of a set of CSA practices only marginally addresses poverty, food 
security, and most of all, emissions reduction, indicating that broader inter-
ventions are necessary. 
CSA is more than just a set of agricultural practices. Evidence suggests 
that CSA should be interpreted broadly and not reduced to a list of accept-
able agricultural practices. Food systems as a whole (that is, trade, stocks, 
nutrition, and social policies) should adjust to climate change, and their 
interaction with other land uses as well as the role of agroforestry, livestock, 
and value chains should be considered as an essential component of climate-
smart agricultural development.
CSA significantly increases both yields and agricultural trade flows, sug-
gesting a potential role for CSA in improving resilience and spreading 
agricultural production risks. The evidence also suggests a heterogeneous 
response of trade flows to CSA in different regional economic communi-
ties. Although these findings are informative, it is worth noting that even if 
famers have complete information about a portfolio of CSA practices and 
their agronomic potential, adoption may be suboptimal due to, for example, 
limited budgets, missing or imperfect markets, and institutional barriers. 
Given that CSA practices have a more complex set of tangible and intangible 
components than does a single and discrete class of technologies, adoption 
of all the components is necessary to benefit from all the synergistic effects 
of CSA on productivity and sustainability. Additional research is therefore 
needed to examine possible general equilibrium effects of large-scale 
adoption of CSA practices and to identify location-specific factors that 
mediate the interaction between climate change, agriculture, and trade. 
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At the micro level, findings suggest that farmers could greatly benefit 
from CSA practices that rely on precision agriculture (PA), mainly 
through efficient and georeferenced application of inorganic fertilizers, 
use of selected seeds, use of cover crops, and minimal or no tillage. 
Though farmers may have to invest more at first on fertilizers under PA, the 
significant increase in crop yield more than offsets the cost of fertilizer. In 
addition, the total fertilizer cost is expected to decrease over time because 
the climate-smart practices implemented would enhance soil conditions and 
preserve the environment. The results also indicate that the revenue under 
PA/CSA is significantly higher than without these practices. It goes without 
saying that “blind farming”—farming without PA/CSA—is highly inefficient 
and exacerbates the challenges of addressing climate change. African gov-
ernments should promote PA/CSA as a way of optimizing the use of limited 
resources while accounting for the effects of climate change. For example, it 
should be mandatory to include the results of soil analysis in farming loan 
and crop insurance applications. Similarly, under the National Agricultural 
Investment Plans, ministries of agriculture should require detailed soil 
analysis prior to every new land development for farming purposes. 
There is still a gap of information on the costs, benefits, synergies, and 
trade-offs of many CSA interventions. Indeed, more comprehensive 
information could help target interventions more effectively and precisely. 
However, evidence is also accumulating on the kinds of approaches that can 
support the scaling up of CSA interventions. Multistakeholder platforms 
and policy-making networks are key, especially if paired with capacity 
enhancement, learning, and innovative approaches to support farmers’ 
decision making. Modern information and communications technology 
offers efficient and cost-effective ways to disseminate and collect information 
at a massive scale, as well as an infrastructure for developing and utilizing 
new and diverse partnerships. A certain level of local engagement will still 
usually be needed, paying attention to farmers’ needs and their own situa-
tions to better understand the benefits of CSA practices. 
Risk management is an important component of CSA, and formal insur-
ance instruments complete the farmers’ tool kit to cope with weather 
shocks. Deteriorating farming conditions caused by rising temperature 
trends and shifting precipitation patterns can increase yield volatility 
and induce risk-reducing responses that, on the aggregate, might prove 
suboptimal for household diets, incomes, and national food security goals. 
Agricultural risk management is becoming an increasingly important area of 
intervention to achieving food security. Even though traditional crop indem-
nity insurance is not widespread in the continent, other options have been 
brought forward in the past decades. Weather index insurance is a promising 
alternative with several advantages. It avoids moral hazard issues, it is not 
subject to adverse selection, and the implementation and administration 
of index insurance is cheaper than that of traditional indemnity insurance. 
Among other risk management options, African policy makers should 
consider innovative weather index insurance tools as part of a comprehen-
sive CSA package to help farmers manage weather risks. Such efforts can go 
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a long way in helping the continent meet the Malabo Declaration commit-
ment to enhance the resilience of farming livelihoods by 2025. 
Gender and nutritional status affect people’s ability to respond to 
climate change and their response choices. Changes in gender equity, 
nutritional status, and environmental sustainability are also outcomes of 
decisions on climate change and adaptation. Development programming 
is moving toward more integrated, systems-based approaches that address 
multiple interlinked development challenges simultaneously. However, 
this shift requires coordination across different disciplines and domains 
of expertise. Frameworks that link multiple areas can reveal the strategic 
aspects of a problem that need interdisciplinary approaches. A framework 
that links gender, climate change, and nutrition, for example, identifies (1) 
the importance of gender-differentiated capacities to respond to climate 
change, the needs and preferences for response options, and the outcomes of 
different practices and approaches; (2) consideration of the food system and 
nutritional status as factors influencing individuals’ capacities to respond to 
climate change; (3) how environmental impacts and women’s empowerment 
affect nutrition and health outcomes; and (4) the importance of multiple 
pathways through which climate change responses influence nutrition, 
health, gender equity, and other development outcomes. These types of 
frameworks enable program implementers and policy makers to think about 
the systems and institutions across different scales that affect each other, 
and how to properly measure and monitor such interactions. They can also 
provide guidance for identifying opportunities and obstacles related to the 
program and outcomes of interest and for tracing the impact pathways from 
interventions to outcomes. 
Ecosystems-based adaptation (EbA) is a known strategy for building 
climate resilience and enhancing the ecosystems that underpin the 
productivity of key socioeconomic sectors in Africa. In light of mounting 
climate impacts and the escalating degradation of ecosystems, the urgent 
need to upscale the practice of EbA cannot be overstated. Generalizing this 
integrated approach will require inclusive partnerships among complemen-
tary actors to bridge the requisite policy and nonpolicy gaps and to foster 
practical means to achieve this integration. UN Environment is already 
fostering these inclusive, mutual, multistakeholder partnerships at the policy 
and operational levels by facilitating the country-driven Ecosystems Based 
Adaptation for Food Security Assembly (EBAFOSA) policy implementa-
tion framework.
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limate change is a significant and growing threat to food security 
already affecting vulnerable populations in many developing countries 
and expected to affect more people, more areas, and more farmers in 
the future. Climate disruptions to agricultural production have increased over 
the past 40 years and are projected to become more frequent over the next 
25 years (Hatfield et al. 2014, Hatfield and Pruege 2015). Farmers in many 
agricultural regions already appear to have experienced declines in crop and 
livestock production because of climate change–induced stress (Lobell and 
Field 2007; Lobell, Schlenker, and Costa-Roberts 2011). Although climate 
change is expected to produce both winners and losers, on balance, losses in 
productivity in many regions are expected to outweigh gains in other regions 
(Jarvis et al. 2011).  
The scale of the potential impacts of climate change is alarming. For 
example, the National Research Council (2011) has projected that each 
degree Celsius of global warming will lead to an overall loss in crop yields 
of about 5 percent. As climate change continues, it is increasingly likely that 
current cropping systems will cease to be viable in many locations. Jones 
and Thornton (2008), for example, argued that by 2050, as many 35 million 
farmers may switch from mixed crop-livestock to livestock-only systems. 
Developing countries are expected to receive the brunt of climate 
change (Morton 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) projects that under more optimistic 
scenarios, climate change could reduce food crop yields in parts of Africa 
by between 10 and 20 percent, a large drop for already at-risk populations 
and regions (IPCC 2014). The outlook for key food crops across the 
African continent under climate change is mostly negative and indicates 
that low productivity, together with increasing global demand, will likely 
drive up food prices (Jalloh et al. 2013; Waithaka et al. 2013; Hachigonta et 
al. 2013). Climate change is expected to negatively affect the yields of most 
of Africa’s major crops, with cereals showing the most consistent decline in 
each of the continent’s regions (Sulser et al. 2015). Nelson and colleagues 
(2010) predicted that staple food prices could rise by 42 to 131 percent for 
maize, 11 to 78 percent for rice, and 17 to 67 percent for wheat between 
2010 and 2050 as a result of the combined effects of climate change, 
increasing population, and economic growth. Moreover, localized weather 
shocks and emerging pest and disease outbreaks are already compromising 
stability in crop production, highlighting the urgency for immediate and 
adaptable management responses (FAO and PAR 2011). 
The 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth 
and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods 
represents Africa’s shared commitment to transforming the agricultural 
sector for sustainable development on the continent between 2015 and 
2025. The declaration sets out seven specific commitments for advancing 
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) agenda. The sixth commitment is focused on enhancing the 
resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and 
other related risks. In order to make good on these promises, rapid action 
is required. Such action will draw from new tools and techniques to build 
resilience to climate- and weather-related risks, commonly referred to 
as climate-smart agriculture (CSA). CSA comprises agricultural systems 
that contribute to the outcomes of (1) sustainable and equitable increases 
in agricultural productivity and incomes; (2) greater resilience of food 
systems and farming livelihoods; and (3) where possible, reduction or 
removal (or both) of greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture 
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(including the relationship between agriculture and ecosystems). The 
agricultural production systems created through CSA methodologies and 
practices are expected not only to be more productive and efficient but 
also to increase resilience to the short-, medium-, and long-term shocks 
and risks associated with climate change and climate variability. The 
operational aspects of CSA still need substantial investigation. Agricultural 
practices in particular may be climate smart in some circumstances, 
but local contexts determine the enabling environment, trade-offs, 
and synergies (Below et al. 2012). As a consequence, conditions for 
adoption are highly context and location specific, highlighting the need 
for information and data to make the approach operational (McCarthy, 
Lipper, and Branca 2011). 
As the official monitoring and evaluation report for CAADP at the 
continent level, the Annual Trends and Outlook Report (ATOR) plays an 
important role in promoting review, dialogue, and mutual accountability 
in support of evidence-based policy making and implementation. And 
in light of the growing intensity and frequency of climate change effects, 
the 2016 ATOR takes an in-depth look at the role of CSA in helping to 
meet Malabo Declaration goals and, in particular, the goal of enhancing 
the resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability. 
Through a series of contributions in key areas spanning the regional to 
the household level, the report offers significant insights into the state 
of our knowledge and understanding of the role that CSA can play for 
agricultural development under changing climate regimes. 
Chapter 2 describes the context in which policy and investment 
decisions will have to take place, finding that in the years leading up 
to 2050, African countries will continue to grow, and many will reach 
middle-income status. As the agricultural sector grows, it will need to 
become technologically more sophisticated to withstand the vagaries of 
climate and market conditions. Key to future growth will be regionally 
tailored, evidence-based efforts to address increased regional market 
integration and the regional shifts in agroecological conditions. 
The next two chapters analyze CSA in Africa south of the Sahara (SSA) 
for more traditional crop production systems and for mixed crop-livestock 
systems, respectively. Chapter 3 shows the benefits of CSA adoption but 
also its limits when the approach is interpreted in a restrictive way and 
applied only to crop production. Chapter 4, while providing an assessment 
of possible investments in CSA in SSA, proposes a framework to prioritize 
among CSA interventions. Both chapters reach the conclusion that 
although multiple wins are possible, “silver bullets” do not appear to exist 
in climate-smart systems. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of CSA in the context of trade flows in 
three regional economic communities (RECs):  the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Likely agroclimatic changes will not only impact 
agriculture but also countries’ ability to fully benefit from regional 
and international trade, especially when rainfed-based agricultural 
commodities dominate trade flow. The authors find that CSA practices 
have the potential to mitigate climate-induced risks in agricultural 
production and food security through increased and less volatile 
agricultural trade flows. 
Chapter 6 provides important insights into the promises and limits of 
production risk management through financial mechanisms. In particular, 
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the authors investigate the role that weather index insurance can play in 
generating better adaptation pathways to weather shocks for smallholder 
farmers than existing ones. Evidence from several pilot insurance 
programs shows that although the potential for innovative insurance 
mechanisms is real, additional work to understand their effectiveness 
and substantial scale-up efforts will be needed to achieve a sustainable 
expansion of efficient agricultural insurance markets in Africa.
The next two chapters bring to our attention localized experiences 
related to the adoption of CSA. Chapter 7 goes to the heart of the location 
specificity of CSA by investigating the potential benefits of using precision 
agriculture in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, finding that this 
approach can boost sustainable productivity through increased efficiencies 
in the use of inputs. Even though the use of precision agriculture may still 
be many years away, we can extrapolate an important lesson that applies 
to many other African countries: increased use of fertilizers, coupled 
with increased efficiency in their use, can lead to an optimal response to 
the effects of climate change. Chapter 8 uses information from several 
SSA countries to revisit the long-standing problem of practices that 
demonstrably show both on-farm and off-farm benefits that outweigh 
investment costs, yet scarcely get adopted. This is clearly a problem that 
affects CSA as well.  
The last two chapters broaden our understating of CSA by connecting 
it to ecosystems, gender, and nutrition. Chapter 9 tackles the nexus of 
CSA, gender, and nutrition, providing an integrated conceptual framework 
with entry points for action as well as information requirements to guide 
interventions in the context of climate change. The authors clearly argue 
that to go beyond incremental approaches to adaptation, these types of 
integrated approaches are essential in order to address the development 
challenges that the future climate creates. 
Chapter 10 considers ecosystem-based adaptation and CSA as new 
paradigms that offer an integrated solution to maximizing the productivity 
of agriculture and food systems under changing climate regimes. 
The author posits that ecosystem-based adaptation and CSA offer an 
opportunity to break from traditional approaches and the silos that have 
limited the capacity for improving the food security condition of many. 
This collection of studies shows the breadth and richness of the 
knowledge that is accumulating around the CSA approach. Although 
clearly there is still much to be investigated, the information available 
can already be used to assist African countries in the design and 
implementation of national agricultural investment plans that account for 
climate change. 
As in previous ATORs, Chapter 11 tracks progress on CAADP 
indicators outlined in the CAADP Results Framework for 2015–2025 in 
the areas of economic growth, food and nutrition security, employment, 
poverty, agricultural production and productivity, intra-African trade 
and market performance, and public agriculture-sector expenditure. It 
also reviews countries’ progress in the CAADP implementation process 
and in strengthening systemic capacity to deliver results. The ATOR 
concludes with Chapter 12, which highlights key policy recommendations 
for the CAADP/Malabo agenda. Finally, the report’s appendixes provide 
aggregate-level data on the CAADP indicators, organized by geographic 
regions, regional economic communities, economic characteristics, and 
CAADP groups, showing when a CAADP compact was signed or the level 
of CAADP implementation reached.
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limate change will play an increasingly important role in Africa, 
as elsewhere, during the course of the 21st century. Rising 
temperatures and increased frequency of extremely dry and wet 
years are expected to slow progress toward increased productivity of 
crop and livestock systems and improved food security, particularly 
in Africa south of the Sahara (FAO 2016). But other drivers of change 
in agriculture and food security are also changing in significant ways. 
In order to place the impacts of climate change in context, we look 
first at changes that affect demand for food and other agricultural 
commodities, and then at changes affecting supply. 
Key Trends and Challenges for 
Agriculture and Food Security in Africa
Demand Side: Population, Income, Urbanization, 
and Globalization
On the demand side, a key factor that immediately distinguishes Africa from 
other regions of the world is population (Figure 2.1, panel [a]). The popula-
tions of East Asia and South Asia are projected to peak and then begin 
declining by the 2030s and 2050s, respectively, whereas the United Nations 
 FIGURE 2.1—CHANGES IN DEMOGRAPHICS WILL INFLUENCE THE LEVEL AND NATURE OF DEMAND FOR FOOD
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projects that population in Africa will continue to grow rapidly throughout 
the 21st century. Africa’s population is projected to exceed that of East Asia 
by the 2030s (at around 1.6 billion) and that of South Asia by midcentury (at 
around 2.3 billion). This growth will have direct effects on the demand for 
agricultural commodities, particularly staple food crops.
At the same time, Africa and other developing regions are projected to 
experience a continuing increase in per capita incomes (see, for example, 
Sulser et al. 2015) and a demographic shift from rural to urban areas, with 
two-thirds of the world’s people living in urban areas by 2050 (Figure 2.1, 
panel [b]). Changing employment patterns, along with growth in incomes 
and increased globalization, have important implications for the nature of 
demand. Demand for traditional staples (excluding rice) is likely to slow in 
per capita terms as demand for purchased and processed foods increases.
These changing patterns of consumption affect food security and 
nutrition in diverse ways. Cheaper calories have reduced the number of 
undernourished people and of stunted children in much of the developing 
world but have not kept pace with population growth in Africa (Figure 2.2, 
panels [a] and [b]). At the same time, the number of overweight and obese 
children has increased in all regions, including Africa (Figure 2.2, panel [c]). 
Rising incomes improve access to higher-value foods such as fruits, veg-
etables, and animal-source foods for many, but these foods remain beyond 
reach for the poorest.
 FIGURE 2.2—UNDERNOURISHMENT REMAINS A CHALLENGE IN AFRICA, EVEN WHILE OVERCONSUMPTION INCREASES
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Supply Side: Land, Water, Infrastructure,  
and Technology
Whereas the level and composition of demand changes with population, 
income, and other factors, changes in natural resources and technology 
present new challenges and opportunities in meeting that demand. Over the 
past half century, growth in world agriculture has been driven increasingly 
by increases in total factor productivity, or the efficiency with which inputs 
such as land, water, and fertilizer are used (Figure 2.3, panel [a]). This is true 
in all regions except Africa south of the Sahara, where growth continues to 
be driven primarily by increases in agricultural inputs (Figure 2.3, panel [b]). 
Because irrigation and commercial fertilizer use remain low in Africa 
south of the Sahara, soil nutrients are being depleted in many areas and 
crop yields also remain low. Cereal yields in Africa average about 1.5 tons2
per hectare—only half of those in South Asia and 20–25 percent of those 
in East Asia and North America (Figure 2.4)—and maize yields represent 
only 20–50 percent of potential yields in the region (van Ittersum et al. 
2016). These figures illustrate the challenge faced by the region but also 
the potential to be realized from improvements in productivity through 
increased investment in agricultural research, resource use efficiency, and 
infrastructure. We will return to these potential returns later.
2  Throughout the chapter, tons refers to metric tons.
 FIGURE 2.3—AFRICA LAGS BEHIND OTHER REGIONS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
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The Special Challenge of Climate Change
Compounding the effects of rising population and low productivity, climate 
change will present new challenges to Africa’s farmers and consumers. 
Projections of impacts depend on general circulation models of Earth’s 
climate and assumptions about the rate of change in greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the coming decades. Details vary depending on the climate model 
and scenario considered, with general agreement on rising temperatures 
(Figure 2.5, panel [a]) but less consensus on how precipitation patterns will 
change (Figure2.5, panel [b]). 
The combination of rising temperatures and changing precipitation 
patterns is projected to result in a wide range of impacts, including increases 
in weather volatility and extreme events, rising sea levels, changes in glacial 
meltwater flows (initially increasing and ultimately declining), changes 
in the incidence of agricultural pests and diseases, and direct effects on 
crop productivity. Many of these impacts are beyond our current ability to 
model at the global scale, but we are able to simulate the impact of expected 
changes in temperature and precipitation on crop yields at the local, 
regional, and global levels. To do so, we use projections from global climate 
models as inputs in crop simulation models such as the Decision Support 
FIGURE 2.4—CROP YIELDS IN AFRICA REMAIN A FRACTION OF THOSE IN OTHER 
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System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) to simulate impacts on yields 
under different climate scenarios. The results presented here are based on a 
scenario using the United Kingdom’s Hadley Centre Global Environment 
Model version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model 
(Jones et al. 2011) and assuming relatively rapid increases in greenhouse gas 
emissions combined with middle-of-the-road assumptions about growth 
in population and incomes.3 These results thus represent the impacts of 
relatively large changes in temperature and precipitation, but they omit the 
other dimensions of climate change noted above.
3  Specifically, these results assume climate change as represented by representative concentration 
pathway (RCP) 8.5 and shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP) 2. See Moss and others (2008) and 
O’Neill and others (2014) for more information.
Yields of rainfed maize, for example, are projected to decline by as 
much as 25 percent or more in some regions under this scenario by 2050, 
relative to 2000 levels (Figure 2.6). It is essential to note that this projection 
is based on crop modeling that holds everything else constant—that is, 
it assumes that farmers continue to grow the same varieties in the same 
locations on the same planting calendar and using the same management 
practices. But we know that farmers won’t continue to do everything the 
same as before—not only because they will respond to changing climate 
conditions but also because market conditions and technologies will also be 
changing in the coming decades.
FIGURE 2.5—TEMPERATURES ARE PROJECTED TO RISE AND PRECIPITATION PATTERNS TO CHANGE
Source: Rosegrant and colleagues (2017), using the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model version 2—
Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model, assuming representative concentration pathway 
(RCP) 8.5.
Note: The color gradient in panel (a) shows increases in maximum temperature in 2050 relative to 2000, 
from < 0˚C (white) to > 6˚C (dark red). The color gradient in (b) shows changes in annual precipitation in 
2050 relative to 2000, from < -400 mm (dark red) to > 400 mm (dark blue).
(a) Increase in temperature, 2050 relative to 2000 (b) Change in annual precipitation, 2050 relative to 2000
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This chapter explores the future impacts of these various changes, 
incorporating economic adjustments. The following sections present 
baseline projections for agriculture and food in Africa to 2050 based on 
changes in the driving factors described here, and then explore how these 
projected outcomes can be changed by decisions we make today, specifically 
in relation to investment in agricultural research, natural resource manage-
ment, and infrastructure.
Baseline Projections for Production, 
Area, Yield, Consumption, Prices, Trade, 
Hunger, and the Environment to 2050
The IMPACT System of Models
To explore how changes in population, income, technology, climate, invest-
ment, and policy will affect agriculture and food in Africa in the coming 
decades, we use a system of models developed by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), called the International Model for Policy 
FIGURE 2.6—MAIZE YIELDS WILL BE HARD HIT BY CLIMATE CHANGE (YIELDS  
EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE OF 2000 LEVELS)
Source: Robertson (2015).
Note: Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) crop model results for rainfed maize based on the Hadley Centre Global Environment 
Model version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) model and representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 for 2050, before economic adjustments. 
2000 old area lost
yield loss >25% of 2000
yield loss 5–25% 
yield change within 5%
yield gain 5–25%
yield gain >25%
2050 new area gained
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Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade 
(IMPACT) (Figure 2.7). IMPACT is a linked system of 
climate, water, crop, and economic models designed to 
explore the impacts of changes in population, income, 
technology, climate, and other factors on agricultural 
production, resource use, trade, and food security 
(Rosegrant et al. 2008). IMPACT has been further devel-
oped in recent years through ongoing collaboration 
among the 15 CGIAR Centers and with other climate, 
crop, and economic modeling groups through the 
Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement 
Project (Robinson et al. 2015).4   
Baseline Projections for Africa South 
of the Sahara
Using the IMPACT model with standard assumptions on 
changes in population, income, and climate as reflected 
in shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP) 2 and represen-
tative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5, together with 
moderate growth in agricultural productivity, IFPRI 
recently released a new set of baseline projections of 
agricultural production, food consumption, trade, and 
risk of hunger in its 2017 Global Food Policy Report 
(IFPRI 2017). Selected results from those projections 
4  More details on the IMPACT model and methodology can be found at  
www.ifpri.org/program/impact-model.
FIGURE 2.7—THE IMPACT SYSTEM OF MODELS
Source: Robinson and others (2015).
Note: CGE = computable general equilibrium; DSSAT = Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer; IMPACT = International 
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TABLE 2.1— IMPACT PROJECTIONS OF CEREAL AND MEAT PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND TRADE TO 2050
Food group / region Total production
(million metric tons)
Per capita food consumption
(kg per capita per year)
Net trade
(million metric tons)
Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change
2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050
Cereals
World  2,155  2,746  3,235  2,621  2,990 143.5 146.7 148.3 143.4 140.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  151  230  303  220  279 139.9 143.8 145.9 138.9 136.2 -59.7 -106.6 -185.0 -103.2 -169.2
West  49  79  110  75  99 143.5 152.4 155.3 146.9 144.8 -13.7 -29.8 -60.3 -29.1 -56.9
Central  7  12  18  12  17 59.3 65.4 68.9 62.4 63.0 -3.1 -6.3 -11.8 -5.9 -10.5
East  39  65  91  64  91 115.7 125.6 134.1 119.7 123.1 -8.7 -17.1 -31.9 -13.7 -21.8
Southern  13  18  21  19  23 182.8 194.8 201.5 187.5 187.3 -3.5 -7.1 -12.5 -4.6 -7.2
Northern  42  55  62  49  50 204.7 202.5 198.7 199.6 191.0 -30.6 -46.4 -68.5 -49.9 -72.8
Meats
World  274  381  460  380  455 39.4 45.6 49.5 45.4 49.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  14  27  45  27  45 14.7 20.1 28.4 20.0 28.1 -0.9 -3.9 -12.4 -3.8 -11.9
West  3  6  11  6  11 10.2 16.2 26.6 16.1 26.3 -0.3 -1.9 -7.3 -1.9 -7.1
Central  1  1  2  1  2 9.1 12.2 17.0 12.1 16.8 -0.4 -1.0 -2.1 -1.0 -2.0
East  3  6  10  6  10 10.3 14.4 22.5 14.3 22.2 0.0 -1.1 -4.9 -1.1 -4.7
Southern  2  4  5  4  5 45.2 61.0 73.3 60.8 72.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Northern  5  10  17  10  17 22.6 32.0 42.9 31.9 42.7 0.0 0.3 2.0 0.3 2.0
Fruits and vegetables
World  1,592  2,334  3,044  2,297  2,945 196.2 240.0 284.7 236.2 275.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  153  276  435  255  378 121.8 141.7 166.5 139.1 160.2 2.2 12.8 22.1 -3.1 -18.4
West  40  74  118  70  106 117.2 145.3 174.4 142.4 167.9 0.3 -3.5 -14.8 -6.0 -22.1
Central  10  17  27  16  22 66.0 82.4 103.1 80.2 97.7 0.1 -1.3 -4.4 -2.5 -7.5
East  36  70  121  65  107 82.2 105.5 138.5 103.2 132.4 -1.2 -5.4 -12.9 -8.1 -20.3
Southern  9  15  21  14  17 76.2 89.2 98.3 87.4 94.3 2.9 6.4 10.1 5.2 7.2
Northern  57  99  149  90  126 228.9 250.1 270.3 246.7 262.9 0.0 16.5 44.1 8.3 24.4
Source: IMPACT version 3.3 results from IFPRI (2017).
Notes: World figures include other regions not reported separately. Country-level details are available online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/impact. Total production is aggregated across irrigated and rainfed 
systems at the national level and aligned with years as reported in FAOSTAT, the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Per capita food consumption is based on food availability at 
the national level. Net trade includes negative and positive numbers indicating that a region is a net importer or exporter, respectively, and balances to 0 at the global level. Cereals include barley, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, 
wheat, and aggregated other cereals. Meats include beef, pork, poultry, and sheep and goats. Fruits and vegetables include bananas, plantains, aggregated temperate fruits, aggregated tropical fruits, and aggregated 
vegetables. Oilseeds include groundnut, rapeseed, soybean, sunflower, and aggregated other oilseeds. Pulses include beans, chickpeas, cowpeas, lentils, pigeon peas, and aggregated other pulses. Roots and tubers include 
cassavas, potatoes, sweet potatoes, yams, and aggregated other roots and tubers. Values reported for 2010 are calibrated model results. Projections for 2030 and 2050 assume changes in population and income as reflected in 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP) 2. Climate change impacts are simulated using the IPCC’s representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre 
Global Environment Model version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model. Further documentation is available at www.ifpri.org/program/impact-model. IMPACT = International Model for Policy Analysis of 
Agricultural Commodities and Trade.
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TABLE 2.1— IMPACT PROJECTIONS OF CEREAL AND MEAT PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND TRADE TO 2050, continued
Food group / region Total production
(million metric tons)
Per capita food consumption
(kg per capita per year)
Net trade
(million metric tons)
Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change
2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050
Oilseeds
World  673  1,033  1,293  1,017  1,257 6.8 8.2 7.8 7.9 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  56  94  118  91  110 5.7 6.7 7.5 6.4 6.9 -1.2 -2.7 -6.3 -2.4 -5.4
West  43  74  94  72  88 8.1 9.3 10.1 8.8 9.2 0.3 -0.5 -2.7 -0.4 -2.5
Central  4  6  8  6  7 9.0 10.0 10.6 9.4 9.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
East  4  6  7  6  7 3.7 4.4 5.3 4.2 4.8 0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -0.2 -0.9
Southern  1  1  2  1  1 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Northern  4  6  7  5  6 4.6 5.3 5.7 5.1 5.3 -1.5 -1.8 -2.2 -1.7 -2.1
Pulses
World  66  94  121  92  118 6.2 7.5 8.9 7.5 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  13  20  30  20  28 10.0 12.0 14.3 11.8 14.0 -1.7 -5.2 -11.1 -5.4 -11.5
West  5  9  16  9  14 8.5 9.8 11.6 9.6 11.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.6
Central  1  2  2  2  2 6.7 7.4 8.7 7.3 8.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
East  5  7  9  7  10 15.3 18.2 22.0 18.0 21.6 -0.7 -3.3 -7.9 -3.2 -7.5
Southern  0  0  0  0  0 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.1 4.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Northern  1  2  2  1  2 8.2 9.7 11.4 9.8 11.5 -1.1 -1.8 -2.6 -2.1 -3.2
Roots and tubers
World  780  1,006  1,185  963  1,103 65.0 70.5 73.4 67.8 69.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa  232  362  506  346  469 129.0 138.0 143.7 134.4 137.0 -0.7 -10.2 -28.3 -15.1 -37.8
West  133  207  297  201  281 197.5 199.0 198.8 194.9 191.1 1.5 -4.3 -11.7 -4.2 -10.2
Central  37  59  80  56  72 172.5 170.6 166.7 167.1 159.9 1.0 2.6 -2.2 0.1 -8.2
East  50  78  107  71  91 129.6 138.5 142.0 134.6 134.4 -3.2 -9.4 -15.3 -13.9 -24.6
Southern  3  4  5  4  5 36.8 37.7 38.7 36.6 37.1 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.3
Northern  9  14  18  15  20 33.7 38.3 42.1 35.7 37.9 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 2.0 4.0
Source:  IMPACT version 3.3 results from IFPRI (2017).
Notes: World figures include other regions not reported separately. Country-level details are available online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/impact. Total production is aggregated across irrigated and rainfed 
systems at the national level and aligned with years as reported in FAOSTAT, the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Per capita food consumption is based on food availability at 
the national level. Net trade includes negative and positive numbers indicating that a region is a net importer or exporter, respectively, and balances to 0 at the global level. Cereals include barley, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, 
wheat, and aggregated other cereals. Meats include beef, pork, poultry, and sheep and goats. Fruits and vegetables include bananas, plantains, aggregated temperate fruits, aggregated tropical fruits, and aggregated 
vegetables. Oilseeds include groundnut, rapeseed, soybean, sunflower, and aggregated other oilseeds. Pulses include beans, chickpeas, cowpeas, lentils, pigeon peas, and aggregated other pulses. Roots and tubers include 
cassavas, potatoes, sweet potatoes, yams, and aggregated other roots and tubers. Values reported for 2010 are calibrated model results. Projections for 2030 and 2050 assume changes in population and income as reflected in 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP) 2. Climate change impacts are simulated using the IPCC’s representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre 
Global Environment Model version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model. Further documentation is available at www.ifpri.org/program/impact-model. IMPACT = International Model for Policy Analysis of 
Agricultural Commodities and Trade.
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are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.5 Given the complexity and uncertainty 
inherent in the underlying processes involved, it is important to note that pro-
jections vary depending on the specific models and assumptions used. Those 
presented here represent current baselines with and without climate change, 
but work is under way to analyze a wider range climate and socioeconomic 
assumptions (Wiebe et al. 2015).
Cereal production is projected to double in Africa south of the Sahara 
by midcentury, but production in 2050 will be about 5 percent less than it 
would have been in the absence of climate change. (These results assume 
moderate growth in agricultural productivity—an assumption that can be 
adjusted according to decisions made regarding investment in agricultural 
5  The full set of results can be found online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/impact. 
research and development.) Net imports of cereals in the region are projected 
to increase threefold relative to 2010 levels. Perhaps counterintuitively, net 
cereal imports into the region are projected to be lower in 2050 with climate 
change than they would have been in the absence of climate change. This 
is because in this scenario, based on climate results from HadGEM2-ES, 
temperature increases and changes in precipitation reduce growth in produc-
tion by the major cereal-producing and -exporting countries in the Americas 
and Europe (Figure 2.6), thereby raising prices.6  Higher prices will in turn 
reduce cereal imports by African and other developing countries. The 
6  Increased levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide increase plant productivity under certain 
circumstances and may partially offset some adverse impacts of climate change, but their effects 
are sensitive to other factors and remain controversial (Nowak 2017; Obermeier and colleagues 
2016), and therefore they are not included in the scenarios described here.
TABLE 2.2— IMPACT PROJECTIONS OF FOOD PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND HUNGER TO 2050 
Region Aggregate food production
(index, 2010 = 1.00)
Per capita food consumption
(KCAL per capita per day)
Hunger
(millions of people at risk)
Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change Without climate change With climate change
2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2030 2050
World 1.00 1.37 1.69 1.33 1.60  2,795  3,032  3,191  2,982  3,079 838.1 528.2 405.8 592.3 476.9
Africa 1.00 1.63 2.32 1.55 2.12  2,505  2,709  2,947  2,642  2,810 215.5 202.2 157.4 229.7 196.0
West 1.00 1.65 2.36 1.59 2.19  2,637  2,853  3,056  2,778  2,909 30.1 28.0 29.0 32.5 33.5
Central 1.00 1.66 2.33 1.56 2.07  2,101  2,432  2,843  2,366  2,701 52.3 36.5 21.2 43.2 25.4
East 1.00 1.68 2.50 1.59 2.28  2,110  2,345  2,629  2,273  2,488 112.1 115.6 89.2 130.6 116.3
Southern 1.00 1.50 1.87 1.49 1.81  2,881  3,134  3,308  3,059  3,165 3.8 3.0 2.3 3.3 2.8
Northern 1.00 1.56 2.14 1.43 1.85  3,029  3,182  3,360  3,137  3,254 17.2 19.1 15.9 20.2 18.0
Source:  IMPACT version 3.3 results from IFPRI (2017).
Notes: World figures include other regions not reported separately. Country-level details are available online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/impact. Aggregate food production is an index, by weight, of cereals, 
meats, fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, pulses, and roots and tubers (which are reported separately in Table 2.1). Per capita food consumption is a projection of daily dietary energy supply in kilocalories. Estimates of the number 
of people at risk of hunger are based on a quadratic specification of the relationship between national-level calorie supply and the share of population that is undernourished as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations. Values reported for 2010 are calibrated model results. Projections for 2030 and 2050 assume changes in population and income as reflected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) 
shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP) 2. Climate change impacts are simulated using the IPCC’s representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model version 2—Earth System 
(HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model. Further documentation is available at www.ifpri.org/program/impact-model. IMPACT = International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade.
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combined impact of increased population, slower growth in production due 
to climate change, and imports that are lower than they would have been in 
the absence of climate change means that per capita consumption of cereals 
will remain basically unchanged in the region in 2050 relative to 2010.
Meat production in Africa south of the Sahara is projected to grow by 
around 24 million tons (a threefold increase) by 2050, and net imports are 
projected to grow from less than 1 million tons to around 13 million tons, 
resulting in a doubling of per capita meat consumption. 
Pulse production in the region is projected to more than double, and 
net imports are projected to grow from less than 1 million tons to around 9 
million tons. Per capita consumption is projected to rise by about a third.
Root and tuber production in the region is projected to double, and 
net imports are projected to grow from around 1 million tons to 43 million 
tons by 2050. Per capita consumption will remain basically unchanged, at 
around 150 kg per capita per year.
Oilseed production will also double, to 105 million tons, with a small 
increase in net imports, to around 4 million tons, and relatively little change 
in per capita consumption.
Fruit and vegetable production in the region is projected to increase 
by 1.6 times by 2050, and per capita consumption by half. The region is 
projected to become a net importer of fruits and vegetables, with about one-
quarter of total demand being met by imports.
Based on the combined effects of changes in population, income, 
climate, and productivity, the number of people at risk of hunger in 
Africa south of the Sahara is projected to decline from 209.5 million 
in 2010 to 188.7 million in 2050 in this scenario (Table 2.2). Projected 
improvements are greatest in central Africa, with slight increases in the 
number at risk in eastern and western Africa. Climate change reduces 
the improvement that would be projected in the absence of climate 
change, leaving 38 million more people at risk of hunger in Africa south 
of the Sahara in 2050 than would otherwise be the case, most of them in 
eastern Africa. And the malnutrition rate for children younger than five 
years (as measured by wasting) is projected to rise from 21.7 to 24.4 percent 
by 2050—an increase of more than 4 million children (Waithaka et al. 2013; 
Jalloh et al. 2013; Hachigonta et al. 2013; Thomas and Rosegrant 2015).
Gains from Improvements in 
Productivity, Resource Management,  
and Infrastructure
Adoption of Improved Agricultural Technologies 
for Sustainable Intensification
Rosegrant and colleagues (2014) analyzed a wide range of agricultural 
technologies selected for their potential to improve productivity while 
reducing adverse environmental impacts. Approaches ranging from new 
stress-tolerant crop varieties to no-till and precision agriculture were simu-
lated worldwide for maize, rice, and wheat crops, under a warmer and wetter 
future climate scenario. 
In Africa south of the Sahara, among the technologies considered, 
no-till farming and nitrogen-efficient crop varieties show the greatest 
promise under a warmer and wetter climate in 2050, compared with a 
scenario without adoption of those technologies (Table 2.3). Overall, rice 
yields in Africa south of the Sahara receive the largest boost through the use 
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of nitrogen-use-efficient varieties (+21 percent), whereas 
no-till farming is the most favorable technology for both 
maize (+15 percent) and wheat (+17 percent).
Increased production and lower prices due to 
adoption of improved technologies translates into 
better access to food, and simulations show a potential 
reduction in the population at risk of hunger of up to 
11 percent in Africa south of the Sahara (Figure 2.8). 
Islam and others (2016) also examined the potential 
impact of adoption of drought- and heat-tolerant crop 
varieties, including maize and groundnuts, in selected 
countries of Africa south of the Sahara. They found that 
in many cases the new technologies are projected to more 
than offset the adverse impacts of climate change on 
yields for those crops and countries—at least through the 
duration of the projected period (to 2050). Farmers and 
countries that adopt the new technologies improve their 
productivity faster than projected increases in demand, 
which improves those countries’ terms of trade.
Although such technologies show promise in 
terms of increased productivity and food security, their 
adoption, particularly by poor smallholder farmers 
in Africa south of the Sahara, is often limited by well-
known barriers in the form of poor access to resources; 
information; and markets for inputs, outputs, and 
risk-management tools. Overcoming these barriers will 
require major investment in research and technology as 
well as in the institutional and physical infrastructure 
FIGURE 2.8—PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN POPULATION AT RISK OF HUNGER 
IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, COMPARED WITH BASELINE WITHOUT 
ADOPTION OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES, 2050
Source: Rosegrant and colleagues (2014).
Note: International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) simulations under Model for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Climate (MIROC) scenario A1B (a wetter and warmer climate).
-12.0 -10.0 -8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 
Nitrogen-efficient crop varieties 
No-till farming 
Heat-tolerant crop varieties 
Precision agriculture 
Integrated soil fertility management 
Crop protection from diseases 
Crop protection from weeds 
Crop protection from insects 
Drought-tolerant crop varieties 
Water harvesting 
TABLE 2.3—PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN YIELDS FOR MAIZE, RICE, AND WHEAT 
IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, COMPARED WITH BASELINE WITHOUT 
ADOPTION OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES, 2050
Technology Maize Rice Wheat
Nitrogen-efficient crop varieties 7.9 20.9 4.4
No-till farming 15.0 -0.4 17.1
Heat-tolerant crop varieties 3.5 0.2 4.5
Precision agriculture -0.6 7.9 6.2
Integrated soil fertility management 5.8 5.7 6.1
Crop protection from diseases 4.4 10.5 2.6
Crop protection from weeds 6.5 10.3 2.1
Crop protection from insects 4.9 11.7 1.9
Drought-tolerant crop varieties 3.5 0.4 2.6
Water harvesting 0.6 0.0 0.9
Source: Rosegrant and colleagues (2014).
Note: International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) simulations under Model for Interdisciplinary 
Research on Climate (MIROC) scenario A1B (a wetter and warmer climate).
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needed to improve access to new opportunities. Recent findings on the 
impacts of such investments are described in the next section.
Investment in Productivity-Enhancing Research 
and Development, Water Management, and 
Infrastructure
A recent analysis by Rosegrant and colleagues (2017) in collaboration 
with the 15 CGIAR Centers examined three sets of alternative investment 
scenarios for the developing world, each of which increases investment in 
one of the areas described in the previous section. A fourth comprehensive 
scenario combines elements from the first three: 
1. Enhanced productivity through increased investments in agricul-
tural research and development (R&D). Five scenarios explore the 
impacts of different levels of increased investment in research by 
CGIAR and national agricultural research systems, with different 
regional emphases, to help overcome the disparities in productivity 
growth evident in Figure 2.4, particularly in Africa south of the 
Sahara and South Asia.
2. Improved water resource management. Three scenarios explore the 
impacts of increased investment to expand irrigated area, increase 
water use efficiency, and increase the water-holding capacity of soil.
3. Improved marketing efficiency through increased investment in 
infrastructure. One scenario explores the impact of increased 
investment in transportation and marketing infrastructure to 
reduce price margins between producers and consumers.
4. A comprehensive scenario combining selected elements of 1–3. 
Scenarios were run to 2050, but we focus here on results for 2030, which 
is the time frame for the Sustainable Development Goals. Globally, we 
project that crop yields would increase by 30 percent, on average, by 2030 
over 2010 levels in a baseline scenario without climate change or additional 
investments, but climate change is projected to reduce this increase to 
25 percent (Table 2.4). The comprehensive portfolio of investments in 
agricultural research, improved resource management, and improved infra-
structure (#4 in the list above) would more than offset the adverse impacts 
of climate change through 2030 and would increase average crop yields by 
35 percent over 2010 levels.7 (Note that adverse impacts of climate change, 
though already occurring, are relatively modest through 2030 and even 
through midcentury, but are projected to accelerate thereafter.)
Similar patterns are projected for developing countries and for Africa, 
with average yield increases of 32–43 percent by 2030 in the absence of 
climate change, reductions of 4–9 percentage points due to climate change, 
and overall increases of 40–56 percent with a comprehensive investment 
portfolio. With such investment, yields in Africa are projected to grow 
more rapidly than those in other developing regions, with average increases 
of 47–56 percent, compared with 40 percent for developing countries as a 
whole and 35 percent globally.
Based on these increased yields (together with smaller increases in 
cropland area), food availability in terms of dietary energy is projected to 
increase by 2030 globally and in all regions of Africa (Table 2.5). The overall 
7  Increasing investment in agricultural R&D, resource use efficiency, and marketing efficiency 
separately rather than as part of a comprehensive package would cost less but would also offer 
lower benefits. In some cases it would also generate trade-offs between different goals, for example 
in the case of improved marketing efficiency, which would increase agricultural production and 
lower food prices but also expand forestland conversion and greenhouse gas emissions. More on 
these scenarios can be found in Rosegrant and colleagues (2017).
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pattern is similar to that of crop yields, with projected increases slowed by 
climate change but adverse climate impacts offset by the effects of increased 
investment. In the latter case, kilocalorie availability per capita per day 
is projected to increase by more than 10 percent, to 2,834, for Africa as a 
whole, with subregional averages ranging from around 2,500 kilocalories 
per capita per day in eastern and central Africa to more than 3,000 kilocalo-
ries per capita per day in northern, southern, and western Africa.
Because of rapid population growth, the prevalence of hunger declines 
only slightly by 2030 in the case of no climate change, and actually increases 
in the climate change baseline (Table 2.6). Increased investment is projected 
to reduce the number of people at risk of hunger in Africa, in terms of 
average caloric deficiency, to 161 million by 2030, representing a decline of 
TABLE 2.4—AVERAGE CROP YIELDS IN 2030 (INDEXED, 2010 = 
1.0), BY REGION AND SCENARIO
Region 2010 2030, no CC 2030, CC 2030, COMP
World 1.00 1.30 1.25 1.35
 Developing countries 1.00 1.32 1.28 1.40
 Africa 1.00 1.35 1.28 1.51
 Northern Africa 1.00 1.35 1.24 1.48
 Africa south of the Sahara 1.00 1.35 1.28 1.52
 Western Africa 1.00 1.36 1.30 1.53
 Eastern Africa 1.00 1.38 1.31 1.56
 Central Africa 1.00 1.32 1.23 1.47
 Southern Africa 1.00 1.43 1.40 1.54
Source: Mason-D’Croz and others (2016).
Note: No CC assumes no climate change (a constant 2005 climate); CC reflects a future with climate change 
using representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model 
version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model (Jones and others 2011); COMP refers to a 
scenario with climate change and a comprehensive investment portfolio as described above.
TABLE 2.5—AVERAGE FOOD SUPPLY (KILOCALORIES PER 
CAPITA PER DAY) IN 2010 AND 2030, BY REGION AND SCENARIO
Region 2010 2030, no CC 2030, CC 2030, COMP
World 1.00 1.30 1.25 1.35
 Developing countries 1.00 1.32 1.28 1.40
 Africa 1.00 1.35 1.28 1.51
 Northern Africa 1.00 1.35 1.24 1.48
 Africa south of the Sahara 1.00 1.35 1.28 1.52
 Western Africa 1.00 1.36 1.30 1.53
 Eastern Africa 1.00 1.38 1.31 1.56
 Central Africa 1.00 1.32 1.23 1.47
 Southern Africa 1.00 1.43 1.40 1.54
Source: Mason-D’Croz and others (2016).
Note: No CC assumes no climate change (a constant 2005 climate); CC reflects a future with climate change 
using representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model 
version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model (Jones and others 2011); COMP refers 
to a scenario with climate change and a comprehensive investment portfolio as described above. The 
horizontal axis at 1,800 kilocalories per capita per day represents the daily minimum requirement; 2,400 is the 
recommended daily consumption for an active 20- to 35-year-old female and 3,000 is the recommended daily 
consumption for an active 20- to 35-year-old male.
TABLE 2.6—PREVALENCE OF HUNGER IN 2010 AND 2030 
(MILLIONS OF PEOPLE)
Region 2010 2030, no CC 2030, CC 2030, COMP
World 838 528 598 416
 Developing countries 823 513 582 403
 Africa 215 202 231 161
 Northern Africa 17 19 20 16
 Africa south of the Sahara 209 196 224 155
 Western Africa 30 28 33 22
 Eastern Africa 112 116 131 98
 Central Africa 52 36 43 23
 Southern Africa 4 3 3 3
Source: Mason-D’Croz and others (2016).
Note: No CC assumes no climate change (a constant 2005 climate); CC reflects a future with climate change 
using representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model 
version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model (Jones and others 2011); COMP refers to a 
scenario with climate change and a comprehensive investment portfolio as described above.
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30 percent relative to 2010 levels, with the largest numeric improvement (33 
million) in eastern Africa and the largest percentage improvement (nearly 
50 percent) in central Africa.
The share of the population at risk of chronic hunger is projected to 
remain at more than 10 percent in Africa by 2030 in the absence of climate 
change (Table 2.7). The share is lower in western and southern Africa and 
higher in eastern Africa. Climate change reverses these gains in Africa, as in 
other regions, but its effects can be offset by a comprehensive set of investments 
in agricultural research, resource management, and infrastructure. It is impor-
tant to note that the assessments of population at risk of chronic hunger are 
based on the average availability of food energy and do not take into account 
other dimensions of food insecurity such as micronutrient deficiencies, 
episodes of conflict, or other shocks that create localized vulnerability. 
Discussion, Institutional and Political 
Challenges, and Conclusion
In the face of a growing threat to food security, policy makers are under 
increasing pressure to devise policies that promote adaptation to climate 
change while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These policies need 
to address the local impacts of global change and must be feasible in the 
short term and sustainable in the long term, designed to weather challenges 
from forces that are both global and local, exogenous and endogenous to 
a country (De Pinto, Wiebe, and Rosegrant 2016). Recent analyses offer 
insights on alternative scenarios and inform the consideration of policy 
options that can contribute to a country’s climate-change readiness. A 
global-to-local approach also helps in identifying climate opportuni-
ties—that is, places where climate change will improve conditions for 
agriculture—as well as which crops to invest in, given changes in compara-
tive advantage and commodity prices.
In the years ahead, up to 2050, African countries are projected to 
continue the substantial growth observed in recent decades. Many will 
enter middle-income status. Agriculture will grow absolutely and decline 
as a share of national economies as services and manufacturing increase 
more rapidly than primary agriculture. In order to engage constructively in 
the process of structural transformation and growth, African agriculture 
will need to become technologically more sophisticated and derive more 
benefit from a strong foundation in agricultural science. A vibrant scientific 
establishment will facilitate sectoral adaptation to changing conditions of 
the climate and markets, and create jobs for young people seeking to share 
in the national transition to middle-income status. This is all the more 
important because climate change impacts will accelerate after midcentury, 
TABLE 2.7—PREVALENCE OF HUNGER IN 2010 AND 2030  
(AS A SHARE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, PERCENTAGE)
Region 2010 2030, no CC 2030, CC 2030, COMP
World 12.2 6.4 7.2 5.0
 Developing countries 14.3 7.4 8.3 5.7
 Africa 20.9 13.2 15.0 10.5
 Northern Africa 7.7 6.5 6.9 5.5
 Africa south of the Sahara 24.3 14.8 16.9 11.7
 Western Africa 9.9 5.8 6.9 4.6
 Eastern Africa 34.9 23.2 26.4 19.7
 Central Africa 41.3 18.2 21.6 11.5
 Southern Africa 6.6 4.4 4.9 3.7
Source: Mason-D’Croz and others (2016).
Note: No CC assumes no climate change (a constant 2005 climate); CC reflects a future with climate 
change using representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and the Hadley Centre Global Environment 
Model version 2—Earth System (HadGEM2-ES) general circulation model (Jones and others 2011); COMP 
refers to a scenario with climate change and a comprehensive investment portfolio as described above.
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and—uniquely among world regions—population will continue to grow in 
Africa south of the Sahara throughout the 21st century. 
Many of the issues that African farmers will confront are regional 
in nature, due to both increased integration of markets and regional 
dimensions of shifts in agroecology. Thus, the scientific effort to facilitate 
agriculture’s contribution to growth must be regional in design. Given 
the weak foundation of agricultural science in the region at present, the 
effort to rebuild will require focused and targeted training and investment. 
Improvements are also needed in modeling tools to address the impacts 
of increases in weather volatility and extreme events, rising sea levels, and 
changes in the incidence of agricultural pests and diseases, as well as to 
better account for uncertainty and the costs involved in addressing these 
challenges. The foresight analysis presented above and subsequent refine-
ments of the work can serve as a platform for rigorous consideration of 
investment alternatives. Foresight analysis can also provide early warning of 
locally specific agricultural challenges, thereby facilitating planning to assist 
affected populations, as well as highlight new opportunities. 
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C
urrent scenarios for “business-as-usual” (BAU) farming under 
climate change project increasing food shortages by 2050. The worst 
hit will be underdeveloped economic regions of the world where food 
security is already problematic and populations are vulnerable to shocks 
(Rosegrant et al. 2014). Without substantial measures to adapt to increasing 
temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events, losses in crop 
and livestock productivity are expected to undermine the rate of gain from 
technological and management improvements (Lobell and Gourdji 2012). 
Furthermore, climate change not only is threatening the productivity of the 
world’s agricultural systems but is also expected to have consequences on a 
wide range of ecosystem services (Knight and Harrison 2012).
Developing countries are expected to bear the brunt of climate change 
(Morton 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth 
Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) projects that under more optimistic 
scenarios, climate change could reduce food crop yields in parts of Africa 
by between 10 and 20 percent, a large drop for already at-risk populations 
and regions. The outlook for key food crops across the African continent 
under climate change is mostly negative. Low productivity, together with 
increasing global demand, will likely drive up the prices of staple foods, 
which may rise by 42 to 131 percent for maize, 11 to 78 percent for rice, and 
17 to 67 percent for wheat between 2010 and 2050 (Hachigonta et al. 2013; 
Jalloh et al. 2013; Nelson et al. 2010; Waithaka et al. 2013). Moreover, local-
ized weather shocks and emerging pest and disease outbreaks are already 
compromising stability in crop production, highlighting the urgency for 
immediate and adaptable management responses (FAO 2016). 
Agriculture not only is affected by climate change but also significantly 
contributes to the problem. Yearly greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from the agricultural sector range from 5.0 to 5.8 gigatons9 of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) equivalent, or about 11 percent of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions, not including land use change (Smith et al. 2014). Poor soil 
management and land conversion from tropical forests to poorly productive 
agricultural systems also have a large climate footprint. Combined with 
forestry and other land uses, anthropogenic land activities contribute about 
a quarter of annual GHG emissions, three-fourths of which are estimated 
to originate in the developing world (Smith et al. 2014). Importantly, small-
holder farming systems worldwide contribute 3.4 percent of total global 
emissions (Vermeulen and Wollenberg 2017). 
Considering existing expectations for agricultural production in devel-
oping countries, including the production of smallholder producers—for 
example, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2.3 calls for doubling the 
agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers by 
2030—it is undisputed that farmers need options to increase production 
under a changing climate and, ideally, to reduce emissions. 
Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an approach that addresses these 
problems jointly. After years of dichotomy in the climate change research 
community between climate change adaptation and mitigation, the two 
concepts were combined in the term CSA. CSA was introduced in 2009 
(FAO 2009a, 2009b) and became prominent a year later at the first Global 
Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change (FAO 2010). 
It is an umbrella term that includes many approaches built upon geographi-
cally specific solutions, and it is recognized as a potential means to help 
achieve the SDGs. It is composed of agricultural systems that contribute 
to three objectives: (1) sustainable and equitable increases in agricultural 
9  Tons refers to metric tons throughout the chapter; 1 gigaton = 109 tons.
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productivity and incomes; (2) greater resilience of food systems and farming 
livelihoods; and (3) reduction, removal, or both of greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with agriculture (including the relationship between agriculture 
and ecosystems), where possible. 
Agricultural production systems that follow the general principles 
of CSA are expected to be not only more productive and efficient, but 
also more resilient to short-, medium-, and long-term shocks and risks 
associated with climate change and climate variability. There is a general 
consensus that CSA, albeit with limits (Wheeler and von Braun 2013), helps 
to advance the discussion on future agricultural production under a signifi-
cantly different climate environment. 
Indeed, CSA is an important departure from the single-objective 
analysis that has supported most food policies so far. CSA is expected to 
address climate-related risks by simultaneously considering three main 
objectives and by fully accounting for the trade-offs and synergies among 
them (Rosenstock et al. 2016). CSA’s broader and more flexible approach 
is supposed to distinguish it from more prescriptive practices such as 
conservation agriculture or agroforestry. Furthermore, its multi-objective 
approach has the potential to spur productive conversations and negotia-
tions among ministries that often do not share or coordinate objectives. 
Many operational aspects of CSA are still under investigation. 
Agricultural practices may be climate smart in particular circumstances, 
but local contexts determine the enabling environment and the trade-offs 
and synergies across the multiple objectives (Below et al. 2012). As a con-
sequence, conditions for adoption are highly context and location specific, 
and farmers need access to considerable information to make the approach 
operational (Mccarthy, Lipper, and Branca 2011). The literature has also 
focused on technical aspects related to economic feasibility (Sain et al. 2017), 
the emission reduction and adaptation benefits (de Nijs et al. 2015), and the 
local-level impacts (Zougmoré et al. 2016) of CSA. 
However, to our knowledge, no study has produced a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects that widespread adoption of CSA practices and tech-
nologies may have on the production of key crops, on GHG emissions, and 
on key food security metrics, regionally or globally. This chapter investigates 
the potential broad benefits of a widespread adoption of CSA practices, 
focusing its analysis on Africa south of the Sahara (SSA). 
Results of this analysis indicate that there might be significant challenges 
for CSA to deliver across the three objectives, particularly the abatement 
of GHG emissions. So-called win-win outcomes, cases in which both 
productivity and reduction of emissions are achieved, do exist but are not 
as common as often believed. In order to achieve significant GHG emission 
abatement, mechanisms that incentivize a reduction in emission intensity 
must be in place. Importantly, the current results indicate that CSA should 
not be interpreted simply as a list of acceptable practices from which farmers 
can choose. If the CSA approach is to have a significant impact on food 
security, sustainable development, and GHG emission reduction, it should 
consider activities across production systems as well as the interaction of 
agricultural land use with carbon-rich land uses such as forests. 
Background 
Uncertainties in climate change scenarios make it difficult to determine 
the precise impacts of climate change on future agricultural productivity. 
However, although the expectations are mixed, studies have consistently 
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found that under the most severe scenarios of climate change, significant 
losses should be expected worldwide (Darwin et al. 1995, 1996; Easterling 
et al. 2007; Fischer et al. 1993; Fischer and van Velthuizen 1996; Nelson et 
al. 2010; Rosenthal and Kurukulasuriya 2003; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). 
Regional differences in crop production are expected to grow stronger 
through time, potentially widening the gap between the haves and have-nots 
and increasing hunger among the poorer nations (Parry et al. 2004; Nelson 
et al. 2010). Interregional trade flows, as a result, may expand from their 
current location in mid- to high-latitude regions into low-latitude regions, 
although trade alone might not be a sufficient strategy for adaptation to 
climate change (Elbehri, Elliott, and Wheele 2015).
SSA is expected to be strongly affected by climate change. Niang and 
colleagues (2014) found that climate change is very likely to have negative 
effects on yields of major cereal crops in the African region, albeit with 
strong subregional variation. Schlenker and Lobell (2010) indicated that 
in a “worst-case’’ scenario, a warming of about 2°C above preindustrial 
levels by midcentury, losses of 27–32 percent for maize, sorghum, millet, 
and groundnut should be expected. Thornton and others (2010) estimated 
mean yield losses of 24 percent for maize and 71 percent for beans under a 
warming scenario exceeding 4°C. Rosenzweig and colleagues (2014) found 
yield decreases of more than 50 percent for maize in the Sahel region and in 
the range of 10–20 percent in other regions south of the Sahara. On the other 
hand, crops like cassava, are likely to be more resistant to higher tempera-
tures and the increasing seasonality of precipitation, compared with cereal 
crops (Niang et al. 2014); furthermore, alternative practices and cropping 
systems are expected to reduce the risk of crop failure (Waha et al. 2013). 
Thomas and Rosegrant (2015) found that production of some crops in 
SSA may rise faster under climate change than under a scenario without 
climate change. This seemingly counterintuitive result is due to the market 
effects resulting from the global negative impact of climate change on yields. 
Reduced global yields have the effect of boosting world crop prices, making 
increasing production attractive to some African farmers. Yet even with 
increased production in some crops, Thomas and Rosegrant (2015) found, 
the price increase will ultimately cause food insecurity to rise. According to 
their calculations, SSA could have a malnutrition rate of 21.7 percent among 
children younger than five years in 2050 without climate change, but this 
rate may rise to 24.4 percent with climate change, an increase of more than 
4 million children.
Projections of future production for maize, wheat, and rice in SSA for 
the period 2010–2050 obtained using the International Model for Policy 
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) (Robinson 
et al. 2015) indicate that their output is expected to increase by 61 percent, 
92–94 percent, and 190–197 percent, respectively, depending on the particu-
lar general circulation model used. During the same 40-year period, prices 
are projected to increase by 56–103 percent for maize, 24–46 percent for 
wheat, and 44–60 percent for rice. Growth in world prices, combined with 
regional growth in production and income, and changing diets, will have 
an effect on hunger and nutrition. In SSA, the number of undernourished 
children younger than five years is anticipated to decrease by 4–7 percent 
and the population at risk of hunger by 10–22 percent by 2050. These 
results, summarized in Figure 3.1, constitute the BAU scenario against 
which we will evaluate the performance of CSA practices and technologies. 
The BAU scenario was generated using two particular climate scenarios: 
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GFDL-ESM2M (Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory Earth System Model version 2M) 
(Dunne et al. 2012) and HadGEM2-ES (Hadley 
Centre Global Environment Model version 2—
Earth System) (Jones et al. 2011), both under a 
representative concentration pathway (RCP) of 
8.5 and coupled with trends of population and 
income growth obtained through the shared 
socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) 2 scenario 
(O’Neill et al. 2014) developed for the IPCC AR5. 
Methods and Data
To perform an ex ante assessment of the effects 
of adoption of CSA practices and technologies 
in SSA, we linked the inputs and outputs of three 
models: the Spatial Production Allocation Model 
(SPAM) (You, Wood, and Wood-Sichra 2006), 
the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer (DSSAT) (Jones et al. 2003), and 
IMPACT version 3.3 (Robinson et al. 2015). 
The analysis focuses on three widely grown 
crops—wheat (Triticum aestivum), maize (Zea 
mays), and rice (Oryza sativa)—which represent 
about 41 percent of the global harvested area and 
20 percent of the harvested area in SSA. They also 
FIGURE 3.1—CHANGES IN PRODUCTION, PRICES, UNDERNOURISHED CHILDREN 
YOUNGER THAN FIVE YEARS, AND POPULATION AT RISK OF HUNGER , 2010–2050, 
UNDER TWO CLIMATE SCENARIOS WITH BUSINESS-AS-USUAL FARMING PRACTICES
Source: Authors.
Note: SSP2-GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory model under shared socioeconomic pathway 2; SSP2-HadGEM = Hadley Centre Global 
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represent about 64 percent of GHG emissions generated by crop production 
globally (Carlson et al. 2016). The simulations in the ex ante assessment 
use the same climate scenarios considered under the BAU scenario: GFDL-
ESM2M and HadGEM2-ES, with an RCP of 8.5 and SSP 2. 
The SPAM model spatially disaggregates subnational statistics on crop 
production and cropland (for the period 2004–2006) into either 0.08 or 
0.5-degree grid cells by analyzing biophysical crop “suitability” assessments, 
population density, and all other available knowledge regarding the spatial 
distribution of specific crops or crop systems. We used the model to geo-
graphically locate the area allocated to the three considered crops. For each 
SPAM grid cell, we assembled a database of existing dominant management 
practices and inputs used (that is, varieties employed, application rates of 
inorganic fertilizers, organic amendment availability, and water management 
practices). Furthermore, we linked climate scenario data to each 0.5-degree 
grid cell (a square of approximately 56 km by 56 km at the equator). Finally, 
we treated each grid cell as an individual farm, assuming that it can properly 
represent as many farms as are actually contained in its area.
The DSSAT crop model simulates crop yields by accounting for the 
interaction between the biophysical elements of crop systems (for example, 
soil, weather, and crop type) and management options (for example, tillage, 
nutrient application, and water availability). Data from the SPAM model 
and climate projections from the GFDL and HadGEM models are used as 
inputs into DSSAT to simulate changes in yields due to adoption of CSA 
practices compared with the BAU scenario, the latter assuming a continued 
use of current agricultural practices. All simulations were performed for 
a 40-year period (2011–2050; see “Simulation of Technology Adoption” in 
the appendix10).
The yield changes derived from the crop simulation in DSSAT, reflect-
ing climate change effects as well as adoption of CSA technologies, form 
the basis for the simulations of the adoption of CSA practices carried out in 
the IMPACT model (see “Yield Responses” in the appendix). IMPACT is a 
partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector that approximates the 
behavior of a global competitive agricultural market and simulates supply, 
demand, and prices for agricultural commodities at the country level. The 
model has a long record of application, having been employed in a wide 
range of analyses, from assessing the potential effects of climate change on 
global food production and nutrition (Springmann et al. 2016) to evaluating 
the global effects of biofuel production (Rosegrant 2008). The yield changes 
simulated in DSSAT that result from adoption of CSA practices function 
as shifters for the crop-specific supply curves and also change yield growth 
rates under climate change. 
Along with the yield responses, we also calculate changes in GHG emis-
sions. Spatial and temporal changes in soil carbon stocks and direct nitrous 
oxide (N2O) emissions, which account for N2O emitted directly from the 
soils to which the nitrogen has been added and then released, were simu-
lated in soil organic matter modules embedded into the DSSAT crop model. 
For the rice production system, we also calculated methane (CH4) emis-
sions by combining the DSSAT-simulated rice biomass with the approach 
proposed by Yan and colleagues (2009), whereby emission coefficients from 
10  The starting year for the simulations in IMPACT is 2010 but the first year of possible adoption in 
DSSAT is 2011.
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IPCC Tier 1 methods are used to estimate the global CH4 emissions from 
rice fields. Finally, we converted all GHG emissions into kilograms of CO2 
equivalent by using the global warming potential over a 100-year time 
horizon for each GHG: 1, 28, and 265 for CO2, CH4, and N2O, respectively.
Simulation Scenarios 
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present results for the BAU scenario. These results 
determine, although indirectly, the effects of adopting alternative technolo-
gies on both yields and GHG emissions.11 
Calibration of DSSAT for the Business-as-Usual 
Scenario
The BAU scenario in DSSAT reflects the use of current agronomic practices 
and technologies, assuming that farmers are not adopting any of the assessed 
CSA alternatives throughout the simulation period of 2010–2050. We made 
considerable efforts to calibrate DSSAT to ensure that the simulated yields 
in the reference year would match national statistical data as accurately as 
possible (see “Calibration of DSSAT for the Business-as-Usual Scenario” in 
the appendix).
After calibration, simulated yields for maize and wheat are comparable 
to yields in the database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), known as FAOSTAT (FAO 2017), with very 
good fits—R2 values of 0.85 and 0.80, respectively. The fit is lower but still 
adequate for rice, with an R2 of 0.63 (Figure 3.2). However, when only the 
11  It should be noted that both the BAU and alternative scenarios reflect the yield responses to the 
projected changes in climate (precipitation and temperature) but do not consider potentially 
important changes in the incidence and impact of pests and diseases.
SSA region is considered, the fit of the simulated yields is worse, especially 
for rice. This outcome might be related to higher uncertainties about the 
model inputs (for example, soil characteristics and highly localized farming 
practices) compiled for the simulations of the SSA region. 
It must be noted that only monoculture systems were simulated, thereby 
providing a stylized representation of worldwide agricultural systems. This 
limitation should be addressed in future research through including inter-
cropping and rotation practices.
Climate-Smart Alternatives Scenario
We identified four specific technologies to use in simulations for the 
climate-smart scenario. These are practices with a potential for large-scale 
adoption, and most of them are already being utilized or tested in some 
regions, including SSA. The technologies considered for maize and wheat are 
no tillage (NT) and integrated soil fertility management (ISFM), and those 
for rice are alternate wetting and drying (AWD) and urea deep placement 
(UDP) (Table 3.1). For this study, we assume that CSA practices are adopted 
across the entire SSA region but not the rest of the world. Although this 
assumption is clearly unrealistic, it allows us to better appreciate the effects 
of adoption of CSA practices on the African continent.
Examples from SSA and other regions show that unlike continuous 
tillage, which leaves soils prone to soil erosion and is a major source of soil 
carbon loss (Reicosky et al. 2005), NT combined with crop rotation and 
retention of crop residues reduces erosion and improves general soil fertility 
through retention of water and nutrients as well as benefits to soil aeration 
and soil biota, with potential direct effects on agricultural productivity 
(Hobbs, Sayre, and Gupta 2008; Kassam et al. 2009). The existing literature 
on conservation agriculture, of which NT is an essential component, points 
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FIGURE 3.2—DSSAT CALIBRATION RESULTS FOR THE WORLD (TOP) AND AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (BOTTOM), BUSINESS-AS-USUAL 
SCENARIO
Source: Authors.
Note: The dry-matter weight used in the DSSAT yield was converted into the fresh-matter weight of yield typically reported in FAOSTAT and SPAM by correcting for harvesting and threshing losses and grain moisture contents (see “Calibration of DSSAT 
for the Business-as-Usual Scenario” in the appendix). DSSAT = Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer; FAOSTAT = the database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; SPAM = Spatial Production Allocation Model.
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to an increase in yields, as evidenced by the effects on soil quality, soil 
moisture, and maize yields gathered at two different farm sites in Zambia 
(Thierfelder, Mwila, and Rusinamhodzi 2013). In general, however, the 
effects are quite variable because they depend on a range of location-specific 
exogenous conditions (such as climate and learning processes) and endoge-
nous conditions (such as soil type) (Erenstein et al. 2012; Lal 2015; Pittelkow, 
Liang, et al. 2015). In some conditions, short-term productivity may even 
decrease under conservation agriculture (Pittelkow, Liang, et al. 2015). 
A review of case studies across SSA (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) showed that yields are more 
stable and often increase with time under such practices, especially in dry or 
drought-stressed conditions (Corbeels et al. 2014). 
ISFM has been especially studied in SSA (Vanlauwe et al. 2010). ISFM 
is a set of locally adapted practices that utilize crop residues along with 
both synthetic fertilizers and organic inputs (such as animal manure, green 
manure, or both), aiming at increasing productivity through the efficient 
use of nutrients (Vanlauwe et al. 2011). It has been recognized that ISFM 
contributes toward improving the resilience of soils and agricultural pro-
duction to weather variability, but much depends on the different benefits 
that synthetic fertilizers and organic inputs bring to the soil. 
AWD has been used in paddy rice cultivation, which is one of the 
main sources of non-CO2 GHG emissions from the agriculture sector, after 
livestock and soil (Smith et al. 2014), to significantly reduce CH4 emissions 
from rice paddies (FAO 2013; Tyagi, Kumari, and Singh 2010) and in some 
instances also increase yields (Rejesus et al. 2011; Lampayan 2012). The 
technology has been validated and promoted across several countries in 
Asia, and adopted widely in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Viet Nam. 
The water savings associated with AWD make this technology particularly 
suited to testing in the SSA context, and some positive results have been 
already reported in the Sahel region (de Vries et al. 2010; Comas et al. 2012).
TABLE 3.1—CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE TECHNOLOGIES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
Technology Definition Crop Potential effects on yields and GHG emissions References
No tillage (NT) Minimal or no soil disturbance; often used in 
combination with residue retention, crop rotation, and 
cover crops
Maize, wheat • Positive or neutral effect on yields
• Uncertain effect on GHG emissions
• Erenstein et al. 2008, 2012; Hobbs, Sayre, and Gupta 2008; 
Pittelkow, Linquist, et al. 2015
• Powlson et al. 2014
Integrated soil fertility 
management (ISFM)
Combination of chemical fertilizers, crop residues, and 
manure or compost
Maize, wheat • Positive effect on yields
• Variable effects on GHG emissions
• Agegnehu, vanBeek, and Bird 2014; Chivenge, Vanlauwe, and 
Six 2011; Vanlauwe et al. 2011
• Gentile et al. 2008
Alternate wetting and 
drying (AWD)
Repeated interruptions of flooding during the season, 
causing the water to decline as the upper soil layer 
dries out before subsequent reflooding
Rice • Low to no significant changes in yields
• High confidence in lower GHG emissions due to 
reduction of methane emissions
• Devkota et al. 2013; Huda et al. 2016; Rejesus et al. 2010
• Pandey et al. 2014; Tyagi, Kumari, and Singh 2010
Urea deep placement 
(UDP)
Strategic burial of urea “supergranules” near the root 
zones of crop plants
Rice • Positive results on yields
• Reduction of GHG emissions
• Bandaogo et al. 2015; Huda et al. 2016
• Gaihre et al. 2015
Source: Authors. 
Note: GHG = greenhouse gas.
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UDP aims at the efficient use of nitrogen, which is the key to both 
increased production and reduced emissions (FAO 2013). Broadcast applica-
tion of nitrogen in rice fields leads to loss of 60 to 70 percent of the nitrogen, 
directly contributing to both water pollution and GHG emissions. The 
placement of urea “supergranules” deep in the soil provides a slow release 
of fertilizer near the root system of rice plants, thereby improving the 
efficiency of nutrient uptake and limiting nitrogen losses. The result is an 
increase in yields, combined with a significant reduction in leached nitrates 
and therefore a lower likelihood of N2O emissions. At the same time, UDP 
increases the resilience of agricultural systems by making them less suscep-
tible to economic shocks due to changes in energy prices. The International 
Fertilizer Development Center reports that UDP was introduced for testing 
in West Africa in 2009 (IFDC 2011). Experiments conducted in Burkina 
Faso revealed the potential for a significant increase in rice yields (Bandaogo 
et al. 2015).
Adoption of Alternative Technologies
The alternatives to the BAU scenario were constructed by assuming that 
farmers who are cultivating either maize, wheat, or rice are offered a 
portfolio of alternatives (that is, the four CSA practices considered) from 
which to choose. We constructed two scenarios based on two alternative 
conditions for adoption. In the first, the prerequisite for adoption is that the 
CSA technology or practice must return a yield gain over the status quo (i.e. 
the BAU scenario). In the second, CSA practices are adopted if they generate 
higher yields than current practices and reduce emission intensity.12 In both 
cases, farmers are assumed to choose the alternative that increases yields the 
most. If none of the alternatives increases yields, farmers retain their current 
practices. 
Clearly, in real-world conditions, adoption of alternatives to the status 
quo depends on many other factors. Yields, which could be considered a 
crude proxy for profitability, are only one of the aspects of production that 
enter the farmer’s decision process. The literature on the socioeconomic 
determinants of adoption is extensive and considers factors related to the 
characteristics of farmers and their farms, market access, technology, the 
quality of extension services, and risk factors (Bewket 2007; Enfors and 
Gordon 2008; Shiferaw, Okello, and Reddy 2009; Teklewold and Kohlin 
2011). However, we consider the yield increase assumption to be justified 
because it is difficult to imagine that countries would favor the widespread 
use of technologies that reduce yields, given the pressure of population 
growth and changing diets.
The analysis also assumes that when an alternative provides better 
yields in a particular grid cell, all farmers in that cell adopt the best alterna-
tive. This assumption departs significantly from previous studies (such as 
Rosegrant et al. 2014), in which adoption depends on other socioeconomic 
factors and has a ceiling lower than 100 percent. It is important therefore to 
consider the results of this study as an upper bound of the changes induced 
by the widespread adoption of CSA practices. As a sensitivity analysis, we 
12  Emission intensity is defined as emissions per unit of output (yield). There are connections 
between reduction of emission intensity, efficient use of energy, and total factor productivity 
(Ayres et al. 2002). These linkages should be explored further, but they are not the target of this 
analysis. Still, farmers’ adoption of CSA practices that reduce emission intensity could be in 
response to policies that target GHG emission reduction or to more general policies that aim at 
increasing total factor productivity.
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simulated several other scenarios, including (following Rosegrant et al. 
2014) lower adoption rates and adoption of AWD based on a reduction of 
production costs, not just an increase in yields. Although the results are 
numerically different, there are no qualitative differences between these 
additional scenarios and the two presented in this chapter. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Emission Intensity
One of the pillars of CSA is the reduction of GHG emissions. Even though 
the CSA practices considered are expected to reduce emissions, given the 
high heterogeneity of soil characteristics and growing conditions, there is no 
assurance that adopting these practices actually reduces emissions on a given 
farm. Furthermore, to appreciate the complexities related to the reduction of 
GHGs it is necessary to take a closer look at what determines total emissions. 
Total emissions from crop production (E)  are determined by a multiplicative 
combination of emission intensity (e, emissions per unit of output), yield (y, 
output per hectare), and area (a, hectares allocated to crop production):
  .           (1)
Equation  indicates that reducing total emissions depends not only 
on the effectiveness of the alternative practices in reducing emissions per 
unit of output but also on their effects on yields. In principle, it is possible 
for yields and area to increase sufficiently to offset any reduction in emission 
intensity.13 
13  This can be easily observed by taking the total derivative of equation (1),
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Results
Results for the scenarios that simulate global adoption of CSA practices and 
technologies are dependent on how widely CSA practices and technologies 
are adopted. The adoption rates for the two scenarios are shown in Table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2—ADOPTION RATE BY CROP UNDER VARIOUS 

















Adoption of CSA practices 
dependent on increased yields
94.0% / 94.2% 90.0% / 90.1% 22.2% / 20.9%
Adoption of CSA practices 
dependent on reduction 
of emission intensity and 
increased yields 
79.0% / 78.1% 26.8% / 26.5% 20.8% / 20.2%
Source: Authors.
Note: CSA = climate-smart agriculture; GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory Earth System Model 
version 2M; HadGEM = Hadley Centre Global Environment Model version 2—Earth System.
As expected, adoption rates are lower when two conditions (increase 
in yields and reduction of emission intensity) must be satisfied. Adoption 
seems to drop the most for wheat with the addition of a second condition, 
indicating that the CSA practices considered do not automatically lead to a 
reduction of emissions for this crop. 
Overall, when compared with a BAU scenario, CSA technology 
adoption in SSA is estimated to increase production of maize by more 
than 50 percent, wheat production by between 7 and 14 percent, and rice 
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production by more than 30 percent (Figure 3.3). There is almost no dif-
ference in effect between the two adoption scenarios, with the exception 
of wheat, for which production is about 6 percent larger when only yield 
increases are a condition for adoption. Results for maize are particularly 
important. CSA technologies appear to be able to offset the negative effects 
of climate change (Figure 3.3). When CSA practices are adopted under the 
GFDL simulated climate, for instance, production 
may increase by 55–56 percent over BAU. 
Not surprisingly, because we limit adoption of 
CSA to SSA, the increase in crop productivity has 
only a small effect on the world prices of maize, rice, 
and wheat (Table 3.3), especially when compared with 
the changes in global prices projected for the period 
2010–2050 under SSP2-GFDL or SSP2-HadGEM and 
BAU (Figure 3.1). A result of the unchanged upward 
trend in prices is that producers can take advantage 
of higher productivity by expanding production area. 
Projections indicate that harvested area for maize, 
rice, and wheat is expected to increase in SSA with 
the adoption of CSA practices. The IMPACT simula-
tions show an increase of up to 12 percent for maize, 
3 percent for wheat, and 2 percent for rice by 2050 
(Table 3.3). These are important changes to consider 
even though the current model framework does not 
allow us to discern what other land uses would be 
affected by this expansion. Further research is neces-
sary to explore these issues.
FIGURE 3.3—PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PRODUCTION (TOTAL OUTPUT) IN 2050, 
CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE SCENARIOS COMPARED WITH BUSINESS-AS-
USUAL SCENARIO
Source: Authors.
Note: CSA = climate-smart agriculture; SSP2-GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory Earth System Model version 2M under shared 
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Consistent with the production results,14 the population at risk of 
hunger in SSA is projected to decrease by between 1.8 and 2.5 percent, 
with little difference between the two adoption scenarios. However, the 
decrease in undernourished children younger than five years is low under 
both adoption scenarios, ranging between 0.2 and 0.3 percent (equivalent to 
approximately 100,000 children). 
Overall, the considered CSA practices also appear to be beneficial for 
soil fertility, for sustainability, and potentially for resilience in general. The 
soil organic carbon concentration, which increases not only 
fertility but also soil water retention, is estimated to increase 
by an average of 0.16–0.17 tons/ha-1/year-1 over BAU across 
the area that adopts the alternative practices, depending on 
which scenario is considered. Soil organic carbon “gains” 
should be interpreted mostly as avoided soil carbon losses 
rather than actual gains from the initial conditions.
Significant differences are apparent between the two 
adoption scenarios when we consider GHG emissions. 
When the choice to adopt is based only on yields, total 
GHG emissions remain basically unchanged or decrease 
minimally, at an estimated 0.01 tons/ha-1/year-1  and results 
depend largely on the climate scenario used (Figure 3.4). 
Importantly, although CSA practices reduce emissions 
during the first two decades simulated, during the latter two 
decades they appear to increase emissions. This happens 
14 On exception is wheat, for which results change significantly across 
scenarios. However, wheat area by 2050 is about one-third of rice area 
and one-seventh of maize area, and therefore its contribution to overall 
production and calories is limited.
TABLE 3.3—PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN 2050 WORLD PRICES 









Adoption rate of CSA practices 
predicated on increased yields
-2.80% / -3.00% -1.30% / -2.00% -3.20% / -3.40%
Adoption rate of CSA practices 
predicated on increased yields 
and reduction of emission 
intensity
-2.70% / -3.00% -1.20% / -1.80% -3.20% / -3.30%
Source: Authors.
Note: GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory Earth System Model version 2M; HadGEM = Hadley 
Centre Global Environment Model version 2—Earth System.
FIGURE 3.4—CHANGE IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM BASELINE UNDER 
TWO ADOPTION AND TWO CLIMATE SCENARIOS
Source: Authors.
Note: CSA = climate-smart agriculture; SSP2-GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory Earth System Model version 2M under shared 
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because soils reach a steady-state condition wherein no more soil organic 
carbon sequestration occurs even though N2O emissions continue at rela-
tively constant rates over the entire 40 years. This leads to an actual increase 
in GHG emissions during the final decade simulated, compared with the 
baseline, estimated at 1.5 million tons of CO2 equivalent annually. 
Results from the second simulation show that it is possible, in principle, 
to increase production while reducing GHG emissions. By enforcing a 
reduction of emission intensity, it is possible to reduce GHG emissions by 
more than 200 million tons for the period under consideration (Figure 3.4), 
equivalent to an average per-hectare yearly reduc-
tion of approximately 0.17 tons of CO2 equivalent. 
Significantly, even during the final decade modeled, 
emissions are reduced at an average rate of 5.5 million 
tons of CO2 equivalent annually. 
Figure 3.5 summarizes the results of compar-
ing the two adoption scenarios for the final decade 
under consideration. The change in total production 
is computed using the cumulative fresh weight of 
the three crops considered, and yearly GHG emis-
sions are computed using the yearly average for the 
final decade (2040–2050). The whisker bars indicate 
the range of simulation results obtained using the 
two different climate projections, with the average 
of the two estimates marked by a colored dot. Two 
messages can be drawn from the results displayed in 
Figure 3.5. First of all, although the CSA practices and 
technologies simulated have overall positive effects on 
production, reducing emissions while also increasing 
production is possible but depends on being able to enforce a reduction in 
emission intensity. This result is consistent with field findings reported in 
the literature indicating that CSA practices do not reduce emissions in all 
conditions and require careful tailoring to the specific local soil and weather 
conditions. In other words, there appears to be substantial room for CSA 
practices to increase yields but not necessarily to reduce GHG emissions. 
Second, there appears to be a trade-off between crop production and reduc-
tion of GHG emissions. Simulation results reveal that total annual output 
is reduced by some 4 million tons of fresh matter when a reduction in GHG 
FIGURE 3.5—EFFECTS OF ADOPTION OF THE BEST CLIMATE-SMART 
AGRICULTURE PRACTICE DURING THE PERIOD 2040–2050 ON TOTAL ANNUAL 
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emissions is achieved. In order to resolve these trade-offs in an economi-
cally efficient manner, a correct pricing of the factors of production and a 
price for carbon are necessary. 
Discussion and Conclusions
A growing body of literature analyzes the effects of CSA practices and 
technologies in terms of agronomic, economic, and environmental benefits. 
Though most of the literature focuses on these effects at the farm and house-
hold levels, this study takes a broader geographic perspective, performing 
an ex ante evaluation of the effects of widespread adoption of selected 
CSA practices on three cereals: maize, wheat, and rice. Household-level 
analyses are important to determine, among other things, the viability of 
new practices and their benefits for households’ well-being. However, a 
broader outlook provides insights into issues related to changes in prices, 
accessibility of food products, and the cumulative effects on GHG reduc-
tion. This broader perspective is necessary when the changes in production 
affect global prices and consequently cause changes in demand, potential 
substitution among food products, and increases in production area needed 
to satisfy demand, all of which must be accounted for. 
We therefore carried out an ex ante assessment of the effects of wide-
spread adoption of CSA practices and technologies compared with the 
outcomes of a BAU scenario in which the climate-smart practices are not 
adopted. Notwithstanding the broad generalizations necessary to carry out 
such a large-scale analysis, several insights into the benefits and limits of the 
CSA approach come to light.
Results indicate that widespread adoption of CSA practices has 
a positive effect on production and total agricultural output, with a 
consequent reduction in prices and decrease in the number of people at 
risk of hunger and the number of children younger than five years at risk 
of malnutrition. Soil organic carbon appears to grow, compared with the 
BAU scenario, indicating that productivity can be increased while making 
production more sustainable than it is with current practices. 
These results indicate that CSA practices can positively affect yields 
and production, induce a reduction in prices, and decrease the number 
of people at risk of hunger and the number of undernourished children 
younger than five years. Adoption of CSA practices also induces an increase 
in soil organic carbon content, or at least reduces soil organic carbon losses, 
indicating that productivity can be increased in a more sustainable manner 
than with the current practices. Taken together, all of these outcomes 
suggest an increase in resilience to climate change.
Importantly, however, the relatively modest effect on world prices does 
not lead to reduced pressure for cropland expansion. Given the increased 
productivity, producers might find bringing additional land into production 
profitable even with the projected decrease in prices, potentially endanger-
ing environmentally sensitive and carbon-rich areas.
It is important to recall that these results reflect the upper-bound 
effects of adoption of CSA practices and that the overall-positive outcomes 
strongly depend on the uptake of CSA practices by farmers, which we 
purposely assume to be unrealistically high. The effects of CSA practices 
would be increasingly marginal with lower adoption rates. In addition, CSA 
alone does not solve long-standing problems related to the adoption of new 
beneficial technologies, such as the necessity of well-functioning extension 
services, the amount and quality of the information provided to farmers, 
and the removal of a host of other barriers to adoption. These caveats point 
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to the importance of putting in place policies and incentives that promote 
climate-smart agricultural development. 
The effects on GHG emissions are mixed and mostly depend on how 
much emphasis is given to reduction of emissions. Results for the scenario 
that simulates adoption of alternative practices based only on yield increases 
suggest that GHG emission reduction is minimal or nonexistent, depending 
on which climate scenario is used, highlighting the highly context- and 
location-specific nature of CSA practices as well as the fact that their use 
alone does not assure a reduction in emissions. Conversely, when adoption 
depends on yield increase and emission intensity reduction, GHG emissions 
decrease while some increase in productivity is preserved. This result is 
important because it appears to indicate that the reduction of GHG emis-
sions is compatible with increased productivity—although it depends on 
how feasible it is to enforce and control the actual achievement of in-the-
field emission intensity reductions. 
Not surprisingly, simulations point to an overall trade-off between 
increasing total output and reducing GHG emissions. Resolving this trade-
off in an economically efficient manner depends on correctly pricing the 
factors of production and possibly creating a price for carbon. Given the 
multi-objective nature of the approach and the highly context-specific per-
formance of CSA practices, simply offering farmers a portfolio of options 
from which to choose and educating them about their benefits appears not 
to lead automatically to meeting the goals of CSA—particularly if signifi-
cant levels of GHG reduction must be achieved. 
Although the insights on emission reduction offered by this analysis 
are limited by construction (that is, the study focuses on three crops and 
only on crop production), results point to the importance of broadening the 
interpretation of CSA and making sure its interactions with other land uses 
(for example, forests and mangroves) are considered and that agroforestry, 
livestock, and value chains are included in any analysis. The focus on crop 
production seems to be limiting and could potentially omit other and more 
important opportunities for carbon sequestration. 
Frelat and colleagues (2016) suggested that targeting poverty through 
improving market access and off-farm opportunities is a better strategy to 
increase food security than focusing on agricultural production and closing 
yield gaps. Wheeler and von Braun (2013) suggested that the whole food 
system (that is, trade, stocks, nutrition, and social policies) needs to adjust to 
climate change. These authors make important calls for an approach that is 
much broader than a narrow focus on increasing yields, and this approach 
can be applied to CSA as well. CSA is too often reduced to a list of viable 
agricultural practices and technologies identified as acceptable. The results 
offered by this study suggest that although beneficial, the adoption of a set of 
CSA practices only marginally addresses poverty, food security, and most of 
all, emission reduction, indicating that broader interventions are necessary. 
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Appendix
Simulation of Technology Adoption
In order to simulate changes in yields, crop area, and production due 
to adoption of CSA practices and technologies compared with the BAU 
scenario, IMPACT must be linked with the DSSAT crop model through 
several steps (Robinson et al. 2015). 
First, the IMPACT’s BAU scenario begins in the year 2005, with yield 
values taken from FAOSTAT, which contains statistics and data compiled 
by the FAO Statistics Division (FAO 2017). Whereas early yield trends 
are calibrated to reproduce observed historical data, long-term yield 
trends or intrinsic productivity growth rates (IPRs) are estimated using 
the expected increases in inputs (for example, fertilizers and water) and 
general improvements in investments in agriculture. These IPRs differ for 
developing countries, where there is considerable scope to narrow the gap 
in yields compared with developed countries, and are exogenous to the 
model. As a result, changes in the IPRs are specified in the definitions of the 
various scenarios. Second, on top of these IPRs, the effects of temperature 
and precipitation (climate shocks) and CSA practices and technologies on 
crop yields (yield responses) are estimated through the DSSAT crop model. 
These climate shocks and yield responses are combined as shifters and then 
aggregated from the DSSAT area unit (a 0.5-degree grid cell, a square of 
approximately 56 km by 56 km at the equator) to the food producing unit 
(FPU) used in IMPACT. Finally, yield estimates in IMPACT are adjusted by 
way of an endogenous link between yields and estimated changes in com-
modity prices. The link hinges on the underlying assumption that farmers 
will respond to changes in prices by varying their use of inputs, such as 
fertilizer, chemicals, and labor, which will in turn change yields. 
Yield Responses
We analyzed yields estimated through DSSAT runs at global grid levels to 
calculate yield responses (percentages) due to any CSA practices and tech-
nologies, compared with the BAU scenario:
    (2)
where t indicates time and i identifies the 0.5-degree grid cell.
The yield responses for the first 10 years and the final 10 years were 
averaged to represent two specific years, 2005 and 2050. Because IMPACT 
operates on a regional basis, that of FPUs, we aggregated the detailed 
gridded crop modeling results of each pixel to the FPU level by calculating 
area-weighted average yield responses and applying them to the IMPACT 
yields. This approach allowed us to capture the direction and magnitude 
of change due to technologies (or climate change) seen in the crop models 
while maintaining the observed agricultural productivity reported in the 
FAOSTAT database.
Calibration of DSSAT for the Business-as-Usual 
Scenario
To improve estimates of yield responses calculated from DSSAT-simulated 
yields under the respective scenarios of BAU and CSA practices/technolo-
gies, we calibrated the DSSAT crop model to ensure that its simulated yields 
would be compatible with those used in IMPACT as baseline yields in any 
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given reference year. Because the yields of both IMPACT and SPAM at the 
reference year, 2005, are derived from FAOSTAT, we utilized disaggregated 
yields of SPAM as observed baseline yields for the purpose of calibration.
First, we adjusted the SPAM yields to account for harvesting and thresh-
ing losses and grain moisture contents. This step is necessary because FAO 
crop yield data are for harvested production, defined as production minus 
harvesting and threshing losses per unit of harvested area. Correcting for 
grain moisture content is necessary to convert FAO fresh-matter weight 
yields into the dry-matter weight yields simulated in DSSAT. Second, we 
selected one model parameter (the soil fertility factor, or SLPF, a growth 
reduction and fertility factor that accounts for the effects of soil nutrients—
other than nitrogen—on the daily plant growth rate, on a scale of 0 to 1) 
and two model inputs (planting density and nitrogen fertilization rate) that 
would be sensitive to simulated yields yet could still be derived in spite of 
some uncertainties in the DSSAT database. Third, we varied the parameter 
and each input using three levels. For example, the SLPF was assigned a 
value of either 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0, whereas planting density and nitrogen rates 
were assigned either the original values derived from the DSSAT database 
or 50 percent or 150 percent of these original values. These levels resulted in 
27 possible combinations of model parameter and input values for each grid 
cell. Fourth, we ran DSSAT to simulate yields corresponding to all of these 
combinations for five continuous years, and then selected the combination 
of parameter and input levels that gave the lowest relative difference between 
simulated and observed yields (Yieldsim and Yieldobs) :
  
 (3)
Finally, within the irrigated and the rainfed grid cells, respectively, 
for each crop, we identified SPAM cells that were statistically deemed 
as outliers based on the method by Leys and others (2013). To do so, we 
calculated the relative difference (positive or negative) between simulated 
and observed yields and then removed grid cells with too large a relative 
difference, assuming that DSSAT would not be capable of simulating yields 
comparable to the observed yields for those grid cells.  
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M
ixed crop-livestock systems, in which crops and livestock are 
raised on the same farm, are the backbone of smallholder 
production in most of Africa south of the Sahara. They have 
considerable potential for increasing agricultural production 
for food security, helping farmers adapt to a changing climate, 
and providing mitigation benefits: these benefits constitute 
the three pillars of climate-smart agriculture (CSA). The 
synergies and trade-offs among these three pillars are not well 
studied or understood; there is very little robust information 
in the published literature that evaluates all three pillars of 
CSA practices. This chapter presents a qualitative analysis that 
prioritizes investments in CSA in Africa south of the Sahara 
on a broad scale and concludes with a brief discussion of some 
of the associated technical and policy implications of current 
knowledge as well as key knowledge gaps.
Mixed crop-livestock systems are central to smallholder 
production in the developing countries of the tropics (Herrero et 
al. 2010). Globally, they produce 69 percent of the world’s milk 
and 61 percent of the meat from ruminants; in Africa south 
of the Sahara (SSA), they produce more than 90 percent of the 
milk and 80 percent of the meat from ruminants (Herrero et al. 
2013). Figure 4.1 shows the location of mixed systems in Africa, 
defined as those in which more than 10 percent of the dry matter 
fed to animals comes from crop by-products or stubble, or more 
than 10 percent of the total value of production comes from 
non-livestock farming activities (Seré and Steinfeld 1996). This 
map distinguishes two types of mixed systems: “extensive,” with 
lower agroecological potential (an annual length of growing 
period [LGP] of fewer than 180 days per year) and “intensifying,” with 
higher agroecological potential (having an LGP of 180 or more days per 
year) coupled with better access to urban markets (less than 8 hours’ travel 
FIGURE 4.1—MIXED CROP-LIVESTOCK SYSTEMS IN AFRICA
Source: Herrero et al. (2009), using a mapped version of the livestock classification system of Seré and Steinfeld (1996).
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time to an urban center with a population of more than 50,000). The great 
majority of these mixed systems are rainfed.
In mixed systems, livestock provide draft power to cultivate the land 
and manure to fertilize the soil, and crop residues are a key feed resource 
for livestock. Appropriate integration of crop and livestock activities can 
lead to greater farm efficiency, productivity, and sustainability (Sumberg 
2003), as well as increasing farmers’ incomes (Descheemaeker, Amede, 
and Haileslassie 2010). Mixed systems offer key livelihood diversification 
options to smallholders in developing countries who aim to minimize the 
risk associated with agricultural production, liquidity constraints, and high 
transaction costs, all of which can result in income and consumption fluctu-
ations (Dercon 1996; Davies et al. 2009; Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001). 
These diversification options offer alternatives for addressing some of the 
challenges posed by a changing climate and increasing climate variability in 
the future (Thornton and Herrero 2015). The mixed systems also have a role 
to play in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the agriculture, 
forestry, and land-use sectors. Although livestock systems are a considerable 
source of GHG emissions, the emissions intensities of mixed systems are 
24–37 percent lower than those of grazing systems in Africa (Herrero et al. 
2013), mostly because of higher-quality ruminant diets. Other mitigation 
opportunities are afforded by manure amendments for crop production and 
carbon sequestration in soils and biomass (Liu et al. 2010; Seebauer 2014).
Mixed farming systems have various characteristics that may be 
advantageous in some situations and disadvantageous in others (van Keulen 
and Schiere 2004). For example, when conditions are appropriate, the use 
of draft power allows larger areas of land to be cultivated and planting 
to be completed more rapidly. On the other hand, these advantages may 
mean that extra labor (often women’s) is required for weeding. On a mixed 
farm, crop residues can be mulched, thereby helping to control weeds and 
conserve water, and they are an alternative source of low-quality roughage 
for livestock. But again, feeding crop residues to livestock may compete 
with other uses of this material, such as mulching, construction, and 
nutrient cycling. A major constraint to increased crop-livestock integration 
is that these systems can be complex to operate and manage (van Keulen 
and Schiere 2004; Russelle, Entz, and Franzluebbers 2007). Nonetheless, 
integration may offer one pathway whereby smallholders can increase their 
livelihood security while reducing their vulnerability to food insecurity as 
well as to climate change (Thornton and Herrero 2015).
Comprehensive evaluations of the costs and benefits, and the synergies 
and trade-offs, of different options in African mixed systems are underway, 
drawn from extensive searches of published literature (Rosenstock et al. 
2015, 2016). To date, very few studies have included quantitative evaluation 
of all three components, or pillars, of climate-smart agriculture (CSA): 
increasing agricultural production for food security, helping farmers adapt 
to a changing climate, and providing mitigation benefits. Generalization is 
thus difficult, and local context has a considerable effect on whether trade-
offs or synergies will arise when CSA options are implemented (Rosenstock 
et al. 2015). This chapter outlines crop and livestock management interven-
tions that may be able to deliver multiple benefits (food security as well as 
improved climate change mitigation and adaptation) in different situations 
in SSA. To evaluate how these farm-level CSA management practices and 
technologies may affect food production, adaptive capacity, and climate 
change mitigation, we use the protocol of Rosenstock and colleagues (2016), 
supplemented by a survey of experts, to determine whether the practice has 
a positive, negative, or undetermined impact on productivity (production 
per hectare or per animal), resilience (via variables that help buffer the 
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system against shocks and stresses, such as soil organic carbon and input 
use efficiency, for example), and mitigation (via emission reductions or 
avoidance). The next sections provide brief descriptions and evaluations of 
CSA interventions, and discuss constraints to the uptake 
of these interventions and the potential for their adoption 
at scale. A simple spatial analysis of potential domains 
of adoption of these interventions is then presented. The 
chapter concludes with some of the technical and policy 
implications of current knowledge as well as knowledge gaps 
concerning CSA interventions in the mixed crop-livestock 
systems of SSA.
Climate-Smart Agriculture 
Interventions in Mixed Systems 
Climate-smart options for mixed crop-livestock systems vary 
widely in their potential impacts on agricultural productivity, 
climate change resilience, and GHG mitigation. Table 4.1 
shows results of an expert survey on 17 CSA options 
delineated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO 2013). Although most options will 
improve productivity, impacts on resilience and mitigation 
are particularly variable due to context specificity. The nine 
experts surveyed felt that it was particularly difficult to gen-
eralize about mitigation impacts, in view of the importance 
of the precise context and the local situation, and this feeling 
is reflected in the number of options in Table 4.1 for which 
the mitigation impacts are judged to be uncertain. It should 
be stressed again that for some of the interventions, the strength of evidence 
to support the assessments is quite limited, hence the reliance on expert 
opinion. The 17 options are very briefly described below.
TABLE 4.1—CLIMATE-SMART OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SMALLHOLDERS 
IN MIXED CROP-LIVESTOCK SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE  
Region Potential impacts
Strength of evidenceProduction Resilience Mitigation
Changing crop varieties + +/- +/- ***
Changing crops + + +/- *
Crop residue 
management +/- + - **
Crop management + +/- +/- *
Nutrient management + + + ***
Soil management + + +/- **
Changing livestock breed + + + *
Manure management + +/- +/- *
Changing livestock 
species + +/- +/- *
Improved feeding + +/- +/- **
Grazing management + + +/- **
Altering integration 
within the system + + + *
Water use efficiency and 
management + + +/- **
Food storage + + + *
Food processing + +/-  +/- *
Use of weather 
information + + +/- -
Weather-index insurance + +/- +/- *
Source: Scoring based on authors’ assessment of the articles found in a systematic review of climate-smart agriculture literature 
(described in Rosenstock et al. 2016), supplemented with an informal survey of nine experts. CSA options from FAO (2013).
Note: The results of the survey were averaged to determine the impact of the practice on the key climate-smart agriculture indicators. 
Potential impacts: + = positive; - = negative; +/- = uncertain. Strength of evidence: *** = confident; ** = likely; * = poor, - = speculation.
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Changing crop varieties: Adaptation strategies such as improved vari-
eties may reduce projected yield losses under climate change, particularly 
for rice and wheat in the tropics (Challinor et al. 2014). High-yielding variet-
ies can improve the food self-sufficiency of smallholders and increase their 
income without the need to cultivate extra land. Drought-tolerant varieties 
have helped to stabilize yields, particularly of cereal crops in rainfed systems 
(La Rovere et al. 2014). As droughts, pest and disease outbreaks, and water 
salinization become more common with climate change and increasing 
demands on natural resources, shifts in crop varieties will continue to be 
among the first lines of defense for improving productivity and resilience in 
mixed crop-livestock systems. However, research on crop improvement and 
resilience has been limited to staple grains for the most part. Within mixed 
systems, many different crops, including feed and forage species as well as 
trees or fodder shrubs, contribute to the resilience of the system, but their 
climate resilience and contribution to smallholder well-being are not always 
well understood.
Changing crops: Climate change will modify the areas suitable for 
cultivation of staple crops, requiring farmers to switch crops in some 
places (Vermeulen et al. 2013). Maize, beans, bananas, and finger millet, 
staple crops in much of SSA, could experience a reduction of 30–50 percent 
in areas suitable for cropping (Ramirez-Villegas and Thornton 2015). 
Changing from less suitable crops to those more suitable in future climates 
is an effective strategy for maintaining productivity and may increase 
resilience to climate change. Though many studies have looked at climate 
impacts on staples, information on the likely impacts of climate change 
on forages such as Napier grass that are typically used in mixed systems is 
practically nonexistent. In areas that are projected to see improvements in 
crop suitability, such as a relaxation of current cold temperature constraints 
in parts of the tropical highlands in East Africa, for example, mixed crop-
livestock farmers may be able to capitalize by planting crops appropriate to 
the changing climatic conditions.
Crop residue management: Crop residue management practices 
determine the destination and use of stover and other crop by-products. 
Some effective residue management solutions retain plant residues and use 
practices that minimally disturb the soil. In addition to potential increases 
in soil organic carbon and subsequently increased water infiltration and 
storage within the soil, effective crop residue management can dramatically 
decrease soil erosion by protecting the soil surface from rainfall (Lal 1997). 
Cover cropping typically includes the growing of a nonharvested or par-
tially harvested crop, either in a crop rotation or outside the main growing 
season. Cover cropping with leguminous crops can be very beneficial to 
the typically low-fertility and highly weathered soils common in small-
holder systems (Snapp et al. 2005). Mulching can increase soil aggregation 
(Mulumba and Lal 2008) and thus enhance its physical quality, as well as 
protect soils from direct impact by rainfall, greatly reducing the loss of 
nutrients and organic matter through soil erosion (Barton et al. 2004).
Crop management: As local weather patterns become more unpredict-
able with climate change, farmers may need to adjust planting seasons 
accordingly. Changes in planting dates can have profound impacts on 
farm productivity (Shumba, Waddington, and Rukuni 1992). However, for 
some farmers, effective earlier planting may require adjusting cultivation 
practices in ways such as using pesticides and minimal tillage techniques. 
Multicropping involves the growing of multiple crops within the same 
growing season and can include intercropping (within the same field at 
the same time) with both leguminous and nonleguminous crops and 
trees (agroforestry). Intercropping can reduce risk substantially: crops in 
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intercropping systems typically access different soil water and nutrient 
resources, have different water requirements, and have varying growth and 
maturity rates, all of which can reduce the risk of total crop failure (and the 
associated risk of food insecurity) due to erratic or decreased precipitation 
(Ghosh et al. 2006).
Nutrient management: Smallholders on mixed crop-livestock farms 
can control the distribution of nutrients by applying inorganic and organic 
fertilizers and composts, growing trees, recycling waste, and improving 
animal diets. These all have benefits for improving productivity, boosting 
water and nutrient use efficiency, and reducing the GHG intensity of 
production (Kimaro et al. 2015; Bryan et al. 2013; Zingore et al. 2007). The 
transfer of nutrient-rich materials (manure, residues, and feeds) between 
production activities may have cascading effects across the farm due to 
changes in available nutrients (van Wijk et al. 2009). For example, conserva-
tion agriculture may help to maintain soil chemical and physical properties, 
but crop residues in mixed systems are often fed to livestock, serving 
as a vital feed resource during periods of low supply (Giller et al. 2015). 
Conserving crop residues for soil fertility purposes may reduce the nutrients 
available to other subcomponents of the system, such as livestock.
Soil management: Managing the soil for climate-related risks often 
involves increasing its physical quality while maintaining or improving 
its fertility. Increased soil organic carbon and soil aggregation can lead 
to increased water infiltration and water storage for plant use. Climate 
change may negatively affect soil fertility and the mineral nutrition of crops 
(St. Clair and Lynch 2010). These aspects of soil quality can be addressed 
through the effective use of crop rotation and leguminous plants and via 
livestock density management. Crop rotation with leguminous plants may 
decrease disease incidence, suppress weed infestation, and enhance nutrient 
cycling (Mureithi, Gachene, and Ojiem 2003). Leguminous plants and trees 
can be effectively incorporated into smallholder systems through intercrop-
ping, relay cropping, and planting boundaries, with their nitrogen-fixing 
capabilities increasing soil fertility (Kerr et al. 2007).
Changing livestock breed: Local animal breeds in the developing 
world are generally well adapted to their environments in terms of disease 
resistance, heat tolerance, and nutritional demand. Their productivity is 
often low, however, and the emissions intensity of production (the amount 
of GHG emissions produced per kilogram of milk or meat) can be high. The 
utilization of more productive animals can provide not only higher produc-
tivity but also reduced emissions intensity. Livestock populations exhibit 
natural genetic variation, and selection within breeds of farm livestock may 
produce genetic changes in trait(s) of interest in the range of 1–3 percent per 
year (Smith 1984). Within-breed selection poses challenges because appro-
priate infrastructure such as performance recording and genetic evaluation 
programs may be lacking. Cross-breeding is usually more feasible. Locally 
adapted breeds can be utilized that are tolerant to heat, poor nutrition, 
and parasites and diseases, and these traits can be transferred to crossbred 
animals. Cross-breeding coupled with diet intensification can lead to 
substantial efficiency gains in livestock production and methane output 
(Thornton and Herrero 2010; Galukande et al. 2013).
Manure management: The utilization of livestock manure to add 
nutrients back to the soil is a key crop-livestock interaction in mixed 
farming systems. When used as a soil amendment, manure can benefit the 
soil, resulting in crop production and resilience benefits for smallholders 
via increased nutrient supply to crops and improved soil structure and 
water-holding capacity. Manure has well-documented impacts on soil 
chemical and physical properties (Srinivasarao et al. 2012; Taddesse et al. 
46   resakss.org
2003). The GHG emissions dimension associated with manure is complex. 
When stored, manure can release significant amounts of nitrous oxide and 
methane. Nitrous oxide and other GHGs are also released when manure is 
applied to the land (Smith et al. 2008). In tropical mixed farming systems, 
the opportunities for manure management, treatment, and storage are often 
quite limited, although they may exist in zero-grazing smallholder dairy 
systems, for example (FAO 2013).
Changing livestock species: The substitution of one species of livestock 
for another is one strategy that can be used to increase resilience to climatic 
and economic shocks: risk can be spread by having a more diverse species 
portfolio, and for a farm with small stock, it will often be easier to shift 
between small stock species than between larger, less “liquid” stock. In 
parts of the Sahel, dromedaries have replaced cattle, and goats have replaced 
sheep in the wake of the droughts of the 1980s (Hoffman 2010). In other 
areas, smallholders are adopting goats and sheep rather than cattle in 
response to market opportunities: there is strong urban demand for meat, 
it is easier to sell small animals, and profits accrue more quickly and are 
generally less risky with small animals than with larger ones. Traditional 
cattle keepers in parts of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia have 
adopted camels as part of their livelihood strategy as a result of drought, 
cattle raiding, and epizootics.
Improved feeding: Interventions that target improved feed resources 
can result in faster animal growth, higher milk production, earlier first 
calving, and increased incomes. Better nutrition can also increase the 
fertility rates and reduce the mortality rates of calves and mature animals, 
thus improving animal and herd performance and system resilience to 
climatic shocks. For cattle, such interventions may include the use of 
improved pasture, higher-digestibility crop residues, diet supplementation 
with grain, small areas of planted legumes (“fodder banks”), the leaves of 
certain agroforestry species, and grass species that can be planted on field 
boundaries or in rehabilitated gullies (with added erosion control benefits). 
Such supplements can substantially increase productivity per animal while 
also increasing resilience by boosting income (Thornton and Herrero 2010) 
and reducing the amount of methane produced by the animal per kilogram 
of meat or milk produced (Bryan et al. 2013). 
Grazing management: Native grasses in rangelands and mixed 
systems are often of relatively low digestibility. Pasture productivity can be 
increased through adding nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers, adjusting the 
frequency and severity of grazing, changing plant composition, and utiliz-
ing irrigation. Particularly in the humid and subhumid tropics, substantial 
improvements in livestock productivity and soil carbon sequestration are 
possible, as well as reductions in enteric emission intensities, by replacing 
natural vegetation with deep-rooted pasture species. For example, in Latin 
America, where Brachiaria grasses have been widely adopted, animal 
productivity can be increased by 5–10 times compared with diets of native 
savannah vegetation (Rao et al. 2014). Such options will not always reduce 
GHG emissions, however (Henderson et al. 2015). Another way in which 
grazing management may deliver productivity, adaptation, and mitigation 
benefits is by balancing and adapting grazing pressure on land, though the 
effects are highly dependent on the context, such as plant species and soil 
and climatic conditions (Smith et al. 2008).
Altering integration within the system: Smallholders in mixed systems 
have various options involving changes to the proportion of crops to 
livestock, and additions or subtractions to the enterprises in which farmers 
are engaged. Such changes can directly and indirectly affect the integra-
tion of the different elements in the farming system with respect to feed, 
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manure, draft power and labor, and cash. Integrated crop-livestock systems 
offer some buffering capacity for adaptation, with mitigation and resilience 
benefits too (Thornton and Herrero 2015). In many places, risk reduction 
may be more important than productivity increases per se (Kraaijvanger 
and Veldkamp 2015). In dry spells, farmers may reduce their investment in 
crops or even stop planting altogether and focus instead on livestock pro-
duction (Thomas et al. 2007). Others may increase off-farm income in poor 
seasons via trading or some other business activity (Thornton et al. 2007; 
Deshingkar 2012). Depending on the context, these kinds of transitions may 
be permanent or semipermanent (Thornton and Herrero 2015; Rufino et al. 
2013).
Water use efficiency and management: Improving water use efficiency 
and water management on mixed farms can have substantial benefits 
(Harris and Orr 2014). The ability to supply water; mitigate the impacts 
of variable rainfall on crops, pasture, and animals; and extend growing 
seasons can all have significant impacts on smallholder livelihoods, increas-
ing yields and economic returns (Burney and Naylor 2012; Kurwakumire 
et al. 2014; Thierfelder and Wall 2009; Gebrehiwot, Mesfin, and Nyssen 
2015). Water harvesting can include practices such as digging zai pits for 
individual plants and constructing ditches, terraces, or stone lines to direct 
water to where it is needed, thus conserving soil moisture and improving 
productivity (Amede, Menza, and Awlachew 2011; Zougmoré, Mando, and 
Stroosnijder 2004). Investments in soil and water conservation in northern 
Ethiopia, combined with collective action and a conducive policy environ-
ment, have transformed semiarid, degraded lands into productive farming 
systems that are far less prone to droughts than before, thus transforming 
smallholder livelihoods and food security (Walraevens et al. 2015).
Food storage: Food losses in SSA generally occur during and after 
harvest; harvesting techniques, inadequate storage facilities, and pests and 
diseases cause losses of 30–40 percent, a figure similar to the amount of 
consumer waste in developed countries (Affognon et al. 2015). Postharvest 
losses can be reduced by using existing low-cost technologies and methods, 
many of which have been adopted rapidly in Asia but are not widely used in 
SSA. Though the appropriate strategy to reduce losses needs to be tailored to 
the specific agricultural enterprise (in terms of resources available, market 
orientation, and commodity), several approaches are already available for 
cereal grains, even for small-scale producers (Kitinoja and Kader 2003). 
Storage of highly perishable animal products—milk and meat—as well as of 
higher-value vegetables and fruits presents unique challenges in resource-
limited and small-scale producer environments, yet it has received markedly 
less attention than that of cereals.
Food processing: Like improved postharvest storage methods, food 
processing presents an opportunity to extend the shelf life of perishable 
farm products. Food processing also provides a mechanism for smallholders 
to add value to products at the farmgate. In mixed systems, farmers typi-
cally have the potential to create fermented milk and dried meat products 
as well as derivatives from crop products. By reducing the speed of food 
degradation, food processing increases or at least maintains the level of 
consumable farm output. Food processing also typically generates value 
addition or an extra product that can be sold on the market, facilitat-
ing livelihood diversification by creating an alternative revenue stream. 
Improved longevity and increased marketability of farm production may 
make smallholders less susceptible to the annual cycles of food insecurity 
and less vulnerable to shifting weather patterns. The impacts on GHG 
emissions may depend on context: increased food availability may decrease 
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production-related emissions, but processing may require energy and 
off-farm transportation.
Use of weather information: Smallholders in rainfed mixed systems 
deal with rainfall variability in several ways, usually building on long 
experience. Uncertainty can be reduced through the use of weather infor-
mation and climate advisories, enabling smallholders to better manage 
risks and take advantage of favorable climate conditions when they occur 
(Hansen et al. 2011). The provision of appropriate weather information and 
associated advisories can help smallholders make more informed decisions 
regarding the management of their crops and livestock, leading to increased 
productivity. The effective use of weather information may also be able to 
contribute to resilience by helping smallholders better manage the negative 
impacts of weather-related risks in poor seasons while taking greater advan-
tage of better-than-average seasons. Use of weather information may also 
contribute to GHG mitigation in some situations—for example, by better 
matching the use of fertilizer and other crop and pasture production inputs 
with prevailing weather conditions.
Weather-index insurance: Agricultural insurance is one approach 
to managing weather-related risks; it normally relies on direct measure-
ment of the loss or damage suffered by each farmer, which can be costly 
and time consuming. An alternative is index-based insurance that uses a 
weather index (for example, the amount of rainfall in a specified period) 
to determine payouts for the targeted hazard. In remote areas, the index 
may be based on satellite imagery of vegetation ground cover as a proxy for 
fodder availability to insure livestock keepers against drought (Chantarat 
et al. 2013). Index insurance is often bundled with access to credit and farm 
inputs, allowing farmers to invest in improved practices that can increase 
their productivity and food security, even in adverse weather conditions, 
thereby increasing their resilience (Greatrex et al. 2015). Index insurance 
may have few direct mitigation co-benefits, but smallholders may be able to 
enhance carbon sequestration or reduce GHG emissions via the manage-
ment decisions they make as a result of being insured.
Adoption Constraints and the Potential 
for Uptake of Climate-Smart Agriculture 
Interventions
As outlined above, a wide range of options exists for mixed crop-livestock 
farmers in developing countries, and many of them have positive impacts on 
at least one or two of the three CSA pillars, some on all three. The evidence 
base is mixed, however: the scientific literature for some of these options 
is very scanty, and the results of the expert opinion survey presented here 
clearly show that local context can have an overriding influence on whether 
particular practices have positive or negative effects in a certain situation, 
given that some 40 percent of the impacts shown in Table 4.1 are adjudged to 
be uncertain. One key message from this analysis is that broad-brush target-
ing of CSA interventions is not appropriate, from a technical standpoint, 
given that the impacts are often not clear or are highly context specific.
Independent of context, we can identify common elements that are 
important to facilitate the adoption of CSA in developing countries. These 
elements tend to be similar to those that characterize the adoption of 
other types of sustainable agricultural development or natural resource 
management strategies. In light of their limited capacity to bear risk, 
many smallholders tend to select farm portfolios that stabilize income 
flows and consumption (Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001). Under climate 
change, smallholders’ ability to select such portfolios is determined by 
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high-level factors such as conducive enabling policy environments and 
public investment; the assurance of peace and security; stable macroeco-
nomic conditions; functioning markets and appropriate incentives (or the 
development of these, including financial, labor, land, and input markets); 
and the ability and willingness of farmers to invest their own human, 
social, natural, and physical capital (Ehui and Pender 2005; Westermann, 
Thornton, and Förch 2015). Sociocultural traditions, including structural 
social inequalities, marginalization of specific groups, and gender relations, 
as well as local institutions (with informal rules and regulations) that guide 
resource use, the division of labor, and household decision making also play 
a key role in determining whether climate-smarter practices are feasible in 
specific locations.
As for agricultural technology adoption and uptake in general, many of 
the CSA interventions outlined above have different constraints. These are 
laid out in Table 4.2 by intervention, for the following constraints:
• Investment cost: Farmers may face up-front infrastructural or techno-
logical costs before some types of interventions can be implemented, 
such as costs for fencing material or irrigation equipment.
• Input and operating cost: These are the recurring costs of the needed 
inputs, including labor, fertilizer, and hybrid seed.
• Risk: Certain technologies in some situations (for instance, higher 
levels of purchased inputs in places with high rainfall variability) may 
have unintended impacts on production or income variability, which 
can severely constrain adoption.
• Access to technology: Adoption may well be constrained in situations 
in which smallholders have limited physical access to the technology 
(such as the seeds of improved crop or pasture varieties).
• Technical know-how: Some interventions require high levels of techni-
cal knowledge about their implementation and management, which 
may act as a powerful deterrent to adoption.
• Temporal trade-offs: Sometimes trade-offs may need to be made in 
the short term to realize medium- or longer-term benefits (for instance, 
losing access to a piece of land while waiting for certain cash crops to 
produce harvestable yield), and farmers may not have the wherewithal 
to wait for these benefits to materialize.
• CSA trade-offs: In some situations, some interventions may involve 
trade-offs among the three CSA pillars (that is, the production, resil-
ience, and mitigation objectives). Productivity-enhancing technology 
(such as adding nitrogen fertilizer, under some circumstances) may, for 
instance, increase resilience by improving household cash flow but at 
the same time increase GHG emissions or their intensities.
• Information: Some interventions have recurring informational needs, 
such as seasonal weather forecasts.
• Acceptability: Some CSA interventions (for example, practices that 
may affect a location’s communal grazing governance or investments 
in areas with weak land tenure arrangements) may go against socio-
cultural norms, directly affecting a technology’s acceptability in a 
community.
• State of evidence base: Insufficient evidence to make robust statements 
about the relative climate smartness of different alternatives in differing 
contexts may indirectly constrain their uptake.
Table 4.2 demonstrates clearly that all interventions are associated with 
some constraints that may affect adoption, depending on the circumstances. 
Despite the constraints, all of these interventions may be suitable in some 
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circumstances, but currently there is only limited informa-
tion concerning the potential uptake of CSA interventions 
at scale, in terms of geographic or other domains.
Toward Prioritizing Investments 
in Climate-Smart Agriculture in 
Africa South of the Sahara
One preliminary step toward generating the information 
needed to prioritize investments in CSA is to identify those 
locations where different interventions may be profitable 
and feasible for smallholders given their biophysical, infor-
mational, and socioeconomic constraints. As an illustration, 
we mapped the 17 interventions outlined above to spatial 
domains in SSA based on the mixed-system classification 
shown in Figure 4.1. We used the potential impacts of each 
intervention from Table 4.1 and the nature of the con-
straints to adoption from Table 4.2 to subjectively evaluate 
the suitability of each intervention as 0, low, medium, or 
high in each system. One way to evaluate suitability is to 
look at potential adoption rates. To date, adoption rates of 
agricultural technology in SSA have not often exceeded 
30 percent over one or two decades (Thornton and Herrero 
2010). Accordingly, we used a potential adoption rate of 
5 percent (low suitability), 15 percent (medium suitability), 
or 30 percent (high suitability), nominally for the period 
to 2030, for each of the 17 CSA interventions. For each 
TABLE 4.2—CONSTRAINTS TO THE WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF 
CLIMATE-SMART OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SMALLHOLDERS IN MIXED 






















































































Changing crop varieties  * ** *
Changing crops * * * * * *
Crop residue 
management * * ** * **
Crop management * * ** *
Nutrient management ** * * *
Soil management * * * * *
Changing livestock breed ** * * * ** * * ** *
Manure management *(*) * ** * ** * **
Changing livestock 
species ** * * * ** * ** ** *
Improved feeding * ** * * * * *
Grazing management ** * * ** * * ** *
Altering integration 
within the system * ** * ** * ** ** **
Water use efficiency and 
management ** ** * * * * **
Food storage * * * **
Food processing * * * ? * **
Use of weather 
information * * * *? * * **
Weather-index insurance * * ** ** * *? ** * **
Source: Authors’ evaluation. CSA options from FAO (2013).
Note: Importance of constraint: ** = major; * = moderate; ? = unknown or highly context specific. CSA = climate-smart agriculture.
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intervention, we calculated the size of the rural area and the current number 
of rural people in each system, crudely multiplied this by the associated 
adoption rate, and summed the results to give a highly approximate indica-
tion of the relative size of the “suitability domain” (in terms of 
geographic size and rural population) for each intervention. 
Results are shown in Table 4.3.
Improved feeding and altering the enterprise balance 
may be suitable over relatively large areas and for large 
numbers of people living in rural areas, not all of whom are 
engaged in agriculture, of course (Lowder, Skoet, and Singh 
2014). Food storage, grazing management, and changes in 
livestock species (particularly from large to small ruminants 
or from ruminants to nonruminants) are also options with 
relatively large domains, according to this analysis. The 
results for food storage are noteworthy; this intervention 
appears to have solid CSA benefits, particularly those related 
to increased food availability, but also resilience and mitiga-
tion benefits, burdened with only moderate (rather than 
major) technical and informational constraints (Table 4.2). 
Considerable effort and resources might well be warranted to 
increase the uptake of simple food storage technologies and 
the availability of appropriate information.
Table 4.3 also reveals some interesting differences among 
systems. The crop-related options generally have higher 
potential in the intensifying mixed systems, as might be 
expected. In the extensive mixed (agropastoral) systems, 
the social acceptability of changing livestock breeds may be 
a big constraint, with the new breeds offering considerably less potential 
in these systems than in the intensifying mixed systems, where increasing 
market orientation may be modifying traditional views on livestock’s role 
TABLE 4.3—AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM DOMAINS WHERE CLIMATE-SMART 
OPTIONS MAY BE SUITABLE FOR SMALLHOLDERS IN MIXED CROP-
LIVESTOCK SYSTEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA   
CSA option “Suitability” Total area
(in million km2)
Total rural population 
(2000, in millions)EM IM
Changing crop varieties 1 3 0.67 60.62
Changing crops 2 3 1.12 85.78
Crop residue 
management 0 1 0.07 8.01
Crop management 1 2 0.45 36.60
Nutrient management 1 2 0.45 36.60
Soil management 1 2 0.45 36.60
Changing livestock breed 2 3 1.12 85.78
Manure management 2 2 0.91 61.76
Changing livestock 
species 3 2 1.59 99.50
Improved feeding 3 3 1.81 123.52
Grazing management 3 2 1.59 99.50
Altering integration 
between crops & livestock 3 3 1.81 123.52
Water use efficiency and 
management 2 1 0.76 45.75
Food storage 3 2 1.59 99.50
Food processing 1 2 0.45 36.60
Weather information 3 1 1.45 83.49
Weather-index insurance 2 2 0.91 61.76
Source: Population data from CIESIN (2005). Suitability ratings are the authors’ own estimates. CSA options from FAO (2013).
Note: Relative suitability: 0 = not suitable; 1 (low) = 5 percent potential adoption; 2 (medium) = 15 percent potential adoption; 3 
(high) = 30 percent potential adoption. EM = extensive mixed systems; IM = intensifying mixed systems (from Herrero et al. 2009; 
see Figure 4.1). CSA = climate-smart agriculture.
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in livelihood systems. Similarly, nutrient management options may have 
substantial input and operating costs, particularly related to labor, so their 
potential in the extensive mixed systems is likely to be low, but they show 
higher potential in the intensifying mixed systems. It is worth noting that 
some of these potentials may already be changing as climate-targeted 
financing becomes increasingly available for adaptation and mitigation 
purposes. From the mitigation perspective, livestock may well be an increas-
ing priority because of their high emissions and also their considerable 
potential to reduce the emissions intensity of livestock products in SSA, 
principally through improved diets (Thornton and Herrero 2010).
There are several obvious weaknesses with this analysis: the subjective 
nature of the suitability index, the fact that potential adoption rates are 
likely to be context- and intervention-specific, and the lack of specificity 
as to what the exact intervention actually is in each category (for instance, 
“improved feeding” is a broad term covering many different types of 
interventions). Nevertheless, this type of broad-brush analysis, if done 
on a regional basis in relation to specific interventions and with as much 
quantifiable information as possible, could be very helpful as a first step in 
prioritizing investments in CSA over the next few years.
Conclusions
The analysis presented here is largely qualitative because at present we lack 
comprehensive information on the costs, benefits, synergies, and trade-offs 
of many of the interventions examined. This lack of information is partly 
because the current state of science for CSA in the mixed systems in SSA 
is sparse, notwithstanding the efforts of Rosenstock and colleagues (2016) 
to seek out information through a very extensive review of the literature. 
There are gaps in our understanding of some of the key biophysical and 
socioeconomic interactions at the farm level. At the same time, we do not 
lack for analytical tools and methods that could be used for quantitative 
priority setting to help allocate the resources needed to stimulate widespread 
adoption of CSA. To overcome the dearth of field-based evidence on CSA 
practices and their interactions, modeling tools for the ex ante evaluation 
of these practices will be particularly useful in these early stages of CSA 
programming. The outputs of these models can in turn be used to help 
specify the biophysical relationships in bioeconomic models suited to the ex 
ante assessment of CSA practices. Although such assessment is important, 
field-based research and ex post analyses of the adoption of interventions 
and their economic impacts will also be needed to expand the evidence base 
as to what works where and why.
Despite the limitations of the analysis presented here, some conclu-
sions can be drawn. First, from a technical perspective, there are no “silver 
bullets” for climate smartness in the mixed systems. Though this statement 
echoes the conclusions of the semiquantitative analysis in Thornton and 
Herrero (2014), the present analysis looked at a much wider range of possible 
interventions. Table 4.1 indicates that triple wins undoubtedly exist (for 
example, certain nutrient management practices, changing livestock breeds, 
and improved ruminant diets can all lead to productivity gains, increased 
resilience, and mitigation benefits compared with business as usual, in some 
situations). But technical recommendations over broad domains covering all 
or even most circumstances may not be appropriate.
Second, from an adoption perspective, a range of different constraints 
exist that may impede the widespread adoption of all these innovations. 
These constraints may involve investment or running costs, access to tech-
nology and knowledge of how to implement it, social acceptability, or local 
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governance issues. In different contexts, these concerns may conspire to 
prevent the incremental and transformational shifts toward CSA that may 
be needed.
Third, some of the interventions evaluated present significant trade-
offs between shorter-term food production or food security objectives and 
longer-term resilience objectives. Such trade-offs apply particularly to crop 
residue management and altering the integration of crops and livestock 
within the system, but also to several other interventions (nutrient, soil, 
and water management; grazing management; changing livestock species 
and breeds; and use of weather information and weather-index insurance). 
These temporal trade-offs may be difficult to resolve in many local contexts, 
making the triple wins these interventions promise sometimes elusive.
Fourth, the analysis has highlighted several CSA options for which the 
evidence base is severely lacking. Food storage and food processing appear 
to have relatively few constraints, although their impacts are uncertain and 
largely unquantified. As noted previously, these options appear to be heavily 
under-researched and would benefit from well-targeted research efforts. 
For these options, as for the use of weather information and weather-index 
insurance, the evidence base as to their impacts is weak, highlighting the 
need for robust impact studies that can help guide future research-for-
development investment.
Despite some key knowledge gaps, the lack of a silver bullet, the con-
straints to adoption, and the trade-offs that may arise between shorter- and 
longer-term objectives at the household level, much is being done. Although 
more comprehensive information could help target interventions more 
effectively and precisely, in many situations appropriate information already 
exists, for example, regarding interventions that fit well within current 
farming practices and do not significantly increase labor demands and 
household risk. Evidence is also accumulating of the kinds of approaches 
that can support the scaling up of CSA interventions. Multistakeholder 
platforms and policy making networks are key, especially if paired with 
capacity enhancement, learning, and innovative approaches to support 
farmers’ decision making (Westermann, Thornton, and Förch 2015). 
Modern information and communications technology offers efficient and 
cost-effective ways to disseminate and collect information at a massive 
scale, as well as an infrastructure for developing and utilizing new and 
diverse partnerships. A certain level of local engagement may still usually 
be needed, paying attention to farmers’ needs and their unique situations 
(Westermann, Thornton, and Förch 2015).
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T
he eradication of poverty in Africa south of the Sahara (SSA), 
whose poverty rate is the highest in the world, and of its food and 
nutrition insecurity necessitates structural transformation of the 
agricultural sector. Meanwhile, global climate change models suggest an 
overall warming trend and increased incidence of extreme weather events 
that vary by altitude (Serdeczny et al. 2017). These changes are expected to 
have a significant impact on agricultural productivity and the availability 
of productive resources globally and in SSA, a region that relies heavily on 
rainfed agriculture (Knox et al. 2012; Müller and Robertson 2014).
At the same time, agriculture affects climate change through anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and by acting as a greenhouse 
gas sink. GHG emissions result, for instance, from enteric fermentation, 
application of synthetic fertilizers, land use change, and deforestation, while 
a sink removes atmospheric GHG by storing (sequestering) it in other forms 
through photosynthesis. Africa accounted for 15 percent of the world’s 
agriculture-related GHG emissions in 2012, making it the third most 
important contributor, after Asia (45 percent) and the Americas (25 percent) 
(Tubiello et al. 2014). Considering the pressure on agricultural production 
driven by population growth, growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and 
a consequent change in diets toward higher consumption of animal-source 
foods, and the risks posed by climate change, farmers need options to sus-
tainably increase production. 
Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is one approach that has been 
promoted to enhance agricultural productivity, food security, and adaptive 
capacity, while at the same time reducing GHG emissions and increasing 
carbon sequestration (Campbell et al. 2014; Huang, Lampe, and Tongeren 
2011). The CSA approach, which became prominent during the First Global 
Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change (FAO 2013), 
is an umbrella term that includes many strategies built upon location-
specific solutions that are expected to contribute toward achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It relies on agricultural systems 
that contribute to three outcomes: (1) sustainable and equitable increases in 
agricultural productivity and income; (2) greater resilience of food systems 
and farming livelihoods, and (3) reduction and removal of GHG emissions 
associated with agriculture, wherever possible. Agricultural production 
systems that follow the tenets of CSA are expected to be not only more 
productive and efficient, but also resilient to short-, medium-, and long-term 
shocks and risks associated with climate change and variability. 
The CSA approach represents a departure from the single-objective 
approach that underlies most work to ensure food and nutrition security. 
CSA’s multi-objective approach facilitates important conversations, negotia-
tions, and coordination of interventions among different ministries. Many 
operational aspects of CSA, however, are still under investigation. Local 
contexts determine the enabling environment, the trade-offs, and the 
synergies of CSA, so practices and technologies may be climate smart in 
some circumstances and conditions but not in others. Therefore, how these 
practices deliver across the three pillars of CSA, and the conditions for their 
adoption, are highly specific to contexts and locations, with fundamental 
implications for the operational aspects of CSA (McCarthy, Lipper, and 
Branca 2011). Indeed, short-term productivity may even decrease under 
CSA (Pittelkow et al. 2015), with more stable and often increasing yields 
observed over time, especially under dry or drought-stressed conditions 
(Corbeels et al. 2014; Pittelkow et al. 2015).
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Another approach being promoted to ensure the eradication of extreme 
poverty and promote inclusive and sustainable development, especially in the 
face of climate-induced changes in the amount and distribution of produc-
tion, is trade (Sommer and Luke 2016). Trade is recognized as a cross-cutting 
means of implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development under 
SDG 17. Agricultural commodity trade in Africa has increased steadily over 
the past 30 years, with net exports (exports minus imports) rising from 
2 to 6 percent of GDP between 1980 and 2014 (IMF 2016). Despite these 
improvements, the region not only accounts for a small share of the global 
commodity trade but has one of the lowest intraregional trades in goods 
(16 percent, versus 17 percent for South and Central America, 42 percent for 
North America, 62 percent for the European Union, and 64 percent for Asia) 
(Davis 2016; Khandelwal 2005; Tamiotti et al. 2009). 
Although a number of regional economic communities (RECs) have 
been established to promote economic integration and trade, including 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),17  the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),18  and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC),19 intraregional trade 
remains staggeringly low. For example, between 2001 and 2010, intraregional 
trade grew at 2 percent, 1.3 percent, and 0.9 percent per year, on average, 
for ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA, respectively, and intraregional trade 
17  COMESA includes Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
18  ECOWAS includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
19  SADC includes Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, of which eight also belong to COMESA.
accounted for 9 percent, 9.8 percent, and 5.6 percent of the total trade, on 
average, for ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA, respectively (Seid 2013). But 
intraregional trade is expected to increase in the coming decades, thanks to 
an emerging favorable trade environment including the establishment of the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (UNCTAD 2016); the Malabo declara-
tion, aimed at tripling intracontinental trade in agricultural commodities 
and services by 2025; and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which aims to 
increase intracontinental trade from 12 percent to 50 percent and the con-
tinent’s share of global trade from 2 percent to 12 percent between 2013 and 
2045 (African Union Commission 2015).
This chapter examines the role of CSA in mitigating the negative effects 
of climate change on yields and commodity trade flows in SSA. The analysis 
is disaggregated by the three RECs—SADC, ECOWAS, and COMESA—to 
capture possible region-specific factors that could mediate the interaction 
between agricultural production and trade flow as well as potential location 
specificity in the effectiveness of CSA practices. We simulate the expected 
effects of adoption of four CSA practices for the period 2018–2025: no 
tillage (NT) and integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) for maize, 
and urea deep placement (UDP) and alternate wetting and drying (AWD) 
for rice. These practices are found to increase agricultural productivity 
and net exports, highlighting the potential that CSA has in mitigating 
climate-induced risks in agricultural production, food security, and 
foreign currency. 
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Conceptual Framework 
The linkage between climate change, agricultural production, and trade flow 
is quite complex, as summarized in Figure 5.1. Given the reliance of Africa’s 
agriculture on weather and its role in the region’s 
trade, climatic changes such as rising tempera-
ture, weather variability, and extreme weather 
events (such as El Niño and La Niña) will have a 
significant impact on the availability of produc-
tive resources, productivity, food security, foreign 
exchange, and physical infrastructure (Müller 
and Robertson 2014). Important drivers of the 
relationship between agriculture and trade in 
the region are the production landscape and 
the biophysical conditions. Favorable climatic 
and weather conditions increase net exports by 
affecting the supply of exportable commodities, 
whereas climate changes and variability that 
reduce the supply of agricultural production 
have the opposite effect, given the possibility of 
substitution between internally produced and 
externally procured goods.
Climate change affects not only yields but 
also the pattern of production, the latter by 
changing countries’ comparative advantage in 
the production of certain crops. By changing 
precipitation patterns and reservoir storage, 
it will also impact water availability for power production and irrigation 
(You et al. 2011). The effects of climate change will vary by agroecology 
and by countries’ adaptive capability (Hebebrand 2009; Kang et al. 2009; 
FIGURE 5.1—LINKAGES BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 
AND AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY TRADE 
Source: Authors, based on review of relevant literature.
Note: CSA = climate-smart agriculture; GHG = greenhouse gas.
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Wheeler 2011). For example, rising temperatures will lengthen the growing 
period in mid- and high-latitude areas, with lower temperatures having the 
opposite effect in low-latitude areas. In this regard, a widespread adoption of 
improved agricultural technologies and management practices that reduce 
GHG emissions, improve the sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils, 
and curtail undesirable land use changes could play a crucial role in miti-
gating the effects of climate change. 
Unlike continuous tillage, which leaves soils prone to erosion and 
is a major source of soil carbon loss (Reicosky et al. 2005), NT practices 
improve general soil fertility through retention of water and nutrients, at 
the same time benefiting soil aeration and biota, with potential direct effects 
on agricultural productivity (Hobbs, Sayre, and Gupta 2008; Thierfelder, 
Mwila, and Rusinamhodzi 2013). The existing literature on conservation 
agriculture, of which NT is an essential component, points to an increase in 
yields, but the effects are notably variable, dependent on a range of location-
specific factors such as climate and soil type (Pittelkow et al. 2015; Lal 2015; 
Erenstein et al. 2012). Similarly, ISFM, a set of locally adapted practices 
using residues along with both organic and inorganic inputs (for instance, 
animal manure and green manure) to promote the efficient use of nutrients, 
can significantly increase productivity (Vanlauwe et al. 2011). 
Given that agriculture is a crucial foreign exchange earner in SSA, 
climatic changes that affect productivity and the distribution of produc-
tion will ultimately impact the region’s trade flow. In addition, extreme 
weather events such as La Niña and El Niño, which interfere with ship 
navigation and port operations as well as damaging physical infrastructure, 
could hamper the flow of trade locally, regionally, and internationally. 
At the same time, trade contributes to climate change through increased 
GHG emissions due to the transportation of commodities and increased 
consumption of tradable goods. Free trade can help offset climate-induced 
changes in agricultural production and food supply, and trade liberalization 
and investments can encourage the introduction of more (energy-) efficient 
production processes that emit fewer GHGs per unit of output produced 
and traded. Thus, trade can serve as both a mitigation and an adaptation 
strategy to climate change.20
Finally, trade and agricultural policies can either worsen or mitigate 
climatic changes, depending on whether they encourage or limit the pro-
duction and distribution of GHG-intensive goods (IPCC 2007). Similarly, 
large-scale adoption of improved technologies and practices can cause an 
agricultural glut if local, regional, and international markets are too weak to 
absorb the boost, potentially inducing suboptimal adoption in subsequent 
cropping seasons. Although disentangling these complex linkages between 
climate change, agriculture, and trade is beyond the scope of this study, the 
chapter examines the potential role of CSA in enhancing yields and trade 
flow in SSA in the face of expected climatic changes. 
Data and Summary 
The analysis uses secondary data from several sources. A time series 
(1993–2010) of country-level data on the gross value of agricultural produc-
tion in purchasing power parity (PPP) (constant 2004–2006 international 
20 Mitigation aims at reducing GHG emissions sources or enhancing GHG sinks, whereas adaptation 
refers to adjustments to mitigate detrimental effects of actual or anticipated climatic changes and 
to seize opportunities induced by climate change (IPCC 2007).
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    59
dollars)21 and trade flow in US dollars comes from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s trade statistics database, FAOSTAT (FAO 2017). Data on 
population and GDP per capita in PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) 
are obtained from the World Bank (World Bank 2017a, 2017b). 
For crop modeling, we use a time series of site-specific weather 
data from the US National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA’s) AgMERRA database 
(Ruane, Goldberg, and Chryssanthacopoulos 
2015). AgMERRA (based on NASA’s Modern-Era 
Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications, 
or MERRA) compiles satellite-measured weather data 
for 30-arc-minute grid squares, including minimum 
temperature, maximum temperature, solar radiation, 
and precipitation. Our source for high-resolution (in 
5-arc-minute grid squares) soil property data is the 
Global High-Resolution Soil Profile Database (IRI et 
al. 2015). The geography of the two crops we simulate 
(maize and rice) is based on the Spatial Production 
Allocation Model (SPAM) (IFPRI and IIASA 2016).22
Figure 5.2 summarizes the per capita gross value 
of agricultural production (constant 2004–2006 
21 An international dollar has the same purchasing power as the U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. Values and costs in local currency are 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rates. The PPP between two countries A and B measures 
the amount of A’s local currency needed to purchase a basket of 
commodities in A as compared to one unit of B’s currency needed to 
purchase a similar basket of commodities in B (World Bank, 2017c). 
22 The analysis excludes the following countries due to incomplete data 
on trade, simulated yields, or both: Benin, Cabo Verde, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sierra Leone.
international dollars). Per capita gross value has been rising steadily over 
the years, with ECOWAS reaching consistently higher production than the 
other two RECs. The population of the region grew at about 2.3 percent per 
year, whereas per capita GDP (constant 2011 international dollars) grew at 
about 1.7 percent, with a much faster growth observed from the first years 
FIGURE 5.2—HISTORICAL PER CAPITA GROSS PRODUCTION VALUE (LEFT AXIS) 
AND GROWTH RATE OF PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (RIGHT 
AXIS), SELECTED AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, 1993–2010
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on agricultural production data from FAO (FAO 2017) and population data from the World Bank 
(World Bank 2017b).  
Note: COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; GDP = gross 
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of the new millennium until the dip in 2009, following the 2007–2008 
financial crisis. 
Figure 5.3 summarizes net agricultural exports (in millions of US 
dollars) by REC. Overall, the region has been a net importer of agricultural 
commodities since just after the turn of the 21st century, with net exports 
(in absolute value) accounting for about 4.5 percent of GDP, on average. 
Although the gross value of agricultural production has been rising, the 
relatively faster economic growth since the early years of the century has 
created a strong demand for consumer-oriented agricultural products such 
as prepared foods, dairy, poultry, and vegetables (USDA 2014). What is 
more, many of the net importers were unable to pay for their imports. For 
example, the export revenues of only one-third of African countries were 
large enough to pay their food import bills, with the rest of them resorting 
to external funding (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and Paschali 2011). Cereals, 
oilseeds, and dairy products accounted for more than 
60 percent of the region’s total imports, whereas coffee, 
cocoa, tea, and fruits and vegetables accounted for more 
than 55 percent of total exports (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, 
and Paschali 2011). 
Method 
Climate-Smart Agriculture and Yields
Crop growth is affected by several factors, including 
weather condition, soil type, and farmers’ management 
practices. Process-based crop models simulate crop 
growth by dynamically interacting these factors. Since 
the 1970s, as plant science has rapidly advanced with a 
better understanding of how plant photosynthesis and 
respiration processes work, various forms of dynamic crop 
models have been developed and used to support farm 
management decision making. Given the complex nature 
of CSA implementation in the fields and its potential 
FIGURE 5.3—HISTORICAL TOTAL AGRICULTURAL NET EXPORTS, SELECTED 
AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, 1993–2010
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on trade flow data from FAO (FAO 2017) and GDP data from the World Bank (World Bank 2017a).  
Note: COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; GDP = gross 
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impacts, this study uses the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer (DSSAT) (Hoogenboom et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2003) to simulate 
the effects of the adoption of selected CSA practices. 
DSSAT combines a suite of complex and dynamic crop system models 
to estimate the biophysical responses of crops under various scenarios, in 
our case, scenarios of large-scale CSA technology adoption by farmers. 
DSSAT integrates the effects of crop system components and manage-
ment options to simulate the states of all the components of the cropping 
system and their interactions. DSSAT crop models are designed based on 
a systems approach, which provides a framework for users to understand 
how the overall cropping system and its components function throughout 
cropping season(s) on a daily basis. Table 5.1 summarizes the CSA prac-
tices we focus on.
TABLE 5.1—SUMMARY OF CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURAL 
PRACTICES CONSIDERED
CSA technology Definition Crop
No tillage
Minimal or no soil disturbance, often in 
combination with residue retention, crop 
rotation, and use of cover crops
Maize
Integrated soil fertility 
management
Combination of chemical fertilizers, crop 
residues, and manure or compost
Maize 
Alternative wetting and 
drying
Repeated interruptions of flooding during 
the season, causing water to decline as the 




Strategic burial of urea “supergranules” near 
the root zones of crop plants
Rice
Source: Authors’ review of the relevant literature.
Note: CSA = climate-smart agriculture.
It has been shown that ISFM improves the resilience of soils and agri-
cultural production systems to weather variability (Roobroeck et al., 2016). 
This finding is dependent on the fact that synthetic fertilizers and organic 
inputs bring diverse benefits to the soil. AWD has been used in paddy rice 
cultivation, one of the main sources of non–carbon dioxide GHG emissions 
from the agriculture sector, after livestock and soil (Smith et al. 2014), to 
significantly reduce methane emissions from rice paddies (FAO 2013; Tyagi, 
Kumari, and Singh 2010) and, in some instances, also to increase yields 
(Rejesus et al. 2011). 
UDP aims at the efficient use of nitrogen, key to both increased produc-
tion and reduced emissions (FAO 2013). Broadcast application of nitrogen 
in rice fields leads to 60 to 70 percent nitrogen losses, directly contributing 
to both water pollution and GHG emissions. The placement of urea “super-
granules” deep in the soil provides a slow release of fertilizer near the root 
system of rice plants, thereby improving the efficiency of nutrient uptake 
and limiting nitrogen losses. The result is an increase in yields combined 
with a significant reduction in leached nitrates and therefore a lower 
likelihood of nitrous oxide emissions. At the same time, UDP increases 
the resilience of agricultural systems by making them less susceptible to 
economic shocks due to changes in energy prices.
Conditions for adoption of CSA practices are highly context and location 
specific, highlighting the need for information and data to make a true CSA 
approach to agricultural development operational (McCarthy, Lipper, and 
Branca 2011). From the farmers’ perspective, however, the problem is quite 
different. Adoption of practices and technologies that are alternatives to the 
status quo depends on many factors. An extensive literature has investigated 
the socioeconomic determinants of adoption of alternative practices, 
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attempting to account for farmers’ and farms’ charac-
teristics by considering access to markets and credit, 
the characteristics of the technology, the quality of 
extension services, and risk factors as important 
factors of adoption (Bewket 2007; Enfors and Gordon 
2008; Shiferaw, Okello, and Reddy 2009; Teklewold 
and Kohlin 2011).
We assume that farmers who are currently using 
a determinate set of practices to produce either maize 
or rice have the option to choose from a portfolio of 
alternatives (that is, the four CSA practices consid-
ered). In addition, we assume that they have complete 
information regarding potential yields and are able 
choose the alternative that provides the highest yield 
for their grid square compared with business-as-usual 
practices, a scenario we refer to as a “smart farmer 
option.” Depending on the location, therefore, the 
CSA practice that corresponds with the smart farmer 
option could be one of the four CSA practices we 
are considering (NT or ISFM for maize and UDP 
or AWD for rice). In cases in which the alternatives are not projected to 
produce yield gains, farmers are assumed to retain the current practices. 
Although these assumptions are an extreme simplification of the condi-
tions for adoption of alternative practices, it is difficult to imagine that 
countries would favor the widespread use of technologies that reduce yields 
in the face of high population growth rates and changing diets. Therefore, 
the yield-increase assumption on which adoption is based is considered 
justified with the understanding that the analysis could overestimate CSA 
adoption rates and hence their effects. 
For each grid-cell level and crop, yields were simulated for alterna-
tive CSA practices for 2018–2025 based on AgMERRA weather data for 
2003–2010, assuming the weather patterns for 2018–2025 will be identical 
FIGURE 5.4—HISTORICAL (1993–2010) AND SIMULATED (2018–2025) YIELDS 
UNDER THE SMART FARMER OPTION, ECOWAS
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to those of the earlier period. To simulate the effects of CSA on agricultural 
commodity trade flow, simulated yields are converted into monetary values 
using crop-specific FAOSTAT data on cultivated area and a PPP conversion 
factor.23
23 The PPP conversion rate is calculated as the ratio between production value in thousands of 
constant 2004–2006 international dollar per metric ton and the quantity of production in metric 
tons. 
A summary of historical and simulated yields (in tons/hectare)24
associated with the smart farmer option for each REC is shown in Figures 
5.4–5.6. The ECOWAS region has witnessed a steady increase in maize yield 
over the years, except for 2007 (Figure 5.4, panel A), whereas the increasing 
trend in maize yield observed for COMESA (Figure 5.5, panel A) and 
24  Throughout the chapter, tons refers to metric tons.
FIGURE 5.5—HISTORICAL (1993–2010) AND SIMULATED (2018–2025) YIELDS 
UNDER THE SMART FARMER OPTION, COMESA
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SADC (Figure 5.6, panel A) begins after the early years of the 21st century. 
Compared with maize yields, rice yields show more temporal variation. 
Nonetheless, given the projected climatic changes, these increasing trends 
in yields may not be sustained (Lesk and Ramankutty 2016). On the other 
hand, large-scale adoption of CSA practices has the potential to increase 
yields, as summarized in panel B of the respective figures. 
Climate-Smart Agriculture and Trade Flow
To examine the link between agricultural production and trade flow, we 
estimate Equation (1) using historical data: 
  NXct=α0 + α1 Yct + Λ' Zc(t)+γt + εct ,  (1)
where c and t are country and year indexes, respectively; NX is the gross 
value of total agricultural net exports (in millions of US dollars); Y is the 
logarithm (log) of the gross value of agricultural pro-
duction (in constant 2004–2006 international dollars, 
thousands); Z is a matrix of time-varying or time-
invariant factors that could affect net exports, including 
the log of per capita GDP (in constant 2011 international 
dollars), population (in millions), price indexes of 
agricultural imports and exports, and crop land area 
(millions of hectares); t is a linear time trend to capture 
overall temporal trends in NX; and ε is the (composite) 
error term. 
For the sake of comparability, Equation (1) is esti-
mated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
random-effects (RE) estimators, the latter assuming Y 
and Z to be exogenous (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005 
and Wooldridge 2010 for general discussions). Since we 
are estimating a level-log model, a percent increase in 
Y is associated with α̂1 ⁄100 change in NX, where α̂1 is 
the coefficient estimate of Y. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the country level to correct for intracountry 
serial correlation and cross-country heteroscedasticity. 
Next, OLS point estimates from Equation (1) and the 
FIGURE 5.6—HISTORICAL (1993–2010) AND SIMULATED (2018–2025) YIELDS 
UNDER THE SMART FARMER OPTION, SADC
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on historical yield data from FAO (FAO, 2017) and DSSAT-simulated yields.
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projected increase in the gross value of agricultural production are used 
to simulate the effects of CSA on net agricultural exports for the period 
2018–2025. To simulate net exports, we assume that the values 
of Z during the forecast period will remain the same as those 
during 2003–2010. A similar assumption is made about the 
value of all other agricultural commodities (except maize and 
rice) that constitute Y, so that simulated Y (Ys) is calculated as  
Ys = Y – Ycb + Ycs, where b, s, and c index baseline, simulation, 
and crop (either maize or rice), respectively.
Results and Discussion 
Table 5.2 presents OLS and RE estimates of Equation (1). 
Overall, coefficient estimates are jointly significant, although 
only at the 10 percent level for the RE estimator. The model 
fitness statistic from the OLS estimation shows that the condi-
tioning variables explain about 40 percent of the model variance. 
The overall model fitness in the RE estimation (R-squared 
overall) is about 23 percent and the fact that “R-squared overall” 
and “R-squared within” are not quite close suggests the impor-
tance of country fixed effects. The fraction of the variance due to 
country fixed effect (rho) is 0.76. Depending on the estimator, 
a 1 percent increase in the gross value of agricultural produc-
tion (in constant 2004–2006 international dollars, thousands) 
increases total agricultural net exports by about US$4,000 to 
US$4,500. Alternatively, climatic changes that cause a 1 percent 
reduction in the value of agricultural production will reduce net agricultural 
exports by about the same amount. 
TABLE 5.2—NET AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (IN MILLIONS OF US 
DOLLARS) AND GROSS VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 
SELECTED AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES,1993–2010  
Dependent variable: agricultural net 
exports (millions of US $)
OLS Random-effects
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Log. gross production value (thousands 
of constant 2004–2006 international $) 0.410*** 0.139 0.448** 0.180
Population (millions) -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000
Per capita gross domestic product (2011 
international $) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Import value index (2004–2006 = 100) -0.002 0.002 -0.002* 0.001
Export value index (2004–2006 = 100) 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001
Total cereal area harvested (millions of 
hectares) -0.105** 0.044 0.037 0.060
Linear time trend -0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008
Constant 3.862 14.109 -21.846 15.385
Number of observations (N*T) 450 450
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 n.a.
R-squared within n.a. 0.367
R-squared between n.a. 0.224
R-squared overall n.a. 0.228
Chi-squared n.a. 13.104
F-statistic 3.959 n.a.
Panel-level std. dev. n.a. 0.520
Rho n.a. 0.767
Log-likelihood -379.13 n.a.
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. n.a. = not applicable; OLS = ordinary least squares; Std. err. = cluster-robust standard error.
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This increase amounts to about 0.27 percent, 0.39 percent, and 
0.02 percent, in absolute value, of the yearly average total agricultural net 
exports for COMESA, ECOWAS, and SADC, respectively, for 1993–2010. 
Indeed, as noted above, climate change is projected to have an overall 
negative effect on yields of major food-security crops across SSA, with 
effects on yields expected to experience significant spatial variation (Berg 
et al. 2013; Sultan et al. 2013). Thus, the adoption of yield-enhancing CSA 
practices could be one promising approach to mitigate these effects. 
Summaries of simulated production values and net exports under 
the smart farmer option for maize and rice, disaggregated by REC, are 
shown in Table 5.3. The average production value of maize under the smart 
farmer option is 0.33 million (in constant 2004–2006 international dollar) 
(Table 5.3, column 4), whereas that of rice is 0.21 million (in constant 
2004–2006 international dollar) (Table 5.3, column 8). Using average annual 
production values during 2003–2010 as a benchmark scenario, these results 
represent a 73 percent (from 0.19 million to 0.33 million for maize) and 
40 percent (from 0.15 million to 0.21 million for rice) increase in produc-
tion value, on average, for the whole sample. For both maize and rice, the 
percentage increase in production value from the benchmark scenario is 
highest for SADC and lowest for ECOWAS. 
Compared with the benchmark scenarios, the simulated net exports 
under the smart farmer option are significantly higher, especially for SADC, 
yet ECOWAS’s net exports appear to decline (Figures 5.7 and 5.8). Further 
research is needed to identify possible factors behind these inter-REC differ-
ences in the elasticity of net agricultural exports to CSA-induced increases 
in the value of agricultural production.
TABLE 5.3—CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION VALUE AND NET EXPORTS, 
SELECTED AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, 2018–2025 PROJECTIONS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Smart farmer option—maize Smart farmer option—rice
2018–2025 2018–2025
ECOWAS SADC COMESA All ECOWAS SADC COMESA All
Maize production value
0.22 0.47 0.28 0.33 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.40) (0.61) (0.32) (0.49)
Rice production value 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.22 0.49 0.22 0.21
(0.31) (0.69) (0.51) (0.39)
Gross production value
5.32 3.63 3.81 4.60 5.29 3.44 3.76 4.49
(9.57) (3.84) (3.25) (6.97) (9.44) (3.77) (3.21) (6.88)
Total agricultural net exports
-0.15 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 0.18 0.04 -0.04
(0.64) (0.20) (0.38) (0.50) (0.64) (0.18) (0.37) (0.52)
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Note: Production values expressed in millions (in constant 2004–2006 international dollars). Agricultural net exports expressed in millions of US dollars. COMESA = Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; n.a. = not applicable; SADC = Southern African Development Community.
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Conclusion
Given its heavy reliance on rainfed agriculture and projected climatic 
and weather changes, SSA faces multidimensional challenges in ensuring 
food and nutrition security as well as preserving its ecosystems. In this 
regard, CSA can play an important role in addressing the interlinked chal-
lenges of food security and climate change. The dominance of agricultural 
commodities in the region’s exports also implies that agroclimatic changes 
will affect countries’ ability to fully benefit from international trade. 
This chapter combines crop modeling and econometric analysis to 
simulate the effects of CSA on maize and rice yields and net agricultural 
exports (exports minus imports) in SSA, with a focus on three RECs: 
ECOWAS, COMESA, and SADC. The analysis assumes that farmers have 
FIGURE 5.7—SIMULATED TOTAL AGRICULTURAL NET EXPORTS 
WITH SMART FARMER OPTION, MAIZE, SELECTED AFRICAN 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, 2018–2025
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Note: COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African 
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complete information regarding potential yields associated with alternative 
CSA practices and can choose the alternative that produces the highest 
yields for their agroecology. Expected effects of CSA are simulated for 
the period 2018–2025, by the end of which countries have committed to 
tripling intra-Africa trade in agricultural commodities and services as part 
of the 2014 Malabo Declaration. We find that CSA significantly increases 
both yields and agricultural trade flow, suggesting a potential role for CSA 
in improving resilience and spreading out agricultural production risks. 
The evidence also suggests a heterogeneous response of trade flows to CSA 
by REC.
Finally, although these findings are informative, it is worth noting 
that even if famers have complete information about a portfolio of CSA 
practices and their agronomic potential, adoption may be suboptimal 
due to, for example, limited budget, missing or imperfect markets, and 
institutional barriers (see Barrett 2008; Dillon and Barrett 2016; Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2010; and Suri 2011 for some discussions). Given that CSA 
practices have more complex sets of tangible and intangible components, 
relative to a single and discrete class of technologies, adoption of all the 
components is necessary to benefit from all the synergistic effects of CSA 
on productivity and sustainability. Additional research is therefore needed 
to examine the possible general equilibrium effects of large-scale adoption 
of CSA practices and to identify location-specific factors that mediate the 
interaction between climate change, agriculture, and trade.
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I
n Africa, agriculture is the dominant source of livelihood for the poor, 
particularly in rural areas, where the majority resides. This sector 
employed about 60 percent of Africa’s labor force in 2010, and more 
than 80 percent in some countries (FAO 2017). African agriculture is 
typically rainfed and occurs predominantly on smallholder farms of less 
than 2 hectares. In Africa south of the Sahara (SSA), rainfed agriculture 
accounts for more than 95 percent of farmed land (Wani, Rockström, 
and Oweis 2009), and smallholder farms represent 80 percent of all 
farms and up to 90 percent of production in some countries (Wiggins 
2009). Smallholder farmers largely grow for subsistence purposes, usually 
using few to no modern inputs (such as fertilizer, high-yielding seeds, 
or irrigation), with some growing cash crops for income or engaging in 
livestock rearing, a combination of crop and livestock farming, or off-farm 
activities.  
Extreme weather events can devastate crop yields and food production, 
adversely impact food security and nutrition, and erode the livelihoods and 
assets of the poor. The rainfed nature of African agriculture is often charac-
terized by low productivity and thus subject to a wide range of weather risks 
such as extreme temperatures or rainfall, as well as weather-related hazards 
such as pests, diseases, and reduced accessibility to cultivated fields and 
roads. Weather-related hazards can also be transmitted to other segments 
of the agricultural supply chain, such as processors, wholesalers, and trans-
porters, and also to other sectors that support agriculture, such as banking, 
for instance through loan defaults (Ceballos and Robles 2014).
In this context, the poor are disproportionately affected by extreme 
weather. Total crop and livestock loss can threaten the food security and 
nutritional status of entire communities. Moreover, the poor are at higher 
risk from vector- and waterborne diseases. Through their effects on health 
condition and nutritional intake, temporary weather shocks can thus 
induce permanent negative shocks to human capital.25 Finally, a decrease 
in nonfarm employment availability may follow extreme weather events, 
further damaging the poor’s livelihoods and their ability to recover.
For instance, the 2011 /2012 drought in the Horn of Africa severely 
impacted food production as well as livestock and pastoral systems. The 
drought induced alarming rates of malnutrition among young children and 
an estimated 13 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (Slim 
2012). The 2015/2016 El Niño cycle was related to both droughts in southern 
and eastern Africa and flooding in parts of eastern Africa, devastating 
agricultural production and threatening the food security and well-being 
of millions of people. Extreme weather events can also cause long-lasting 
damage to poor communities through the destruction of infrastructure 
(roads, schools, and hospitals), with staggering costs of recovery and 
rebuilding. For example, the 2013 flooding in Mozambique damaged 
health clinics and resulted in humanitarian and recovery costs estimated 
at US$30.6 million (UNRCO Mozambique 2013). In Kenya, the 2008–2011 
drought caused a total of US$10.7 billion in damages and losses, of which 
nearly US$9.0 billion was in the livestock subsector alone, US$91.0 million 
in the food processing industry, US$1.5 billion in crops, US$53.0 million in 
fisheries, and US$85.0 million in nutrition (FAO 2015).
Climate change is projected to result in more frequent and intense 
droughts and heat extremes in central and southern Africa as well as 
25 Mclntosh (2015) highlighted considerable drops in consumption and food security resulting from 
the effects of severe weather shocks on the agricultural sector in Uganda.
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increased precipitation and flooding in the Horn of Africa and other parts 
of eastern Africa (World Bank 2013). Moreover, climate change will likely 
exacerbate cyclical weather events such as La Niña and El Niño, resulting 
in even more frequent and severe droughts and floods. In addition, climate 
change is projected to increase risks from vector- and waterborne diseases 
in Africa (World Bank 2013).
In this context, it is crucial for smallholder farmers to rely on efficient 
protection mechanisms against these impending risks. But traditional 
indemnity agricultural insurance has not been able to reach rural com-
munities in Africa at a large scale, mainly due to high distribution and loss 
verification costs and information asymmetry problems between farmers 
and insurers. 
In the absence of well-functioning weather insurance markets, African 
smallholder farmers have typically resorted to informal and semi-formal 
risk-coping strategies to deal with weather-related shocks. However, tradi-
tional informal strategies such as savings, credit, borrowing from friends 
and relatives, and diversifying income sources have shortcomings. Savings 
can easily be diverted to more pressing household demands before weather 
shocks occur, credit can be expensive and out of reach for poor farming 
households, and extreme weather events can affect entire geographic areas 
and thus preclude the possibility of seeking help from social networks or 
off-farm activities. 
Therefore, innovative strategies and insurance mechanisms are needed 
to help smallholder farmers adapt to the effects of extreme weather events. 
Over the past few decades, weather index insurance has been increas-
ingly regarded as an important alternative for protecting farmers against 
weather shocks and for enabling investment and growth in the agricultural 
sector (Greatrex et al. 2015). Weather index insurance can thus become 
an important part of the climate-smart tool kit for increasing agricultural 
productivity and incomes by allowing smallholder farmers to adapt and 
build resilience to weather shocks. In addition, the safeguards provided 
by insurance may enable farmers to access credit and adopt riskier but 
higher-yielding technologies, raising their productivity and improving 
their incomes. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter highlights insurance opportuni-
ties for protecting smallholder farmers against weather-related risks. It is 
organized as follows: the next two sections outline the different types of, 
respectively, traditional and formal coping strategies against weather risk. 
Subsequent sections discuss Africa’s experience with formal risk-coping 
strategies, including weather index insurance, and explore linkages and 
complementarities between weather-related risk-coping strategies and 
climate-smart agriculture, as well as new developments and opportunities 
for scaling up weather index insurance. The final section highlights key 
messages and policy implications for achieving the Malabo Declaration goal 
of enhancing the resilience of livelihoods to weather shocks.
Traditional Risk-Coping Strategies
In the absence of efficient and widespread tools to cope with weather risks, 
rural households in developing countries have traditionally resorted to a 
number of different informal risk-coping mechanisms for protecting their 
livelihoods from unexpected shocks.
The most universal of these is probably savings. Households around 
the world understand the benefits and generally pursue the holding of 
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savings. Savings, however, can take several forms: although many people 
save in cash, others save by building up assets (even small-scale assets, such 
as poultry or livestock); although many prefer saving in a bank, some still 
choose saving under a mattress. A buffer of savings can certainly help when 
a negative event affects the household. Yet there are drawbacks. Banks fail; 
animals age and become sick; money stuck away can catch fire, get flooded, 
or become food for insects and other creatures. In addition, households 
exist socially, and readily available stocks of money are regularly under 
pressure for alternative uses by the household or for the needs of others. 
A second strategy, closely related to savings, is formal or informal 
credit. Savings and credit are both mechanisms that turn a stream of small 
amounts of money into one larger lump sum. The difference is that in credit, 
the lump sum comes first, with the stream of small payments following it, 
whereas for savings, the process is the reverse. In addition, credit bears a 
cost in the form of interest, but so do savings, which are prone to the above-
mentioned risks and subject to loss of value through inflation (in the case of 
cash) and price fluctuations (in the case of savings in kind). 
However, neither credit nor savings is a good form of insurance, 
principally for reasons of timing: when needs arise unexpectedly, credit 
may be in high demand or simply not available, and savings stocks may 
not yet be sufficient to be of help. Moreover, formal credit is not available to 
all, particularly the poorest households, who often lack required collateral. 
Informal credit (that is, from local moneylenders) generally comes with 
high interest rates that can quickly turn a small, temporary shock into an 
untenable burden if not handled appropriately—particularly a problem 
in poor rural communities with low education levels and a lack of overall 
financial literacy.
To overcome these limitations, households resort to other types of 
informal mechanisms when disaster strikes, usually borrowing from other 
households in their social network, including family and friends. This type 
of informal insurance can be effective, timely, and overall, inexpensive 
relative to other alternatives. Nevertheless, though loans and gifts from 
other households have the potential to protect from idiosyncratic shocks 
(that is, unexpected losses that affect a limited number of households within 
a locality or social network), they are ill suited to protect against systemic 
(or generalized) shocks, which affect most households in a given region and 
thus undermine their capacity to support each other.
Certain types of semiformal insurance have sprouted over the last few 
decades (though they have much older historical roots). One example is 
burial societies, particularly common in Africa, whereby households come 
together into informal groups and regularly contribute a small amount in 
exchange for a—generally fixed—larger payment in the event of a death in 
the family. Unfortunately, these kinds of institutions are rarely available to 
handle agricultural risks. Other semiformal institutions prolific in Africa 
are rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), which consist of 
a self-organized group of individuals who contribute a small amount of 
money at fixed periods of time (such as every week), the total of which is 
assigned each period to a different member of the ROSCA as a lump sum to 
be used at the individual’s will. Even though several variations exist on the 
ROSCA model, they all generally suffer from the same issues as the other 
strategies mentioned above, such as imperfect timing and an inability to 
help under systemic shocks that affect all households.
A final important way in which agricultural households regularly 
protect themselves from weather and other risks is by diversifying their 
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income sources. Diversification can take shape either through carrying out 
different agricultural activities (such as staggering the planting of crops 
or choosing a mix of crops with different sensitivities to weather events) 
or through engaging in other agricultural and rural nonfarm activities. 
A related strategy is that of reducing agricultural risk exposure by either 
planting crops less vulnerable to weather risks or choosing more resilient 
crop varieties. Unfortunately, these alternatives often generate lower profit 
and have lower yield potential, thus precluding the household from increas-
ing its income and escaping poverty.
All in all, though they are important and essential for dealing with a 
large array of shocks, most traditional risk-coping strategies are costly and 
have limited risk-mitigation potential for systemic weather risks (Townsend 
1994). Informal savings are perhaps too costly for a population that probably 
should better invest its resources in assuring adequate food intake for 
household members, in improving human capital, and in seizing productive 
opportunities. In addition, diversification strategies may come at an effi-
ciency cost—that is, they may impede rural farmers from capturing the full 
range of benefits from specialization or keep them from investing in risky 
capital and technology with higher expected incomes.
Formal Risk-Coping Strategies
Formal risk-sharing mechanisms take advantage of the fact that, across a 
large enough population, only a fraction of individuals may suffer a negative 
shock. For example, in a given year, only a small fraction of drivers will 
be involved in a car accident. By pooling risks within a large population, 
formal insurance programs can provide an efficient risk-sharing mechanism 
in which all contribute with premiums but only those who experience a 
loss get compensated. Furthermore, because insurance markets can pool 
risks across a broad scope of activities and large geographic areas, they can 
lower the costs of dealing with systemic risks through diversification. The 
most common type of insurance is known as indemnity insurance, whereby 
compensation relies on identifying specific losses and indemnifying the 
individual against them.
Although in theory, the same principles should be applied to weather 
risks and rural populations, the reality is that most countries lack standard 
indemnity agricultural insurance markets (with the exception of certain 
developed countries or large subsidized systems in a few developing ones, 
usually involving considerable public intervention). Multiple-peril crop 
insurance, for example, which can protect against any source of risk affect-
ing yields, has been unsuccessful commercially without large subsidies. 
Single-peril crop insurance, which covers against a specific factor affecting 
the crop (such as hail or wind), has had more success, though it has been 
developed only at modest scales (Smith and Goodwin 2010).
There are a number of reasons why agricultural indemnity insurance 
has failed to expand successfully in developing countries, including those in 
Africa. Possibly the most important is that among small farmers the costs 
of loss verification, which typically requires a site visit, can be substantial 
relative to the sum being insured, especially when rural infrastructure is 
inadequate. Moreover, the lack of formal financial service networks and 
legal records may add to the cost of premium collection and compensation 
disbursement. Second, indemnity insurance is prone to significant informa-
tion asymmetry problems, such as adverse selection (whereby only the most 
at-risk farmers purchase insurance) and moral hazard (whereby an insured 
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farmer may not exert optimal effort to reduce risk or mitigate its impact), 
both of which generally result in an increased cost (Hazell, Pomareda, and 
Valdes 1986). 
In view of these market failures, an increasing trend has been to explore 
an alternative type of weather insurance product for smallholder farmers 
(Hazell et al. 2010). Under weather index insurance, a somewhat recent 
innovation that is possibly more suitable for rural areas in developing coun-
tries, farmers get a pre-specified compensation according to the value of a 
particular weather variable (the index).26 For instance, an index insurance 
product against drought would pay farmers when rainfall (as measured 
at a specific weather station or by satellite images) is less than a certain 
predefined “trigger,” generally with higher payments the lower the recorded 
rainfall is. The key assumption is that by carefully selecting a weather index, 
one should be able to estimate agricultural losses with a sufficient level of 
confidence.
Some regard index-based insurance as having great potential to reach 
smallholder farmers in developing countries because (1) payouts are 
based only on publicly observed data (the index), drastically reducing loss 
verification costs; (2) adverse selection and moral hazard problems are 
26 A slightly different type of index insurance, area-yield insurance, does not rely on a weather 
variable as its index but instead focuses on whether the average yield over a specified area is 
greater or less than a threshold.
minimized;27 and (3) compensations can be automatically determined 
and thus disbursed quickly to farmers, making insurance easier and 
cheaper to administer, and thus potentially more affordable for the rural 
poor. These characteristics of index insurance have attracted donors and 
governments alike. Over the past two decades, many international organi-
zations, researchers, and microfinance institutions have conducted pilots 
in developing countries, including several African ones, to demonstrate the 
advantages of index insurance and learn the best implementation practices, 
with the general aim of scaling up these pilots (Hazell et al. 2010).
In general, index insurance pilots in developing countries have repeat-
edly experienced low uptake, which has been linked to certain constraints 
such as lack of trust in the insurance company, lack of understanding of 
the product, and liquidity constraints (Cole et al. 2013, Matul et al. 2013). 
Though all of these constraints are also applicable to traditional indemnity 
insurance, there is one disadvantage that is unique to index insurance: basis 
risk. Basis risk arises due to an index’s inadequacy to perfectly capture the 
individual losses of an insured farmer, which can be related to a number 
of factors. First, the index is generally measured at a local weather station 
(or through not-fully-accurate satellite imagery), not at the farmer’s plot. 
27 Because losses are assessed not directly but only through the value of an objective index, the 
farmer’s effort does not affect the probability of a payout—thus moral hazard considerations 
are dealt with. Additionally, because the probability of a payout is assessed objectively from the 
historical values of the index, the insurance company should not be concerned about which 
type of farmer buys this insurance—thus adverse selection is dealt with. However, under 
some circumstances, temporal adverse selection may still be present, whereby farmers buy 
the insurance product only in seasons in which payouts are expected to be higher (relying, for 
instance, on weather forecasts or levels of soil moisture at the beginning of the season). Although 
such behavior would tend to undermine an insurance product’s sustainability, it can be generally 
dealt with by, for instance, controlling the time frame during which farmers can purchase 
insurance.
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Second, a simple weather index cannot capture the interplay of weather 
variables (temperature, rainfall, humidity, evapotranspiration, winds, 
and the like), nor can it account for variability in crop variety, soil quality, 
and farming practices. Third, other, nonweather events, such as pests and 
diseases, may impact crop growth. Hence there is a chance that a farmer, 
after having paid the premium, will not get a compensation even after 
experiencing a loss. On the other hand, it is also possible that a farmer will 
get compensation without experiencing a loss.
Despite these obstacles, there have indeed been a number of seemingly 
successful implementations of index insurance. In India alone, more than 9 
million farmers annually purchase these hedging products to insure against 
weather risk (Clarke et al. 2012), although this high uptake can be partly 
explained by the fact that agricultural insurance is mandatory in order 
to gain access to subsidized agricultural loans from the government. In 
the United States, a large federal index-based insurance program protects 
farmers against a variety of weather risks, although the system is highly 
subsidized. In Africa, some index insurance experiences have been relatively 
successful, such as the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, which has helped to 
increase the resilience of farming households to weather-related shocks in 
Ethiopia and Senegal. This and other examples of Africa’s experience with 
risk-coping strategies are discussed next.
Africa’s Experience with Risk-Coping 
Strategies
Insurance services are still very much underprovided in Africa. According 
to Assah and others (2017), in Senegal, 18,540 producers benefited from a 
policy against drought in 2015, whereas close to 700,000 farmers remained 
without coverage. In Mali, only 30,000 farmers, fewer than 1 percent of the 
total, were insured in 2014. In addition to information asymmetry problems, 
other factors constraining the development of insurance markets in Africa 
include illiteracy among farmers, their inability to service loans, limited 
solvency among insurers, and a hostile regulatory environment in some 
countries (Assah et al. 2017). Mahul and Stutley (2010) reported that gov-
ernment support for agricultural insurance premiums is very small in Africa. 
For example, governments cover only 3 percent of agricultural insurance 
premiums on the African continent, compared with 50 percent in Asia and 
73 percent in the United States and Canada. 
Nonetheless, promising examples are burgeoning across Africa, thanks 
to financial and technological innovations in the insurance sector, as well 
as overall economic progress. As argued above, one of the most promising 
innovations in agricultural insurance is index-based insurance. Therefore 
we focus below on successful index insurance case studies on the continent. 
R4 Rural Resilience Initiative in Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Senegal, and Zambia (Formerly Horn of Africa Risk 
Transfer for Adaptation Project–HARITA)
In Ethiopia, several projects tackling agricultural resilience have incor-
porated index-based insurance (Table 6.1). Examples of these programs 
include the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer 
for Adaptation project (HARITA), and the Rural Resilience Enhancement 
Project, which have been implemented by the Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation, the World Bank, the UN World Food Programme (WFP), 
Oxfam America, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
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TABLE 6.1—PILOT AGRICULTURE INSURANCE PROJECTS IN ETHIOPIA  
Subsector Weather index insurance Indemnity insurance
Crops • World Bank initiative for maize in Alaba woreda
• Nyala Insurance Company (NISCO) / World Food 
Programme / Lume Adama Farmers Cooperative Union 
for beans in Bofa (Boset woreda)
• Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation program by 
Oxfam America and consortium of partners in Tigray 
Region
• International Food Policy Research Institute and 
consortium of partners for bundle of prevalent crops in 
SNNPR and Oromia regions
NISCO multiperil crop insurance 
for teff, wheat, lentils, beans, and 
chickpeas in Oromia Region
Livestock International Livestock Research Institute’s (ILRI) index-
based livestock insurance (IBLI)
Pilot of high-value livestock 
insurance by World Bank and 
Association for Ethiopian 
Microfinance Institutions
Source: Bhushan et al. (2016).
Note: A woreda is a local administrative division in Ethiopia. SNNPR = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region.
TABLE 6.2—EXPANSION OF HORN OF AFRICA RISK TRANSFER FOR 















2009 200 2,500 10,200 0 Ethiopia
2010 1,300 27,000 73,000 0 Ethiopia
2011 13,000 215,000 940,000 17,000 Ethiopia, Senegal
2012 18,000 275,000 1,300,000 320,000 Ethiopia, Senegal
2013 20,000 283,000 1,200,000 24,000 Ethiopia, Senegal
2014 26,000 306,000 1,500,000 38,000 Ethiopia, Senegal
2015 32,000 370,000 2,200,000 450,000 Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia
Source: WFP (2017).
R4, in Ethiopia and Senegal, is perhaps one of the most suc-
cessful initiatives for enhancing agricultural resilience. Before 
launching R4 in 2011, however, the Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation, in partnership with the World Bank, had 
launched an index insurance program for Ethiopian farmers in 
the form of a deficit rainfall index insurance for maize in 2006. 
Unfortunately, this initiative encountered many challenges—
especially lack of sufficient data—that limited its expansion. 
Greatrex and others (2015), for instance, highlighted inefficien-
cies in data collection from weather stations, limited financial 
capacity of cooperatives, and limited bank involvement due to 
the cost and time associated with incorporating weather risk 
assessments into their procedures.
Then in 2009, Oxfam America and the Relief Society of 
Tigray launched HARITA, initially covering 200 Ethiopian 
farmers. Building on the success of HARITA, Oxfam America 
and partners launched R4 in Ethiopia in 2011 and eventually 
expanded it to Senegal (Greatrex et al. 2015). By 2014, growth 
of the program was impressive: more than 24,000 farmers 
in Ethiopia and 2,000 in Senegal were covered (Table 6.2). 
And in 2015, R4 distributed about US$450,000 in payouts to 
43,000 farmers in Ethiopia, Senegal, and Malawi. One of the 
key features that R4 borrowed from HARITA that is perhaps 
responsible for a large portion of its success was the concept 
of “insurance for work,” which allowed poor farmers to 
afford insurance by paying for it through their own labor in 
resilience-related community projects.
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Currently operating in Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia, the 
R4 program is based on four risk-management strategies: building risk 
reserves (savings); promoting risk reduction (through growth of assets); 
prudent risk taking (relying on microfinance and diversification); and risk 
transfer (index insurance), which allows for the transfer of components of 
risk that cannot be mitigated by using the other strategies. In addition, the 
program is complemented by training for farmers on the properties and 
application of index insurance and on risk management principles.
Madajewicz, Tsegay, and Norton (2013) evaluated the impact of the R4 
program and found that among insured farmers, the level of grain reserves 
had increased, savings had more than doubled (a 123 percent increase 
on average), and the number of oxen owned had increased by 25 percent. 
Vulnerable groups, particularly women farmers, had benefited significantly 
from the program. In comparison, uninsured farmers did not fare as well. 
In Senegal, an impact evaluation by WFP and Oxfam America (2015) 
revealed that in the presence of the same shocks, farmers who had enrolled 
in the R4 initiative fared better in maintaining their food security than 
those who had not enrolled.28
28 In particular, enrollees’ food consumption score (FCS) dropped from 59.02 to 56.24 between 
2013 and 2015, whereas nonparticipants’ FCS witnessed a decrease from 56.2 to 28.6 in the same 
period.
Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise (ACRE) 
in Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania (formerly 
Kilimo Salama) 
In 2009, the Syngenta Foundation launched Kilimo Salama in Kenya, with a 
pilot project offering index insurance to 200 farmers. By 2012, the insurance 
program had more than 51,000 subscribers in Kenya and 14,000 in Rwanda 
(IFC 2013). In Kenya, premium payments averaged 19 million Kenya 
shillings (KSh) in 2011 and KSh 33 million in 2012. In 2014, the program 
was transferred to Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise Inc. (ACRE), a 
for-profit enterprise. By 2016, ACRE had more than 1 million subscribed 
farmers in Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania, insuring more than US$56 million 
in crops against various types of weather risks (ACRE 2017).
ACRE is an insurance agent and surveyor based in Kenya, Rwanda, and 
Tanzania. It operates as an intermediary institution among different stake-
holders along the agricultural insurance value chain. ACRE’s primary goal 
is to help insurance companies add index products to their portfolios, using 
actuarial and product development expertise. Participating stakeholders 
include local insurers (who carry risk, document policies, and pay claims), 
reinsurers (who price policies and reinsure risk), farmers (who access insur-
ance services), and farmer aggregators (organizations insured on behalf of 
farmers, such as banks, microfinance institutions, and agribusinesses).
ACRE is considered the largest commercial (that is, with farmers paying 
a market premium) index insurance program in developing countries and 
the largest agricultural insurance program in SSA (Greatrex et al. 2015). It 
is also the first-ever agricultural insurance program to reach smallholder 
farmers using mobile phones. ACRE offers a wide range of products, such 
as indemnity coverage, dairy insurance, hybrid seed index insurance, and 
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multiperil crop insurance, and uses several data sources for its indexes, 
including automatic weather stations and remote sensing technologies. 
Targeted crops under the program include maize, sorghum, coffee, sun-
flowers, wheat, cashew nuts, and potatoes, with coverage against drought, 
excess rain, and large storms. The insurance operates through three main 
channels: the distribution of seeds via mobile phone network location 
services; agribusinesses; and banks, microfinance institutions, and credit 
cooperatives along the agricultural value chain. By facilitating enrollment 
and electronic payment, M-Pesa29 is arguably one of the most important 
factors behind the program’s success. Overall, ACRE’s success is credited 
to the involvement of a wide range of partners, including government 
institutions (ministries of agriculture and national meteorological services), 
financial institutions, mobile network companies, research institutions, and 
insurance and reinsurance companies.
Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) in Kenya 
and Ethiopia
The index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) program in Ethiopia and Kenya 
was launched in 2010 with the objective of improving the resilience of 
pastoralist households against droughts and facilitating investments in live-
stock and access to credit (Mude et al. 2010; Miranda and Mulangu 2016). 
The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) teamed up with the 
University of California, Davis, to design an index-based livestock insurance 
relying on the normalized difference vegetation index (NVDI). The NVDI 
is calculated from remotely sensed satellite measurements and used to 
29  M-Pesa is a mobile phone–based money transfer, financing, and microfinancing service, launched 
in 2007 by Vodafone for Safaricom and Vodacom, the largest mobile network operators in Kenya 
and Tanzania.
estimate the availability of forage for livestock. The project derived a statisti-
cal relationship between the NVDI and livestock mortality data to serve as a 
basis for insurance payouts. In February 2017, the government of Kenya, in 
partnership with Kenyan insurers, announced payments to more than 12,000 
pastoral households under IBLI.
At least 4,000 pastoralists in both Ethiopia and Kenya were covered 
by IBLI in 2015. The program provided substantial benefits to households, 
who were less likely to sell their livestock and in some cases increased their 
number of livestock and improved their overall food security (Janzen and 
Carter 2013). Thanks to the substantial learning process from experiences 
on the ground, the IBLI initiative keeps expanding across Kenya. After the 
historic 2016 drought in northern Kenya, which caused the worst forage 
scarcity in the region for 16 years, more than KSh 214 million was disbursed 
in payouts to 12,000 pastoral households in 6 counties.
In 2015, the government of Kenya, supported by the World Bank, 
launched the Kenya Livestock Insurance Program (KLIP) using a design 
based on the NVDI. In October 2015, KLIP covered the livestock of 5,000 
pastoralists in 2 counties (ILRI 2017). Further expansions are planned in 
2017.
Other Index Insurance Experiences in Africa
As a whole, the African continent has been at the vanguard of index 
insurance’s upward trend during the past decade. Though the previous sub-
sections have focused on the most important experiences, a detailed account 
of the remaining ones is beyond the scope of this chapter. In order to fill this 
gap, Table 6.3 summarizes other weather index insurance projects conducted 
across a number of African countries.
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TABLE 6.3—SUMMARY OF KEY AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE INITIATIVES IN AFRICA  
Country Description 
Ghana • Under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the government launched the Ghana Agricultural Insurance Pool in 2011, with 19 Ghanaian insurance companies participating.
• Pool products focus on drought index insurance for maize, soybeans, sorghum, and millet; however, there are few multiperil crop insurance plans for risk experienced by 
commercial farmers and plantations.
Kenya • In addition to the projects described above, the government of Kenya launched the Kenya National Agricultural Insurance Program (KNAIP) in March 2016, focusing on insurance 
for maize and wheat crops and for livestock.
• KNAIP will follow the area yield–based approach: the farming area is divided into insurance units, and if the average production in an insurance unit falls below a threshold yield 
(based on the historical average yield for that unit), the insured farmers within the insurance unit receive a payout. 
• Implementation of the program started in three counties, Bungoma, Embu, and Nakuru, and will be extended to 33 of the country’s 47 counties by 2020.
Malawi • In 2005, the World Bank, in collaboration with Malawi’s National Association of Small Farmers, developed an index-based crop insurance contract. 
• The pilot was implemented in the areas of Kasungu, Nhkotakota, Lilongwe North, and Chitedze.
• In 2005, 892 groundnut farmers purchased weather-based crop insurance policies for total premiums of US$36,600. 
• In 2007, the pilot was expanded to cash crops. By 2008, the number of participants had increased significantly, with 2,600 farmers buying policies worth US$2.5 million.
Mali • PlaNet Guarantee (an international microinsurance facilitator) sold its first insurance products in 2011 for maize crops; roughly 14,000 farmers were insured in 2014. 
• A second product was launched in 2011, a satellite-based index insurance for maize and cotton in partnership with Allianz; 17,481 policies were sold in 2014.
Mozambique • In late 2012, two pilot projects were started by Guy Carpenter & Company LLC in conjunction with the Asia Risk Centre, including weather index–based insurance products 
covering two crops: maize in the district of Chimoio and cotton in the districts of Lalaua and Monapo.
• 43,000 cotton farmers and a small number of maize farmers were insured in 2012/2013; a total of 43,500 policies were sold.
• In the future, the Cotton Institute of Mozambique plans to expand index insurance coverage to all cotton farmers in Mozambique, numbering approximately 200,000.
Nigeria • The Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC) is the primary agency providing insurance.
• Crop insurance packages currently cover 17 crops, including maize, rice, cassava, yams, and sorghum.
• Livestock insurance packages currently cover 14 types of livestock, including cattle, poultry, pigs, rabbits, and sheep.
• In May 2013, NAIC paid more than 500 million Nigerian naira (N) in claims to insured farmers who had suffered losses in the floods in 2012.
• In 2014, NAIC paid N 80 million in compensation to a sugar farm in Adamawa State following natural disasters.
South Africa • In South Africa, agriculture insurance began in the 1970s, operating at two levels: commercial and subsistence farming. 
• The government has implemented subsidized crop insurance to make it affordable to farmers.
• Currently, South Africa has insurance against hail and winds, but not drought. Under the existing scenario, farmers in good agricultural areas with low risk do not need subsidized 
insurance.
• Agri SA, a federation of South African agricultural organizations, focuses its insurance efforts on commercial farmers, who number about 40,000, representing 20 percent of the 
farming population and producing 80 percent of the country’s food.
• The livestock insurance market in South Africa, although limited, is growing; racehorses are insured, and there is a market for insurance of wildlife in game parks.
Tanzania • Apart from the pilot projects mentioned above, agricultural insurance for smallholder farmers is generally absent from the market.
• The National Insurance Corporation launched a livestock insurance product in 1996 targeting only zero-grazing livestock keepers. The program failed because the majority of 
livestock herders were migratory pastoralists. 
Source: Authors’ summary from Bhushan et al. (2016).
80   resakss.org
Africa’s successful experiences with smallholder agricultural insurance 
against extreme weather events shows the importance of investments in 
weather station infrastructure, widespread and inexpensive distribution 
networks for collecting premiums and disbursing payouts, and reliable and 
timely data collection and analysis to help reduce basis risk (Hill 2010). 
Educating smallholder farmers on weather insurance and its benefits is key 
to increasing its uptake and thus making insurance less costly. In cases in 
which selling insurance on its own has been less successful, the example of 
Malawi shows the potential benefits of tying insurance to credit, which can 
encourage a virtuous cycle of credit, enabling farmers to purchase modern 
agricultural inputs and increase their productivity (Leftley 2009).
Despite these successful experiences, agricultural insurance is still 
largely at the pilot stage in several countries, including Benin, Ethiopia, 
Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania (Bhushan et al. 2016). Moreover, 
countries continue to depend on international assistance to deal with the 
effects of extreme weather, and governments have not made the much-
needed investments to help develop effective insurance markets. Among 
these investments, creating an enabling policy and regulatory environment 
that supports the expansion of insurance markets and programs should be 
high on the agenda, including developing insurance products that better 
serve the needs of smallholder farmers. Governments will also need to lead 
the way in insurance infrastructure investments (such as weather stations 
and product distribution networks), building the capacity of insurance 
companies, and training farmers on insurance products (Hill 2010). Finally, 
some form of government insurance subsidy may be required to enable 
higher uptake of insurance, such as the uptake rates seen in developed 
countries with highly subsidized insurance programs. 
The Road Ahead and Opportunities
The African experience shows that index insurance has potential as a 
formal, efficient risk management tool for farmers in developing countries. 
However, for it to be truly brought to scale globally, its limitations have to be 
addressed. This section describes a broad set of issues related to the opportu-
nities for index insurance and the main innovations to consider in the future.
Complementarities with climate-smart agriculture. Climate-smart 
agriculture (CSA) has gained popularity during the past decade as an essen-
tial step toward climate adaptation by rural farming communities. CSA 
refers to agricultural technologies that are well suited to increase farmers’ 
livelihoods in the face of a changing climate by (1) raising agricultural pro-
ductivity, (2) building the resilience of livelihoods and farming systems, and 
(3) reducing carbon emissions. In some cases, these technologies involve 
reducing the vulnerability of crops to certain weather risks. In this regard, 
CSA shares a similar objective with crop insurance. Due to the similarities 
between these two families of technologies, a recent strand of work has 
focused on evaluating the potential for complementarities between them.
One of the most important examples of a complementarity between 
weather index insurance and a CSA technology is drought-tolerant (DT) 
seed varieties. DT seed varieties represent an important avenue of progress 
in seed breeding and are now available for a number of crops across several 
agroclimatic zones. DT seeds are particularly interesting from a develop-
ment point of view because they can potentially bring about improved food 
security and protect rural livelihoods in the face of prolonged droughts.
Although the main characteristic of such seed varieties is their resis-
tance to mild or moderate lack of soil moisture, crop failure is generally an 
inevitable result under an extreme drought, with the added consequence 
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of farmers’ being worse off due to having to repay the higher cost of DT 
seeds. Weather index insurance, on the other hand, is not very well suited 
to handle moderate drought because it tends to be expensive under a high 
frequency of loss (insurance premiums must be high to account for frequent 
payouts). Nevertheless, because extreme drought events occur much more 
rarely and are generally easier to identify through an index (compared with 
more moderate events that may or may not damage crops), weather index 
insurance boasts natural comparative advantages to handle this layer of risk. 
It is natural to see, thus, that a holistic system—wherein farmers rely first on 
DT seeds to inexpensively cover more frequent and milder drought risks, 
and in addition rely on reduced-cost 
catastrophic index insurance against 
extreme events—could provide farmers 
with more complete protection against 
all potential scenarios, thus more effi-
ciently handling drought risk at a much 
lower cost than any of the above stand-
alone technologies would be able to 
achieve (Lybbert and Carter 2015; Ward 
et al. 2015). Figure 6.1 shows a visual 
representation of this complementarity.
Other aspects of the synergies 
between CSA and index insurance 
are starting to be explored. One such 
exploration looked at a CSA practice 
known as conservation agriculture 
(CA) in a project in the wheat-rice 
system in the Indo-Gangetic Plain of India. Under CA, rice residue is left on 
the field at harvest and wheat seeds are sown directly through the residue 
into the soil using special machinery. Sowing the wheat seeds through this 
layer of residue has several advantages, including increased tolerance to high 
temperatures and reduced risk of lodging (bending of the plant due to wet 
soil and winds), because the plant sits deeper in the soil than under other 
planting methods. Similar to the DT scenario described above, adopting 
CA technology can inexpensively protect wheat from mild but frequent 
risks, and index insurance can complement this advantage by providing less 
expensive coverage against more extreme events. 


































Source: Adapted from Lybbert and Carter (2015).
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Finally, another way in which index insurance can partner with CSA 
technologies is by encouraging CSA adoption. Many farmers generally 
refrain from adopting CSA practices due to the inevitable uncertainty and 
higher perceived risks than keeping to more traditional practices. In these 
contexts, index insurance can give a farmer the necessary peace of mind 
to try out a new technology. Such an approach could either complement 
or substitute for standard subsidies for encouraging CSA adoption; more 
research is needed to understand the optimal interplay between the two 
mechanisms.
New developments in index insurance. Confronted with the issue 
of low uptake and high basis risk, index insurance researchers and prac-
titioners have developed some promising new ways to deal with these 
limitations.
An interesting new project led by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) is Picture-Based Crop Insurance (PBI), currently 
being tested in the states of Punjab and Haryana, India. Under PBI, farmers 
take pictures of their insured plots every week using their own smartphones 
and a specially designed app that keeps the frame of view fixed on the 
same portion of the field. Using the pictures recorded over time, a farmer 
can then make a claim for any loss experienced, which can be assessed by 
agronomic experts or an automated machine-learning algorithm, based 
on the pictures and auxiliary information. This type of product can greatly 
reduce basis risk and encourage uptake by instilling in the farmer a sense 
of ownership of the insurance product and its results. Initial results are 
very promising, in terms of both the feasibility of the approach (Kramer, 
Ceballos, Hufkens, et al. 2017) and its sustainability, with no evidence of 
moral hazard or adverse selection (as would be expected from the product’s 
resemblance to indemnity-based insurance), nor of picture tampering or 
fraud (Kramer, Ceballos, Krupoff, et al. 2017).
Another strand of projects has explored the potential of allowing for 
more flexibility as an alternative to current rigid, one-size-fits-all index 
insurance designs. Traditionally, index insurance products have involved a 
number of parameters and predetermined payout functions. These features 
sometimes make a product difficult to understand for farmers lacking suf-
ficient education. More important, because the payout functions are fixed, 
the insurance product cannot adapt to the risk profile of many farmers 
the way an indemnity product would. In this context, a team at IFPRI has 
proposed a novel approach, wherein an array of much simpler products is 
offered, each covering against a specific timing and intensity of risk. Under 
such an approach, a farmer can create a portfolio of products (with different 
triggers, calibrated to protect against weather events of various intensities, 
and for different coverage periods) to suit his or her individual crop risk 
profile. Evidence from three projects suggests that farmers do indeed value 
this simplicity and flexibility.30
Gap insurance, consisting of a second tier of indemnity insurance 
on top of a regular index product, has been considered as a promising 
alternative to traditional index products.31 Under such a program, when the 
first-tier index product is not triggered, farmers have the right to call for 
30 For a theoretical framework and evidence from field experiments in Ethiopia, see Hill and Robles 
(2011). A pilot application of this approach in India is described in Hill, Robles, and Ceballos 
(2016). For a description of a commercial rollout in Uruguay, together with a structural analysis of 
the demand for these products, see Ceballos and Robles (2017).
31 For an application of gap insurance in Ethiopia, see, for instance, Berhane et al. (2015). 
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crop cuts in a reduced geographic area in order to assess losses locally.32
A related idea is multiscale (or double-trigger) area yield insurance, under 
which a product combines two area yield indexes measured at different geo-
graphic levels—a broader geographic index with a higher trigger and a local 
index with a lower trigger—with payouts occurring when both indexes fall 
below their corresponding triggers.33 Measuring yields at a very local level 
reduces basis risk, and the broader area index helps reduce moral hazard. 
Finally, the increasing affordability of automatic weather stations and 
the expanding technologies for remote sensing of weather variables and 
crop growth (such as microsatellites and unmanned aerial vehicles) have 
an enormous potential to underpin innovative insurance products with 
reduced basis risk in the near future.
Meso-level products. A different approach to minimizing basis risk that 
has gained traction recently entails a shift from insuring individual farmers 
to insuring so-called aggregators—such as farmer associations, other formal 
or informal groups, and microfinance institutions.34 For instance, an institu-
tion holding a significant portfolio of agricultural loans may be interested in 
insuring it against severe systemic shocks that may otherwise result in large 
loan write-offs. An advantage of such systems is that, with efficient mecha-
nisms to identify individual losses and appropriate payout practices by the 
aggregators, individual (idiosyncratic) negative and positive basis risks can 
largely offset each other in the aggregate portfolio.
32 Taking crop cuts is a procedure to obtain an objective measure of crop yield by cutting a small, 
random sample of the field (for example, 1 square meter) right before harvest and weighing the 
produce in this sample. The process is repeated across random samples in an area to obtain an 
objective estimate of the area’s yield for a given crop. 
33 See, for instance, Elabed et al. (2013).
34 See de Janvry, Dequiedt, and Sadoulet (2014) and Dercon et al. (2014).
Macro-level products. One of the most important elements behind 
limited crop insurance uptake in developing and developed countries alike 
has perhaps been the state’s traditional role as risk absorber of last resort. 
Once a major weather shock hits, it is fairly common for national, regional, 
or local governments to give in to the pressure for emergency assistance. 
This type of assistance is generally inefficient, difficult to administer, 
and prone to political favoritism and corruption. Most important, it is 
often uncertain—there is no guarantee that adequate assistance will be 
provided when there is a crop failure or livestock loss. Moreover, in many 
of these emergencies the state’s budget capacity is also reduced due to 
lower economic activity and tax revenues. In this context, there has been 
an increasing trend around the world toward ex ante budgeting for natural 
disasters (through risk-coping instruments such as insurance), to the detri-
ment of ex post assistance after a disaster strikes (Clarke and Dercon 2016).
One natural option has been macro-level insurance against weather 
risks, whereby the insured parties can be either different government levels 
(from national to local) or specialized government agencies. This type of 
insurance generally relies on an index and, upon the occurrence of an 
extreme weather event, makes a direct payout to the insured agency or local 
government to implement emergency relief and food security programs. 
Such arrangements are already being implemented in developed countries 
and are expanding into developing countries, particularly those prone to 
natural catastrophes (Hazell et al. 2010). Sometimes this type of instrument 
can be channeled directly through the international financial markets, 
through the issuing of so-called catastrophe (or cat) bonds. Such instru-
ments resemble regular sovereign bonds in that the issuing government 
promises to pay the bearer (generally attractive) interest under normal 
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scenarios, but under disaster scenarios, determined through well-specified 
conditions tied to the index, investors forgo the interest and some or all 
of the principal, in an arrangement resembling the structure of a typical 
insurance product. 
The creation of regional risk pools is another approach that has been 
gaining steam. Under such a system, subscribing sovereign states commit 
funds, receiving in return a type of macro-level insurance. These regional 
risk pools are generally funded through specialized trust funds supported 
by international donors, or through reinsurance agreements. The way they 
work is similar to the macro-level products described above, whereby upon 
the occurrence of a negative weather event (generally defined in terms of 
and captured through specific weather indexes), the sovereign state receives 
financial assistance to put toward social protection and reconstruction 
costs. African Risk Capacity (ARC), established in 2012 as an agency of 
the African Union, is an example of such a pool. In addition to covering 
member states against the devastating consequences of droughts, it provides 
technical and financial assistance to state governments for early response 
systems and emergency management plans.
Conclusions
In the face of climate change, improving the resilience of African smallholder 
farmers should constitute a top priority in policy makers’ agendas. In this 
regard, CSA constitutes a crucial step in the right direction. However, formal 
insurance mechanisms are needed to complete farmers’ tool kit to cope with 
weather shocks. 
Even though traditional crop indemnity insurance has not really taken 
off on the continent, other options have been brought forward in recent 
decades. Weather index insurance is a promising alternative with several 
advantages. First, it avoids moral hazard issues by decoupling insurance 
payouts from the farmer’s behavior. Second, it is not subject to adverse 
selection: payouts depend on objective, readily and publicly available infor-
mation, and are independent of the characteristics of the pool of insured 
farmers. Furthermore, the implementation and administration of index 
insurance is cheaper than that of traditional indemnity insurance because 
it does not require the insurance company to verify loss claims before 
making payouts. 
Nevertheless, index insurance has its own limitations, especially in 
relation to basis risk: because payouts are based on the observed index, any 
given farmer’s actual loss may not be completely compensated. Although 
a number of new developments intend to sort out this and other obstacles, 
it is perhaps too soon to take stock and understand whether they will be 
able to help improve smallholder farmers’ resilience in an efficient and 
sustainable way.
Evidence from several insurance pilot programs shows that although 
the potential for innovative insurance mechanisms is real, additional work 
to understand their effectiveness and substantial scale-up efforts will be 
needed to achieve a sustainable expansion of efficient agricultural insurance 
markets in Africa. Across the continent, a growing pool of experts and 
professionals from both public and private institutions are actively engaged 
in bringing in innovations, improving index products, and finding effective 
ways to scale up insurance programs. Importantly, in the face of shifting 
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weather patterns due to climate change, rating methodologies for index 
insurance products must adapt or run the risk of encouraging oversubscrip-
tion and thus undermining long-term sustainability. 
Governments, in particular, have an important role to play in creating 
an enabling policy and regulatory environment for the expansion of insur-
ance markets and development of insurance products that better serve the 
needs of smallholder farmers. They will also need to lead the way in invest-
ing in weather stations, building the capacity of insurance companies, and 
training farmers on insurance products. By supporting the implementation 
of innovative weather insurance products aimed at addressing prevailing 
challenges, policy makers can actively contribute to the resilience of the 
rural poor facing weather extremes and provide them with much-needed 
opportunities to escape poverty through farming.
In this context, African policy makers should consider innovative 
weather index insurance tools as part of a comprehensive CSA package 
to help African farmers manage weather risks, especially in light of 
the potential complementarities between weather index insurance and 
agricultural technologies aimed at raising productivity and incomes. 
Such efforts can go a long way in helping the continent meet the Malabo 
Declaration commitment to enhance the resilience of farming livelihoods 
by 2025.
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P
recision agriculture (PA) is an appealing concept, referring to a 
package of technologies that can reduce input costs by providing 
the farmer with the detailed information necessary to optimize 
field management practices, resulting in improvements in yields and 
profits as well as environmentally less burdensome production (National 
Research Council 1997; Schimmelpfennig 2016). For small farmers in 
developing countries in particular, PA holds the assurance of substantial 
yield improvement with minimal external input use (Florax, Voortman, 
and Brouwer 2002). 
Although the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that PA 
technologies were used on roughly 30 to 50 percent of US corn and soybean 
acres during the period 2010–2012 (Schimmelpfennig 2016), it appears 
that adoption of PA technologies is limited in Africa and Asia (Swinton 
and Lowenberg-DeBoer 2001). One reason for the low adoption rates may 
be that, as some studies reveal, increased input efficiencies result in rather 
modest profitability increases (Kilian 2000; Cook, Adams, and Bramley 
2000). Although precision farming can include simple practices, it does 
imply complex and intensely managed production systems, such as the use 
of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to spatially reference soil, 
water, and yield (NRCS 2007). The human capacity required to master the 
use of these technologies is not yet readily available in Africa.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), agriculture is the 
most important economic sector, accounting for 44.9 percent of the gross 
domestic product and employing more than 70 percent of the popula-
tion (62 percent of males and 84 percent of females). Undoubtedly, the 
agricultural sector remains the largest sector in terms of employment and 
thus constitutes the most promising foundation for achieving food security 
as well as overall economic development. However, this huge agricultural 
potential remains largely unexploited, with only about 10 percent of arable 
land being cultivated (Herdeschee, Kaiser, and Samba 2012).
Although food security is at the heart of economic and social 
development priorities in the DRC, and despite the country’s great 
agricultural potential combined with government efforts to alleviate 
poverty, the threat of food insecurity is still present. The country has been 
ranked first on the Global Hunger Index for several years; average daily 
food consumption is estimated at less than 1,500 kilocalories per person, 
well below the minimum of 1,800 per person required to maintain good 
health (USAID 2012, 2014). Food insecurity has been exacerbated by 
decades of conflict, reduced agricultural productivity, and migration out of 
rural areas. 
The growing population constitutes an additional constraint to 
achieving food security in the DRC. In 2017, the United Nations estimated 
a population of 82 million, with a growth rate of 3 percent per year 
(World Population Review 2017). The increasing competition for land by 
multiple users suggests that available land suitable for agriculture is likely 
to decrease. In order to meet the food demand of a growing population, 
efficient and sustainable cropland management is therefore crucial 
to increase crop productivity without further degrading the soil and 
depleting resources.
The vast majority (70 percent) of the rural population that depends on 
agriculture for its livelihood relies mainly on rainfall. Indeed, agriculture 
is primarily rainfed in the DRC and also characterized by crop rotation 
and slash-and-burn farming that leaves land fallow for up to five years 
and typically managed to only a very low output per hectare (World Bank 
2010). Maize, for instance—crucial to food security because it is the most 
frequently eaten cereal in the country (World Food Programme 2014)—is 
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grown by small-scale farmers, typically under rainfed conditions with 
low or no inputs. As a result, yields are very low and at risk to changes in 
weather patterns. 
In general, extreme weather events and increasing unpredictability in 
African weather patterns are already having serious consequences on crop 
yields for farmers who rely on rainfall. Though the western part of the DRC 
has good rainfall compared with the southern part, the area is still vulner-
able to climate change as a result of changes in rainfall and temperature 
patterns, as well as extreme weather events. Climate predictions suggest that 
some areas will get warmer and others wetter by 2050 (Harvey et al. 2014). 
In addition to changes in weather patterns, the agricultural sector 
faces other serious challenges that will require Congolese farmers to 
monitor and manage their farming operations more effectively using 
climate-smart agriculture (CSA) practices. There have been proposals to 
address concerns of food security and climate change using an integrated 
framework (FAO 2013a; Harvey et al. 2014). According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), CSA refers to land 
management practices that increase food security, boost the resilience and 
adaptive capacity of farmer households to climate variability, and mitigate 
climate change (FAO 2013a). Conservation agriculture, a combination of 
soil management practices including minimal soil disturbance, permanent 
soil cover, and crop rotation, is promoted across Africa south of the Sahara 
(SSA) and often labeled as “climate smart” (FAO 2013a). In fact, conserva-
tion agriculture practices have been found to address some of CSA’s goals 
under certain conditions (Sithole, Magwaza, and Mafongoya 2016). In short, 
CSA practices seek to increase agricultural production and incomes by 
adapting and building resilience to climate change. 
Similarly, the implementation of PA practices in farming operations has 
the potential to provide solutions to climate-related challenges and promote 
sustainable farming operations. For example, variable-rate application of 
seeds and nutrients based on inherent soil properties can increase yield in 
high-producing areas, maintain yield in low-producing areas, and reduce 
the use of costly inputs. Likewise, precision nitrogen (N) management can 
balance soil nutrient content, preventing unwanted nitrate leaching that can 
impair surface water and groundwater quality (Colorado State University 
Extension 2012). Indeed, established advantages of implementing improved 
cropland management practices include not only higher and more stable 
yields but also increased resilience, which will further improve food security 
(Abberton, Conant, and Batello 2010; Vallis et al. 1996; Pan et al. 2006; 
Woodfine 2009; Thomas 2008).
Although there is a great potential to increase agricultural production 
in the DRC, it is crucial for farmers to adopt these PA practices in order to 
increase their productivity while managing climate risks, thus improving 
their livelihoods. In order to achieve and maintain food security, agricul-
tural systems need to be transformed to increase the efficiency and capacity 
of agricultural production. Though the realization of this potential requires 
high levels of commitment, resources, and consideration of climate risks, 
it is crucial to answer the question of which technologies and practices are 
the most appropriate to reach these objectives. Special funding mechanisms 
are needed to improve smallholders’ access to PA. Moreover, PA practices 
should be included as a requirement for every new agriculture agricultural 
development project.
For this purpose, the government of the DRC has taken some steps 
toward developing a complete agricultural transformation strategy through 
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agricultural special economic zones (ASEZs) that take the form of agricul-
tural business parks (ABPs). The ABPs are perceived as the foundation for 
sustainable and inclusive development in the DRC. As Ulimwengu (2017) 
pointed out, the development of spatially targeted ASEZs has the highest 
potential among strategies being considered to induce a higher level of 
innovation and its fundamentals (human, social, manufactured, and knowl-
edge capital). The pilot ABP, created in 2014 and called Bukanga Lonzo 
Agricultural Business Park, is located 250 kilometers from Kinshasa (the 
capital city of the DRC). It stretches over more than 80,000 ha, between two 
major rivers (the Kwango and the Lonzo) in the western part of the country. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of PA on maize 
yields in western DRC by comparing input application with and without PA 
recommendations. We argue that PA recommendations are the core of CSA 
practices. This study will focus on maize because of its extended upstream 
and downstream value chains and because in the DRC, maize production 
serves both animal and human consumption.
While estimating the impacts of PA-induced CSA practices on maize 
yields, this study is an attempt to explicitly analyze the use of soil knowledge 
to guide optimal input use and cultivation methods in order to improve 
yields and farmers’ income. The study also examines how such knowledge 
can reinforce sustainable farming activities with respect to climate change. 
The goal is not only to report on changes in PA-induced maize yield but also 
to provide a better understanding of how PA helps determine the optimal 
cultivation method and the most efficient crop management practices to 
adopt in an area, given its specific soil conditions. The study uses georefer-
enced data on soil characteristics, inputs, and yield to assess the effects of 
CSA practices on a 10,000-ha plot in western DRC. 
The sections that follow give an overview of CSA and PA; describe the 
application of PA for agricultural development; discuss the implications 
of PA results for site-specific CSA practices; and look at expected benefits 
from implementing CSA practices. Policy implications are laid out in the 
concluding section. 
Climate-Smart and Precision Agriculture
Previous work on climate change impacts conducted in Africa suggests that 
maize, sorghum, and millet production is expected to decline significantly 
(by -5 percent, -14.5 percent, and -9.6 percent, respectively) (Knox et al. 
2012). A recent study (Ramirez-Villegas and Thornton 2015) has indicated 
that during the 21st century, maize output is projected to decrease at a rate 
of 3–5 tons35 per decade from historical levels as a result of climate change. 
The authors add that if no adaptation occurs, in the best scenario, total 
maize production in Africa will have decreased by 12 percent per year by 
the end of the century, whereas in the worst-case scenario it could be as low 
as 25 million tons per year, a 40 percent reduction. Considering all these 
challenges, countries such as the DRC should invest in technologies that 
promote sustainable intensification and adaptation to emerging climatic 
variability while also mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
CSA has been promoted as a way to overcome the challenge of increas-
ing food supply and improving food security in an environmentally 
sustainable way. The FAO describes CSA technologies, practices, and 
services as options that sustainably increase productivity, enhance resilience 
to climatic stresses, and reduce GHG emissions (FAO 2010). In the DRC, 
35  Throughout the chapter, tons refers to metric tons.
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enhancing food security will require agricultural production systems to 
move toward higher productivity and lower output variability due to climate 
factors. The goals are to make production systems resilient and to assure 
good management of natural resources.
One study (Porter et al. 2014) pointed out that the most cost-effective 
CSA options have been assumed to be cropland management, grazing land 
management, and restoration of organic soils. Several regions in Africa are 
experiencing degraded and poor soils, which cause a decline in productiv-
ity. Using a probabilistic cost-benefit analysis, Sain and colleagues (2017) 
assessed the introduction of CSA options in Guatemala and found that all 
examined practices except one were profitable over their life cycles, but 
those that were expected to be ideal for drought-prone areas presented 
higher risks for adoption. 
One example of an agricultural method for restoring organic soils and 
improving fertility is conservation agriculture (CA), with the following key 
characteristics: (1) minimal mechanical soil disturbance (that is, no tillage 
and direct seeding), (2) maintenance of much of the farm’s carbon-rich 
organic matter (that is, use of cover crops), and (3) rotations or sequences 
and associations of crops including trees. CA thus augments climate change 
adaptation and mitigation solutions while improving food security through 
sustainable production, intensification, and enhanced productivity of 
resource use (FAO 2010).
Several meta-studies have attempted to quantify the average benefits 
of CA practices. Lal (2009), for instance, concluded that mulching and 
no-till farming clearly improved soil health, sometimes improved yields, 
and usually improved profits due to lower inputs. Pretty and others (2006) 
gathered evidence on the effect of CA from 286 developing-country case 
studies of “best-practice” sustainable agriculture interventions, finding 
the average yield improvement to be more than 100 percent. Branca and 
colleagues (2011) undertook a comprehensive, empirical meta-analysis 
of 217 individual studies on CA from around the globe and showed that 
reduced tillage and crop residue management was associated with a 
106 percent increase in yield. A study conducted in southern Africa using 
the Agricultural Production Systems Simulator concluded that in semiarid 
environments, CA can improve yields in drier seasons and thus improve 
climate change resilience (FAO 2011). In subhumid environments, on the 
other hand, the same study found that CA offered little yield benefit, at least 
in the short term, due to the wet-season danger of waterlogging (FAO 2011), 
also mentioned by Thierfelder and Wall (2009, 2010). Other evidence of 
increased productivity with reduced- and no-tillage practices under rainfed 
agriculture is mixed. Meta-analyses show higher yields under CA than 
under conventional practices in a few cases, but benefits have varied based 
on soil type, precipitation, and application of N fertilizer (Rusinamhodzi 
et al. 2011; Farooq et al. 2011). Although the literature offers some evidence 
that CA has a positive effect on yields, the magnitude of this effect and how 
it interacts with climatic variables are still unclear. 
Another example of a soil-restoring and fertility-improving method is 
PA, encompassing a series of technologies for applying water, nutrients, and 
pesticides only where and when they are required, thus optimizing the use 
of inputs (Day, Audsley, and Frost 2008). Farmers using PA manage their 
crops based on the site-specific conditions in variable fields (Seelan et al. 
2003). PA provides the data necessary for farmers to make guided decisions 
about fertilizer and pesticide applications, seed distribution densities, irriga-
tion metrics, and tillage patterns (Daberkow and McBride 1998).
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Researchers have studied several aspects of PA, including technologies, 
environmental effects, economic outcomes, adoption rates, and drivers of 
adoption (Tey and Brindal 2012). Although many have acknowledged the 
method’s environmental and economic benefits, a low rate of PA adoption is 
still reported, especially in developing countries (adoption efforts have been 
initiated in Brazil, China, India, and Uruguay in recent years), and adoption 
has focused on cash crops.
Indeed, research has revealed that increased input efficiencies result 
in rather modest profitability increases (Kilian 2000), which could explain 
the rather low adoption rates (Cook, Adams, and Bramley 2000). Another 
obstacle could be the failure to apply fertilizers that appropriately match 
individual site characteristics (Florax, Voortman, and Brouwer 2002; 
Stewart and McBratney 2002; Bullock et al. 2009). 
Regarding profitability, Tey and Brindal (2012) noted that for farmers 
who have access to accurate information about the nutrient needs on their 
land, the precise application of fertilizer could reduce input costs. This 
conclusion is based on the assumption that the net savings from precise 
fertilizer application more than offset the cost of additional labor or the use 
of specialized equipment. 
Studies on the profitability of PA application have led to mixed results. 
In contrast to the studies mentioned above, showing that information-led 
application of pesticides would result in input cost savings, others (Carr 
et al. 1991; Biermacher et al. 2009) have found no significant difference 
in returns. Some studies also show that soil sampling tests for fertility do 
not lead to profitability (Lowenberg-DeBoer and Aghib 1999; Swinton and 
Lowenberg-DeBoer 1998). In an attempt to explain the mixed results, some 
authors have suggested that PA application may involve too high a level of 
complex data management and interpretation (Robertson et al. 2012).
Research has shown that PA has the potential to reduce environmental 
impacts caused by agricultural activities (Fuglie and Bosch 1995; Khanna 
and Zilberman 1997; Hudson and Hite 2003). Consistent with one of the 
CSA objectives, improving the match of fertilizer application with crop 
needs prevents excess application (Reichardt and Jurgens 2009). Indeed, a 
study by Biermacher and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that applying the 
necessary amount of N needed for crops to reach their maximum potential 
yield could reduce nitrate contamination in groundwater and the pollution 
of downstream water. 
Tey and Brindal (2012) noted that a number of studies have demon-
strated the economic and ecological superiority of PA over conventional 
approaches (Tey and Brindal 2012; Silva et al. 2007; Sylvester-Bradley et al. 
1999; Takacs-Gyorgy 2008).
Precision Agriculture in Practice
The Case for Precision Agriculture
The use of PA in BL was aimed at improving farmers’ understanding of the 
variability of soil properties and crop requirements, which we expected 
to allow more informed decision making (Maohua 2001). We argue that 
decisions made by farmers under PA are better than those that would 
be made with conventional agricultural practices (that is, the national 
recommendations), and therefore that PA has the potential to promote 
efficient use of resources (through site-specific information), reduce input 
92   resakss.org
(fertilizer and pesticide) costs, and minimize environmental degradation 
caused by agricultural activities (by preventing excess application). In 
addition, we expected PA to improve soil condition and crop quality, and 
increase crop yield.
Data Collection Methods
The ASEZ of Bukanga Lonzo (BL) spans more than 80,000 ha. The South 
African agricultural company Agri Xcellence36 was engaged to perform soil 
analysis and classification at BL to identify land suitable for crop cultiva-
tion (mainly maize for the first year) and provide a better understanding 
of maize yield response to fertilizers. Based on topography limitations and 
physical aspects of the soil, the land identified as suitable for cultivation was 
about 56,000 ha, and this arable land was later arranged into 9 parcels. 
The government started its first phase of PA implementation in BL 
with parcel 1 (10,575 ha). First, Agri Xcellence conducted complete soil 
chemistry and classification on 1,500 soil samples—2 samples per 20–50 
ha grid—to establish the presence of the major elements, such as calcium 
(Ca), magnesium (Mg), phosphorus (P), potassium (K), and sodium (Na). 
Soil chemical characteristics were also determined by measuring cation 
exchange capacity and pH. Researchers used technology such as GPS to 
map topography as well as soil and plant deficiency or excess character-
istics, indicated by chemical and physical attributes. Rainfall patterns, 
temperatures, and evaporation tendencies were also studied to determine 
the best times to plant and harvest maize. The rainy season starts around 
September and lasts until around March, and the dry season runs approxi-
mately from June to August. September was therefore targeted as the ideal 
36  https://www.triomfsa.co.za/index.php/home/agri-xcellence 
planting date to allow the maize plants to be developed enough to with-
stand the heavy showers that usually fall in November. Similarly, March, 
which usually marks the end of the short dry season (February-March), 
was determined to be the ideal time to commence harvesting.
The soil analysis was followed by yield simulations, which determined 
that a portion of the parcel (3,742.7 ha) presented very low productivity 
prospects (less than 2 tons/ha); it was therefore deemed not profitable and 
excluded from the planting area. The remaining part of the parcel (6,832.6 
ha) was then divided into two areas: 1a (1111.1 ha) and 1b (5721.5 ha).
In BL, the government opted to use precision farming to optimize the 
use of required nutrients based on good knowledge of crop requirements 
and local soil, terrain, and climatic conditions. We argue that PA provides 
farmers with spatial information that reduces uncertainty and improves 
decision making. Cook and others likewise indicated that site-specific 
information—“for example, the knowledge that fertilizer should be applied 
to one location but not another; the decision that a cropping system variety 
is suitable for one area, but not another” (2003, n.p.)—reduces the chance 
of both type I and type II errors. 
Physical Properties of the Soil
The soil survey conducted by Agri Xcellence assessed the physical properties 
(texture, structure, water-holding capacity, and dispersion) and chemical 
properties (potential in hydrogen, or pH, as well as nutrients and salinity). 
The planting area is composed of only four types of soil, making it quite 
homogenous considering its size. Each soil type represented (Cartref, 
Clovelly, Constantia, and Fernwood) presents a different depth and clay 
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content, both of which play an important role in water storage 
capacity.37
Both areas 1a and 1b were dominated by the Constantia soil type, 
which consists of an orthic A horizon followed by an E horizon and 
then a third horizon consisting of a yellow-brown apedal soil. The soil 
analysis also indicated a high organic material content in the form 
of carbon, which helps in the retention of nutrients. The E horizon 
is formed by water that drains laterally out of this horizon and is an 
indication of a highly leached horizon. Thus, the high carbon content 
is perceived as a positive factor because it counters the effects of highly 
leached soils. The USDA reported that soil organic matter serves as a 
reservoir of nutrients for crops, provides soil aggregation, increases 
nutrient exchange, and increases water infiltration into soil (NRCS 
n.d.). The Constantia soil type is also considered a sandy soil because 
of the sandy nature of its E horizon. The remaining soil types found in 
the area suitable for cultivation were far less represented (Summary of 
Soil Analysis, Parc Agro Industriel de Bukanga-Lonzo, Part 1. n.d.).
Characteristics of the Soil 
The soil analysis performed in BL on parcel 1 (10,575 ha) indicated a 
wide variation in soil characteristics. It also identified areas of nutrient 
deficiency, suggesting the need for nutrient adjustment over time to 
reach the optimal levels required for efficient farming in terms of both 
environmental sustainability and profitability (Table 7.1).
37  Soil texture varies by depth, and so does water-holding capacity. To determine water-holding 
capacity for the soil profile, the depth of each horizon is multiplied by the available water for that 
soil texture, and then the values for the different horizons are summed (Plant & Soil Sciences 
eLibrary 2017).
TABLE 7.1—SOIL CHARACTERISTICS  
Parameter Soil in sampled area Normal range Recommendations
pH (potential in 
hydrogen)
4.4 KCl (low) 5.5–6.5 KCl Indication of highly leached soil.
Dolomitic lime should be used to 
correct the pH in the soil.
Exchangeable 
acids
≥ 2.33 cmol/kg in 1a 
(very high)
≥ 0.30 cmol/kg in 1b 
(very high)
0.00 cmol+/kg The high level of exchangeable 
acids is very toxic to plants and 
plant roots.
Magnesium (Mg) 8 mg/kg in 1a
6 mg/kg in 1b
100–120 mg/kg Highly leached soils cannot 
physically retain enough Mg in 
the clay complex.
The deficiency in Mg can be 
corrected by using dolomitic 
lime.
Acid saturation 42% in 1a
51% in 1b
0%–7% This very high level may result 
in poor root development and 
stunted growth.
Potassium (K) 12 mg/kg 70–90 mg/kg Deficiency can be corrected by 
using a K source such as KCl 50 
fertilizer.
Or it can be corrected over time 
by applying a higher rate of a 
fertilizer blend high in K.
Calcium (Ca) 51 mg/kg in 1a
39 mg/kg in 1b
200–220 mg/kg If the physical amount of Ca in 
the soil is corrected, the pH will 
also start to stabilize at greater 
than 5 Kcl.
Deficiency in Ca can be corrected 
by using either dolomitic or 
calcitic lime.
Source: Agri Xcellence
Note: cmol = centimole (1 cmole = 10-2 moles); KCl = potassium chloride.
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The first 30 cm of the topsoil was high in organic carbon, which has 
positive effects by reducing the leaching of cations. Nevertheless, the report 
suggested the importance of building up organic matter in the soil by 
using a no-till or strip-till system of cultivation. Indeed, organic matter 
production is affected radically by conventional tillage, which decreases soil 
organic matter and increases the potential for erosion by wind and water 
(FAO 2005).
Overall, the soil analysis results suggested the following:
• Low pH and high levels of exchangeable acidity were the most yield-
limiting factors in the first year of cultivation and were expected to 
especially hamper production in the first year.
• The soils were highly leached, making it important to reach adequate 
levels of Ca, Mg, P, and K over time.
• The first 30 cm of the topsoil was high in organic matter, which creates 
more negatively charged sites to which cations can bind, potentially 
lowering the amount of leaching. Therefore, it was important to build up 
even more organic matter in the soils by using a no-till or strip-till system 
of cultivation.
• The soils were prone to compaction, so care had to be taken not to 
compact the soil with traffic on the fields. The soils would need to be 
monitored for compaction every year.
• As the production of grain crops continues, the soil chemical balances 
should start stabilizing and crops should start producing higher yields 
over time.
• The split application of fertilizer, especially N and K, over the growing 
season was expected to have a positive effect on yield.
• The use of foliar feeding during the growing season should also have 
a positive effect on yields in the first year, when the soil does not have 
enough nutrients to produce very high yields.
Fertilizer Application in Precision Farming
Based on the soil analysis described above, we then derived georeferenced, 
PA-based recommendations for nutrient application, presented in Table 7.2, 
which allow for optimal use of fertilizer for maize cultivation in BL.
In general, Table 7.2 depicts a greater need for Ca, monoammonium 
phosphate (MAP) 33, and potassium chloride (KCl) 50 than for other 
nutrients.38 As Table 7.2, panel A, shows, soil types determine the level and 
nature of required nutrients. Systematically, Fernwood requires the most 
attention across all nutrients and Cartref requires the least. It follows that 
any homogenous application is not only against recommendations but also 
likely to lead to inefficient farming. 
The thickness of the white E horizon (Table 7.2, panel B) appears to 
have relatively little impact on the amount of recommended nutrients of 
all types. Harris and others (2010) pointed out that the water table depth in 
relation to the E horizon thickness affects the availability to crops of applied 
P as well as the potential for lateral transport of P through subsurface flow. 
In addition, when determining N fertilizer rates, it is important to keep 
in mind that poorly drained soils can lose N via denitrification. Thus, as 
recommended for BL (panel B), the thicker the white E horizon, the fewer 
38 MAP 33 contains around 11 percent N and 22 percent P. It is widely used as a source of P and N, 
and has the highest P content of any common solid fertilizer (IPNI n.d.-b). KCl 50 is the most 
widely used K fertilizer due to its relatively low cost and inclusion of more K (50–52 percent) than 
most other sources (IPNI n.d.-a).
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nutrients are required. Nevertheless, Ca is recommended at a higher 
amount than KCl 50, MAP 33, and the other nutrients.
Similarly, nitrate loss through leaching (Table 7.2, panel C) 
appears to have little relative impact on nutrient needs. Still, appro-
priate nutrient management can greatly reduce the risk of nitrate 
loss through leaching. In addition, highly leached soils (those whose 
loss is considered “high” or “very high”) cannot retain enough Mg 
in the clay complex, and thus it is important to increase the soil 
organic matter and reach the appropriate fertilizer mix (with the 
proper proportions of Ca, Mg, K, and P) to satisfy the plants’ needs 
for Mg. Thus, more nutrients should be applied to highly and very 
highly leached soils than to soils with average and low levels of 
leaching. Soils experiencing very high nitrate loss would need about 
22–40 percent more of each nutrient in comparison to soils experi-
encing low nitrate loss (Table 7.2, panel C).
At the time of maize planting in BL, farmers applied diammo-
nium phosphate (DAP), which contains 18 percent N and 46 percent 
phosphate, making it an excellent source of N and P, in addition to 
KCl 0-0-60, which contains 60 percent K fertilizer (as potassium 
oxide, or K2O, also known as potash, yielding 50 percent K). For top 
dressing (Table 7.2, panel D), N-supplying fertilizers (urea) and other 
nutrients (Ca, Mg, P, KCl 50, and MAP 33) were applied. In a very 
wet season, when heavy rain may leach away some of the fertilizer, 
top dressing should be split (one application at two to three weeks 
and the second before tasseling), for a total of three applications, 
consistent with the soil analysis report’s recommendation to split 
the application of fertilizer, especially N and K, over the growing 
TABLE 7.2—FERTILIZER APPLICATION RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Average recommended fertilizer (kg/ha) by soil type
Soil type Calcium MAP 33 Phosphate Magnesium Potassium KCl 50
Cartref 88.1 48.9 20.6 17.3 10.9 40.0
Clovelly 926.2 490.5 236.8 184.9 109.9 491.8
Constantia 1,103.4 620.4 264.9 218.8 136.7 531.8
Fernwood 1,263.9 679.5 299.6 245.0 149.2 597.6
B. Average recommended fertilizer (kg/ha) by thickness of white E horizon
Thickness (cm) Calcium MAP 33 Phosphate Magnesium Potassium KCl 50
0 1,263.9 679.5 299.6 245.0 149.2 597.6
≥ 7 1,038.1 598.1 250.7 205.8 132.2 504.8
≥ 8 and ≤ 9 1,072.8 621.8 258.0 212.0 136.7 520.1
≥ 10 1,177.5 608.8 282.0 234.6 134.3 563.0
C. Average recommended fertilizer (kg/ha) by level of nitrogenous loss due to leaching
Level of 
nitrogenous loss
Calcium MAP 33 Phosphate Magnesium Potassium KCl 50
Very high 1,260.6 686.5 302.4 249.0 151.1 602.5
High 1,086.4 609.2 257.8 211.0 133.9 520.1
Average 942.0 534.6 224.2 185.5 117.9 450.9
Low 926.2 490.5 236.8 184.9 109.9 491.8
D. Average recommended fertilizer (kg/ha) by frequency for top dressing
Frequency Calcium MAP 33 Phosphate Magnesium Potassium KCl 50
1 time 926.2 490.5 236.8 184.9 109.9 491.8
2 times 1,037.6 584.0 246.4 202.4 128.5 496.7
3 times 1,260.6 686.5 302.4 249.0 151.1 602.5
E. Average recommended fertilizer (kg/ha) by risk of waterlogging
Waterlogging risk Calcium MAP 33 Phosphate Magnesium Potassium KCl 50
Yes 1,217.7 654.6 290.1 238.2 144.0 579.3
No 1,122.5 636.9 275.7 224.5 140.5 557.7
Avg. 1,013.1 589.4 241.4 199.7 129.8 485.4
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Agri Xcellence.
Note: KCl = potassium chloride; MAP = monoammonium phosphate.
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season. Thus, the amount of nutrients applied should be slightly higher in 
the second and third applications than in the first. 
Maize is frequently subjected to waterlogging (Table 7.2, panel E), 
especially in poorly drained soils, where standing water can cause a 
rapid depletion of the oxygen required for plant growth and development 
(Geigenberger et al. 2000). In addition, waterlogging can leach out or change 
the availability of nutrients to the plant (Palapala and Nyamolo 2016). Thus, 
for BL, it was recommended that an average of 1,217.7kg/ha of Ca, 654.6 kg/
ha of MAP 33, 290.1 kg/ha of phosphate, 238.2 kg/ha of Mg, 144.0 kg/ha of 
K, and 579.3 kg/ha of KCl 50 be applied when there is a risk of waterlogging 
(Table 7.2, panel E).
Table 7.3 displays descriptive statistics for all of the fertilizer recommen-
dations. The mean and median values for each input are close to each other 
and the skew values are relatively low, indicating that the data are normally 
distributed.
TABLE 7.3—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, FERTILIZER 
RECOMMENDATIONS, KG/HA
Statistic Ca MAP 33 K Mg P KCl 50
Mean 665.91 373.28 158.94 131.73 82.07 318.10
Median 664.81 400.00 160.25 132.40 85.71 300.00
Mode 698.84 400.00 164.59 135.40 80.91 300.00
Min. 466.12 0.00 87.81 99.17 0.00 150.00
Max. 1,036.54 600.00 200.16 156.64 134.03 400.00
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Agri Xcellence.
There were 6,135 ha requiring Ca in the range of 500–1,000 kg/ha and 
6,130 ha requiring Mg in the range of 90–150 kg/ha, suggesting that the 
entire land area required Ca and Mg. In addition, most of the land required 
more than 250 kg/ha of KCl 50 (that is, 56 percent of the land required 
between 250 and 300 kg/ha and 44 percent required more than 300 kg/
ha—which is close to the mean value of 373 kg/ha). As for K, approximately 
99 percent (6,112 ha) of the land required this nutrient in amounts greater 
than 120 kg/ha.
Fertilizer Application: National Recommendations 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
We use national recommendations for fertilizer as an example of non-CSA 
practices based on PA. Because BL is in the western part of the country, 
we use recommendations for the provinces of Kongo Central (formerly 
called Bas-Congo) and Kinshasa, and the former province of Bandundu, as 
opposed to nationwide recommendations.
In Kongo Central and Bandundu, maize is produced by smallholder 
farmers, cultivating 1 ha or less per household and using no external inputs. 
In Kinshasa Province, there are some large (100- to 1,000-ha) commercial, 
tractor-mechanized farms on the Batéké plateau, which usually use some 
chemical fertilizers (urea and N-P-K). In smallholder agriculture, yields are 
very low, less than 1,000 kg/ha (± 800 kg/ha) (USAID 2015b).
Farmers have only limited access to fertilizers because of their high 
cost. Maize always tends to be grown on the more fertile soils in the valley 
bottoms. Because no chemical fertilizers are used on maize or cassava, 
except on large commercial farms on the Batéké plateau near Kinshasa, and 
because organic fertilizers (manure and compost) are usually in very short 
supply, soil fertility is not restored after harvest. Furthermore, fallows tend 
to disappear completely due to population and marketing pressure. Thus, 
yields tend to decrease over time, and poor soil fertility becomes a major 
production constraint (USAID 2015b).
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Overall, fertilizer application is based on national recommendations 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, which call for specific amounts for small, 
medium, and large farms. For example, the recommendation for large farms 
is that the first application be done following the formula NPK 17-17-1739
(300 kg for N, P and K), in addition to 200 kg of urea. In Kongo Central 
Province, for example, the amount of fertilizer recommended for maize is 
200 kg/ha, at a unit cost of US$1.60/kg.
These recommendations assume homogeneity across space and time, 
prescribing the same quantities of nutrients regardless of the soil and spatial 
heterogeneity. However, as the soil analysis performed in BL shows, there is 
wide variation in the soils’ chemical and physical properties. Therefore, the 
optimal amount of fertilizer is specific to the region, soil type, and predicted 
rainfall. Thus the agricultural sector in the DRC would greatly benefit from 
precision farming practices, which facilitate the optimal use of fertilizers and 
other resources. 
Benefits from Implementing Climate-
Smart Agricultural Practices 
Expected Long-Term Yield 
Based on PA recommendations for nutrient application, the expected long-
term maize yield is much higher than under national recommendations 
without PA—one more reason that the DRC agricultural sector would largely 
benefit from PA and CSA management practices in the medium and long 
39 Fertilizer grade refers to a legal guarantee of the content of available plant nutrients, expressed as a 
percentage by weight in the fertilizer. For example, the 12-32-16 grade of NPK complex fertilizers 
has 12 percent N, 32 percent P (in the form of P2O5), and 16 percent potash (K2O). 
run. As shown in Table 7.4, 49.1 percent of the land is expected to yield 
between 4 and 8 tons/ha, 30 percent to yield at least 9 tons/ha, and 20 percent 
to produce 2 to 3 tons/ha”, compared with 0.8 tons/ha when PA is not 
applied.40 Yield distribution is not uniform across the field (Table 7.4) due to 
the spatial heterogeneity of available soil nutrients.
TABLE 7.4—DISTRIBUTION OF EXPECTED LONG-TERM 
YIELD UNDER PRECISION AGRICULTURE PRACTICES
Yield (tons/ha) Area (ha) Area (% of total)






> 9 3,220.2 30.4
Total 10,575.5 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Agri Xcellence.
If provided with the information in Table 7.4, what would a smart 
farmer do? Because fertilizer cost per hectare is the same regardless of 
expected yield, a smart farmer would avoid planting in areas with at most 2 
tons/ha of expected yield and maximize planting of areas with 5–7 tons/ha 
and more than 9 tons/ha. Such optimization thinking, which leads to smart 
farming, is possible only when knowledge is available to farmers. 
40  The average yield under national recommendations in the DRC is only 0.8 tons/ha (Ministry of 
Agriculture, DRC).
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In addition, an analysis of first-year and long-term expected yields 
indicates that the total production from the entire parcel of land will be 
50,360.6 tons of maize during the first year but will grow over the long term 
to 64,284.6 tons, an increase of 27.6 percent. These predictions are consistent 
with the BL progress report (Africom Commodities 2016), which predicted, 
based on the current condition of the crop, that a yield of 4–5 tons/ha can 
indeed be achieved.
Cultivation Method: Tillage versus No Tillage
In general, no-till agriculture is considered good for soil fertility, with 
benefits in terms of adaptive capacity and food security because it con-
tributes to increased yields. Kassam and colleagues (2009) indicated that 
minimal soil disturbance through no tillage or reduced tillage ensures a 
favorable proportion of gases for root respiration, moderate organic matter 
oxidation, good porosity for water movement, and limited re-exposure to 
weed seeds and their germination—all of which may enhance crop growth 
and final grain yield.
In addition, research shows evidence of yield and soil improvements 
in humid tropical and temperate ecosystems where minimal and no-tillage 
practices are applied (Rasmussen 1999, Diaz-Zorita, Duarte, and Grove 
2002; Bronick and Lal 2005). Consistent with previous research, Hine and 
Pretty (2008) suggested positive effects on maize yields compared with 
traditional tillage management. 
The BL soil analysis revealed that the first 30 cm of the topsoil was 
high in organic carbon. Such organic matter creates negatively charged 
sites to which cations can bind, reducing the leaching of cations. Therefore, 
recommendations called for building more organic matter by using a no-till 
or strip-till system of cultivation, which can contribute toward improved 
water retention, rain use efficiency, soil improvement, and increased yields. 
In addition, farmers in the DRC practicing no tillage are likely to save on 
plowing costs, estimated at US$200–US$300 per hectare.
Optimal Soil and Crop Management 
Research has shown that the greatest benefits of implementing improved 
cropland management practices under CSA are higher and more stable 
yields, increased system resilience, enhanced livelihoods, greater food 
security, and reduced uncertainty (Conant 2010; Woodfine 2009; Thomas 
2008).
In BL, the application of inorganic fertilizer was based on the soil 
analysis with the objective of improving the proportion of nutrients 
retained in the soil while reducing both waste and GHGs. Given their 
low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, poverty, and additional 
constraints because of climate change, countries such as the DRC need to 
increase their food production. This process of agricultural intensification 
requires the use of inorganic fertilizer. Indeed, increases in fertilizer use 
have driven a rapid expansion in agricultural productivity in the post-
World War II era (FAO 2015).
Optimal Soil Management: Cover Crops
As part of PA-driven soil management practices, BL farmers used cover 
crops, first planting them so that trial runs could be conducted. Thus, 
soil analysis as well as cover crop tests provided valuable insights into the 
best-suited applications of lime, humates, nutrients, and fertilizer in order 
to ensure the expected optimal yields (Africom Commodities 2016). The 
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BL experiment is in line with previous studies (Pretty 2000; Altieri 1999) 
showing that farmers benefited through increased yields of maize following 
the use of cover crops. In addition, mixing no-till farming and cover crop 
usage with herbicides has been found to reduce leaching and improve yields 
(FAO 2010).
The use of improved crop varieties in BL is also expected to increase 
average yields over time. Though the gains may vary across countries and 
crops, the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT 2008) found 
a yield increase following the introduction of new bean varieties in some 
African countries. Thus, the use of improved crop varieties in BL is also 
expected to improve average yields.
Profitability: Fertilizer Costs 
Table 7.5 compares first-year fertilizer costs between DRC farmers under 
precision farming, which requires location-specific fertilizer application, and 
those using homogenous fertilizer application as recommended by the DRC 
Ministry of Agriculture.
TABLE 7.5—FIRST-YEAR INPUT COSTS WITH AND 
WITHOUT PRECISION AGRICULTURE
Variables PA No PA
Average area planted (ha) 5,721.5 5,721.5
Application rate (kg/ha) 296.6 200.0
Fertilizer cost ($US/kg) 1.60 1.60
Fertilizer cost ($US/ha) 474.60 320.00
Total fertilizer cost ($US) 2,715,195.00 1,830,880.00
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: “No PA” application rate is based on national recommendations of an average of 200 kg/ha of 
fertilizer for maize. “PA” application rate is a weighted average. PA = precision agriculture.
Agricultural practices involving efficient use and application of fertil-
izers (i.e., PA) lead to higher initial costs. We use an average unit fertilizer 
cost of $US1.60/kg and an area planted of 5,721.5 ha (the area of BL parcel 
1), which leads to a total cost of $1,830,880 when fertilizers are applied per 
national recommendations, compared with $2,715,195 under PA. Therefore, 
precision farming, entailing an increase of 48 percent in fertilizer costs for 
the first year, does not allow immediate savings for farmers. However, this 
comparison paints an incomplete picture until we take into account the fol-
lowing factors:
• First, the need for fertilizer during the first year, following the soil 
analysis, will be higher than in subsequent years. The soil condition and 
nutrient balance are expected to improve over time, leading to lower 
fertilizer requirements in the future (Africom Commodities 2016).
• Second, the combined effect of inorganic fertilizer and organic fertil-
izer (compost and animal manure) use in the subsequent years in BL, 
as recommended by CSA practices, is likely to boost yields, leading 
to higher incomes that offset the fertilizer costs. Indeed, research has 
shown that maize yields increased by 100 percent in Kenya (Pretty et 
al. 2006), and maize and wheat yields increased by between 198 and 
250 percent (Altieri 1999) following the adoption of organic fertilization. 
In addition, following PA recommendations is expected to improve soil 
conditions, reducing future fertilizer costs (as mentioned above) while 
having a positive effect on the environment.
• As pointed out above, the no-tillage practice offers an immediate 
savings on input costs (plowing). 
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• Some costs are not included in this analysis (cost of pesticides, operating 
expenses, transportation costs)41 and could alter the results.
Table 7.6 shows a significant yield increase when PA practices are 
implemented. The total production with PA is 22,886 tons, representing an 
increase of a little more than 400 percent over conventional practices.
TABLE 7.6—MAIZE YIELD WITH AND WITHOUT 
PRECISION AGRICULTURE
Variables PA No PA
Hectares planted 5,721.50 5,721.50
Average yield (tons/ha) 4.00 0.78a
Total production (tons) 22,886.00 4,462.77
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: aAverage yield under no PA for maize in DRC between 2000 and 2014 from FAO (2013b).
PA = precision agriculture.
As reported in Table 7.7, the level of income under PA is significantly 
higher than under the national recommendation (about four times as high). 
Given the higher yield that is expected to be sustained over time when PA 
practices are implemented, there is a very high potential for the yield to 
remain at approximately 4 tons/ha or more. Our findings also suggest a 
positive profit under PA, compared with negative profit under the national 
recommendations, indicating that although implementing PA may result 
in higher costs (if all costs are included), the expected increase in yield will 
more than offset the additional costs. In addition, a portion of the costs is 
expected to be lowered over time for reasons described above.
41  An estimate of these costs (which will further increase the input costs) is available for BL but not 
for farms under national recommendations, so no comparison is currently possible.
TABLE 7.7—INCOME WITH AND WITHOUT PRECISION 
AGRICULTURE
Variables PA No PA
Input costs (US$/ha) 474.56 320.00
 Plowing (US$/ha) 0.00 250.00
Total planted area (ha) 5,721.50 5,721.50
Total input costs for 5,721.5 ha 2,715,195.04 1,830,880.00
Average yield (tons/ha) 4.00 380.00
Sales price ($US/ton) 380.00 4,462.77
Total production 22,886.00 1,695,852.60
Total revenue ($US) 8,696,680.00 265,477.60
Profit (including plowing costs) 8,696,680.00
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: For simplicity, we assume that all costs are the same except the ones whose application 
requires fine-tuned knowledge, such as fertilizer and cultivation methods. PA = precision agriculture.
Concluding Remarks and Policy 
Implications
Similar to that of most countries in SSA, the agricultural sector in the DRC 
has been characterized by low productivity. The effects of climate change 
constitute an additional challenge to food security; rising temperatures and 
increased frequency of extreme weather events (floods, droughts, and so on) 
have already started having negative effects on crop yields. 
For these reasons, the DRC needs to revisit and improve on its current 
agricultural methods and management of natural resources to achieve food 
security while also preserving natural resources and the environment, and 
reducing the effects of climate change.
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The government of the DRC recently initiated efforts to transform the 
agricultural sector; feed the growing population; and provide a basis for 
inclusive economic growth, food security, and poverty reduction. In 2014, it 
created the BL ASEZ, making investments in crop production, agroprocess-
ing, and marketing following CSA practices induced by PA. PA methods 
help farmers optimize inputs for agricultural production in accordance 
with the capability of the land. Thus, some of the practices analyzed here 
fall into the category of conservation agriculture and PA, whose impacts on 
production have been extensively researched (FAO 2011; Umar et al. 2011). 
Specifically, the following practices were implemented: efficient and georef-
erenced application of inorganic fertilizer, use of selected seeds, use of cover 
crops, and minimal or no tillage. 
This study aimed at examining the effects of PA-induced CSA practices 
on maize yields in BL by comparing input application with and without PA 
recommendations. In addition, it was an attempt to explicitly analyze the 
use of soil knowledge to guide optimal input use and cultivation methods 
to improve yields and farmers’ income. The first step was an extensive soil 
analysis and data mapping of BL, which was crucial in that it provided a 
better understanding of the soil condition, texture, and nutrient deficiencies. 
Using the knowledge gained from the soil analysis, some recommenda-
tions were made to guide the timely application of nutrients in precise and 
targeted areas.
Overall, the findings suggest that climate-smart practices offer to 
countries such as the DRC a sustainable way to boost productivity through 
improved crop yields and increased input efficiencies. We compared the 
expected average long-term yield under PA with the average yield obtained 
under national recommendations (as formulated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture) and found that yield under PA was about four times higher 
than under national recommendations, indicating that farmers could largely 
benefit from increased crop yields under PA. Specifically, the average yield 
under national recommendations in the DRC is only 0.8 tons/ha, whereas 
the yield under PA was 4.0 tons/ha. 
Under national recommendations, the average fertilizer applica-
tion rate is 200 kg/ha, whereas under PA it is about 296 kg/ha. Though 
farmers may have to spend a little more at first on fertilizers under PA, 
the significantly large increase in crop yield more than offsets the cost of 
fertilizer. In addition, total fertilizer cost is expected to decrease over time 
because the CSA practices should enhance soil conditions and preserve the 
environment.
Moreover, market information suggests that the price of maize flour in 
the DRC decreased by 30 percent when BL began providing an additional 
maize supply for the country. Given that consumers allocate a high propor-
tion of their income to food, a 30 percent reduction in the price of maize 
flour would make a significant and positive impact on consumers’ budgets.
Consistent with previous studies, the use of cover crops, combined with 
mulching and no tillage, are expected to improve crop yield over time. Thus, 
the yield expected in the future could be even higher than that reported in 
this study. No-tillage practices are expected to cut farmers’ costs as well, 
with plowing costs estimated at US$250 per hectare. 
Overall, then, farmers’ revenue under PA is significantly higher than 
that under the national recommendations. Though fertilizer costs are higher 
(due to a higher application rate in the first year), the savings on plowing 
and the increase in crop yield largely compensate for this cost, and yields are 
expected to increase over time.
102   resakss.org
It goes without saying that “blind farming,” that is, farming without 
PA, is highly inefficient and exacerbates the challenges of addressing climate 
change. As in the case of the DRC, other African governments should 
promote PA as a way of optimizing the use of limited resources while 
mitigating the effects of climate change. For example, it should be manda-
tory to include results of soil analysis in farming loan and crop insurance 
applications. Similarly, under the National Agricultural Investment Plans, 
ministries of agriculture should require detailed soil analysis prior to every 
new land development for farming purposes. However, because of the high 
cost associated with PA technology, millions of smallholders, who make up 
more than 70 percent of the African agricultural production system, will 
likely be left out. Therefore, we propose that a special fund be set up to make 
PA accessible to these smallholders.
Smallholder farmers’ access to PA is still very limited for two main 
reasons: affordability and understanding. Indeed, in the DRC, soil analysis 
costs US$74/ha—too expensive for smallholder farmers. The ideal would 
be the creation of a special-purpose funding vehicle as a platform for the 
corporate sector to work in partnership with the government, multilateral 
development banks, development organizations, donor agencies, founda-
tions, nongovernmental and civil society organizations, small farmers, and 
local community organizations. With respect to understanding, it is impor-
tant that national education and research systems be reorganized to upgrade 
smallholder farmers’ skills to properly use PA tools. As the FAO stated, 
“this requires strategic interministerial planning involving the ministries of 
agriculture, education, and trade, along with representatives of tertiary and 
secondary institutes, farmer organizations, and agro-industry” (2015, 4). 
Finally, to promote and expand the use of PA, given its benefits beyond 
targeted farmers, we propose that (1) PA practices be included as a require-
ment for every new agricultural development project and (2) soil analysis be 
made part of applications for agricultural loans and crop insurance.





The Unholy Cross: Profitability 
and Adoption of Climate-Smart 
Agriculture Practices in Africa 
South of the Sahara
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42  We are grateful to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for providing funding  
for this study. We also acknowledge Edward Kato for providing analytical support. 
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Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) practices aim to achieve three closely related objectives—sustainably increase agricultural productivity, adapt to climate change, and mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions. The CSA objectives directly contribute to achieving United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals 1 (no poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 
13 (climate action), and 15 (life on land). These factors underscore the 
importance of ensuring widespread uptake of CSA, which will significantly 
contribute to achieving overarching development objectives in Africa south 
of the Sahara (SSA), in particular, food security and poverty reduction.
Scaling up the adoption of CSA requires that farmer incentives be taken 
into account—especially for practices that require significant investment 
in external and on-farm inputs. Smallholder farmers have particularly 
limited access to external inputs such as fertilizer, which leads to lower 
profitability (Chianu, Chianu, and Mairura 2012), lower CSA adoption, and 
land degradation. For example, over the past 56 years, intensity of fertilizer 
use—that is, the amount of nutrients used—in SSA has increased from 1 kg/
ha of a nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium blend in 1961 to only 13 kg/
ha in 2014 (FAO 2015). The slow growth rate of inorganic fertilizer use has 
translated into low crop production, plunging the region into being a net 
food importer since 1980 (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and Paschali 2011). 
SSA countries have used different methods to increase fertilizer con-
sumption and consequently food production. The most common method 
has been fertilizer subsidies, which have increased the rate of fertilizer 
use. For example, fertilizer use in Zambia increased by 12.5 percent due 
to subsidies (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé 2012). Fertilizer subsidies have 
also been shown to increase yield by 12 percent for cotton in Burkina 
Faso, 41 percent for maize in Ghana, and 32 percent for maize in Nigeria 
(Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé 2012). However, such programs have crowded 
out private-sector development in input marketing. Across SSA, the cost 
of these subsidies has become a burden for governments’ budgets, making 
them unsustainable. 
This chapter examines the profitability and adoption rates of CSA 
practices in SSA. We particularly look at strategies that could be used to 
increase adoption of one particular CSA practice, integrated soil fertility 
management (ISFM). Other CSA practices include agroforestry, drought-
tolerant crops and improved crop varieties, conservation agriculture, 
integrated crop-livestock management, improved water management, 
improved pasture and grazing land and water management, restoration of 
degraded lands, weather early warning systems, and risk insurance (World 
Bank 2011). 
Our results on the adoption and profitability of CSA show an inverse 
relationship—that is, the adoption rate and profit are inversely related, a 
pattern that is puzzling and undesired—or, as we refer to it in this chapter, 
an unholy cross. We begin with a discussion of how ISFM achieves the three 
CSA objectives. The next section analyzes its profitability and adoption rate, 
compared with other land management practices, finding a profit-adoption 
pattern in SSA that is contrary to expectations—the higher the profit, the 
lower the adoption rate. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons 
behind this puzzling pattern and a reflection on the policy implications. 
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Integrated Soil Fertility 
Management and Climate-
Smart Agriculture Objectives
In an effort to better understand strategies for increasing 
the adoption of CSA, it is important to examine the objec-
tives of CSA and the incentives for its adoption. To set the 
background for this analysis, this section illustrates the 
CSA objectives by using empirical evidence to show how 
ISFM, as an example of CSA, achieves these objectives.
Objective 1: Sustainably Increase 
Agricultural Productivity 
Long-term soil fertility trials in Kenya have shown that the 
yield and soil organic carbon (SOC) of plots treated with 
ISFM, fertilizer only, and organic inputs decline over time 
(Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1). In the 21-year period reported 
(1972-1993), maize yield and SOC for the plots that did 
not receive any external inputs fell by almost 80 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively, whereas the yield on ISFM 
plots fell by only 34 percent (Figure 8.1). The percentage 
yield decline for the plots receiving inorganic fertilizer 
and those receiving organic inputs only were comparable 
to that of the ISFM plots. In fact, the average yield of 
plots under organic inputs was 23 percent higher than 
that of plots under fertilizer only. This result underscores 
the potential negative impacts of policies that promote 
FIGURE 8.1—PERCENTAGE DECLINE IN YIELD AND SOIL ORGANIC CARBON, 















ISFM Organic inputs Fertilizer No external inputs 
Yield SOC 
Source: Authors’ calculations from unpublished long-term experiment data, Kabete Agricultural Research Institute, Kenya.
Note: ISFM = integrated soil fertility management; SOC = soil organic carbon.
TABLE 8.1—MAIZE YIELD TREND, 1976–1993, KENYA LONG-
TERM EXPERIMENT
Treatmenta
Yield (tons/ha) % yield  
increaseb1976 1977–1981 1982–1986 1990–1993
Control—no inputs 3.80 2.77 2.18 0.91 221
Organic inputs only 3.79 3.89 3.98 2.69 9
Fertilizer only 4.23 4.00 4.21 2.18 34
ISFM 4.43 4.72 4.98 2.92 n.a.
Source: Authors’ calculations from unpublished long-term experiment data, Kabete Agricultural Research 
Institute, Kenya.
Note: a Organic inputs: 5 metric tons per hectare of manure; Fertilizer only: 60 KgN/ha-1 and 60 KgP2O5/ha-1; 
ISFM: 60 KgN/ha-1, 60 KgP2O5/ha-1, and 5 metric tons per hectare of manure. b Yield increase (percentage) 
when farmer switches to ISFM from another soil fertility management practice. ISFM = integrated soil fertility 
management; n.a. = not applicable.
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fertilizer only. During the 1990–1993 
period, findings suggest that yield 
increased threefold, from 0.9 tons/
ha43 to about 3.0 tons/ha (Table 8.1), 
when farmers switched from no 
external inputs to ISFM.
The decline in yield is largely due 
to continuous cropping, which depletes 
SOC and leads to deterioration of 
soil chemical and physical proper-
ties (Nandwa and Bekunda 1998). 
A subregional-level analysis using 
40-year crop simulation modeling 
(Nkonya et al. 2017) shows comparable 
results—though smaller in impact, 
largely due to extensive aggregation 
(Figure 8.2). Yield on plots treated with 
ISFM fell by 18 percent, compared 
with about 30 percent for the baseline 
treatment, which is the average soil fertility management practice in SSA and 
differs across countries (Figure 8.2). If maize farmers in SSA adopt ISFM, 
food security will increase by at least 30 percent for the 50 percent of the 
SSA population who are maize consumers (CIMMYT 2016) (Table 8.2). This 
means that ISFM and other CSAs will improve food security, even though 
43  Throughout the chapter, tons refers to metric tons.
the improvement will happen at a declining rate if farmers practice continu-
ous cropping. 
On-farm experiments in SSA have shown that a combination of CSA 
practices can sustainably increase agricultural productivity. Increased pro-
ductivity can also be sustainable if farmers use a combination of other CSA 
practices that can help maintain and restore soil fertility. Such practices 
include fallowing, agroforestry, crop rotation, reduced tillage, cover crops, 
and balanced fertilizer application (Tilman et al. 2002). For example, a 
FIGURE 8.2—YIELD CHANGE DUE TO LONG-TERM CONTINUOUS MAIZE CROPPING UNDER 





















ISFM yield decline (%) over 40-year period 
Baseline yield decline (%) over 40-year period 
Yield increase (%) when farmer switches from baseline practice to ISFM 
Source: Results of Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) crop simulation model from Nkonya et al. (2016) study. 
Note: Baseline is average soil fertility management practice in SSA and differs across countries. ISFM = integrated soil fertility management; SSA = Africa south of 
the Sahara.
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    107
long-term (10-year) agroforestry experiment in Malawi showed that the yield 
of maize intercropped with Gliricidia started to increase in the third year 
and ultimately reached about 500 percent of its year-one yield (Akinnifesi et 
al. 2010). Gliricidia also improved SOC and other chemical and biophysical 
characteristics (Akinnifesi et al. 2010). In summary, the first CSA objective, 
of sustainably increasing agricultural productivity, can be achieved using a 
combination of practices that are affordable to smallholder farmers in SSA.
Objective 2: Increase Adaptation to Climate Change
ISFM practices reduce yield variability by improving the soil’s water-holding 
capacity (Gentile et al. 2008; Lal 2011; Govaerts et al. 2009; Manna et al. 
2005). To illustrate, Figure 8.3 offers results of a 30-year crop simulation, 
showing a declining yield variance for maize and millet as soil fertility 
management improves in Mali.44 These results underscore the adaptation 
potential of ISFM and other CSA practices that enhance SOC.
Objective 3: Mitigate 
Climate Change
As seen above, ISFM significantly 
increases SOC, simultaneously 
contributing to adaptation and 
mitigation of climate change. 
However, climate change mitiga-
tion may not be a criterion used 
by farmers to make investment 
decisions. Thus, there is a need to 
incentivize farmers to adopt ISFM 
in the form of payment for ecosys-
tem services (PES). Determining 
the level of off-site climate mitiga-
tion benefits that accrue from ISFM 
would help policy makers design 
strategies for incentivizing adoption 
44  Our own simulation results, not reported 
here, show there was an increase in yield 
variability due to climate change.
FIGURE 8.3—IMPACT OF SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENT ON MAIZE AND MILLET YIELD 
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Source: Results of DSSAT crop simulation model from Nkonya, Koo and Kato (2017).
Note: CR = crop residues; MN = manure; DSSAT = Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer; tons = metric tons.
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of ISFM and other CSA practices. We use crop simulation 
results from Rwanda to compute the value of the climate 
mitigation services provided by ISFM. A large proportion 
of Rwandan farmers (about 40 percent) use no external 
inputs (Nkonya et al. 2017), so that practice becomes our 
baseline. Farmers who adopt ISFM sequester more carbon 
(as CO2 equivalent) than those using the baseline practice. 
The additional CO2 equivalent sequestered is worth close 
to US$3,000/ha, which is about 200 percent of the profit 
these ISFM farmers get from their maize grain harvest 
(Table 8.2).
The discussion above shows that ISFM achieves all 
three major objectives of CSA, yet its adoption is the 
lowest among land management practices in SSA. Below 
we discuss the adoption pattern of ISFM in relation to its 
profitability.
Adoption of ISFM and Other 
Soil Fertility Management 
Practices
The adoption rates of ISFM and other soil fertility 
management practices differ significantly across crops. 
In Kenya, adoption of ISFM is highest for potatoes and 
beans, both of which are commercial crops (Figure 8.4). 
In Zambia, ISFM adoption is highest on maize plots and 
lowest on soybeans (Figure 8.5), an expected outcome, 
given that maize is Zambia’s staple food crop, accounting 
FIGURE 8.4—ADOPTION RATE OF IMPROVED SEEDS AND SOIL FERTILITY 























Maize Beans Potatoes 
Source: Nkonya et al. (2017).
TABLE 8.2—VALUE OF OFF-FARM BENEFITS (CLIMATE MITIGATION) OF 
ADOPTING INTEGRATED SOIL FERTILITY MANAGEMENT ON MAIZE PLOTS
Statistic
Treatment
ISFM Fertilizer Organic Baselineb
Yield (metric tons/ha) 3 2 2 1
Cost of production (US$/ha) 127 175 62 51
Profit (US$/ha)a 1,350 855 891 654
Value of CO2 equivalent sequestered—net of value sequestered with no external inputsc
• CO2-equiv. sequestered (US$/ha) 2,701 584 1,095 n.a.
• As percentage of total profit 200 68 123 n.a.
• Off-farm benefit as % of total benefits 67 41 55  n.a.
Source: Computed from Nkonya et al. (2017).
Note: a Price of maize per ton = US$475 (RATIN 2017). b Baseline is no external inputs. c Carbon price varies widely, from as low as <US$1 to as 
high as US$126 per ton of CO2 equivalent (World Bank 2017). n.a. = not applicable.
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for 49.4 percent of the country’s caloric intake (FAO 2013). As is common 
in other countries, ISFM has the lowest adoption in Kenya and Zambia 
among the four technologies considered—improved seeds, inorganic 
fertilizer only, organic inputs only, and ISFM (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). Adoption 
of improved seeds is higher in both countries than elsewhere in SSA. For 
example, adoption of improved maize seeds is 33 percent in eastern Africa 
and 38 percent in southern Africa (Scoones and Thompson 2011), compared 
with 57 percent in Kenya. Adoption of inorganic fertilizer for potatoes is 
especially high in Kenya, where the tuber crop is grown for commercial 
purposes. Interestingly, Kenya has much higher inorganic fertilizer adoption 
than Zambia even though the latter gives 
a generous fertilizer subsidy, reflecting the 
effect of Kenya’s strong input markets and the 
presence of agroforestry supported by local and 
international institutions. 
The Unholy Cross?
Our study to determine the profitability of 
fertilizer and other soil fertility management 
practices revealed puzzling results. According 
to economic theory, the higher the profit of a 
soil fertility management practice, the higher 
the adoption rate should be. However, our 
analysis of household survey data from seven 
SSA countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda) shows an 
inverse relationship between profitability and 
adoption of soil fertility management practices 
(Figure 8.6). ISFM has the highest profit but the lowest adoption rate. The 
majority of farmers (52 percent) apply no inputs at all, even though this 
practice has the lowest profit! 
An important question is why we observe such puzzling farmer 
behavior. Below we discuss some possible reasons for the observed pattern 
based on our empirical studies and literature review.
Weak promotion of ISFM by extension agents: The first important 
question concerns the advisory services that farmers receive from extension 
service providers. Nkonya, Koo, and Kato (2017) asked extension agents in 
Nigeria and Uganda what types of extension messages they give to farmers. 
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Sources: Calculated from Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Survey (RALS) survey 2012 raw data.
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Only one-third of the surveyed extension agents 
reported providing messages on organic soil 
fertility management practices—compared with 
about 70 percent who provided advisory services 
on inorganic fertilizer (Figure 8.7). In both 
countries, no extension agents reported promot-
ing ISFM, suggesting weak capacity of extension 
agents to provide advisory services on ISFM. It is 
not surprising, then, that the adoption of ISFM 
in Nigeria and Uganda is only about 1 percent 
(Nkonya et al. 2016). The most common extension 
messages given were on improved varieties (about 
90 percent of agents) and agrochemicals (about 
80 percent). These are traditional messages that 
have been provided to farmers since the early 
1960s to increase crop yield. The new paradigm 
of ISFM started in the late 1980s45 (Bationo et 
al. 2007), so it is possible that many extension 
service providers have not received ISFM training. 
The majority of the extension agents interviewed 
were middle-aged, with an average age of 44 in 
both countries. Nkonya, Koo, and Kato (2017) 
conducted the extension agent study in 2012, so 
the agents’ age suggests that they graduated from 
college in the 1980s or early 1990s, when ISFM was not yet widely known 
and the extension emphasis was on improved varieties and agrochemicals. 
45  The first study documenting ISFM was published in 1987 (Kang et al. 1987). 
FIGURE 8.6—THE UNHOLY CROSS: INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PROFITABILITY AND ADOPTION OF SOIL FERTILITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, 
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
Source: Authors’ calculations using raw household survey data from Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.
Adoption rate (%) Profit (US$/ha/year) 
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Labor intensiveness of ISFM involving biomass transfer: The majority 
of farmers who reported use of organic inputs applied manure. Our study 
has shown that labor accounts for 50 percent of the total cost of produc-
tion for ISFM adopters who use manure or other organic inputs involving 
biomass transfer—that is, transportation of organic inputs from a source 
(such as the cattle pen) to crop plots. 
The best strategy to address the high labor intensity of ISFM is to use 
agroforestry—that is, to incorporate trees on agricultural land. Studies 
have shown that planting leguminous trees on cropland can fix a large 
quantity of atmospheric nitrogen and carbon, both of which enhance soil 
fertility. For example, Sesbania sesban can fix up to 84 kg/
ha of nitrogen (Akinnifesi et al. 2008), a level that supplies 
the recommended amount of nitrogen for maize, the leading 
consumer of fertilizer in SSA. Agroforestry labor is high 
only during planting, and no significant labor investment is 
required to maintain agroforestry trees.
High fertilizer cost: Fertilizer prices in SSA are much 
higher than in other countries; indeed, a kilogram of urea in 
SSA costs about US$1,46 compared with US$0.65 in the United 
States (USDA 2016). The high fertilizer price in SSA is a result 
of high transportation costs, and it translates into high input 
transaction costs and lower profit for farmers. Most farmers also 
use unimproved varieties, whose yield response to fertilizer is 
low. All these factors translate to low fertilizer demand. 
Off-farm and long-term nature of ISFM benefits: As 
seen above, a large share of the total benefits of adoption of 
ISFM is off-farm. Farmers are not likely to take into account 
off-farm climate mitigation services when making soil fertility improve-
ment decisions. In addition, smallholder farmers also heavily discount 
investments in practices whose benefits are attainable only in the long run 
(Van Campenhout, D’Exelle, and Lecoutere 2015), a preference that further 
reduces the probability that they will adopt carbon-sequestering practices. 
Profitability of no-input farming with no up-front investment: 
Though the “doing nothing” option has the lowest profitability, it is profit-
able, has no up-front investment costs, and is less risky than other practices. 
46  This calculation is based on district-level fertilizer price data available from MIPAD (2017). 
FIGURE 8.7—TYPES OF MESSAGES GIVEN TO FARMERS BY EXTENSION 































Source: Nkonya, Koo, and Kato (2017).
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This could be the reason that the majority of farmers prefer this option. 
Meijer and others (2015) also observed that risk-averse smallholder farmers 
invest in low-cost management practices. 
What Could Be Done to Undo the Unholy 
Cross? 
A number of factors need to be considered to address the challenges 
discussed above. 
Re-education Programs for Extension Agents
The capacity of extension agents to provide advisory services on ISFM, 
organic soil fertility, and other new paradigms for sustainable soil fertility 
management is low. There is a need to increase this capacity by providing 
short-term training and workshops to extension agents who are already in 
service. Such training could be provided by researchers, nongovernmental 
organizations, and other scientists with good knowledge of the new sustain-
able soil fertility management practices. This new knowledge must also be 
incorporated in agricultural college curricula to ensure that new graduates 
are equipped to promote new sustainable practices. 
New Policies and Strategies that Do Not Treat 
Smallholder Farmers as Subsistence Farmers
For too long, government and even donor policies and strategies have treated 
smallholder farmers as subsistence farmers. Consequently, they have largely 
focused on provision of production-oriented rural services. For example, 
public extension agents affiliated with the ministries of agriculture largely 
provide production-related advisory services, whereas, in most countries, 
marketing advisory services are relegated to the ministries of industries and 
trade, where they do not receive much attention. Fertilizer can be profitable 
if it is applied to improved varieties that respond well to it. This means small-
holder fertilizer users need to be treated the same as commercially oriented 
farmers and given appropriate advisory and other rural services. Smallholders 
face the same market forces that large-scale farmers do. For example, for 
them to adopt ISFM, they need to buy improved seeds and inorganic fertil-
izer—thus elevating their farming to market-oriented economic activity. At 
the same time, their higher output will require selling at remunerative prices. 
Hence, the provision of marketing advisory services should be incorporated 
into strategies to increase the capacity of extension services. 
Storage Facilities and Other Market Value Chain 
Investments
As pointed out above, fertilizer is still quite expensive; therefore, its adoption 
will depend on farmers’ perception of risk. This situation calls for the imple-
mentation of risk-coping mechanisms, including ISFM; improved seeds; 
storage facilities; processing equipment; and enhanced access to markets, 
crop insurance, and so on. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), farmers do not use fertilizer on maize because they often 
leave maize to dry in the field until a buyer shows up. With fertilizer, the 
maize husks are too heavy and tend to break the stalk, which may lead to loss 
of the harvest while waiting for a buyer. In this case, increased postharvest 
storage capacity could allow farmers to use fertilizer without the fear of crop 
loss. It could also enhance market participation, allowing farmers to delay 
sales, which could translate to higher prices.
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Payment for Ecosystem Services
Given that a large share of the benefits of ISFM and other CSA practices are 
off-farm, subsidized programs could be used to incentivize farmers to adopt 
CSA practices. Subsidies could be given on the condition that a farmer adopt 
an easily verifiable land and water management practice that sequesters 
significant soil carbon. Promoted practices could include agroforestry, soil 
and water management structures, and others. The subsidies could be turned 
into PES to attract both national and international buyers. Needless to say, a 
strong market and verification strategies need to be developed to overcome 
a host of problems facing PES in developing countries, such as land tenure, 
legal knowledge of operating under contracts, and the like. 
Concluding Remarks
CSA practices have both on-farm and off-farm benefits that far outweigh 
their investment costs. Yet their adoption rates are low in SSA. Increasing 
CSA adoption rates will require increasing the capacity of extension agents to 
provide the required advisory services. Additionally, CSA adoption requires 
significant farmer market participation to buy inputs and sell outputs. 
Unfortunately, current policies and investments remain focused on produc-
tion, and efforts to improve the food value chain are limited. This situation 
will need to change to support widespread CSA adoption. To increase incen-
tives for CSA adoption, it is important to design policies and strategies for 
PES because as much as two-thirds of the total benefit of ISMF is off-farm. 
Current subsidy programs can easily be turned into PES. Such a strategy will 
simultaneously serve food security and climate change adaptation and mitiga-
tion objectives.
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The effects of climate change are already being felt across the globe, particularly among smallholder producers in developing countries, whose livelihoods are strongly affected by climate conditions. 
Climate change will continue to threaten food production and security, 
particularly in Africa south of the Sahara, where dramatic increases 
in temperature (greater than the global average) and changing rainfall 
patterns are expected to result in declines in staple crop yields and farm 
profits (Kurukulasuriya 2006; Müller et al. 2011; Nelson et al. 2014; Niang 
et al. 2014; Seo and Mendelsohn 2008). 
Efforts to increase coping and adaptive capacity have accelerated in 
recent years, resulting in adoption of adaptation strategies that include 
improved agricultural practices (using different crop and livestock practices 
and inputs), livelihood diversification strategies (for example, migration, 
off-farm work, and small enterprises) and risk mitigation strategies (such 
as improved food and water storage) (Bryan et al. 2009, 2013; Deressa et 
al. 2009; Kristjanson et al. 2012; Nhemachena and Hassan 2008). More 
recent efforts of governments and civil society organizations emphasize 
“climate-smart” practices and approaches that increase the productivity and 
profitability of agriculture, increase resilience to climate risks, and mitigate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Lipper et al. 2014).48
48  Several organizations and donors, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations; the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security; the 
World Bank; and others have converged on a definition of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) that 
describes it as an approach with three objectives or pillars: (1) sustainably increasing agricultural 
productivity and incomes, (2) adapting and building resilience to climate change, and (3) reducing 
or removing GHG emissions, where possible and appropriate. The concept of CSA enables policy 
makers and practitioners to evaluate their agricultural strategies across these three pillars and to 
maximize gains across these objectives when possible. Given the risk that climate change poses to 
poor smallholder producers in developing countries, often the first two objectives are prioritized 
and mitigation is viewed as a co-benefit.
Despite these efforts, there is consensus that current incremental 
approaches to adaptation are inadequate to address future climate 
challenges (Niang et al. 2014; Noble et al. 2014). Recognizing that poor 
smallholder producers face multiple stressors across a range of complex 
social and environmental contexts and that resources to respond to these 
stressors differ by gender and other factors, efforts to support producers’ 
responses to climate change cannot take place in a vacuum. 
Ensuring that responses to climate change are successful in making 
agricultural production, food systems, and livelihoods more resilient 
therefore requires careful consideration of all the factors influencing 
resilience in a given context. Such factors include environmental condi-
tions, the institutional environment, and the policy context. When such 
factors are considered, responses to climate change also have the potential 
to accelerate gains toward other development objectives, such as health and 
nutrition improvements. At the global and regional levels, there is growing 
recognition of the importance and efficacy of addressing multiple develop-
ment objectives simultaneously in an integrated fashion, as illustrated by 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, combating and 
reducing the adverse impacts of climate change are key objectives of the 
SDGs; the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and 
Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, adopted 
by heads of state of the African Union; and many national-level agriculture 
and development strategies as laid out in nationally-determined contribu-
tion documents across the region. 
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By identifying the synergies and trade-offs implicit in alternative 
actions, the research community can help identify policies, strategies, and 
technologies that can achieve multiple development goals while protect-
ing against the negative impacts of climate change. Currently, no studies 
address the linkages among climate resilience, food security, nutrition, 
and women’s empowerment. However, the literature has begun to connect 
several of these elements, linking agriculture to nutrition pathways (for 
example, Herforth and Harris 2014), gender and climate change (for 
example, Ringler et al. 2014), climate change and nutrition (Fanzo et al. 
2017), and gender and nutrition (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2012). Based on a 
review of these bodies of literature, this chapter develops an integrated 
gender, climate change, and nutrition (GCAN) conceptual framework that 
can be used to guide integrated approaches to addressing multiple develop-
ment challenges in the context of climate change by highlighting entry 
points for action, potential outcomes of various responses, and the trade-
offs and synergies among outcomes. 
Gender and Climate Change
Numerous studies have identified the salient factors influencing household-
level responses to climate change, including access to rural services (such as 
extension and credit), access to information, demographic characteristics, 
agroecological conditions, social capital, and cognitive processes, among 
others (Bryan et al. 2009, 2013; Deressa et al. 2009; Di Falco and Bulte 
2013; Nhemachena and Hassan 2008; Nielsen and Reenberg 2010; Juana, 
Kahaka, and Okurut 2013; Grothmann and Patt 2005). However, this 
research accounts for only the gender of the household head, showing that 
female-headed households are less likely to adapt to climate change (Bryan 
et al. 2013; Deressa et al. 2009; Nabikolo et al. 2012). This literature also pays 
little attention to the nutritional implications of various adaptation strategies 
and how gender intersects with the pathways from adaptation to nutritional 
outcomes.
The extensive literature on intrahousehold relations and resource 
allocation in the context of development demonstrates that men and women 
have different preferences and responsibilities, and that women are often at 
a disadvantage regarding access to and control over resources and decision-
making authority (Doss 2001; Doss and Morris 2001; Peterman et al. 2011; 
Quisumbing 2003; Udry 1996). A growing number of studies are beginning 
to explore the reasons for gender differences in perceptions of climate 
change, adaptive capacity, and preferences for and adoption of climate-
smart or risk management practices, not just between male and female 
household heads but between male and female decision makers within 
the same household (Bernier et al. 2015; Jost et al. 2015; Perez et al. 2014; 
Twyman et al. 2014). A recent review provided a conceptual framework for 
examining issues on gender and climate change, summarizing the evidence 
accumulated under the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (Kristjanson et al. 2017). This section 
expands on that review by drawing on additional research on these issues. 
The literature on gender and climate change suggests that the ways in 
which gender intersects with vulnerability and resilience to climate change 
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are very context specific and nuanced, although some common themes 
emerge, as summarized in Box 9.1. 
Perceiving climate change is an essential prerequisite for taking action 
and a factor in the types of response options that are chosen. In general, 
women tend to be less likely to perceive climate changes, and when they do 
perceive them, their perceptions often differ from those of men (Oloukoi 
et al., 2014; Twyman et al., 2014). For example, in Nigeria, these perception 
differences were related to gender-specific livelihood activities—men were 
concerned with climate change impacts on the yields of tuber and legume 
crops, and women perceived a reduction in the availability of fruits, seeds, 
and herbs from community woodlots (Oloukoi et al. 2014). 
Information is also essential for adapting to climate change, but 
numerous studies show that women lack access to critical sources and types 
of information on climate change and appropriate responses (Bernier et al. 
2015; Jost et al. 2015; Katungi, Edmeades, and Smale 2008; Lahai, Goldey, 
and Jones 1999; Tall et al. 2014). Given their different livelihood activities 
and roles in farming, men and women also have different preferences for 
information (Jost et al. 2015; Tall et al. 2014). For example, a study from 
Senegal found that women preferred to receive forecasts of dry spells and 
information on the cessation of the rainfall season, given that they plant 
after the men’s fields have been planted (Tall et al. 2014). Information seems 
to be a critical barrier to women’s adoption of climate-smart practices—a 
study from Kenya found that, though women’s awareness of climate-smart 
practices was lower than men’s, women who were aware of improved prac-
tices were at least as likely as men to adopt them (Bernier et al. 2015).
Although productive assets and financial capital are important for 
adaptation, there is ample evidence of a gender resource gap in agriculture: 
women tend to have fewer or lower-value assets, less access to capital 
and labor, fewer agricultural inputs, and less access to other productive 
resources, such as land (Deere and Doss 2006; Doss and Morris 2001; 
Peterman, Behrman, and Quisumbing 2014; Perez et al. 2014; Peterman 
et al. 2011). These gender disparities limit countries’ capacity to adapt 
to climate change and to achieve several other development goals 
(Quisumbing 2003).
The literature also suggests that formal and informal institutions, 
such as local organizations, markets, and social and cultural norms, 
influence how climate risks are experienced, how resources for adaptation 
are distributed, and how men and women respond to climate change 
(Adger 2003; Adger et al. 2009; Agrawal and Perrin 2008; Agrawal 2010). 
Institutions can promote cooperation and group-based approaches to 
BOX 9.1—EXAMPLES OF KEY GENDER DIFFERENCES LIKELY TO 
AFFECT CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AT THE HOUSEHOLD 
LEVEL
Preferences for response options: Technology choices, investment 
choices (e.g., investments in productive inputs, children’s health, 
education, diets)
Responsibilities: Livelihood strategies, labor roles, migration patterns
Resources: Information, assets, financial capital, natural resources, labor
Institutions: Organizational and group membership, market access, 
social norms
Source: Authors.
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adaptation or they may hinder the adoption of particular adaptation 
strategies (Di Falco and Bulte 2013; Rodima-Taylor 2012). Given that 
institutions are defined within a local context, the ways in which men and 
women participate in and are influenced by them vary. In general, women 
face institutional barriers to adaptation due to social norms governing the 
division of labor (such as women’s heavy domestic workload and inability 
to engage in certain livelihood activities) and women’s ability to participate 
in group activities, move freely, and use particular technologies or practices 
(Djoudi and Brockhaus 2011; Jost et al. 2015; Katungi, Edmeades, and 
Smale 2008; Naab and Koranteng 2012; Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). 
For example, it is often considered culturally inappropriate for women 
to engage in agroforestry (Kiptot and Franzel 2012) or certain types of 
irrigation (Njuki et al. 2014). 
The literature also highlights gender differences in preferences for 
adaptation strategies that vary widely across different contexts, often 
related to traditional labor roles (Bernier et al. 2015; Djoudi and Brockhaus 
2011; Jost et al. 2015; Naab and Koranteng 2012; Twyman et al. 2014). 
For instance, women in Ghana preferred to invest in infrastructure for 
improving water access during times of drought due to their responsibility 
for domestic water collection (Codjoe, Atidoh, and Burkett 2012). Men 
and women also do not necessarily share the same preferences regarding 
investment in children’s health and education or dietary choices (Gillespie, 
Harris, and Kadiyala 2012; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). Responses to 
climate change can lead to shifts in traditional gender roles. For example, 
women in Mali became engaged in charcoal production using local forest 
resources due to male out-migration as a result of climate change (Djoudi 
and Brockhaus 2011). 
Although there are no empirical studies on the differential long-term 
impacts of climate change on men and women, there are several studies 
on the impact of climate shocks on gender-differentiated asset dynamics, 
food security, and nutrition. The literature on shocks and poverty traps (for 
example, Barrett and Constas 2014; Carter et al. 2007; Carter and Barrett 
2006; and Dercon 2004) shows that the ways in which shocks differentially 
affect men’s and women’s assets depend on the type of shock and the local 
context. Quisumbing, Kumar, and Behrman (2011) found that the asset 
holdings of women in Uganda were more severely affected by shocks than 
those of women in Bangladesh, given Ugandan women’s larger role in 
agricultural production. In Zimbabwe, drought appeared to have a negative 
impact on the body mass index of women but not of men (Hoddinott 
2006). Similarly, a qualitative study from Mali found that food shortages 
resulting from environmental change affected women more than men 
(Djoudi and Brockhaus 2011). 
New research highlights the fact that technologies and practices 
adopted at the household level do not benefit all members of the household 
equally (Theis et al. 2017). Some practices, such as conservation agriculture, 
may have a negative impact on women due to increased labor requirements 
(Beuchelt and Badstue 2013; Nelson and Stathers 2009). Climate change 
responses can affect women both positively and negatively, suggesting that 
there are important trade-offs across outcomes that must be considered. 
For example, male out-migration as an adaptive response to climate change 
may increase women’s decision making authority while at the same time 
increasing their labor burden (Djoudi and Brockhaus 2011; Nelson and 
Stathers 2009). 
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Agriculture-to-Nutrition Pathways and 
the Role of Women
There is increasing interest in leveraging the agricultural sector to comple-
ment nutrition-specific interventions and mitigate risks. Researchers and 
practitioners have identified a set of pathways through which agriculture is 
hypothesized to affect nutrition (Haddad 2000; Kadiyala et al. 2014; Gillespie, 
Harris, and Kadiyala 2012; Herforth and Harris 2014; SPRING 2014).
These pathways trace how the rural poor’s diverse engagement in 
agricultural livelihoods can affect their ability to care for infants and young 
children, allocate income for nutrition- and health-enhancing goods and 
services, produce healthy and diverse foods, and so on. Key agriculture-
nutrition linkages include how production outcomes influence food prices, 
expenditures, and diet choices; how crop choices influence the consumption 
decisions of producer households; how nutrient losses can be minimized 
through processing and preparation; and how agriculture indirectly affects 
nutrition through income changes, time allocation, and changes in the 
health environment (Haddad 2000). Because agriculture is at once a source 
of income and food as well as the main energy expenditure for the majority 
of the world’s rural poor, agricultural work can have both positive and 
negative impacts on nutrition. 
Women’s empowerment is thought to interact with the agriculture-
to-nutrition pathways in several ways (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2012). First, 
women’s work in agriculture may increase their bargaining power within 
a household. Given evidence that suggests women are more likely to spend 
earnings on nutrition-enhancing purchases (Gillespie, Harris, and Kadiyala 
2012; Smith et al. 2003), an increase in women’s bargaining power could 
bring about greater allocation of resources for nutrition. However, as 
Malapit and Quisumbing (2015) pointed out, without nutrition knowledge, 
women will not necessarily bargain for better nutrition. In addition, greater 
bargaining power can benefit nutrition by enabling women to negotiate for 
access to various health services for themselves and their children. 
On the other hand, women’s work in agriculture may decrease time 
available for other activities important for nutrition and, without substitutes 
for this work, nutrition may suffer (see Komatsu, Malapit, and Theis 2015 
for a review of the literature). The impact of women’s time displacement 
from domestic work to agriculture depends on the age of their children, the 
availability and quality of substitutes for domestic work, the importance of 
income, and the quantity of food produced relative to care work (Glick 2002). 
Moreover, the quality of care work may be more important than the quantity 
(for example, feeding infants appropriate complementary foods at the right 
time may be more important than overall time spent preparing food and 
feeding). Finally, women’s energy expenditure on physically demanding 
agricultural tasks, especially while pregnant, can have detrimental impacts 
on maternal and child nutrition and health (Owens et al. 2015; Rao et al. 
2003). Although women’s empowerment influences agriculture-to-nutrition 
pathways, agricultural interventions also directly influence aspects of 
women’s empowerment, including their control over assets, participation in 
decision making, control over income, and workload (Johnson et al. 2016; 
Malapit et al. 2014), depending on the degree of gender sensitivity of the 
implementation approach (van den Bold, Quisumbing, and Gillespie 2013).
The agriculture-to-nutrition framework neglects additional interactions 
that relate to how farmers respond to climate risks. First, though the frame-
work captures variations in the quantity and quality of food produced, 
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it does not detail the dynamic ways in which farmers manage risk and 
respond to failures in agricultural production, and the implications of these 
actions for nutrition and health outcomes. Rural households are constantly 
balancing consumption and investment decisions, which are influenced 
by risk aversion, availability of alternative livelihoods, storage capabilities, 
access to markets, financial services, and social protection options, among 
other factors. Distress sales of assets, such as livestock, in response to shocks 
can smooth short-term consumption but reduce resilience to future shocks, 
as well as shift the bargaining power of household members whose assets 
were sold or lost. Although the agriculture-to-nutrition framework works 
well in a “normal” year without shocks, it needs modification to capture the 
nutrition implications of households’ complex responses to risk.
Second, the agriculture-to-nutrition literature does not unpack the 
many factors that influence agricultural decisions and investments, such as 
access to information (extension and climate information services), access 
to technology and credit, and tenure security. These factors, implicit in the 
enabling environment, are important to articulate when looking at how 
and why farmers choose to shift production in response to climate change. 
Gender differences in the factors that affect agricultural decisions mean 
that women face different incentives and constraints than men, resulting in 
different production choices.
Third, natural resources and the institutions that govern them play 
a larger role in nutrition than indicated in the agriculture-to-nutrition 
pathways literature. Collectively managed natural resources can be impor-
tant for nutrition through the direct harvesting of forest products, fish, 
fodder, and fuel resources; through provision and maintenance of water 
resources for irrigation, drinking, and hygiene; and through ecosystem 
services that benefit agricultural production, such as erosion control and 
pollination. Climate change directly affects natural resources, such as 
water availability, while increasing households’ reliance on natural resource 
extraction. Subsequent environmental degradation (for example, deforesta-
tion or excessive groundwater extraction) may exacerbate the severity of 
future climate shocks and stresses, with clear implications for food and 
nutrition security as well as the health and care environment. 
Climate Change and Nutrition
Undernutrition is commonly framed as a consequence of climate change 
(Phalkey et al. 2015; Myers et al. 2017; Fanzo et al. 2017). By some projec-
tions, medium-high climate change is expected to result in an additional 
4.8 million undernourished children by 2050 (IFPRI 2017). Of the people 
at risk for hunger, 97 percent will live in developing countries, with the 
highest number in Africa south of the Sahara (2.4 million) (IFPRI 2017). 
Climate change affects food availability and prices, impacting overall calorie 
consumption as well as consumption of healthful foods, such as vegetables, 
fruits, and animal-source foods. Springmann and colleagues (2016a) esti-
mated that by 2050, climate change would result in 529,000 deaths due to 
decreased food intake and decreased vegetable and fruit consumption. 
Although the effects of climate change on nutrition and health deserve 
immediate attention, it is also important to recognize the role nutrition 
plays in determining individuals’, communities’, and nations’ capacities to 
respond to climate change. Evidence shows that better child nutrition is 
associated with higher cognitive and educational performance in middle 
childhood and greater productivity in adulthood due to increased physical 
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capacity for manual labor (Victora et al. 2008; Haas et al. 1995; Rivera et 
al. 1995). Therefore, considering the current nutritional status of individu-
als and larger communities can be helpful for understanding the extent 
to which these communities are vulnerable to climate shocks and their 
physical ability to respond. 
An underappreciated relationship in the climate change–nutrition 
literature is the full set of linkages between diet choice and environmental 
outcomes. It is important to consider the trade-offs and implications of 
consumption choices and resulting production system changes for future 
climate change and other environmental outcomes. For example, animal-
source food production systems and practices may negatively affect the 
environment by increasing GHG emissions and contaminating surface 
and groundwater (Vetter et al. 2017; Ranganathan et al. 2016). Although 
there may be opportunities for shifting to more plant-based protein sources 
in developed countries for enhanced environmental outcomes,49  animal-
source foods are a rich source of protein and micronutrients needed for 
growth and development that are often lacking in the diets of the poor 
in developing countries (Murphy and Allen 2003). Therefore, climate 
mitigation policies may also affect diet choice, health, and malnutrition 
(Springmann et al. 2016b). 
The nutritional context also determines which climate change response 
strategies may be most effective at addressing the most pressing nutritional 
challenges. It is helpful to think of the bidirectional relationship between 
climate change and nutrition using a food systems approach focused on 
food value chains as a way to leverage agriculture to improve nutrition, 
49 For example, Harwatt and others (2017) suggested that shifting to more consumption of beans 
instead of beef in the United States would contribute to GHG mitigation.
particularly value chains for micronutrient-rich foods (Ruel, Alderman, 
and the Maternal and Child Nutrition Study Group 2013). Value chain 
approaches go beyond farm-level production to include the way foods 
are produced, processed, distributed, and marketed. Climate change and 
shocks may affect these activities, and response strategies at various stages 
of the value chain also have implications for food, nutrition, and environ-
mental security (Fanzo et al. 2017). 
Fanzo et al. (2017) identified focal areas for interventions to reduce 
nutrition risks under climate change along the food value chain and 
discussed ways in which actors can strengthen adaptation-mitigation syn-
ergies at different spatial and time scales. Beginning with inputs, increased 
access to diverse seed varieties and local livestock breeds that are resilient 
to heat, drought, pests, and disease, along with improved soil quality and 
water access, have the potential to increase dietary diversity and ensure 
increased production in the face of climate shocks and stressors. Mitigation 
and adaptation strategies, such as mixed crop and livestock systems or 
improved livestock feeding practices, are also needed to minimize the 
impacts of production on climate change. 
Moving along the value chain, food storage and processing is key to 
ensuring that food is safe, its nutritional content is preserved, and food 
waste is reduced. One example is the increased risk of aflatoxin production 
in crops under climate change and its detrimental effects on both health 
(Kensler et al. 2011) and child growth (Khlangwiset, Shephard, and Wu 
2011; PACA 2014).
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Climate change is expected to affect other components of the value 
chain, including distribution, marketing, and retail, for example by 
reducing market access for smallholder farmers, thus affecting availability 
of and access to foods and, in turn, nutrition outcomes. Climate-proofed 
infrastructure and transportation can reduce these adverse impacts, protect 
nutritional value, and reduce food waste through improved connections 
between farmers and markets (Fanzo et al. 2017). 
At the end of the value chain, actors must consider the different dimen-
sions of food consumption and utilization. Ensuring dietary diversity 
and food security throughout the value chain secures the supply side of 
nutrition, but the complex relationships between health, nutrition, and the 
environment require actors to go a step further. For example, infectious 
disease is affected by climate and can, in turn, increase nutrient demands 
and requirements while reducing nutrient absorption, ultimately affecting 
nutritional status. Climate shocks potentially prevent access to local health 
services, which could also have negative impacts on health and nutri-
tion status. Patz and colleagues (2003) reviewed a wide range of climate 
change–infectious disease linkages. Burke, Gong, and Jones (2015) provided 
a useful example of climate-disease linkages by showing that droughts can 
substantially increase HIV/AIDS infection rates. 
It is evident that the relationship between climate change and nutri-
tion is complex and intertwined with other dimensions of well-being. In a 
vicious cycle, communities without adequate means of risk mitigation and 
adaptation are forced to make short-term decisions on food consumption; 
livelihoods; land, water and energy use; and transportation that endanger 
their nutrition security in the long term and impair effective climate change 
mitigation, potentially worsening planetary health (Fanzo et al. 2017). 
Discussion
The literature reviewed above shows that although considerable work has 
been done to explore the connections between gender and climate change, 
agriculture and nutrition, and nutrition and climate change, many research 
gaps remain. The literature on gender and climate change highlights many 
ways that the adaptive capacity, preferences and needs for responding to 
climate change, and decision-making authority of men and women may 
differ. Though some research is beginning to explore the implications of 
climate change and alternative responses for better well-being outcomes of 
men and women, much more is needed in this area to generate actionable 
evidence. More research is also needed to develop effective approaches to 
engaging women in actions that increase resilience to climate change. The 
challenge is that the barriers to women’s participation and the approaches 
designed to reach women must vary across different sociocultural environ-
ments. Similarly, the literature on agriculture for nutrition and health does 
not articulate production risk due to climate change; the role of decision-
making processes in determining nutritional outcomes; and the interactions 
between agriculture, nutrition, and the environment, particularly the 
management of natural resources. The nutrition literature has only recently 
begun to consider the risks due to climate change and the implications of 
value chains on environmental outcomes, including GHG emissions.
Although recent research has highlighted the concept of resilience as 
an important factor to consider in development programming and has 
begun to develop indicators for its measurement (Barrett and Constas 2014; 
Béné, Frankenberger, and Nelson 2015; Constas et al. 2014; Frankenberger 
et al. 2014), the extent to which issues related to gender and nutrition 
are addressed remains minimal in the resilience literature. For example, 
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few resilience frameworks incorporate preferences and decision-making 
processes, which are fundamental for understanding gender-differentiated 
aspects and impacts. No comprehensive studies or tools integrate all these 
concepts, even though governments, NGOs, donors, and other stakehold-
ers that aim to achieve multiple development objectives increasingly 
emphasize addressing issues of gender and social inclusion, nutrition, and 
climate resilience in an integrated fashion. The challenges of designing, 
monitoring, and evaluating such integrated programs are widely acknowl-
edged (Cole et al. 2016).
This article, therefore, develops a GCAN conceptual framework that 
draws on the existing literature to provide stakeholders from different 
disciplines and backgrounds with a common point of reference for under-
standing these complex issues and interlinkages. The framework can be 
used to identify research and evidence gaps, identify possible trade-offs 
and synergies among different objectives, and highlight entry points 
for programs and projects that aim to increase resilience and influence 
outcomes, such as nutrition or women’s empowerment. Given that gender, 
nutrition, and climate challenges vary across local contexts, the framework 
is not intended to be prescriptive but rather to provide a means for examin-
ing the key issues across the intersection of these issues. 
This work draws primarily from elements of four existing frameworks: 
the (Frankenberger et al. (2014) resilience framework; a framework on 
gender and climate change (Behrman, Bryan, and Goh 2014, cited in 
Kristjanson et al. 2017); the Global Nutrition Report’s climate change and 
nutrition framework (IFPRI 2015); and the Strengthening Partnerships, 
Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) agriculture-for-
nutrition framework (Herforth and Harris 2014). The appendix presents 
visual representations of these frameworks. We selected these four frame-
works because they integrate multiple elements of interest or are widely 
known and used in the development community, or both. 
Framework for Integrating Gender, 
Climate Change, and Nutrition
Resilience is a dynamic, path-dependent concept. People’s current state and 
their ability to respond to shocks and stressors will influence their well-being 
in the immediate future and their capacity to meet future challenges. In the 
GCAN framework (Figure 9.1), resilience depends on several key elements 
including the initial state of absorptive and adaptive capacity when a given 
climate shock or stress is experienced; the portfolio of available options; the 
actions taken in response to the climate signal; and the outcomes of those 
responses, which influence the context in which future climate shocks and 
stressors are experienced. 
Although this framework focuses on climate shocks and stressors, it 
could also be adapted to assess other sources of livelihood risk, such as 
food price shocks, political instability, and conflict. It can also be adapted 
to illustrate the intersection of climate, gender, and nutrition issues within 
a given local context, development program, or set of response options (for 
example, on-farm climate-smart practices or technologies).
Numerous underlying factors determine the key elements of the GCAN 
framework. The framework shown in Figure 9.1 does not attempt to define 
or list all these factors, which can be categorized in different ways and vary 
depending on the scale or context of analysis. Rather, to further explore 
the key elements of this general framework, Figures 9.2 and 9.3 adapt it to 
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show the key variables one might examine at the household and 
policy levels, respectively. The specific details provided in the 
household and policy versions of the GCAN framework are not 
an exhaustive set of factors or characteristics that influence resil-
ience at that level but merely serve to illustrate the key elements 
of the framework. This section describes the key elements of the 
overarching framework (Figure 9.1) in more detail, drawing on 
specific examples from the more detailed household- and policy-
level GCAN frameworks (Figures 9.2 and 9.3, respectively). 
The Climate Signal
The climate signal represents the source of uncertainty, volatility, 
shocks, and longer-term changes. These shocks or stressors can be 
characterized in many ways, such as by the scale and magnitude of 
the event or change (Smithers and Smit 1997). Long-term climate 
changes involve shifts in average temperature and rainfall condi-
tions, as well as in the frequency of extreme weather events, such 
as droughts, floods, and storms. This framework not only focuses 
on long-term climate changes but also illustrates how normal 
patterns of climate variability and extreme weather events influ-
ence resilience.
The Enabling Environment
The effects of climate change occur within a particular context or 
enabling environment, which influences the ability of individuals 
and groups—across a broad scale—to absorb and respond to 
the impact of the changes they experience. Policies, laws, and 
 FIGURE 9.1 —INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE RESILIENCE, 
GENDER, AND NUTRITION, GENERAL
Source: Authors.
Note: NRM = natural resource management.
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other institutions all influence individual, household, and group 
responses to climate shocks and stressors (Figure 9.2). At higher 
levels, such factors as international commitments, international 
aid flows, and the degree of political stability influence the 
resilience of nations and regions to climate shocks and stresses 
(Figure 9.3). 
Absorptive and Adaptive Capacity
Drawing on the resilience literature, which sometimes refers to 
three capacities for resilience—absorptive, adaptive, and transfor-
mative (Béné, Frankenberger, and Nelson 2015; Frankenberger et 
al. 2014)—the GCAN framework includes elements for absorptive 
and adaptive capacity. Here, absorptive capacity is defined as the 
sensitivity of individuals, groups, communities, countries, or 
regions to shocks and stressors—that is, factors that determine 
the extent to which different actors are directly affected by climate 
shocks and stressors, and the extent of the changes they need to 
make to preserve or improve their well-being. For example, a 
smallholder farmer with a diversified livelihood that includes farm 
and nonfarm income sources may not experience as great a loss 
of income upon delayed onset of rains as a neighboring farmer 
whose livelihood is dependent on a single rainfed crop. 
The health and nutritional status of individuals at the time 
of a climatic shock also affects their absorptive capacity—for 
example, whether or not they can withstand an increased risk 
of infectious disease. Because health status affects both the 
productivity of households and the time burden associated with 
Healthcare expenditure 
Healthcare expenditure 
 FIGURE 9.2 — INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GENDER, CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND NUTRITION, HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
Source: Authors.
Note: NRM = natural resource management.
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providing care to the sick, health status is important to absorptive 
capacity. Other factors, such as infrastructure and the strength 
of the social safety net, also influence absorptive capacity at the 
household level (Figure 9.2). Absorptive capacity at the country 
level is influenced by such factors as the structure of the economy, 
the natural resource base, the level of poverty or inequality, and 
relations with other countries in the region (Figure 9.3).
Adaptive capacity is defined as the ability of different actors 
or groups of actors to respond to climate shocks, stressors, risks, 
or opportunities. This ability depends on a variety of factors that 
interact in different ways based on social demographics, such 
as gender and age. At the individual or household levels, these 
factors include the capacity of individuals to perceive and under-
stand climate risks, their access to financial capital and assets, 
their human and social capital, their access to information and 
technology, and their time constraints (Figure 9.2). At the state 
or policy level, factors influencing adaptive capacity include the 
perceptions and risk preferences of policy makers, gross domestic 
product, information systems and the availability of technology, 
health systems, and access to markets (Figure 9.3).
High absorptive capacity reduces the urgency of adapta-
tion. To a certain extent, absorptive capacity can offset adaptive 
capacity. Conversely, low absorptive capacity necessitates higher 
adaptive capacity to respond to shocks and stressors. However, 
many of the factors that drive absorptive and adaptive capacity 
are positively correlated, so people with high absorptive capacity 
often also have a high adaptive capacity and vice versa.
 FIGURE 9.3 — INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GENDER, CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND NUTRITION, POLICY LEVEL 
Source: Authors.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; NRM = natural resource management; R&D = research and development.
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Absorptive and adaptive capacity interact with the enabling environ-
ment to determine the range of response options available to decision 
makers from the individual to the state level. As mentioned in the litera-
ture review, important gender differences, such as women’s lack of access 
to information, often limit the range of response options available to them. 
Women’s low adaptive capacity relative to men’s limits their potential 
contribution to increasing resilience at the household, community, and 
national scales, and poses the risk that adaptation will occur in ways that 
do not reflect women’s needs and priorities. 
Response Options 
Different actors—including individuals, households, groups, communi-
ties, and policy makers—respond differently to the climatic challenges 
they have experienced or anticipate. Drawing on the literature on climate 
change adaptation and resilience, in the GCAN framework, responses can 
take several forms, from actions directed toward coping with the immedi-
ate impacts of a climate shock or stress, to adaptive or transformative 
approaches that protect or improve livelihoods and well-being outcomes 
over the longer run. Coping responses generally refer to strategies that 
utilize available resources, skills, and opportunities to address, manage, 
and overcome adverse climate stresses and shocks in the short to medium 
term. Risk management strategies involve plans, actions, or policies that 
aim to reduce the likelihood or impact of future negative events (or both). 
Adaptation involves adjustments to actual or expected climate stimuli in 
order to avoid harm or exploit potential benefits to return to, maintain, 
or achieve a desired state. Transformative responses aim to change the 
fundamental attributes of a system or context to improve well-being 
outcomes, and include actions such as those that address underlying social 
vulnerabilities.
The GCAN framework shows that responses to climate shocks and 
stressors take place across different spatial scales, from individual actions 
to state or regional responses. These actions can also be characterized by 
the time scale at which they occur. Some actions can be implemented in the 
short term, such as an individual farmer’s or farm household’s decision to 
plant a new crop variety, whereas others take time to implement, such as 
switching from annual crops to tree crops, or developing new crop varieties. 
Decision-Making Context
The actions households take in response to climate challenges often depend 
on internal negotiations between different actors who advocate for their 
own needs, preferences, and priorities that may overlap but often diverge. 
The ability of different actors to influence the outcomes of these decision-
making processes depends on their own bargaining power and control over 
resources. 
The extent to which the chosen responses reflect the needs and 
priorities of different individuals also depends on the degree to which 
the interests of different actors involved in the decision-making process 
align. For example, a husband and wife who tend to agree on a course of 
action are both likely to be satisfied with the decision. On the other hand, 
disagreement among decision makers is likely to result in one or more 
individuals’ being dissatisfied with decisions that are made, as well as 
skewing of benefits toward individuals with more decision-making power. 
Divergent preferences around responses to climate shocks and stressors 
may be seen in decisions to migrate and in the prioritization of uses of 
limited resources, such as water and land. 
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Pathways to Change 
Drawing on the agriculture-to-nutrition literature, the GCAN framework 
shows that actions taken in response to climate shocks and stressors poten-
tially influence well-being outcomes through six possible pathways: (1) food 
production, (2) income, (3) asset dynamics, (4) labor, (5) natural resources, 
and (6) cooperation. 
Changes in farming practices, crops, or inputs have implications for 
food production at the farm level. In the absence of fully functioning 
markets, as is the case in many developing countries, these changes in food 
production have dramatic impacts on the food environment. Similarly, 
changes in income or assets (or both) as a result of responses to climate 
shocks and stressors influence nutrition and health outcomes—differently 
depending on who controls the income or asset. Livestock assets, in par-
ticular, may directly influence nutritional and health status—potentially 
positively by increasing access to animal-source foods, or negatively by 
worsening the water, sanitation, and hygiene environment via exposure to 
disease and fecal matter. 
Many responses to climate challenges also have implications for labor 
allocation, which in turn influences outcomes such as care practices (that 
is, the amount of time people—often women—spend caring for children 
or the elderly) and leisure time, an indicator often linked with well-being 
and empowerment. In addition, practices that affect the management and 
use of natural resources also have implications for outcomes, such as the 
WASH environmental and health status. Another key pathway pertains to 
the degree to which coordination or cooperation exists at the household, 
community, or broader scales. At the household scale, such coordina-
tion would indicate greater cooperation among household members for 
BOX 9.2 —THE FOOD, SOCIAL/WORK, HEALTH, AND LIVING 
ENVIRONMENTS
The food environment includes food availability, quality, and access. Food 
availability entails temporal stability through production and storage, both of 
which are directly affected by climate shocks. Quality refers to both the nutritional 
value of diets and the safety of food. Access to food necessitates adequate market 
access and affordability. Price increases, ruptures in market access, production 
failures, and shifts in production diversity are ways in which the food environment 
can be affected by environmental shocks and stressors. 
The social/work environment refers to shifts in time use as well as access to 
and control over assets as people alter their livelihood strategies in response 
to climate change. Such shifts affect the intrahousehold bargaining power 
and empowerment status of men and women, with implications also for 
intergenerational gender equality. An increased time burden for men, women, 
and children may intensify human energy expenditure and carry possible 
opportunity costs in terms of alternative livelihood activities, access to services, 
investment in human and social capital, and in some cases greater physical risk. 
Shifts in time use may also affect care practices and the ability to raise healthy 
children and care for the elderly. 
The health environment entails health stresses and health care. Transmission of 
viral, bacterial, and parasitic diseases is projected to increase with climate change. 
Gender-based violence is also a health risk associated with climate shocks, 
stressors, and responses. Health care service delivery may be disrupted by climate 
shocks that reduce access to health facilities. 
The living environment refers to changes in water security (reliable, safe, 
affordable, and physically accessible water services for human use and 
consumption), physical infrastructure for access to services (such as education 
and health), sanitation and hygiene, disaster risk reduction (such as flood 
infrastructure and cyclone shelters), and the natural resource base as a result of 
climate shocks and stressors and the responses to them. Changes in the living 
environment also have implications for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Source: Adapted from IFPRI (2015).
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common interests. At the community scale, it refers to cooperation around 
shared resources and social capital, which can greatly facilitate access to 
information, learning, social insurance, resources, and labor (Bernier and 
Meinzen-Dick 2014). At higher scales, cooperation could refer to coordina-
tion among regional states to ensure a stable food supply through trade or 
cross-boundary water management. 
Well-Being Outcomes 
The GCAN framework focuses on food and nutritional security, environ-
mental security, gender equality, and health as four final outcomes that are 
affected by the interactions between climate shocks and stresses and by the 
various responses to these challenges at different scales. 
Four interrelated “environments” that mediate these outcomes are 
highlighted in the blue area of Figures 9.1–9.3: the food environment, the 
social/work environment, the health environment, and the living environ-
ment (Box 9.2). 
Linkages, Trade-Offs, and Synergies between 
People, Outcomes, and Time Scales
Importantly, considerable linkages, trade-offs, and synergies arise across 
these “environments” or development outcomes, temporal scales, and 
different groups of people. For example, poor water quality in the living 
environment increases vulnerability to other health stresses; people may 
cope by seeking different water sources, which increases their time burden 
and potentially their security risk. Practices that improve food availability 
and access in the food environment, such as increasing the use of chemical 
fertilizers or pesticides, may have negative implications for the health and 
living environment, such as water quality and GHG emissions. 
In terms of temporal trade-offs, responses that may yield benefits in 
the short term, such as selling assets to meet consumptive demands, may 
improve nutritional status in the short term but have negative implications 
for long-term availability of and access to food. Intergenerational trade-offs 
also exist. For example, when women’s workloads increase to secure liveli-
hoods in the face of climate change, there can be negative implications for 
the health status of pregnant women and their infants (Owens et al. 2015).
Moreover, there are differences in terms of how the costs and benefits 
of the chosen response options are distributed. For example, responses to 
climate change and shocks may intensify or alleviate inequalities between 
men and women and require us to examine who bears the brunt of shifts in 
time burden, human energy expenditure, control over assets and income, 
and subsequent bargaining power and empowerment. 
The GCAN framework shows that outcomes at any given point in time 
influence future absorptive and adaptive capacity as well as future potential 
response options. Similarly, actions taken in response to existing climate 
conditions have implications for the trajectory of future climate changes by 
influencing GHG emissions and carbon sequestration. These feedback loops 
illustrate the dynamic nature of resilience or vulnerability to climate condi-
tions and change, highlighting the fact that outcomes, such as nutrition and 
health status, are never static. 
The flow of the elements of this framework, from top to bottom and 
back up again, can follow several possible scenarios. For example, actors 
may be able to increase their resilience to climate shocks and stressors due 
to high initial absorptive and adaptive capacity, which enables them to 
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make changes that improve their well-being outcomes and, in turn, increase 
their future absorptive and adaptive capacity. Alternatively, vulnerability 
to climate shocks and stressors may increase, given low absorptive and 
adaptive capacity and limited response options, which causes well-being to 
deteriorate. Adapting the framework to explore a specific shock or stress 
in the context of a particular community, program, or country can yield 
valuable insights into the potential consequences of that shock; how dif-
ferent people or groups may be affected; how they may respond; and what 
policies, programs, or actions might be implemented to improve well-being 
outcomes in both the short and the long term.
Conclusions
Development programming is moving toward more integrated, systems-
based approaches that address multiple, interlinked development challenges 
simultaneously. However, these approaches require coordination across 
different disciplines and areas of expertise. A conceptual framework can help 
identify key elements and connections between disciplines and provide a 
common ground for different disciplines to see how they affect each other 
and what synergies they may find in complex challenges. In particular, 
it highlights possible unintended consequences of interventions, hidden 
factors that influence specific development outcomes, and relationships and 
trade-offs between processes and outcomes. 
The GCAN framework provides guidance on key areas to consider, 
including (1) the importance of gender-differentiated capacities to respond 
to climate change, needs and preferences for response options, and 
outcomes of different practices and approaches; (2) the food system and 
nutritional status as factors influencing capacities to respond to shocks and 
stressors; (3) the linkages between various well-being outcomes, such as 
how environmental impacts and women’s empowerment affect nutrition 
and health outcomes; and (4) the importance of multiple pathways through 
which climate change responses influence nutrition, health, gender equality, 
and other development outcomes. 
A suitable framework also clarifies the types of information that must 
be collected to adequately understand the system. The present framework 
draws on available evidence but also identifies numerous gaps that require 
further study. Specifically, there is little evidence on which approaches are 
effective to improve the nutrition and women’s empowerment outcomes 
of agricultural interventions while also ensuring that these approaches 
increase resilience to climate shocks and stressors. Moreover, although 
resilience and climate-smart interventions are starting to be promoted 
more widely, few studies evaluate the differential impacts of interventions 
on well-being outcomes for men and women and the implications of these 
interventions for nutrition and health. By highlighting often-overlooked 
differences in men and women’s preferences and ability to actualize those 
preferences, the framework shows that future research requires a funda-
mentally inclusive, participatory approach that seeks to identify distinct 
priorities and concerns by social group and develops solutions with margin-
alized groups and local actors (for example, Cole et al. 2016; Douthwaite and 
Hoffecker 2017; Kirstjanson et al. 2017). 
More research is also needed on the trade-offs and synergies across 
different development outcomes, such as agricultural productivity, liveli-
hood resilience, and ecosystem resilience / environmental outcomes. 
Such research would be able to identify any potential multiplier effects of 
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development interventions that effectively integrate gender and nutrition 
considerations (for example, development outcomes when women are 
empowered to be more involved in increasing resilience). 
The GCAN framework was designed with the aim of identifying entry 
points for cross-sectoral actions that can achieve positive impacts across 
multiple outcomes. Therefore, it can also be used to guide the needs assess-
ments, design, and monitoring and evaluation of agricultural programs and 
other development interventions to ensure that their climate risk, gender, 
and nutrition implications are considered. This framework enables program 
implementers and policy makers to think of the systems and institutions 
across different scales that affect each other, and how to properly measure 
and monitor the interactions between them. It also provides a guide 
for identifying opportunities and obstacles related to the program and 
outcomes of interest and for tracing the impact pathways from interventions 
to outcomes. Participatory tools and guides will be developed based on this 
framework to further support the design, implementation, and assessment 
of integrated programs that improve the livelihoods and well-being of 
vulnerable populations. 
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Appendix
FIGURE 9A.1—RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
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Appendix continued
FIGURE 9A.2—FRAMEWORK ON GENDER, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE
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Appendix continued
FIGURE 9A.3—AGRICULTURE-TO-NUTRITION PATHWAYS
Source: Reprinted with permission from Herforth and Harris (2014).




























































Key components of the enabling environment:
       • Food market environment
       • Natural resources
       • Health, water, and sanitation
       • Nutrition/health knowledge and norms
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Appendix continued
FIGURE 9A.4—CONCEPTUAL LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND NUTRITION
Source: IFPRI (2015).
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Ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) is a known strategy for building climate resilience and enhancing the ecosystems that underpin the productivity of key socioeconomic sectors in Africa. EbA for 
agriculture is an approach used to build climate-resilient food systems; 
it encompasses climate-smart agriculture (CSA) and a broad range of 
other techniques. In light of mounting climate impacts and escalating 
degradation of ecosystems, the urgent need to scale up such climate-
resilient approaches as EbA and CSA and safeguard future food systems 
cannot be overstated. And effective scaling-up calls for a break from 
classical approaches that view EbA and CSA as a silo climate resilience 
technique, and a move toward embracing a new paradigm that portrays 
them as part of an integrated composite solution to maximizing the 
productivity of agriculture and food systems in Africa for accelerated 
socioeconomic transformation. This transformation is critical to 
achieving the goals of the Malabo Declaration and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Recognizing ecosystems’ catalytic place in 
Africa’s socioeconomic transformation and realization of these goals can 
provide impetus for market-based incentives to expand EbA and such 
resilience approaches as CSA. Actualizing this integrated approach will 
require inclusive partnerships among complementary actors to bridge the 
requisite policy and nonpolicy gaps and foster practical means to achieve 
this integration. UN Environment is already fostering these inclusive, 
mutual, multistakeholder partnerships at the policy and operational levels 
by facilitating a country-driven policy and implementation framework 
through the Ecosystem Based Adaptation for Food Security Assembly 
(EBAFOSA).
Background and Context of Ecosystem-
Based Adaptation 
Ecosystem-based adaptation implies building or boosting the resilience of 
ecosystems to climate change impacts (by sustainably managing, conserving, 
or restoring them) so they can continue providing the ecosystem goods and 
services, such as hydrologic regulation, biodiversity, and healthy soils, that 
human communities need to adapt to climate change (UNCCD 2017). EBA 
purposefully uses “green infrastructure” and ecosystem services to increase 
human societies’ resilience to climate change, reducing their vulnerability 
to its effects. EbA comprises measures to conserve, restore, or sustainably 
manage ecosystems and natural resources, such as CSA, and it complements 
or even substitutes for conventional adaptation approaches that involve 
“hard,” or “gray,” infrastructure measures. In addition, EbA is often cheaper 
than gray hard-and-fast engineering approaches. For example, in Viet 
Nam it has been proven that planting and maintaining mangrove forests 
to act as breakwaters and protect the coast is significantly cheaper, costing 
approximately US$1.1 million for 12,000 ha, than mechanical repair of 
wave-induced dike erosion, which can cost up to US$7.3 million annually 
(Olivier et al. 2012). Similarly, in New York City, two schemes were evaluated 
to manage storm-water flows. One, green-infrastructure-based, emphasized 
stream-buffer restoration, green roofs, and bio-swales (landscape elements 
designed to remove silt and pollution from surface runoff water). The other 
was a gray infrastructure plan involving tunnels and storm drains. The 
green infrastructure option presented a cost savings of over US$1.5 billion 
(Talberth and Hanson 2012). Decision makers in Idaho and North Carolina 
found similar cost savings through green infrastructure.
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To enable communities to adapt to climate change, EbA has been 
applied to a range of ecosystems that communities depend on for liveli-
hoods—mountains, coasts, agricultural landscapes, and so on. Examples of 
practical EbA interventions include the following (Reid et al. 2017):
• Restoration of coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangrove forests, 
dune systems, and salt marshes to dissipate the energy of powerful 
tropical storms. This EbA intervention responds to coastal climate 
change impacts, especially sea-level rise, and is applied in place of, or in 
complementarity with building sea walls, a gray approach. 
• Wetland and floodplain management to prevent floods and maintain 
water flow and quality in the face of changing rainfall patterns in place 
of building dikes/levees/ embankments, which is the gray approach. 
• Conservation and restoration of forests and other natural vegeta-
tion to stabilize slopes, prevent landslides, and regulate water flow. 
Cumulatively, these strategies also improve the groundwater recharge 
rate and prevent flash flooding. 
• Establishment of healthy and diverse agroforestry systems and CSA 
practices to cope with increasingly variable climatic conditions by 
improving soil structure, preventing erosion, enhancing groundwater 
recharging, and so on. 
Ecosystem-Based Adaptation for Food Security:  
A Strategic Thrust
In Africa, agriculture is the most inclusive economic sector, providing 
livelihood opportunities for the majority of people on the continent, includ-
ing vulnerable women. The sector employs on average 64 percent of labor 
in Africa (Calestos 2011), and women produce a significant 47 percent 
of Africa’s food (Kanu, Salami, and Numasawa 2014). It is thus the most 
promising sector for enhancing the economic participation of the majority 
of people in Africa. 
In addition, Africa holds a comparative advantage in agricultural 
resources to leverage toward building a competitive agriculture sector. 
Maximizing productivity can potentially accelerate socioeconomic trans-
formation. For instance, the continent has 65 percent of the world’s arable 
land (UNESCO 2017) and 10 percent of its renewable internal freshwater 
resources (Pietersen et al. 2006). With growth in Africa’s middle class, 
currently estimated at 300 million people (Mubila and Aissa 2011), the 
continent’s food market is projected to grow to US$150 billion by 2030. If 
harnessed, the entire agriculture and agribusiness sector is projected to 
grow to be worth an estimated US$1 trillion by 2030 (World Bank 2013), 
thus enhancing agriculture’s contribution to Africa’s gross domestic 
product.
Agriculture has been documented to be at least two to four times 
more effective at reducing poverty than any other sector (Calestos 2011) 
and to have the potential to catalyze achievement of all of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and many of the Malabo Declaration goals 
(Marks 2016a, 2016b). Agricultural growth also stimulates productivity in 
other sectors, such as processing and transportation, whose value chains 
link with the agricultural value chain, resulting in economywide impacts. 
Furthermore, in Africa, a 10 percent increase in crop yields translates to 
approximately a 7 percent reduction in poverty. Neither the manufacturing 
nor the services sector can achieve an equivalent impact (Imhoff 2015). 
This capacity, coupled with the agricultural sector’s inclusivity, indicates 
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its unique potential to enhance inclusive economic growth for substantial 
poverty reduction and achievement of multiple SDGs.
Regardless of this potential, however, Africa’s current socioeconomic 
development challenges mean that the continent is far from achieving inclu-
sive growth. Poverty is high, with more than 40 percent of the population 
living on less than US$1.90 daily (United Nations 2016). Youth unemploy-
ment is another stressor, with young people ages 15–25 representing more 
than 60 percent of the continent’s population (AfDB et al. 2013), 60 percent 
of them unemployed (Agbor, Taiwo, and Smith 2012) and more than 
70 percent living on less than US$2.00 per day (Montpellier Panel 2014b). 
Related to poverty is low labor productivity, with Africa’s productivity 20 
times lower than that of developed regions (United Nations 2016). Low pro-
ductivity, in turn, implies minimal value addition and growth of industry. 
Food and nutritional insecurity is also high, with more than 50 percent of 
the adult population in Africa south of the Sahara (SSA) facing moderate or 
severe food insecurity (United Nations 2016). 
In light of the potential inherent in agriculture, maximizing its produc-
tivity stands out as strategic in orchestrating the much-needed turnaround. 
This vital truth has been acknowledged in pivotal policy declarations and 
development blueprints, led at the continent level by the African Union 
(AU) and at the global level through the SDGs. Among these are the Maputo 
(African Union 2003) and Malabo (African Union Commission 2014) 
declarations and the related Vision 2025 for Africa’s agriculture, as well as a 
commitment by the AU heads of state and government to end hunger, halve 
poverty in Africa by 2025, and reduce postharvest losses by 50 percent. In 
addition, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) implementation strategy recognizes EbA approaches as key 
strategies, among others, to enhance agroproductivity in Africa (African 
Union and NEPAD n.d.). Further, the AU Agenda 2063 recognizes agri-
culture as the means to achieve inclusive, sustainable development on the 
continent (African Union Commission 2015). It also underscores the need 
for gender parity and enhancing women’s agroproductivity through access 
to financing, for instance calling for dedication of 30 percent of agricultural 
financing to women. Agenda 2063 also underscores the need to achieve more 
than 50 percent clean energy, which will be vital in modernizing and trans-
forming Africa’s agriculture in a sustainable way.
An overriding theme implied in these blueprints is the need to modern-
ize and optimize Africa’s agriculture while at the same time ensuring that 
the productivity of the ecosystems that underpin agricultural productivity 
are safeguarded for future generations. At the global level, the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development and the SDGs align with these noble conti-
nental aims. Specifically, SDG 1 aims for poverty eradication. SDG 2 aims 
to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote 
sustainable agriculture, with targets to be achieved by 2030. SDG 13 calls for 
action to combat climate change. SDG 15 calls for sustainable management 
and restoration of ecosystems. SDG 5 aims to empower women in areas 
including agriculture, where they produce up to 80 percent of the food. 
These goals overlap considerably with the Malabo Declaration goals, which 
include commitments to end hunger and halve poverty by 2025, to sup-
porting agriculture-led growth, and enhancing resilience of livelihoods and 
production systems to climate variability and related risks.
These development blueprints and policy declarations provide the first 
principles and theoretical solutions for transforming Africa’s agriculture. 
Their implementation constitutes an impactful practical solution. 
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Eliminating Inefficiencies to Realize the 
Potential of Agriculture: The Place of 
Ecosystem-Based Adaptation
In spite of the promise of the blueprints and declarations mentioned above, 
the African agricultural sector is vulnerable to ecosystem degradation, 
climate change, and postharvest losses, among other inefficiencies. As an 
example of the first vulnerability, ecosystem degradation, SSA’s food loss due 
to agroecosystem degradation is estimated to be as high as the equivalent 
of 6.6 million tons50 of grain annually, enough to meet the annual caloric 
needs of approximately 31 million people (Munang et al. 2015). Land and 
ecosystem degradation in SSA is estimated to cost US$68 billion annually 
(Montpellier Panel 2014a). It is noteworthy that healthy ecosystems are 
the foundation of long-term productivity, underpinning food production 
through ecosystem goods and services such as water, soils, and pollinators. 
For instance, pollination by bees is an ecosystem service necessary for 
75 percent of all crops used as human food (Bradbear 2009). Increasing the 
quantity and variety of pollinating insects can increase crop yields by more 
than 20 percent (INRA 2016).
In relation to the second vulnerability, climate change, the 2015 techni-
cal report on Africa’s adaptation gap (Schaeffer et al. 2015) observes that 
for a global warming scenario of less than 2.0°C, the agriculture sector will 
be hit by yield declines of up to 40 percent, resulting in a 25–90 percent 
increase in the incidence of undernourishment, not to mention economic 
losses. Based on The Emissions Gap Report 2015, produced by UN 
Environment, the globe is on track for a warming of around 3.0°C to 3.5°C 
50  Tons refer to metric tons throughout the chapter.
by 2100, with a confidence level greater than 66 percent (UNEP 2015), 
implying that impacts could be worse. Adapting to climate change is there-
fore an imperative to safeguard Africa’s future food security. The costs are 
expected to be no less than US$50 billion annually by 2050, and the pace of 
international support does not reflect this continental urgency. 
As for postharvest losses, low value addition (World Economic Forum 
2015) means that Africa’s average annual cereal grain losses are high, esti-
mated at US$4 billion annually (Nomathemba et al. 2010), or enough grain 
to feed an extra 48 million people for a year (FAO n.d.; Formo et al. 2014). 
Postharvest losses in SSA average 30 percent of total production (World 
Economic Forum 2015). In 2010, the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) estimated Africa’s cumulative postharvest losses 
of cereals, roots and tubers, fruits and vegetables, meat, milk, and fish to 
be about 100 million tons with a total value of US$48 billion (FAO 2010). 
In light of Africa’s US$35 billion food import bill in 2011, recovering these 
losses would essentially eliminate the need for imports without increased 
production and inject an extra US$35 billion to capitalize other sectors of 
the continent’s economy. 
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2015 noted that the continent’s 
below-par performance in agriculture undermines poverty reduction and 
inclusive growth (World Economic Forum 2015). There is therefore an 
urgent imperative to optimize the productivity of Africa’s agriculture by 
eliminating these inefficiencies. 
Cumulatively, prioritizing efforts to maximize the productivity of 
Africa’s agriculture will have a ripple effect of improving the livelihoods 
of the majority of people on the continent, including vulnerable women, 
thereby accelerating achievement of multiple goals, including SDGs 1, 2, 5, 
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    141
and 10. But this cannot happen without eliminating prevailing inefficiencies 
along the entire agricultural value chain. 
Ecosystem-Based Adaptation for Food Security: 
Positioning EbA and CSA Strategically 
Rather than being viewed as a silo climate adaptation technique not directly 
connected with socioeconomic priorities, EbA, including CSA, must be 
strategically positioned as a key element in a composite solution to eliminate 
the leading inefficiencies along Africa’s agricultural value chains in order to 
accelerate socioeconomic transformation and achieve the SDGs and Malabo 
Declaration goals. EbA’s compatibility with the approaches of smallholder 
farmers (UNCCD 2017), who produce up to 80 percent of the food in SSA 
(FAO n.d.), coupled with its ability to increase yields by up to 128 percent 
(De Schutter 2011) under the changing climate and to safeguard long-term 
production (Munang and Andrews 2014), makes it pertinent to such inte-
gration as part of a potential composite solution. Such strategic positioning 
of EbA as part of a broad solution to address a leading socioeconomic chal-
lenge in Africa has potential to create incentive for scaling up this approach. 
Policies integrating EbA for on-farm production will contribute to 
climate adaptation, addressed in SDG 13 and Malabo Commitment VI, 
given that EbA is a climate adaptation technique. EbA will also boost food 
security through yield increases of up to 128 percent as well as healthier 
food with more immune-boosting compounds (Kirsten and Jens 2001), 
hence contributing to SDG 2 (Targets 2.3 and 2.4) while also enhancing 
farmer incomes to combat poverty (SDG 1 Targets 1.5 and 1b). It will also 
enhance the capacity of ecosystems to continue providing ecosystem goods 
and services that enable communities to adapt to climate change (SDG 
13 Targets 13.2 and 13.3; SDG 15 Targets 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, and 15.5; and 
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement on climate change). In addition, some 
EbA techniques that should be prioritized, such as agroforestry or farmer-
managed natural regeneration, will enhance carbon sinks, contributing to 
SDG 13 and Paris Agreement Articles 4, 5, and 7. For example, based on 
inference, Rohit, Brent, and John (2006) calculated that a single large-scale 
forest regeneration project of 25,000 ha can ensure that a country sequesters 
up to 15.6 million tons of CO2. The clean energy value addition of EbA 
production will not only create further incentive for application of EbA but 
also minimize emissions sources (SDG 13; Paris Agreement Article 4). For 
example, solar-powered irrigation can sequester more than 1 million tons 
of CO2 equivalent by 2030 (REEEP 2015). Value addition will also eliminate 
postharvest losses, leading to the recovery of both food and finances, while 
creating additional higher-order jobs along the entire agricultural value 
chain. This paradigm can potentially create up to 17 million jobs (Bafana 
2014) along the value chain and catalyze an agricultural sector worth US$1 
trillion by 2030 (World Bank 2013), without adding to aggregate greenhouse 
gas emissions and pollution, thereby minimizing health risks (SDG 3). 
EbA will also contribute directly to SDG 1 (combating poverty) and SDG 
2 (enhancing food security), and catalyze SDG 7 (affordable and clean 
energy). It will also catalyze SDG 8 by enhancing high-quality jobs and 
structural transformation as well as contributing to macroeconomic expan-
sion through increased agricultural GDP. 
Positioning EbA and CSA techniques as part of a composite solution 
to eliminate inefficiencies along Africa’s agricultural value chains and to 
work toward realizing the Malabo Declaration goals and SDGs stands out 
as potentially catalytic to scaling up of EbA. This is the strategic trajectory 
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that the continent is actualizing through multistakeholder, mutual, and 
complementary partnerships being fostered under the Ecosystem-based 
Adaptation for Food Security Assembly (EBAFOSA)  policy action frame-
work facilitated by the UN Environment, discussed below. 
Moving from Talk to Action: The 
Ecosystem-Based Adaptation for Food 
Security Assembly Business Model for 
Scaling Up EbA and Allied Climate 
Resilience Techniques 
EBAFOSA’s strategy for scaling up EbA is to position it as part of a menu in 
an integrated solution to climate-proof and maximize the productivity of 
Africa’s agricultural value chains. Such a solution would aim to ensure that 
the socioeconomic benefits of food security, jobs, and income and mac-
roeconomic growth are created alongside climate resilience and enhanced 
ecosystems, hence catalyzing the achievement of multiple SDGs—as 
opposed to considering EbA as a stand-alone climate adaptation strategy 
implemented only as a climate obligation and not connected to any direct 
socioeconomic action. Positioning EbA in this way is the foundation of 
EBAFOSA’s EbA business model, aimed at incentivizing business-driven 
actions to scale up EbA.
The model covers two components:
Integrating EbA, including allied resilience techniques of CSA, 
as a key component to sustainably industrialize Africa’s agricul-
ture. This component involves amalgamating on-farm EbA and CSA 
actions with various forms of clean energy–powered value addition; 
information-and-communications-technology (ICT)–enabled market and 
supply chain linkages, especially market prices, input suppliers, advisory 
services, financial intermediation, and the like, for efficient access to 
support services; and official standardization to enhance the marketability 
of products—all in a continuum toward establishing clean energy–powered 
agro-industrialization. This approach places EbA and CSA among the 
ingredients required to industrialize Africa’s agriculture, contributing not 
only to food security but also to the creation of additional income and 
business opportunities along the entire agricultural value chain and the 
intervening value chains. 
This paradigm is implemented under the EBAFOSA policy action 
framework by ensuring that actors practicing EbA are linked with these 
complementary actors through mutual partnerships. For example, in 
Turkana County, Kenya, EBAFOSA Kenya is convening stakeholders from 
the county government, the private sector (financiers; providers of ICT, 
irrigation, and other technologies; and advisory service providers), and 
faith-based organizations in a complementary partnership toward develop-
ing a 100-acre solar-powered irrigation enterprise. The crops targeted are 
amaranth and sorghum, grown using nature-based approaches. These are 
high-value, climate-resilient crops known to improve soil structure and 
enhance water retention, making them well suited to EbA’s goal of enhanc-
ing ecosystems. The enterprise is linked to markets and supply chains, 
including advisory extension services and financial intermediation through 
ICT. Cumulatively, this enterprise is incentivizing the application of EbA to 
ensure food, income, and livelihood security in order to meet SDGs 1 and 2. 
It is also building biophysical resilience through incentivizing scaled-up use 
of EbA and clean energy (SDG 13; Paris Agreement Articles 7 and 4), as well 
as enhancing ecosystems’ productivity and resilience (SDG 15). 
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In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a group of young 
university graduates who are EBAFOSA DRC members have channeled 
their skills, networks, and capital to optimize the cassava value chain. These 
young people are using clean energy to process cassava, an indigenous, 
climate-resilient crop, into flour, and then packaging and standardizing the 
flour for sale on high-value markets. Through this integration, the youth 
generate up to US$4,00051, 52 in weekly income, translating to US$16,000 
monthly and US$196,000 annually. In addition, they are incentivizing the 
production of climate-resilient cassava (an EbA approach that fulfills Paris 
Agreement Article 7 as well as SDG 13) and clean energy value addition 
(Paris Agreement Article 4; SDG 13), while creating incomes and jobs, and 
enhancing food security (SDGs 1 and 2). Through EBAFOSA, these youth 
are set to train youth groups across the 40 EBAFOSA countries in Africa on 
their business model, thus expanding their business aims while contribut-
ing toward building the capacity of more youth across Africa to replicate 
this model of clean energy–powered value addition through EbA. 
Integrating EbA and CSA techniques as a component to remove 
risk from agricultural value chain financing. Studies show that a leading 
constraint on the development of private financing for agriculture is its 
perceived high risk (World Bank 2015). Climate change–induced crop 
failure is a key contributory factor to this risk given the up to 40 percent 
yield reductions under climate change as projected in the 2nd Africa 
Adaptation Gap Report. For example, private-sector lending to the catalytic 
agriculture sectors remains underdeveloped due to perceived high risk. 




key climate-related risk factors (driven by climate change–induced crop 
failure) and financial risk (driven by repayment defaults). By leveraging the 
climate risk–reducing properties of EbA, EBAFOSA aims to integrate EbA 
into these climate risk–sharing facilities in order to reduce some of the risk 
of climate change–induced crop failure, with the end goal of lowering the 
risk and cost of agricultural value chain financing, thereby attracting more 
private financing. 
Makueni County, Kenya, is the first county in Africa to legislate 
creation of a climate change fund to domestically finance resilience-
building efforts. Through EBAFOSA, stakeholders are working with the 
county government to leverage this fund for additional private-sector 
resources, as opposed to using the whole fund as a social program to finance 
climate-resilience actions. The fund is setting aside 50 percent of its portfo-
lio to securitize up to 10 times its value in private banks. These securitized 
monies will be loaned to entrepreneurs engaged in actions that optimize 
the agricultural value chain using EbA and clean energy. Thus, the fund 
will indirectly finance the scaling up of EbA-driven agriculture (relevant 
to SDGs 2, 3, 13, and 15) and clean-energy agricultural value addition to 
create multiple low-carbon, higher-order income and job opportunities 
(SDGs 1, 7, 8, and 13). In Makueni County, then, EbA is integrated into a 
solution to mitigate the risk of agricultural value chain financing through 
a risk-sharing facility that covers both climate risk (through climate risk–
mitigating EbA approaches) and financial risk (through cash deposits that 
cover repayment defaults). 
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Innovative Volunteerism:  
The EBAFOSA Modus Operandi 
To achieve all of the goals mentioned above, EBAFOSA, established in 40 
countries, has become an inclusive, country-driven policy action framework 
that convenes multiple stakeholders in a country—individual and insti-
tutional, state and nonstate—drawn from complementary sectors. These 
actors volunteer their physical and nonphysical resources, such as profes-
sional skills, networks, partnerships, ongoing and planned initiatives, time, 
products, and services. They thus build mutual partnerships that address 
their respective business and organizational objectives (such as expand-
ing market share and operationalizing policies) while remaining geared 
toward realizing the larger, shared EBAFOSA strategic objective: bridging 
relevant policy gaps (by harmonizing policies across multiple relevant line 
ministries) and operational gaps (such as financing, technical expertise, and 
technology) toward establishing EbA-based agro-industrial zones powered 
by clean energy to accelerate the achievement of multiple SDGs. These zones 
integrate EbA as a crucial component of agro-industrialization in operation-
alizing their business model. 
These voluntary mutual partnerships among complementary actors at 
both policy and operational levels, aimed at bridging the gaps, constitute 
the EBAFOSA modus operandi, called innovative volunteerism. This process 
uses voluntary actions to build partnerships that address the immediate 
business and organizational objectives of the partners but also align with 
achieving the larger EBAFOSA strategic objectives.
Examples of Innovative Volunteerism in Practice
Innovative volunteerism is not blind optimism. It is already on the move, 
demonstrating that the strength of this paradigm can be channeled through 
voluntary, state-driven partnerships. The spirit of innovative volunteerism is 
mobilizing youth groups through EBAFOSA in countries like Nigeria.
Innovative volunteerism at the policy level. EBAFOSA is convening 
policy makers from ministries of transportation, agriculture, the environ-
ment, lands, energy, and industrialization, among others, across countries 
in Africa to form interministerial policy task forces. Driven by the objective 
of maximizing the impact of their policies, ministerial staff are volun-
teering their professional skills, networks, and time to work together to 
harmonize their relevant line ministry policies to ensure that they support 
the amalgamation of EbA-driven agriculture with clean energy–powered 
value addition and links to markets and commercial supply chains. Already 
EBAFOSA Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, and Tanzania have formed these task forces. In Tanzania, the FAO 
supported the first seating of the task force. Though a recent development, 
this is an innovative solution that has mobilized cross-cutting support. 
Countries around the globe should likewise contextualize this harmoniza-
tion as critical to accelerate achievement of the SDGs. 
Innovative volunteerism at the operational level. EBAFOSA Kenya 
provides a test case of work at the operational level. An enterprise resource 
planning system for agribusiness management called EdenSys, developed 
by an EBAFOSA Kenya stakeholder, is currently integrating the entire 
EbA-driven agriculture and clean energy value addition value chain in the 
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country and set to expand across the 40 EBAFOSA countries. By collaborat-
ing with clean energy actors, banks (including microfinancers), extension 
and advisory service providers, and farmers’ groups on the EBAFOSA 
platform, the EdenSys application, accessible by phone and computer, has 
mapped and archived the intervening services needed to optimize the 
entire agricultural value chain. The application allows enterprises along 
the EbA- and clean energy–based agricultural value chains to post their 
financial records online and, based on their balance sheets, apply for loans 
by phone or computer. The application is enhancing market access for all of 
these intervening actors while also contributing to broader EBAFOSA aims 
by bridging financial inclusion and access gaps to indirectly finance scaled-
up use of EbA (addressing SDGs 2, 3, 13, and 15) and clean energy (SDGs 
7 and 13), as well as enhancing food security and incomes, and creating 
jobs, including high-quality off-farm jobs in agroprocessing, ICT, and clean 
energy (SDGs 1, 2, and 8).
In Nigeria, through the EBAFOSA framework, premised on the spirit 
of innovative volunteerism, mobilized youth groups have volunteered their 
skills and partnered with farmer cooperatives to develop EbA farming and 
expand the reach of EbA actions in Nigeria. The farms are being linked to 
markets and other commercial value chains to increase their earnings. More 
than 1,000 youth are currently engaged in these partnerships.
Through EBAFOSA Malawi, stakeholders have engaged with the 
Malawi Bureau of Standards to develop quality standards for sesame, 
a high-value and drought-resistant crop. This partnership is enhancing 
the marketability of sesame, increasing earnings from this crop, and 
incentivizing its wide-scale growth. Cumulatively, these effects are combat-
ing poverty and food insecurity. 
These pockets of success are a clarion call and an encouragement for 
us to build on them and create full-scale solutions. Harnessing the spirit of 
innovative volunteerism, Africa can achieve a market-driven scaling-up of 
EbA to attain the SDGs, ensuring that truly no one is left behind.
Conclusion
To effectively scale up EbA and allied climate resilience techniques such as 
CSA, there is an urgent need to break away from a silo perspective that views 
EbA as only a climate resilience strategy. Rather, EbA and CSA must be 
positioned as part of a solution for achieving Africa’s leading socioeconomic 
priorities and driving realization of the SDGs and Malabo Declaration goals, 
which the region urgently needs to attain. This positioning of EbA and CSA, 
as part of a composite solution to maximize the productivity of the region’s 
agricultural value chains, provides the gateway to generate market-based 
incentives to scale up both EbA and CSA.
To actualize this trajectory in a practical sense, the region needs 
to bridge gaps at the policy and operational levels. To do so, inclusive, 
country-driven mutual partnerships among multiple but complementary 
actors—institutional and individual, state and nonstate—at both policy 
and operational levels are a prerequisite. And EBAFOSA provides a ready 
policy action framework whereby these partnerships are being forged on a 
continental scale. 
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The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is Africa’s policy framework for transforming the agriculture sector and achieving broad-based economic growth, 
poverty reduction, and food and nutrition security. It was officially ratified 
by African Union (AU) heads of state and government in the 2003 Maputo 
Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security with two main targets: 
achieving a 6 percent annual agricultural growth rate at the national level 
and allocating 10 percent of national budgets to the agriculture sector. In 
2014, AU heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to 
CAADP by adopting the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural 
Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods 
in which they made seven broad commitments including upholding the 
CAADP principles and targets, ending hunger and halving poverty by 
2025, tripling intra-African agricultural trade, and enhancing mutual 
accountability for results by conducting a continental Biennial Review (BR) 
using the CAADP Results Framework (RF). 
The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System 
(ReSAKSS) was established in 2006 to provide data and knowledge products 
to facilitate CAADP benchmarking, review, dialogue, and mutual learning 
processes. It is facilitated by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) in partnership with Africa-based CGIAR centers, the African 
Union Commission (AUC), the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency 
(NPCA), and leading regional economic communities (RECs). ReSAKSS 
led the development of the first CAADP Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
Framework (Benin, Johnson, and Omilola 2010) and has been helping to 
track progress on core CAADP indicators since 2008 through its website 
(www.resakss.org) and flagship Annual Trends and Outlook Reports 
(ATORs). 
The new CAADP RF for 2015–2025 outlines 40 indicators for tracking 
and reporting on progress in implementing the Malabo Declaration 
across three levels (AUC and NPCA, 2015). Level 1 includes the high-level 
outcomes and impacts to which agriculture contributes, including wealth 
creation; food and nutrition security; economic opportunities, poverty 
alleviation, and shared prosperity; and resilience and sustainability. Level 2 
includes the outputs from interventions intended to transform the agricul-
ture sector and achieve inclusive growth: improved agricultural production 
and productivity; increased intra-African regional trade and functional 
markets; expanded local agro-industry and value-chain development, inclu-
sive of women and youth; increased resilience of livelihoods and improved 
management of risks in agriculture; and improved management of natural 
resources for sustainable agriculture. Level 3 includes inputs and processes 
required to strengthen systemic capacity to deliver CAADP results and 
create an enabling environment in which agricultural transformation can 
take place: effective and inclusive policy processes; effective and accountable 
institutions, including assessing implementation of policies and commit-
ments; strengthened capacity for evidence-based planning, implementation, 
and review; improved multisectoral coordination, partnerships, and mutual 
accountability in sectors related to agriculture; increased public and private 
investments in agriculture; and increased capacity to generate, analyze, and 
use data, information, knowledge, and innovations.
ReSAKSS is expanding its database to track the indicators in the new 
CAADP RF and continue to support CAADP implementation processes, 
including promoting mutual accountability through agriculture joint sector 
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review (JSR) assessments, providing technical support to the CAADP BR 
process, and leading efforts to establish country-level strategic analysis 
and knowledge support systems (SAKSS) that provide data and analysis in 
support of CAADP.
This chapter discusses progress on 29 of the 40 indicators in the new 
CAADP RF. These 29 indicators are the ones for which cross-country data 
have been assembled so far—details of the indicators and aggregate statistics 
are available in the data tables in Annexes 1 to 3 of this report. The remain-
ing indicators will be added in subsequent ATORs and on the ReSAKSS 
website as data become available. ReSAKSS will also continue to present 
data for 13 indicators that were reported on previously and which remain 
of interest to stakeholders both in this report and on the ReSAKSS website. 
Details of the indicators and aggregate statistics are available in the data 
tables in Annex 5 of this report.       
Progress in CAADP Implementation 
Processes
The first decade of CAADP (2003–2013) was largely characterized by an 
implementation process that provided countries and regions with a clear 
set of steps to embark on through the CAADP Round Table process, which 
included signing a CAADP Compact, developing national or regional agri-
culture investment plans (NAIPs or RAIPs), and holding a CAADP business 
meeting. With CAADP now in its second decade, countries and regions are 
following somewhat similar steps as they develop second generation or new 
NAIPs/RAIPs and prepare for the first CAADP BR scheduled for January 
2018. The following section describes country and regional progress in com-
pleting the CAADP process as well as progress by ReSAKSS in supporting 
the process through its support for NAIP formulation, JSR assessments, and 
the CAADP BR. 
As of August 2017, 42 of 55 AU member states had signed CAADP 
compacts and 33 had developed, reviewed, and validated related NAIPs. 
The NAIPs provide detailed implementation plans for achieving CAADP/
Malabo goals and targets. Following the signing of the compact and the 
development of a NAIP, countries hold a business meeting to discuss 
financing modalities for the plan. By August 2017, 28 countries had held 
business meetings (Table L3(a)). To help countries finance the gaps in their 
NAIPs and achieve their targeted outcomes, the Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program (GAFSP) was created in 2010. To date, 17 countries 
in Africa have been approved for GAFSP funding totaling US$611.5 million 
(Table L3(a)). 
Beginning in 2016, the AU and NPCA and relevant RECs have orga-
nized Malabo domestication events in various countries to launch the NAIP 
formulation process and ensure its alignment with Malabo commitments. 
Among the outputs of the event is a roadmap outlining the country’s NAIP 
development process. To date, domestication events have been held in eight 
countries (Table L3(a)). Technical support from ReSAKSS and IFPRI leads 
to the production of a Malabo Status Assessment and Profile that evaluates 
the current situation in a country, and a Malabo Goals and Milestones 
Report that analyzes requirements for achieving Malabo targets. By August 
2017, Malabo Status Assessments and Profiles had been completed for 13 
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countries and Malabo Goals and Milestone Reports had been completed for 
4 countries (Table L3(a)).
The Malabo Declaration calls for strengthening national and regional 
institutional capacities for knowledge and data generation and manage-
ment that support evidence-based planning, implementation, and M&E. 
Agricultural JSRs are one way of operationalizing mutual accountability. 
JSRs provide an inclusive, evidence-based platform for multiple stakehold-
ers to jointly review progress; hold each other accountable for actions, 
results, and commitments; and, based on gaps identified, agree on future 
implementation actions. To strengthen mutual accountability, ReSAKSS, at 
the request of AUC and NPCA and in collaboration with Africa Lead, has 
to date initiated agricultural JSR assessments in 30 countries. These assess-
ments are aimed at evaluating the institutional and policy landscape as well 
as the quality of current agricultural review processes, and identifying areas 
that need strengthening in order to help countries develop JSR processes 
that are regular, comprehensive, and inclusive. Out of 30 country-level JSR 
assessments that have been initiated, 7 were completed in 2014 and 11 were 
completed between 2015 and 2016, bringing the total number of countries 
with completed assessments to 18 (Table L3(a)). At the regional level, in June 
2016 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the 
first REC to hold a regional JSR. The experiences and lessons learned during 
the JSR assessments are being used to strengthen JSR processes and to 
support AUC and NPCA in preparing for the inaugural CAADP BR report 
that will be presented at the AU summit in January 2018.
Starting in 2016, ReSAKSS, under the leadership of AUC and NPCA, 
has been supporting the CAADP BR process by providing technical support 
to countries in data collection, analysis, and reporting. Before the BR 
process was rolled out to all countries, the AUC and NPCA organized six 
regional training workshops where country representatives were trained on 
BR tools and guidelines. As of August 2017, 52 of the 55 AU member states 
had launched the BR process and were at varying stages of completing their 
country reports and data templates that will be used to produce an inau-
gural continental BR report and scorecard for the January 2018 summit. A 
total of 31 countries had their BR reports drafted, validated, and submitted 
to the respective REC. The BR process is proving to be a useful tool for 
rallying agriculture sector stakeholders and enhancing mutual accountabil-
ity. A second round of the BR is scheduled for 2020, with the preparation 
process expected to start in 2018. 
Progress in CAADP Indicators
Of the 40 CAADP RF indicators, 34 are quantitative while 6 are qualitative 
and largely deal with strengthening country-level capacities to deliver on the 
CAADP agenda. The following section assesses Africa’s performance on 29 
of the 40 indicators for which data are readily available, that is 23 quantita-
tive and all 6 qualitative indicators. The progress is organized using the three 
levels of the CAADP RF: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic 
Growth and Inclusive Development; Level 2—Agricultural Transformation 
and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth; and Level 3—Strengthening 
Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results.  
Unlike the qualitative indicators that are presented primarily at the 
country level, progress in the quantitative indicators is presented at the 
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aggregate level in six different breakdowns: (1) for Africa as a whole; (2) 
by AU’s five geographic regions (central, eastern, northern, southern, 
and western); (3) by four economic categories (countries with less favor-
able agricultural conditions, countries with more favorable agricultural 
conditions, mineral-rich countries, and middle-income countries); (4) by 
the eight regional economic communities (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, 
ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and UMA)53 ;  (5) by the period during 
which countries signed the CAADP compact (CC1, CC2, CC3, and CC0)54 ;   
and (6) by the level or stage of CAADP implementation reached by the end 
of 2016 (CL0, CL1, CL2, CL3 and CL4).55 Annex 4 lists the countries in 
each CAADP category. Progress is also reported over different sub-periods, 
where achievement in post-CAADP sub-periods (that is, annual average 
levels in 2003–2008 and 2008–2016) are compared with achievement in the 
pre-CAADP or base sub-period of 1995–2003. The discussion here is mainly 
confined to trends for Africa as a whole and for countries categorized by 
53  CEN-SAD = Community of Sahel-Saharan States; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa; EAC = East African Community; ECCAS = Economic Community of 
Central African States; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; IGAD 
= Intergovernmental Authority for Development; SADC = Southern African Development 
Community; UMA = Arab Maghreb Union.
54 CC1 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2007–2009; CC2 = group of countries that 
signed the compact in 2010–2012; CC3 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2013-2015; 
CC0 = group of countries that have not yet signed a CAADP compact.
55 CL0 =group of countries that have not started the CAADP process or are pre-compact; CL1 
=group of countries that have signed a CAADP compact; CL2 = group of countries that have 
signed a compact and formulated a NAIP; CL3 = group of countries that have signed a compact, 
formulated a NAIP, and secured one external funding source; CL4 = group of countries that have 
signed a compact, formulated a NAIP, and secured more than one external funding source.
year in which they signed a CAADP compact and by stage of CAADP 
implementation reached.  
CAADP RF Level 1 Indicators: Agriculture’s 
Contribution to Economic Growth and  
Inclusive Development  
Wealth Creation
In the aftermath of the global commodity and financial crises in 2007 and 
2008, Africa has experienced slower economic growth, breaking from the 
strong growth the continent had experienced since the early 2000s. Recently, 
and especially in 2016, the slowdown in growth has been attributed to lower 
commodity prices and a less-supportive global environment (IMF 2016). 
To illustrate, although per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for Africa as 
a whole grew at an annual average rate of 3.9 percent in 2003–2008, it fell 
to 0.6 percent in 2008–2016 (Table L1.1.1). A similar trend is also observed 
across most classifications: geographic regions, economic classifications, 
RECs, and CAADP groups. The group of countries with more favorable 
agriculture conditions seems to have fared well in 2008–2016 with the 
highest annual average growth rate of 3.5 percent, perhaps because they 
are less dependent on oil and mineral resources, which faced declining 
prices. On average, the groups of countries that have been implementing 
CAADP the longest (especially CC1 countries) or are most advanced in 
implementing CAADP (CL4) achieved higher GDP per capita growth in 
2003–2008 compared to the groups of non-CAADP countries (CC0 or 
CL0). Despite the slower rate of economic growth, Africa as a whole and 
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all classifications have experienced sustained increases in GDP per capita. 
For example, Africa’s GDP per capita increased from an annual average of 
US$1,437 in 1995–2003 to US$1,691 in 2003–2008 and US$1,883 in 2008–
2016. Since 2003–2008, southern and northern Africa and middle-income 
countries experienced the highest GDP per capita (above US$3,000), while 
mineral-rich countries have had the lowest GDP per capita (US$431).  
Since 2003, household consumption expenditures per capita have 
grown steadily for Africa as a whole and across all classifications (Table 
L1.1.2). Moreover, many of the classifications either maintained or regis-
tered improved growth rates in 2008–2016 compared to 2003–2008. And 
consistent with the GDP per capita growth pattern, Africa’s household 
consumption expenditure per capita increased from US$1,014 in 1995–2003 
to US$1,127 in 2003–2008, reaching US$1,296 in 2008–2016. The groups of 
countries engaged in CAADP, and especially those that signed a CAADP 
compact earlier (CC1) and those that have gone through most of the 
CAADP stages (CL4), registered higher growth in household consumption 
expenditure during the CAADP era (2003–2008 and 2008–2016), thereby 
reducing the expenditure-per-capita gap between them and the groups of 
non-CAADP countries or those that have not yet embarked on the process 
(CC0 and CL0). 
Food and Nutrition Security
Rates of hunger and malnutrition (undernourishment and child 
underweight, stunting, and wasting) have been declining over the last 20 
years but remain high across all classifications. For example, the proportion 
of people that are undernourished in Africa as a whole decreased from 
24.9 percent in 1995–2003 to 20.8 percent in 2003–2008 and further down 
to 17.6 percent in 2008–2015 (Table L1.2.1). Despite the declining trend for 
Africa as a whole, rates of undernourishment remained rather high, above 
30 percent, in eastern Africa and mineral-rich countries during 2008–2015. 
The groups of countries involved in the CAADP process, especially those 
that signed CAADP compacts earlier (CC1) and are most advanced in 
implementing the process (CL4), have seen faster declines in the rate of 
undernourishment than the groups of countries that are not part of the 
process (CC0 and CL0). Although the rate of decline has been slower in the 
groups of countries that have not engaged in the CAADP process, which 
include South Africa and most northern Africa countries, the levels of 
undernourishment are much lower in these groups. 
As part of the Malabo commitment to ending hunger, African 
leaders resolved to improve the nutritional status of children, namely by 
reducing stunting to 10 percent and underweight to 5 percent by 2025. The 
prevalence of underweight children under five years of age has consistently 
declined across all classifications. For Africa as a whole, prevalence 
decreased from an annual average level of 24.6 percent in 1995–2003 to 
22.4 percent in 2003–2008 and further down to 19.8 percent in 2008–2016 
(Table L1.2.2A). Although northern Africa countries together had the 
lowest prevalence of underweight children in 1995–2003, they also had the 
fastest rates of decline, bringing down the prevalence from 8.2 percent in 
2003 to 4.6 percent in 2016, thus meeting the Malabo underweight goal as a 
group. Fast declines in the rate of underweight children were also observed 
in southern Africa, which brought down the prevalence from 16.9 percent 
in 2003 to 10 percent in 2016. In addition, the group of countries engaged 
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in the CAADP process experienced faster declines in the prevalence of 
underweight children than those that are not engaged in the CAADP 
process. 
The prevalence of child stunting remains stubbornly high in Africa as 
a whole, at 33.7 percent in 2016. The prevalence rate has also remined high 
across most classifications, at above 35 percent, despite sustained declines. 
The prevalence of stunting in Africa as a whole fell slowly from 41.8 percent 
in 1995–2003 to 39.2 percent in 2003–2008 and to 35.3 percent in 2008–2016 
(Table L1.2.2B). The rate of decline in child stunting slowed during the first 
segment of the CAADP period (2003–2008) across all classifications but 
increased during 2008–2016. Northern Africa countries which make up 
the majority of the groups of countries that have not yet joined the CAADP 
process (CC0 and CL0) began with the lowest rates of child stunting, which 
fell to about 20 percent during 2008–2016. With stunting levels still above 
35 percent for most classifications, there is need to accelerate the rate of 
decline in order to achieve the Malabo target of bringing down stunting to 
10 percent by 2025. 
Although levels of child wasting in Africa are relatively lower than other 
measures of malnutrition, the rate of decline has been slow across all clas-
sifications. For Africa as a whole, the prevalence of child wasting averaged 
10.6 percent in 1995–2003, declining marginally to 9.9 percent in 2003–2008 
and further down to 9.1 percent in 2008–2016 (Table L1.2.2C). Although 
child wasting levels are relatively lower than child stunting and underweight 
levels, they have consistently increased in northern Africa and in the group 
of countries that have not yet joined the CAADP process (CC0 and CL0). 
This trend indicates that the higher levels of GDP per capita and household 
consumption per capita observed in northern Africa have not led to lower 
child wasting.
Despite good progress in reducing malnutrition, the rates of decline 
have been slow and not on track to achieve the Malabo goals of reducing 
stunting to 10 percent and underweight to 5 percent by 2025 for Africa as a 
whole. Concerted and urgent effort is needed to speed up the reduction of 
malnutrition including by making agriculture programs nutrition sensitive.
Africa’s dependence on cereal imports has gradually increased over 
time, reaching an annual average level of 31.8 percent in 2008–2010 (Table 
L1.2.3). This means that about 32 percent of Africa’s cereal food supply in 
2008–2010 was imported from elsewhere. The increasing trend is consistent 
across most classifications even though the level of dependency is quite 
different among the classifications. Central and northern Africa regions had 
the highest cereal import dependency ratio at 73.5 percent and 50.7 percent, 
respectively, in 2008–2010. Southern Africa is the only region that 
reduced its cereal import dependency ratio in 2008–2010, by an average of 
-9.9 percent per year. As may be expected, countries with more favorable 
agricultural conditions had the lowest cereal import dependency ratio, even 
though their dependency has steadily increased over time from 12.2 percent 
in 1995–2003 to 15.7 percent in 2003–2008 and further to 17.3 percent in 
2008–2010. This indicates that due to the amenable agricultural conditions, 
much of the available domestic food supply of cereals has been produced 
in the countries themselves. The groups of countries that joined CAADP 
earlier (CC1) and those that have progressed the furthest in the CAADP 
process (CL3 and CL4) are among those with lowest cereal import 
dependency ratios.  
2016 ReSAKSS Annual Trends and Outlook Report    153
Employment
Tables L1.3.1A and L1.3.1B show employment rates as the number of 
employed people as a percentage of the labor force (15–64 years, Table 
L1.3.1A) and as a percentage of the working-age population (+15 years, 
Table L1.3.1B). Naturally, the employment rate relative to the labor force is 
much higher. On average, the employment rate for Africa as a whole and 
other classifications has increased marginally or remained fairly constant 
over time. For Africa as a whole, the rate is moderate when considering 
the working-age population; it increased marginally from 58.5 percent in 
1995–2003 to 59.0 percent in 2003–2008 and to 59.8 percent in 2008–2016 
(Table L1.3.1B). The employment rates are relatively higher in groups of 
countries that have signed CAADP compacts or are further along in the 
CAADP process than in groups of countries that are not part of the process 
(CC0 and CL0). Given the presence of high levels of undernourishment 
discussed earlier (and poverty discussed in the next section), the moderate 
employment rates, with employment concentrated in the agricultural sector, 
indicate that many of the working-age population or labor force may be con-
sidered poor, that is working poor. Moreover, underemployment and poor 
quality jobs continue to present significant challenges for Africa.   
Poverty
The incidence and depth of poverty have been on a declining trend, but rates 
are still relatively high. In Africa as a whole, the proportion of population 
that lives below US$1.90 a day, measured by the poverty headcount ratio, 
declined marginally from 49.5 percent in 1995–2003 to 45.6 percent in 
2003–2008 and to 42.2 percent in 2008–2016 (Table L1.3.4). The reduction 
in poverty headcount was also consistent across all classifications. Northern 
Africa, despite having the lowest poverty rate, experienced the fastest 
poverty reduction during the CAADP era, reducing its poverty rate from 
3.8 percent in 2003–2008 to 2.1 percent in 2008–2016. Although southern 
Africa has one of the highest levels of GDP per capita and household con-
sumption expenditure per capita (Tables L1.1.1 and L1.1.2), the incidence 
of poverty in the region remains high at 39.3 percent in 2008–2016. This 
suggests the need to exert more effort to achieve inclusive growth and the 
Malabo target of halving poverty by 2025.
The depth of poverty—or the poverty gap—measures the extent to 
which individuals fall below the poverty line, which has implications for 
the resources needed help them move out of extreme poverty. For Africa 
as whole, the depth of poverty, measured by poverty gap index at US$1.90 a 
day, fell from 25 percent in 1995–2003 to 20.9 in 2003–2008 and down to 
17.1 percent in 2008–2016 (Table L1.3.3). On average, during the CAADP 
era, the rate of decline was faster in 2008–2016 compared to the 2003–2008, 
despite the recent slowdown in GDP per capita growth discussed earlier. 
In more recent years, 2008–2016, the poverty gap index was highest in 
central Africa (28.9 percent) and mineral-rich countries (32.1 percent) 
and was lowest in northern Africa (0.4 percent). Also, the poverty gap 
index declined fastest in northern Africa countries at 16.7 percent per 
year in 2008–2016. Groups of countries that have progressed furthest in 
the CAADP process (CL3 and CL4) registered a lower poverty gap index 
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than those that have signed a compact only (CL1) or have gone further and 
developed a NAIP (CL2). 
In Africa as a whole, income inequality measured by the Gini index, has 
been a declining slowly. As Table L1.3.5 shows, the Gini index for Africa as a 
whole declined marginally from 43.8 in 1995–2003 to 43.1 in 2003–2008 and 
to 42.6 in 2008–2016. However, while income inequality has fallen across 
most classifications, more recently (2008–2016) it has increased margin-
ally in central Africa and in the groups of countries that signed a CAADP 
compact earlier (CC1) and those that have not embarked on the CAADP 
process (CC0 and CL0). 
CAADP RF Level 2 Indicators: Agricultural 
Transformation and Sustained Inclusive 
Agricultural Growth 
Agricultural Production and Productivity
Over the past two decades, agriculture value added in Africa as a whole 
almost doubled, increasing from an annual average of US$7.2 billion per 
country in 1995–2003 to US$13.2 billion in 2008–2016 (Table L2.1.1). The 
value added also increased across all classifications. For Africa as a whole, 
agriculture value-added grew at an annual rate of 4.7 percent in 2008–2016, 
slightly up from 4.2 percent in 2003–2008, but lower than the CAADP target 
of 6 percent. However, several classifications including northern Africa, 
countries with more favorable agricultural conditions, and the group of 
countries that signed a compact in 2010–2012 (CC2) surpassed the 6 percent 
target in 2008–2016. In addition, groups of countries engaged in the CAADP 
process achieved stronger agricultural growth rates than those that are not 
(CC0 and CL0). 
The agricultural production index (API) for Africa as a whole and all 
other classifications has increased steadily over the past 20 years. Table 
L2.1.2 shows that the API for Africa as a whole increased from 80.9 in 
1995–2003 to 100.6 in 2003–2008 and further to 119.6 in 2008–2014. The 
rate of increase in the API has been higher in the CAADP era than the 
pre-CAADP period across all classifications and also higher for the group of 
countries that are furthest in the CAADP implementation process than in 
the groups of non-CAADP countries.  
Over the past 20 years too, labor and land productivity, which play a 
key role in driving agricultural growth, have been increasing in Africa as 
a whole and across most classifications. For example, the rate of growth in 
labor productivity, measured by agriculture value added per agricultural 
worker, rose steadily for Africa as whole from 1.4 percent per year in 1995–
2003 to 1.7 percent in 2003–2008 and to 2.7 percent per year in 2008–2016 
(Table L2.1.3). Across several classifications, labor productivity grew faster 
in the CAADP era, reversing the negative growth experienced during the 
pre-CAADP period (1995–2003). In 2008–2016, labor productivity grew 
most rapidly in eastern and northern Africa, countries with more favorable 
agricultural conditions, middle-income countries, EAC, IGAD, and UMA 
regions, and in the groups of countries that joined the CAADP process later 
(CC3) and those that have not progressed much in the CAADP process 
(CL1). Higher levels of labor productivity in the groups of non-CAADP 
countries (CC0 and CL0) are likely due to the higher levels of mechaniza-
tion in that group. 
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Land productivity, measured by agriculture value added per hectare 
of arable land, grew faster than labor productivity, with the rate of growth 
increasing from 3.1 percent per year in 1995–2003 to 5.4 percent per year 
in 2008–2016 for Africa as a whole (Table L2.1.4). Land productivity also 
performed much better across all classifications during the CAADP era 
and especially in 2008–2016. Also in 2008–2016, the greatest growth was 
observed in eastern Africa, countries that have more favorable agricultural 
conditions, middle-income countries, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, 
UMA, and in the groups of countries that joined the CAADP process later 
(CC3) and those have not progressed far in the CAADP process (CL1). In 
addition, groups of countries that joined CAADP earlier and are furthest 
along in the process attained higher levels of land productivity than the 
groups of non-CAADP countries. 
Yield trends for the top five agricultural commodities (cassava, yams, 
maize, meat, and cow milk)56 show varied performance over the past 20 
years. For Africa as a whole, both cassava and yam yields, measured in 
metric tons per hectare (ton/ha), grew faster during 2003–2008 but experi-
enced negative growth during the later CAADP period, 2008–2014 (Tables 
L2.1.5A and L2.1.5B). Maize yield stayed at 1.7 ton/ ha in both 1995–2003 
and 2003–2008 but grew to 2.0 ton/ha in 2008–2014 (Table L2.1.5C). Meat 
and milk yields, measured as kilograms per head, have both experienced an 
increasing trend with meat yield increasing faster during 2003–2008 and 
milk yield during 2008–2014 (Tables L2.1.5D and L2.1.5E). Meat and milk 
yields are much higher in the groups of non-CAADP countries due to the 
high level of mechanization in that group of countries. 
56 These were the commodities with the largest shares in total value of production for Africa as a 
whole.
Intra-African Regional Trade and Market Performance
Tripling intra-African agricultural trade is one of the seven commitments 
of the Malabo Declaration. Intra-African agricultural exports have been 
increasing, and have more than doubled for Africa as a whole, increasing 
from US$0.6 billion in 1995–2003 to US$1.6 billion in 2008–2016 (Table 
L2.2.1A). Growth was particularly remarkable in southern Africa where it 
more than doubled and in northern Africa where it grew six-fold during the 
same period. The group of countries that are further along in the CAADP 
process (CL3 and CL4) and those countries that joined the process earlier 
(CC1 and CC2) witnessed consistent increases in intra-African agricultural 
exports compared to those that have not advanced in the process (CL1 and 
CL2) or those that signed compacts later (CC3). The groups of non-CAADP 
countries experienced a decline in their exports in 2003–2008, followed by a 
rapid increase in 2008–2016. 
Intra-African agricultural imports (Table L2.2.1B) increased steadily over 
the two decades for Africa as a whole and most classifications. Africa’s intra-
African agricultural imports more than doubled between 1995–2003 and 
2008–2016, growing from US$252 million to US$514 million, respectively. 
The group of countries that are further along in the CAADP process espe-
cially (CL3) experienced faster growth in intra-African agricultural imports 
than those that have not advanced very far (CL1 and CL2). The groups of 
non-CAADP countries together also experienced rapid growth in imports, 
particularly in 2008–2016.  
For Africa as a whole, the domestic food price volatility index, which 
measures the variation (volatility) in domestic food prices over time, rose 
during 2003–2008 as a result of the 2007 global food price crisis. Following 
the crisis, food price volatility has been decreasing, declining by an average 
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of 11 percent per year in 2008–2016, compared to the average increase of 
3.7 percent per year in 2003–2008 (Table L2.2.2). Although food price vola-
tility was higher in the groups of countries that joined CAADP earlier and 
are further along in the CAADP process, these groups also had faster rates 
of decline in volatility during 2008–2012. Raising agricultural productivity 
levels to ensure adequate domestic supply can help insulate African coun-
tries from volatile global food prices. 
Resilience of Livelihoods and Management of Risks
The existence of food reserves and programs and early warning systems is 
a key level 2 indicator for increased resilience of livelihoods and improved 
management of risks in the agriculture sector. As of August 2017, 38 coun-
tries had food reserves, local purchase for relief programs, early warning 
systems, and food feeding programs (Table L3(b)).
CAADP RF Level 3 Indicators: Strengthening 
Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results
Capacities for Policy Design and Implementation 
The 2016 ATOR also presents an additional set of qualitative indicators 
for tracking progress in implementation of actions aimed at strengthen-
ing systemic capacity for agriculture and food security policy planning 
and implementation. These indicators are presented in Table L3(b). As 
of August 2017, 15 countries had formulated new or revised NAIPs 
through an inclusive and participatory process. Twenty-one countries had 
inclusive, institutionalized mechanisms for mutual accountability and 
peer review (mainly JSRs). Twenty-eight countries were implementing 
evidence-informed policies with relatively adequate human resources 
in place. Twenty-two countries had functional multisectoral and mul-
tistakeholder coordination bodies—mainly agricultural sector working 
groups. Sixteen countries had successfully undertaken agriculture-related 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) aimed at boosting specific agricultural 
value chains. In addition, SAKSS platforms help meet country-specific data, 
analytical, and capacity needs, and to date, ReSAKSS has helped to establish 
these platforms in a total of 14 countries.
Public Agriculture Expenditure
Through the Malabo Declaration, African leaders committed to enhance 
both public and private investment finance for agriculture and uphold 
their commitment to allocate at least 10 percent of public expenditure to 
agriculture. Over the past 20 years, for Africa as a whole, public agriculture 
expenditures have increased steadily, growing from US$0.7 billion per 
country per year in 1995–2003 to US$1.1 billion in 2008–2016 (Table 
L3.5.1). Public agriculture expenditures grew strongly in both 1995–2003 
and 2003–2008, by 11.5 and 11 percent, respectively. However, following 
the global food-price and financial crises, which reduced fiscal revenues, 
growth in expenditures decelerated at about 4.8 percent per year on average 
in 2008–2016, and expenditures fell to US$0.9 billion per country as of 2016. 
The declining trend in public agricultural expenditure was also observed 
in eastern, southern, and western Africa; only central and northern Africa 
experienced increased expenditures during 2008–2016. Declines in public 
agriculture expenditures were also witnessed in the groups of CAADP coun-
tries (CC1, CC3, CL1, CL4). 
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Although public agriculture expenditures have increased remarkably 
over time, for Africa as a whole, the share of agriculture expenditure in total 
public expenditure has fallen short of the CAADP target of 10 percent budget 
share. The share grew from an annual average of 3.2 percent in 1995–2003 
to 3.5 percent in 2003–2008 and declined to 3.0 percent in 2008–2016 (Table 
L3.5.2). Although a handful of countries met the CAADP budget target, 
none of the classifications managed to achieve the CAADP budget target in 
2008–2016. The groups of countries that joined the CAADP process early 
(CC1 and CC2) and those that are further along in the implementation 
process (CL2, CL3, and CL4) had relatively higher shares of public expendi-
tures, at more than 4 percent during 2008–2016. 
In Africa as a whole, public agricultural expenditure as a share of 
agriculture GDP averaged 6.2 percent per year in 2003–2008 and declined 
to 5.5 percent in 2008–2016 (Table L3.5.3). Northern and southern Africa 
regions, mineral-rich countries, SADC, UMA, and the groups of non-
CAADP countries had higher shares, above 10 percent in 2008–2016, 
indicating they invest more in agriculture relative to the size of the sector. 
More needs to be done to raise public agriculture investments in order to 
increase agricultural productivity growth and deepen the progress toward 
achieving Malabo targets for poverty, hunger, and nutrition by 2025. 
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Rising temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, and increased frequency of extreme weather events are expected to slow progress toward increased productivity of crop and livestock systems and 
improved food security, particularly in Africa south of the Sahara. These 
manifestations of climate change are already having serious impacts 
on crop yields, especially for African farmers who rely on rainfall. An 
integrated framework to address this multifaceted threat is urgently 
needed. Climate-smart agriculture (CSA), with its multi-pronged approach, 
offers an opportunity to address the challenges of meeting future food 
security demands under a changing climate. 
Findings from this report provide a clear sense of the potential positive 
effects that CSA practices can have on productivity and on the number of 
people at risk of hunger, through a reduction in agricultural commodity 
prices. In addition, adoption of CSA practices has the potential to reduce 
soil degradation by increasing soil organic carbon content, or at least 
reducing soil organic carbon losses. Overall, these findings suggest that 
CSA practices can contribute to increasing resilience to climate change. The 
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is compatible with increasing 
productivity, but achieving significant abatement levels will depend on the 
feasibility of enforcing emission intensity reductions on the ground and 
also on the impact of CSA adoption on other carbon-rich environments 
such as forests. More research is needed to develop reliable and inexpensive 
methods to verify emission reductions and monitor land use change as well 
as on the trade-offs and synergies across different development outcomes. 
African countries have committed themselves to achieving the aspira-
tions of the Malabo Declaration, including ending hunger by 2025 and 
building resilience of vulnerable livelihoods and production systems to 
climate variability and shocks. They have committed to scaling up invest-
ments for resilience-building initiatives and to mainstreaming resilience 
and risk management into their policies, strategies, and investment plans. 
CSA is an important approach for meeting Malabo goals, with potential for 
increasing agricultural productivity and meeting food security objectives 
while enhancing resilience. However, the effectiveness of CSA will largely 
depend on its widespread adoption and implementation. This will require 
key innovations and policy actions, including:
• CSA-related training programs for extension agents: A defining 
characteristic of CSA practices is their location-specificity, meaning 
that practices and technologies must be tailored to local conditions. The 
capacity of extension agents to provide advisory services on integrated 
soil fertility management (ISFM), organic soil fertility, and other new 
paradigms for sustainable soil fertility management practices is low. 
This capacity should be increased through short-term training and 
workshops for extension agents who are already in service.  
• Policies and strategies that treat smallholder farmers as 
entrepreneurs: CSA does not by itself solve some of the long-standing 
problems that have limited the progress and development of 
agricultural producers. For too long, governments and even donors have 
treated smallholder farmers as subsistence farmers, and their policies 
and strategies have largely focused on provision of production-related 
rural services, rather than market potential. Public extension 
agents affiliated with the ministries of agriculture largely provide 
production-related advisory services; but marketing advisory services 
in most countries are relegated to the ministry of industries and trade, 
where they receive little attention. Smallholders have the potential to 
160   resakss.org
generate profits and care for their land. They will benefit from being 
treated as commercially-oriented farmers if they are provided with 
appropriate advisory and information services to fully connect them 
with successful value chains. 
• Storage facilities and other market value-chain investments: 
Increased farm and nonfarm investments along agricultural value 
chains can create incentives for farmers to adopt CSA practices. These 
include the implementation of risk-coping mechanisms, namely ISFM, 
improved seeds, storage, processing equipment, and enhanced access to 
markets, crop insurance, and other mechanisms. 
• Payment for ecosystem services (PES): A significant share of the 
benefits generated by CSA practices materializes off-farm and some-
times, as in the case of the reduction of GHG emissions, even at the 
global level. Programs such as PES should be used to reward farmers 
who adopt CSA practices. By internalizing positive externalities, PES 
would help farmers defray initial investments and take on additional 
risks associated with CSA practices.   
• Agriculture risk management including formal insurance mecha-
nisms: Farmers need a more sophisticated toolkit to cope with risks 
induced by changing climate conditions. Furthermore, farmers should 
be able to take advantage of the upside risk of investments without the 
danger of catastrophic consequences. Comprehensive risk manage-
ment strategies, including several insurance pilot programs, show the 
potential positive impact of innovative approaches and of insurance 
mechanisms. However, additional work to understand the effectiveness 
and the potential for substantially scaling up these mechanisms is 
needed. Such efforts can go a long way in helping the continent meet the 
Malabo Declaration commitment to enhancing resilience of farming 
livelihoods.
• Improved adoption of CSA practices: While adoption of CSA has the 
potential to increase agricultural productivity and trade and thus to 
mitigate climate-induced risks, it may be hindered by several factors, 
including the level of investment costs, limited access to CSA technolo-
gies and knowledge of how to implement the technologies, imperfect 
markets, and institutional barriers. And in some contexts, there are 
significant trade-offs between meeting shorter-term food security objec-
tives and the longer-term objective of building resilience. Policies that 
allow for more public-private partnerships are needed to facilitate the 
required investments and the adoption of CSA practices and technolo-
gies. It is also critical for governments to improve vital institutions that 
facilitate access to CSA technologies. 
• Full inclusion of the interlinkages across gender, climate change, 
agriculture, and nutrition when designing CSA policies and 
programs: The gender, climate change, and nutrition (GCAN) frame-
work outlined in the report can be used to identify gender differences 
as they relate to capacities to address climate variability and shocks, 
preferences for  climate change response options, and the effect of 
climate change responses on nutrition, health, and gender equality as 
well as other development outcomes. Thus, the GCAN framework can 
be used to categorize entry points for multisectoral actions that can 
achieve positive impacts across numerous outcomes. It can also be used 
to guide the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of 
agricultural policies and programs to ensure that they account for the 
climate risk, gender, and nutrition implications. 
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Overall, the implementation of CSA practices for smallholder farmers 
is still limited for two main reasons: financial viability and understanding. 
To address the financial viability issue, we propose the creation of a 
special-purpose funding vehicle as a platform for the corporate sector 
to work in partnership with governments, multilateral development 
banks, development organizations, donor agencies, foundations, 
nongovernmental and civil society organizations, small farmers, and 
local community organizations. In addition to creating a platform for 
sustainable development, such a funding approach would not have the 
market-distorting effects associated with pure government subsidy 
programs. With respect to improving understanding, national education 
and research systems should be re-organized to upgrade smallholder 
farmers’ skills to properly use CSA practices. This will require multisectoral 
and interministerial approaches involving all key stakeholders—including 
farmers’ organizations and agro-industries—in planning, implementation, 
and monitoring and evaluation of CSA practices. Finally, the ongoing 
appraisal and formulation of new national agricultural programs and 
investment plans provides a good opportunity to incorporate CSA into 
these plans. 





Core CAADP M&E and 
Supplementary Indicators
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Annexes: 
Core CAADP M&E and Supplementary Indicators
This section presents data and trends across three levels of the CAADP Results Framework as well as supplementary data and trends.57
The data are presented at the aggregate level for the entire continent (Africa); the five geographic regions of the African Union (central, eastern, northern, 
southern, and western); eight Regional Economic Communities (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and UMA);58 four economic 
categories that are classified according to agricultural production potential, alternative nonagricultural sources of growth, and income level;  and nine CAADP 
groups representing either the period during which countries signed a CAADP compact  or  the level of CAADP implementation reached by countries by the 
end of 2015. Data for individual countries and regional groupings is available at www.resakss.org.
Technical Notes to Annex Tables
1. To control for year-to-year fluctuations, point estimates are avoided. Therefore, the values under the column “2003” are averages over the years 
2002 to 2004 and the values under the column “2016” are averages over the years 2015 to 2016
2. Annual average level and annual average change for 2003–2016 include data from 2003 up to the most recent year that is measured and available.
3. Annual average level is the simple average over the years shown, inclusive of the years shown.
4. Annual average change for all indicators is annual average percent change, the beginning to the end years shown by fitting an exponential growth 
function to the data points (that is, “LOGEST” function in Excel).
5. For indicators for which there are only a few measured data points over the years specified in the range (such as poverty, which is measured once 
every three to five years or so), a straight-line method was used to obtain missing values for the individual years between any two measured data 
points. Otherwise, estimated annual average change based on the measured values is used to obtain missing values either preceding or following 
the measured data point. In cases where the missing values could not be interpolated, the data is reported as missing and excluded from the calcu-
lations for that time period. Any weights used for these indicators are adjusted to account for the missing data in the series of the indicator.
57  Future Annual Trends and Outlook Reports (ATORs) will report on more of the CAADP Results Framework indicators as more data becomes available.
58  CEN-SAD = Community of Sahel-Saharan States; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC = East African Community; ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States; 
ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority for Development; SADC = Southern African Development Community; UMA  = Arab Maghreb Union.
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6. Values for Africa, the regional aggregations (central, eastern, northern, southern, and western), economic aggregations (less favorable agriculture 
conditions, more favorable agriculture conditions, mineral-rich countries, and middle-income countries), Regional Economic Communities 
(CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and UMA), and CAADP groups—Compact 2007–2009 (CC1), Compact 2010–2012 
(CC2), Compact 2013–2015 (CC3), Compact not yet (CC0), Level 0 (CL0), Level 1 (CL1), Level 2 (CL2), Level 3 (CL3), and Level 4 (CL4)—are cal-
culated by weighted summation.59 The weights vary by indicator and are based on each country’s proportion in the total value of the indicator used 
for the weighting measured at the respective aggregate level. Each country i’s weight in region j (wij) is then multiplied by the country’s data point 
(xi) and then summed up for the relevant countries in the region to obtain the regional value (yj) according to: yj  = Σi wijxi.
The trend data are organized as follows:
Annex 1
Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development
Annex 2
Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth
Annex 3
Level 3— Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results
Annex 4
Country Classification by Period When CAADP Compact Was Signed and Level of CAADP Implementation
Annex 5
Supplementary Data Tables
59  CC1 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2007–2009; CC2 = group of countries that signed the compact in 2010–2012; CC3 = group of countries that signed the compact in 20132015;  
CC0 = group of countries that have not yet signed a CAADP compact. 
 CL0 =group of countries that have not started the CAADP process or are pre-compact; CL1 =group of countries that have signed a CAADP compact; CL2 = group of countries that have signed a compact 
and formulated a NAIP; CL3 = group of countries that have signed a compact, formulated a NAIP, and secured one external funding source; CL4 = group of countries that have signed a compact, 
formulated a NAIP, and secured more than one external funding source.
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ANNEX 1a: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.1.1




















Africa 1,437 1.1 1,533 1,691 3.9 1,883 0.6 1,924
Central 731 0.1 763 823 2.6 899 0.9 919
Eastern 558 1.5 594 662 5.1 811 1.7 869
Northern 2,534 2.4 2,787 3,053 3.6 3,285 -0.3 3,321
Southern 2,939 0.7 3,038 3,320 4.1 3,657 0.4 3,675
Western 1,021 1.1 1,154 1,347 5.3 1,658 2.2 1,755
Less favorable agriculture conditions 456 1.2 493 538 2.8 600 1.5 627
More favorable agriculture conditions 458 0.4 462 491 3.0 604 3.5 676
Mineral-rich countries 412 -1.6 402 431 3.1 521 2.6 559
Middle-income countries 2,278 1.6 2,481 2,768 4.2 3,085 0.5 3,141
CEN-SAD 1,353 1.5 1,485 1,674 4.5 1,894 0.5 1,934
COMESA 958 0.9 989 1,074 3.8 1,145 -0.8 1,142
EAC 548 0.9 576 625 3.4 752 2.9 826
ECCAS 892 0.3 919 1,078 7.0 1,307 1.0 1,343
ECOWAS 1,021 1.1 1,154 1,347 5.3 1,658 2.2 1,755
IGAD 559 1.4 594 668 5.7 828 1.5 881
SADC 1,821 0.4 1,859 2,012 3.6 2,192 0.4 2,208
UMA 3,134 2.4 3,488 3,846 3.4 3,967 -0.7 3,973
CAADP Compact 2007-09  (CC1) 811 1.2 930 1,107 6.1 1,410 2.6 1,508
CAADP Compact 2010-12  (CC2) 578 0.1 586 623 2.7 728 2.6 795
CAADP Compact 2013-15  (CC3) 1,363 1.4 1,424 1,626 6.2 1,934 0.8 1,980
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 3,314 1.9 3,600 3,911 3.1 4,110 -0.1 4,130
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 3,314 1.9 3,600 3,911 3.1 4,110 -0.1 4,130
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 1,435 1.3 1,494 1,730 6.8 2,080 0.7 2,118
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 520 -0.9 513 533 1.6 583 1.9 626
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 477 1.6 510 545 3.0 649 1.9 682
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 800 0.9 892 1,038 5.4 1,303 2.7 1,409
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
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ANNEX 1b: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.1.2




















Africa 1,014 0.6 1,066 1,127 2.4 1,296 2.4 1,432
Central 453 -1.1 448 461 1.7 524 2.8 597
Eastern 560 0.1 558 597 2.9 723 2.8 804
Northern 1,546 0.4 1,568 1,596 1.9 1,920 2.8 2,114
Southern 1,891 1.1 2,004 2,130 2.8 2,347 1.2 2,476
Western 757 1.5 883 988 3.3 1,178 3.6 1,368
Less favorable agriculture conditions 373 0.3 392 394 1.4 428 1.8 462
More favorable agriculture conditions 431 0.5 434 448 1.7 512 2.4 552
Mineral-rich countries 275 -1.7 263 283 2.9 308 1.7 327
Middle-income countries 1,441 0.9 1,540 1,644 2.6 1,925 2.7 2,153
CEN-SAD 962 1.0 1,040 1,122 3.0 1,331 3.1 1,499
COMESA 833 -0.1 820 845 2.3 967 2.1 1,045
EAC 430 0.5 434 454 2.4 558 3.4 623
ECCAS 463 2.0 528 551 3.5 758 4.4 945
ECOWAS 757 1.5 883 988 3.3 1,178 3.6 1,368
IGAD 653 0.3 651 697 2.8 835 2.8 936
SADC 1,158 0.6 1,198 1,264 2.5 1,381 1.1 1,451
UMA 1,672 -0.8 1,656 1,608 0.0 1,792 2.7 1,998
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 763 1.6 911 1,029 3.4 1,247 3.9 1,464
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 429 -0.1 425 443 2.0 504 2.2 547
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 789 1.6 856 902 3.6 1,198 4.0 1,449
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 2,032 0.6 2,091 2,181 2.1 2,432 1.7 2,573
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 2,032 0.6 2,091 2,181 2.1 2,432 1.7 2,573
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 811 1.4 878 930 4.1 1,265 4.2 1,552
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 397 -0.7 388 401 1.5 427 1.2 448
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 323 1.0 341 364 2.5 409 1.8 436
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 702 1.4 804 892 3.1 1,075 3.7 1,249
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
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ANNEX 1c: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.1




















Africa 24.9 -2.1 22.7 20.8 -3.6 17.6 -2.1 16.6
Central 37.1 -4.0 31.5 29.2 -3.1 23.9 -2.6 22.5
Eastern 44.2 -2.2 40.1 36.8 -3.6 31.3 -2.2 29.4
Northern 6.2 -0.8 5.9 5.6 -1.7 5.1 -1.0 5.0
Southern 28.4 -2.1 26.3 24.8 -2.4 21.0 -2.6 19.5
Western 17.4 -2.8 15.4 13.3 -6.3 10.4 -2.0 9.9
Less favorable agriculture conditions 31.9 -4.8 25.8 24.1 -2.8 19.4 -3.5 17.4
More favorable agriculture conditions 41.3 -2.2 37.8 34.8 -3.5 29.3 -2.4 27.3
Mineral-rich countries 36.3 2.0 38.9 38.3 -1.0 34.6 -1.5 33.5
Middle-income countries 12.9 -3.0 11.3 9.9 -5.5 8.0 -1.7 7.7
CEN-SAD 16.1 -2.0 15.0 13.4 -4.9 11.1 -1.8 10.6
COMESA 33.6 -2.2 30.7 28.6 -2.9 24.7 -2.1 23.4
EAC 34.9 0.0 34.1 31.7 -3.1 28.4 -1.6 27.0
ECCAS 44.6 -4.1 36.7 32.6 -4.6 24.0 -4.3 21.3
ECOWAS 17.4 -2.8 15.4 13.3 -6.3 10.4 -2.0 9.9
IGAD 47.1 -3.3 40.8 36.9 -4.0 30.5 -2.8 28.1
SADC 30.4 -0.8 29.6 28.0 -2.5 24.7 -1.7 23.5
UMA 7.4 -1.2 6.8 6.3 -2.9 5.3 -2.0 5.0
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 27.6 -4.3 22.9 20.4 -4.9 16.0 -2.9 14.8
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 34.8 -0.2 34.4 32.1 -2.9 28.2 -1.9 26.8
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 39.7 -2.6 35.5 31.9 -4.7 24.9 -2.9 23.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 6.4 -0.9 6.1 5.9 -1.1 5.6 -0.5 5.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 6.4 -0.9 6.1 5.9 -1.1 5.6 -0.5 5.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 41.0 -2.3 37.4 34.2 -3.9 28.0 -2.3 26.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 31.2 -2.8 27.0 23.5 -6.2 16.5 -3.3 15.4
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 28.5 -1.0 26.8 25.3 -1.6 22.8 -2.0 21.6
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 31.0 -2.8 27.6 25.0 -4.4 20.5 -2.5 19.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
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ANNEX 1d: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2A




















Africa 24.6 -1.1 23.3 22.4 -1.6 19.8 -2.0 18.4
Central 28.0 -0.6 26.6 26.0 -1.0 23.6 -1.2 22.6
Eastern 29.6 -1.6 27.2 26.0 -1.9 22.8 -2.2 21.2
Northern 8.6 -2.6 8.2 6.9 -4.8 5.4 -3.7 4.6
Southern 18.4 -2.2 16.9 15.4 -3.9 11.8 -4.1 10.0
Western 27.9 -1.3 26.7 26.0 -0.9 24.0 -1.4 22.9
Less favorable agriculture conditions 32.3 -1.0 31.3 31.1 -0.6 30.0 -0.1 29.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 27.5 -1.7 25.2 24.0 -2.2 20.4 -2.4 18.8
Mineral-rich countries 28.0 -0.7 26.3 25.3 -1.5 22.2 -1.7 21.0
Middle-income countries 20.5 -1.1 19.7 18.8 -1.6 16.6 -2.4 15.2
CEN-SAD 23.7 -0.8 23.0 22.4 -1.0 20.7 -1.5 19.6
COMESA 26.1 -1.0 24.6 23.5 -1.8 20.7 -2.0 19.3
EAC 21.1 -2.4 18.8 18.0 -2.0 15.3 -2.8 14.0
ECCAS 28.0 -1.7 25.6 24.3 -2.2 20.1 -2.7 18.3
ECOWAS 27.9 -1.3 26.7 26.0 -0.9 24.0 -1.4 22.9
IGAD 30.7 -1.5 28.4 27.1 -2.0 23.7 -2.1 22.1
SADC 23.7 -1.4 22.0 20.8 -2.1 17.6 -2.5 16.1
UMA 8.6 -1.2 8.3 6.7 -6.4 4.8 -5.4 3.9
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 31.9 -1.8 29.7 28.4 -1.7 25.4 -2.0 23.6
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 22.7 -1.4 20.9 20.2 -1.5 17.5 -1.9 16.4
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 27.4 -0.9 26.0 24.8 -1.8 22.2 -1.9 20.7
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 10.2 -0.9 10.4 9.7 -2.4 8.7 -1.5 8.1
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 10.2 -0.9 10.4 9.7 -2.4 8.7 -1.5 8.1
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 29.0 -0.9 27.6 26.3 -1.9 23.4 -2.0 21.7
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 27.1 -0.6 25.5 24.7 -1.3 21.9 -1.6 20.8
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 26.3 -0.9 25.3 24.6 -0.9 23.4 -0.6 23.0
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 28.1 -1.9 25.9 24.6 -1.9 21.3 -2.5 19.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Notes: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in population under 5 years for the region or group.
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ANNEX 1e: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2B




















Africa 41.8 -1.0 40.2 39.2 -0.9 35.3 -1.6 33.7
Central 44.9 -0.9 43.9 43.4 -0.5 41.4 -0.6 40.6
Eastern 48.5 -1.3 45.7 44.2 -1.5 39.6 -1.6 37.6
Northern 25.5 -3.1 23.1 22.3 1.9 19.4 -3.4 17.3
Southern 43.0 -1.6 40.5 38.2 -2.7 32.3 -2.7 29.5
Western 40.4 -0.4 39.6 39.3 -0.3 36.0 -1.2 35.2
Less favorable agriculture conditions 44.6 0.1 44.4 44.8 -0.1 44.1 0.2 44.5
More favorable agriculture conditions 48.5 -1.3 45.7 44.1 -1.6 39.3 -1.7 37.3
Mineral-rich countries 46.7 -0.9 45.4 44.6 -0.7 42.1 -0.8 41.0
Middle-income countries 35.7 -1.1 34.3 33.4 -0.6 29.1 -2.4 27.1
CEN-SAD 37.5 -0.8 36.4 36.2 0.0 33.2 -1.5 32.0
COMESA 45.6 -1.3 43.3 42.3 -0.7 38.6 -1.7 36.6
EAC 44.4 -1.0 42.3 41.4 -1.2 38.0 -1.4 36.7
ECCAS 46.5 -1.5 44.0 42.4 -1.6 37.6 -1.8 35.3
ECOWAS 40.4 -0.4 39.6 39.3 -0.3 36.0 -1.2 35.2
IGAD 48.2 -1.4 45.0 43.3 -1.8 38.1 -2.0 35.7
SADC 45.7 -1.3 43.7 42.2 -1.6 38.0 -1.5 36.1
UMA 23.2 -1.8 21.3 19.1 -3.2 15.6 -3.1 14.1
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 46.9 -1.0 44.9 43.6 -1.1 39.0 -1.7 37.2
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 41.5 -1.0 39.9 39.2 -0.9 36.1 -1.2 34.9
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 43.4 -1.2 41.0 39.3 -1.8 34.8 -1.9 32.6
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 27.4 -2.1 25.9 25.1 0.3 22.3 -2.4 20.5
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 27.4 -2.1 25.9 25.1 0.3 22.3 -2.4 20.5
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 44.7 -1.3 41.9 40.1 -1.9 35.1 -2.1 32.6
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 43.8 -0.9 42.7 42.2 -0.6 39.9 -0.7 38.9
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 45.0 -0.4 43.7 43.1 -0.6 41.5 -0.4 41.2
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 45.6 -1.1 43.4 42.2 -1.2 37.2 -2.0 35.3
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in population under 5 years for the region or group.
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ANNEX 1f: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.2C




















Africa 10.6 -1.2 10.1 9.9 -0.04 9.1 -1.3 8.7
Central 12.4 0.8 11.5 11.2 -1.1 9.2 -2.1 8.7
Eastern 10.2 -1.1 9.7 9.5 -1.0 8.8 -1.2 8.6
Northern 5.9 0.1 6.4 6.3 1.6 7.0 1.7 7.4
Southern 6.5 -1.6 6.3 6.1 -2.3 5.6 -0.1 5.5
Western 14.2 -2.6 12.9 12.7 1.0 11.5 -2.2 10.6
Less favorable agriculture conditions 15.5 -2.6 14.4 13.7 -1.9 12.7 -1.5 11.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 9.1 -1.3 8.5 8.4 -1.5 7.4 -1.0 7.3
Mineral-rich countries 12.7 0.6 11.5 11.1 -1.4 8.7 -2.6 8.1
Middle-income countries 10.4 -1.3 10.0 10.0 1.7 9.6 -1.2 9.2
CEN-SAD 12.3 -1.6 11.6 11.5 0.8 10.7 -1.5 10.2
COMESA 9.9 -0.1 9.5 9.5 -0.1 8.9 -0.6 8.9
EAC 6.5 -2.3 5.8 5.8 0.1 5.3 -1.4 5.2
ECCAS 11.5 0.3 10.6 10.4 -1.0 8.7 -1.8 8.2
ECOWAS 14.2 -2.6 12.9 12.7 1.0 11.5 -2.2 10.6
IGAD 11.0 -1.0 10.5 10.4 -0.8 9.8 -1.0 9.7
SADC 9.0 -0.2 8.4 8.2 -1.6 7.0 -1.5 6.6
UMA 6.1 1.7 6.9 6.0 -4.7 5.4 0.2 5.5
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 13.5 -2.6 12.2 12.1 0.8 11.0 -2.2 10.3
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 9.3 -0.8 8.5 8.3 -1.0 7.0 -1.7 6.7
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 11.1 -0.2 11.1 11.0 -0.9 10.5 -0.5 10.4
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 6.6 0.3 7.2 6.9 0.1 7.4 1.2 7.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 6.6 0.3 7.2 6.9 0.1 7.4 1.2 7.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 11.9 -0.2 11.9 11.7 -1.0 11.2 -0.5 11.0
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 12.7 0.6 11.5 11.1 -1.5 8.7 -2.6 8.1
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 10.3 -1.8 10.0 9.8 -0.8 9.5 -0.2 9.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 11.5 -2.5 10.3 10.3 0.7 9.1 -2.3 8.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in population under 5 years for the region or group.
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ANNEX 1g: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.2.3




















Africa 27.9 2.9 29.9 30.8 1.3 31.8 0.4 31.8
Central 72.0 0.1 72.5 72.8 0.1 73.5 1.0 73.7
Eastern 14.6 5.0 16.5 17.5 2.3 20.1 2.3 20.5
Northern 48.2 0.7 44.7 46.7 3.9 50.7 0.0 50.7
Southern 18.6 8.8 25.4 26.6 0.1 23.3 -9.9 22.1
Western 16.2 7.3 20.4 20.5 -0.4 20.5 4.7 20.8
Less favorable agriculture conditions 20.7 1.1 22.5 24.9 2.4 25.5 -1.2 25.3
More favorable agriculture conditions 12.2 6.5 15.1 15.7 1.8 17.3 -0.3 17.2
Mineral-rich countries 67.2 0.0 65.4 62.8 -1.3 61.7 1.1 62.0
Middle-income countries 30.6 3.6 32.9 34.4 2.1 35.6 0.7 35.6
CEN-SAD 23.9 3.5 25.4 26.9 3.1 29.5 2.4 29.7
COMESA 30.1 1.7 31.2 31.6 1.2 34.7 2.6 35.2
EAC 13.9 2.3 14.4 17.0 5.1 19.6 2.0 19.6
ECCAS 65.8 -0.2 66.1 67.0 0.4 67.0 0.1 66.9
ECOWAS 16.2 7.3 20.4 20.5 -0.4 20.5 4.7 20.8
IGAD 15.1 6.4 17.6 18.7 3.0 22.4 1.3 22.7
SADC 33.0 3.2 36.8 37.4 0.0 36.0 -1.7 35.6
UMA 60.8 2.3 57.8 59.0 2.7 59.6 -4.4 58.3
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 12.8 8.7 16.6 16.1 -0.8 17.1 5.8 17.5
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 33.4 1.1 34.5 35.3 0.3 35.7 1.1 35.7
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 31.7 4.6 38.1 40.6 1.9 42.8 -1.3 42.8
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 38.4 1.9 37.5 40.1 4.2 42.2 -2.0 41.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 38.4 1.9 37.5 40.1 4.2 42.2 -2.0 41.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 22.6 8.6 29.5 31.9 2.5 34.3 -2.1 34.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 78.4 0.1 78.5 78.2 0.0 79.1 1.1 79.3
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 14.4 2.6 16.2 15.4 -6.0 11.2 -7.6 10.7
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 14.6 6.5 17.9 18.2 0.5 19.6 5.1 20.0
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017), World Bank (2017), and ILO (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2010. For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
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ANNEX 1h: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.1A
TABLE L1.3.1A—EMPLOYMENT RATE (% of labor force, 15–64 years)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 90.8 -0.03 91.0 91.5 0.21 91.9 0.04 92.1
Central 95.2 -0.01 95.3 95.5 0.13 95.6 0.00 95.6
Eastern 93.8 -0.07 93.8 94.1 0.04 94.3 0.05 94.4
Northern 84.8 0.38 86.2 88.1 0.89 88.6 -0.34 87.9
Southern 82.6 -0.35 82.4 83.2 0.47 83.7 -0.05 83.6
Western 93.6 -0.03 93.5 93.4 -0.12 93.8 0.21 94.6
Less favorable agriculture conditions 95.2 0.04 95.4 94.9 -0.22 95.0 0.02 95.0
More favorable agriculture conditions 93.1 -0.06 93.1 93.3 0.02 93.5 0.05 93.6
Mineral-rich countries 94.3 0.03 94.2 94.4 0.22 95.1 0.04 95.3
Middle-income countries 87.6 -0.05 87.9 88.8 0.41 89.4 0.01 89.7
CEN-SAD 91.4 0.08 91.5 91.5 0.04 91.6 0.05 92.0
COMESA 92.9 -0.05 92.8 93.0 0.14 93.1 -0.03 93.2
EAC 95.3 -0.03 95.3 95.4 0.06 95.1 0.02 95.4
ECCAS 95.2 -0.01 95.3 95.4 0.10 95.5 -0.01 95.5
ECOWAS 93.6 -0.03 93.5 93.4 -0.12 93.8 0.21 94.6
IGAD 92.5 -0.03 92.6 92.9 0.05 93.0 0.04 93.1
SADC 89.2 -0.23 89.0 89.6 0.26 90.2 0.03 90.2
UMA 80.2 0.76 83.5 86.5 1.19 88.6 -0.09 88.3
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 94.0 -0.06 94.1 94.1 -0.05 94.5 0.15 95.1
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 92.5 0.01 92.5 92.6 0.08 92.7 0.04 92.9
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 91.6 -0.03 92.0 92.2 0.04 93.0 0.13 93.1
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 82.9 -0.07 83.4 85.3 0.91 85.6 -0.33 84.9
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 82.9 -0.07 83.4 85.3 0.91 85.6 -0.33 84.9
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 91.2 -0.04 91.4 91.4 -0.10 92.2 0.19 92.5
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 94.9 -0.01 95.1 95.4 0.11 95.4 -0.02 95.4
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 94.4 0.05 94.2 94.2 0.14 95.3 0.10 95.5
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 92.7 -0.05 92.8 92.9 0.00 93.0 0.11 93.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total labor force for the region or group.
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ANNEX 1i: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.1B
TABLE L1.3.1B—EMPLOYMENT RATE (% of population, 15+ years)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 58.5 -0.1 58.5 59.0 0.3 59.8 0.2 60.3
Central 69.2 0.1 69.5 69.7 0.1 69.9 0.0 69.8
Eastern 71.3 -0.1 71.4 71.5 0.0 71.1 -0.1 70.9
Northern 39.9 0.0 40.2 41.5 1.1 42.3 -0.1 42.4
Southern 56.2 0.0 56.5 56.8 0.3 56.0 -0.1 56.1
Western 57.7 -0.2 57.1 57.1 0.1 59.0 0.6 60.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 63.5 0.1 63.8 64.3 0.4 66.3 0.2 66.5
More favorable agriculture conditions 75.1 0.1 75.8 76.1 0.0 75.2 -0.2 74.7
Mineral-rich countries 68.2 0.1 68.2 68.1 0.0 68.6 0.2 69.1
Middle-income countries 48.1 -0.3 47.5 48.1 0.5 49.0 0.3 49.7
CEN-SAD 52.6 -0.2 52.0 52.2 0.3 53.5 0.4 54.3
COMESA 62.9 0.0 63.1 63.6 0.3 64.5 0.1 64.8
EAC 76.9 -0.4 75.7 75.3 0.0 74.2 -0.3 73.9
ECCAS 69.8 0.0 69.9 69.9 0.0 69.9 0.0 69.9
ECOWAS 57.7 -0.2 57.1 57.1 0.1 59.0 0.6 60.1
IGAD 66.6 -0.1 66.7 66.8 0.1 67.5 0.2 67.9
SADC 65.4 0.0 65.6 65.9 0.1 64.7 -0.3 64.3
UMA 38.7 0.2 39.4 40.7 0.9 41.4 0.0 41.5
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 62.3 0.0 62.3 62.7 0.2 64.1 0.4 64.9
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 70.1 -0.1 69.7 69.5 -0.1 69.0 -0.1 69.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 62.1 0.2 63.2 63.4 -0.1 63.6 0.1 63.7
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 41.6 -0.3 41.3 42.5 1.1 42.8 -0.2 42.8
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 41.6 -0.3 41.3 42.5 1.1 42.8 -0.2 42.8
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 61.3 0.1 62.1 61.9 -0.3 61.7 0.1 61.9
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 67.0 0.2 67.6 68.0 0.2 68.8 0.2 69.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 68.1 0.1 68.0 68.4 0.5 71.4 0.4 72.2
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 65.3 -0.2 65.1 65.1 0.0 65.1 0.1 65.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
174   resakss.org
TABLE L1.3.3—POVERTY GAP AT $1.90 A DAY (2011 PPP) (%)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 25.0 -2.8 22.1 20.9 -2.2 17.1 -3.4 15.1
Central 55.2 -3.8 46.9 41.9 -4.6 28.9 -6.9 21.7
Eastern 20.9 -2.3 18.0 17.0 -2.2 14.2 -3.2 12.7
Northern 1.6 -5.5 1.2 0.9 -9.4 0.4 -16.7 0.2
Southern 20.5 -1.9 18.9 18.0 -2.9 15.3 -2.4 13.9
Western 23.5 -2.8 21.4 20.9 -0.5 18.4 -1.9 17.2
Less favorable agriculture conditions 32.0 -3.7 27.2 24.9 -4.6 16.9 -5.8 14.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 23.6 -2.4 20.7 19.4 -2.1 16.3 -3.2 14.5
Mineral-rich countries 60.7 -3.7 51.6 46.7 -4.4 32.1 -7.1 24.0
Middle-income countries 15.9 -2.2 14.8 14.7 0.0 13.8 -0.8 13.3
CEN-SAD 19.5 -2.5 17.9 17.6 -0.3 15.7 -1.8 14.8
COMESA 32.5 -2.9 28.5 26.7 -2.7 21.4 -4.0 18.3
EAC 23.4 -1.3 21.0 19.4 -3.3 15.8 -3.3 14.0
ECCAS 47.3 -3.8 40.2 36.2 -4.4 25.3 -6.5 19.5
ECOWAS 23.5 -2.8 21.4 20.9 -0.5 18.4 -1.9 17.2
IGAD 16.4 -3.7 13.4 12.5 -2.4 9.4 -5.6 7.5
SADC 36.3 -2.5 32.1 29.7 -3.5 23.2 -4.2 19.7
UMA 1.6 -5.5 1.2 0.9 -9.4 0.4 -16.7 0.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 22.6 -3.0 20.1 19.7 -0.3 17.6 -1.8 16.6
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 34.6 -3.1 30.0 27.2 -3.9 19.9 -5.6 16.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 21.2 -1.7 20.0 19.1 -1.7 16.9 -2.3 15.5
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 6.5 -4.5 5.2 4.5 -8.6 2.7 -6.9 2.0
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 6.5 -4.5 5.2 4.5 -8.6 2.7 -6.9 2.0
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 24.8 -1.4 23.3 22.2 -1.7 19.7 -2.3 18.1
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 55.0 -4.0 46.4 41.5 -4.7 27.8 -7.5 20.3
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 28.8 -3.3 25.1 23.0 -4.6 15.7 -6.6 12.3
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 22.1 -2.4 19.9 19.4 -0.5 17.6 -1.6 16.6
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
ANNEX 1j: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.3
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TABLE L1.3.4—POVERTY HEADCOUNT RATIO AT $1.90/ DAY (2011 PPP, % of population)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 49.5 -1.4 46.7 45.6 -0.9 42.2 -1.1 40.6
Central 59.0 -3.1 53.1 49.6 -2.7 40.0 -3.7 34.5
Eastern 53.8 -1.5 49.2 47.5 -1.3 42.7 -1.7 40.2
Northern 6.0 -5.6 4.6 3.8 -7.5 2.1 -11.3 1.3
Southern 45.8 -1.0 43.9 42.6 -1.7 39.3 -0.9 37.9
Western 53.8 -1.2 51.7 51.4 -0.1 49.2 -0.5 48.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 72.8 -2.3 66.3 63.1 -2.4 51.4 -3.2 46.2
More favorable agriculture conditions 57.6 -1.5 53.2 51.3 -1.2 46.4 -1.6 43.8
Mineral-rich countries 59.1 -0.7 57.5 57.3 -0.2 53.3 -1.0 51.6
Middle-income countries 39.0 -1.3 37.4 37.1 -0.3 36.1 -0.1 35.7
CEN-SAD 45.7 -1.0 44.3 44.2 0.1 42.8 -0.4 42.3
COMESA 52.3 -1.1 49.4 48.6 -0.5 45.7 -1.0 44.2
EAC 55.3 -0.6 52.6 50.5 -1.6 46.0 -1.3 44.0
ECCAS 52.9 -2.2 48.9 46.5 -2.0 39.8 -2.5 36.2
ECOWAS 53.8 -1.2 51.7 51.4 -0.1 49.2 -0.5 48.3
IGAD 47.2 -2.2 42.0 40.3 -1.3 35.1 -2.3 32.2
SADC 52.9 -0.9 50.5 49.0 -1.5 45.5 -1.0 43.9
UMA 6.0 -5.6 4.6 3.8 -7.5 2.1 -11.3 1.3
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 55.3 -1.7 51.6 51.0 -0.3 47.8 -0.8 46.4
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 52.8 -1.1 50.0 48.1 -1.4 43.6 -1.5 41.3
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 50.1 -1.6 47.9 46.3 -1.4 41.8 -1.7 39.2
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 19.4 -3.5 16.3 14.5 -6.2 10.2 -4.9 8.2
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 19.4 -3.5 16.3 14.5 -6.2 10.2 -4.9 8.2
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 54.7 -1.0 52.7 51.2 -1.2 47.1 -1.5 44.7
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 49.5 -3.1 45.0 42.5 -1.8 34.2 -3.4 30.0
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 64.3 -1.5 60.4 57.6 -2.0 48.7 -2.6 44.6
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 53.3 -1.3 50.2 49.6 -0.4 47.3 -0.6 46.3
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
ANNEX 1k: Level 1—Agriculture’s Contribution to Economic Growth and Inclusive Development, Indicator 1.3.4
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avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 43.8 -0.62 43.0 43.1 0.20 42.6 -0.21 42.3
Central 42.2 -0.04 42.2 42.4 0.24 42.8 0.08 42.9
Eastern 39.5 -0.45 38.9 39.1 0.29 39.0 -0.07 39.0
Northern 40.0 -0.05 39.9 39.7 -0.15 39.4 -0.11 39.2
Southern 55.5 -0.58 54.1 53.9 -0.43 51.7 -0.73 50.4
Western 43.1 -0.99 41.9 42.1 0.60 41.8 -0.12 41.6
Less favorable agriculture conditions 40.5 -0.32 40.0 40.0 -0.53 38.3 -0.36 38.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 41.0 -0.62 40.0 39.9 0.09 39.4 -0.32 39.0
Mineral-rich countries 44.1 -0.48 43.3 43.5 -0.15 42.4 -0.43 41.9
Middle-income countries 46.5 -0.63 45.7 46.0 0.53 46.1 0.00 46.0
CEN-SAD 43.1 -0.77 42.2 42.4 0.42 41.9 -0.16 41.7
COMESA 41.9 -0.68 40.7 40.7 -0.03 40.1 -0.38 39.6
EAC 42.2 0.30 42.5 42.6 0.08 42.4 0.01 42.5
ECCAS 44.0 -0.28 43.5 43.4 -0.12 42.8 -0.27 42.4
ECOWAS 43.1 -0.99 41.9 42.1 0.60 41.8 -0.12 41.6
IGAD 39.6 -0.98 38.4 38.3 0.10 37.8 -0.35 37.4
SADC 48.3 -0.30 47.6 47.5 -0.19 46.3 -0.39 45.7
UMA 40.0 -0.05 39.9 39.7 -0.15 39.4 -0.11 39.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 40.7 -1.18 39.4 39.9 0.84 40.2 0.07 40.3
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 41.9 -0.33 41.1 40.8 -0.17 39.7 -0.50 39.1
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 45.2 -0.45 44.3 43.5 -0.56 42.2 -0.57 41.2
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 51.4 0.20 52.1 52.7 0.34 53.4 0.31 54.0
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 51.4 0.20 52.1 52.7 0.34 53.4 0.31 54.0
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 46.1 -0.62 44.6 43.6 -0.76 41.5 -0.89 40.1
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 42.9 -0.27 42.6 42.4 0.00 42.0 -0.20 41.8
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 42.5 -0.38 41.8 41.7 -0.62 39.9 -0.60 39.2
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 42.2 -0.93 40.9 41.3 0.61 41.2 -0.09 41.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
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ANNEX 2a: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.1
TABLE L2.1.1—AGRICULTURE VALUE ADDED (billion, constant 2010 US$)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 7.2 4.8 9.0 9.8 4.2 13.2 4.7 15.5
Central 2.6 -3.1 2.3 2.4 1.2 3.1 3.5 3.6
Eastern 8.8 3.6 9.5 9.7 2.0 12.5 5.6 14.9
Northern 6.5 2.6 7.4 7.3 -1.3 10.0 6.6 12.6
Southern 3.8 1.2 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.4 3.2 6.3
Western 12.6 8.2 19.0 22.1 6.0 30.0 4.3 34.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 1.5 4.8 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.6 4.4 3.0
More favorable agriculture conditions 3.4 0.3 3.5 4.2 7.1 6.8 6.8 8.3
Mineral-rich countries 2.7 -6.2 2.1 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.1
Middle-income countries 10.9 5.9 14.1 15.5 4.2 21.2 5.0 25.0
CEN-SAD 10.1 6.7 13.4 14.8 4.2 20.2 5.1 23.7
COMESA 8.0 3.0 8.4 8.5 1.8 10.5 5.1 12.6
EAC 5.5 0.3 5.7 6.2 3.4 9.9 7.9 12.6
ECCAS 2.6 -0.3 2.7 3.1 5.5 5.3 8.2 7.1
ECOWAS 12.6 8.2 19.0 22.1 6.0 30.0 4.3 34.3
IGAD 10.7 4.2 11.6 11.7 1.7 15.8 6.7 19.5
SADC 3.8 -0.1 3.9 4.2 4.7 5.6 3.8 6.5
UMA 6.1 2.4 6.9 6.8 -1.7 9.5 7.1 12.1
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 13.9 7.8 20.8 24.4 6.6 33.8 4.3 38.6
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 2.9 -0.8 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.8 7.1 6.1
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 6.8 5.0 7.5 7.6 1.1 8.8 4.4 10.5
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 6.7 1.5 7.3 7.2 1.1 8.7 2.9 9.8
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 6.7 1.5 7.3 7.2 1.1 8.7 2.9 9.8
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 6.8 5.0 7.6 7.7 1.1 8.9 4.5 10.6
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 2.3 -5.4 1.9 2.0 3.0 2.5 4.1 3.0
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 1.8 2.8 1.9 2.2 5.3 3.1 4.7 3.5
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 12.2 7.2 17.7 20.8 6.5 29.0 4.6 33.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017), World Bank (2016), and ILO (2017).
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average per country, where weight is country's share in total agricultural land area for the region or group.
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ANNEX 2b: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.2
TABLE L2.1.2—AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION INDEX (API) (2004–2006 = 100) 
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2014)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 80.9 2.9 91.5 100.6 3.2 119.6 3.3 129.7
Central 92.1 0.0 92.9 101.8 3.7 124.4 3.2 131.7
Eastern 77.5 4.0 91.8 100.8 3.4 125.5 5.2 141.9
Northern 78.9 3.1 91.1 100.7 2.9 122.4 3.5 133.1
Southern 86.6 2.7 94.2 103.2 4.2 140.2 3.7 152.9
Western 79.6 3.4 90.7 99.6 3.0 110.6 2.5 118.0
Less favorable agriculture conditions 81.6 4.1 94.2 104.2 4.3 134.0 3.5 143.3
More favorable agriculture conditions 80.7 3.1 91.5 101.4 4.2 128.3 4.0 140.6
Mineral-rich countries 93.2 -0.6 93.6 100.9 2.6 125.8 3.4 132.7
Middle-income countries 79.7 3.3 91.2 100.2 2.9 115.9 3.0 125.3
CEN-SAD 79.7 3.5 91.4 100.4 3.0 112.9 2.3 119.7
COMESA 82.9 2.7 92.6 101.8 3.5 120.2 2.7 127.8
EAC 77.7 3.5 91.3 100.5 4.2 123.8 4.1 137.2
ECCAS 87.0 0.9 92.0 102.7 4.6 139.6 4.4 154.2
ECOWAS 79.6 3.4 90.7 99.6 3.0 110.6 2.5 118.0
IGAD 77.1 4.5 92.0 100.9 2.9 121.1 4.1 133.9
SADC 88.0 1.4 93.6 102.1 4.0 135.3 4.5 150.2
UMA 77.1 2.9 90.4 98.4 1.0 127.5 5.7 143.9
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 77.7 3.7 90.4 99.8 3.3 113.5 3.0 122.2
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 81.8 1.7 88.1 96.2 3.7 117.4 3.4 127.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 81.3 3.6 92.3 101.7 3.1 135.3 6.6 158.9
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 80.7 2.9 92.0 101.0 3.0 121.8 3.1 131.5
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 80.7 2.9 92.0 101.0 3.0 121.8 3.1 131.5
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 82.2 3.7 93.5 101.3 2.4 133.5 6.8 158.9
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 91.9 -0.2 92.3 101.8 4.0 123.5 2.9 130.6
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 80.8 3.8 93.9 103.0 3.6 126.8 2.1 131.9
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 78.4 3.5 90.3 99.8 3.5 115.5 3.3 125.3
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2014. For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total agriculture value added for the region or group.
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ANNEX 2c: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.3
TABLE L2.1.3—LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (agriculture value-added per agricultural worker, constant 2010 US$)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 1,010.9 1.4 1,100.4 1,138.9 1.7 1,366.1 2.7 1,500.3
Central 636.0 -4.3 534.2 531.0 0.4 608.1 2.0 670.6
Eastern 545.3 -0.9 515.7 525.0 1.4 686.2 5.1 798.2
Northern 3,137.8 2.3 3,410.4 3,444.1 0.2 4,362.1 4.1 5,116.7
Southern 821.8 0.1 824.8 840.1 2.6 955.3 1.2 1,024.6
Western 1,415.6 5.3 1,874.2 2,055.5 3.7 2,495.4 2.1 2,667.0
Less favorable agriculture conditions 554.4 0.6 575.6 581.7 -0.3 635.7 2.0 693.0
More favorable agriculture conditions 392.3 -2.1 363.6 389.7 3.3 504.3 3.5 559.8
Mineral-rich countries 503.4 -4.7 407.9 412.3 1.7 444.1 -0.2 439.5
Middle-income countries 2,290.8 3.8 2,744.4 2,892.0 2.4 3,696.8 3.9 4,231.2
CEN-SAD 1,560.8 3.7 1,852.0 1,948.8 2.2 2,384.8 3.0 2,637.0
COMESA 744.7 -0.8 696.3 695.6 0.7 822.8 3.0 908.8
EAC 460.5 -2.2 431.2 442.7 0.7 585.9 5.1 686.4
ECCAS 604.9 -3.5 536.8 555.3 1.8 725.1 4.3 862.5
ECOWAS 1,415.6 5.3 1,874.2 2,055.5 3.7 2,495.4 2.1 2,667.0
IGAD 606.1 -0.6 563.6 570.2 1.5 768.7 5.9 916.8
SADC 617.1 -2.5 571.6 581.4 2.1 677.2 1.7 726.1
UMA 3,048.4 1.2 3,294.3 3,248.4 -1.6 4,312.6 6.3 5,379.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 994.7 4.0 1,273.3 1,410.3 4.2 1,730.5 2.1 1,843.5
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 508.9 -2.0 471.5 474.9 0.5 571.3 2.8 629.2
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 1,057.8 1.6 1,068.3 1,046.0 -0.2 1,325.0 6.1 1,632.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 3,400.2 2.1 3,683.5 3,731.7 1.0 4,669.9 3.5 5,382.8
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 3,400.2 2.1 3,683.5 3,731.7 1.0 4,669.9 3.5 5,382.8
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 1,073.6 1.7 1,080.1 1,043.5 -0.8 1,313.4 6.5 1,630.5
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 595.6 -4.7 489.5 500.2 2.1 566.6 1.1 599.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 505.6 -0.1 489.8 512.7 2.1 589.5 1.8 613.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 810.3 3.0 986.2 1,071.9 3.4 1,328.2 2.5 1,435.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and FAO (2017).
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ANNEX 2d: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.4




















Africa 164.6 3.1 190.6 205.4 3.4 292.4 5.3 346.9
Central 128.8 -2.9 116.1 121.1 2.3 153.4 3.3 176.9
Eastern 138.1 1.3 142.3 152.3 3.5 286.6 10.7 380.8
Northern 346.0 2.9 384.4 391.9 0.5 494.9 3.8 573.4
Southern 61.4 1.6 65.3 69.4 4.4 90.1 3.5 104.4
Western 258.2 6.0 350.7 390.1 4.5 523.9 3.9 593.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 47.1 3.5 54.5 57.9 1.8 74.3 4.5 87.7
More favorable agriculture conditions 141.4 -0.4 140.9 158.5 5.2 233.7 5.8 279.1
Mineral-rich countries 137.9 -3.5 117.7 123.8 3.4 147.7 1.4 154.9
Middle-income countries 211.3 4.6 259.8 279.0 3.2 414.7 6.0 499.8
CEN-SAD 216.8 4.8 267.3 287.9 3.2 426.8 5.9 509.7
COMESA 203.9 1.0 204.7 214.1 2.6 348.4 7.9 436.4
EAC 227.5 0.0 231.6 248.8 2.5 367.5 6.9 456.1
ECCAS 105.1 -1.3 102.4 112.0 4.0 165.4 6.0 207.6
ECOWAS 258.2 6.0 350.7 390.1 4.5 523.9 3.9 593.3
IGAD 145.2 1.9 147.7 157.2 3.7 341.0 13.3 478.3
SADC 79.2 -1.1 78.2 83.6 4.0 111.3 3.9 128.5
UMA 187.8 2.1 208.9 209.0 -1.2 281.2 6.4 350.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 272.9 5.7 369.7 420.5 5.6 586.3 4.1 665.3
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 134.3 -0.3 133.3 140.2 2.2 190.8 5.0 225.7
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 85.9 3.1 91.8 94.0 1.7 160.5 10.4 219.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 209.6 2.5 230.2 234.5 1.1 289.3 3.0 327.4
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 209.6 2.5 230.2 234.5 1.1 289.3 3.0 327.4
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 78.0 3.2 83.3 84.7 1.2 146.2 11.0 202.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 124.3 -3.4 108.6 115.5 3.7 143.6 2.5 159.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 92.4 1.2 94.9 103.2 3.8 136.5 4.2 153.9
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 269.6 4.9 349.7 393.6 4.9 551.4 4.5 636.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and FAO (2017).
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ANNEX 2e: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5A
TABLE L2.1.5A—YIELD, CASSAVA (metric tons per hectare)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2014)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 8.5 0.9 8.8 9.2 1.8 9.1 -2.9 8.3
Central 7.8 -0.2 7.6 7.8 1.3 8.1 0.4 8.3
Eastern 8.0 0.1 7.7 7.6 1.9 6.6 -2.4 6.3
Northern         
Southern 6.4 8.4 8.1 8.5 3.0 10.0 0.7 10.2
Western 9.9 -0.5 10.1 10.6 1.3 10.1 -5.6 8.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 7.0 6.9 8.2 7.8 -0.7 9.1 3.7 10.2
More favorable agriculture conditions 7.4 2.6 7.6 7.7 1.0 7.3 -0.7 7.0
Mineral-rich countries 7.5 -0.3 7.4 7.4 -0.4 7.6 1.2 7.8
Middle-income countries 9.7 0.2 10.2 10.9 2.7 10.7 -6.3 8.8
CEN-SAD 9.6 -0.3 9.8 10.3 1.2 9.8 -5.3 8.2
COMESA 8.1 2.4 8.6 8.7 0.0 8.2 -1.1 8.1
EAC 8.4 0.2 8.1 7.8 0.6 6.4 -2.4 6.2
ECCAS 7.6 1.9 8.3 8.7 2.7 9.5 -0.8 9.6
ECOWAS 9.9 -0.5 10.1 10.6 1.3 10.1 -5.6 8.3
IGAD 10.2 9.1 12.6 11.9 -7.3 5.7 -12.1 4.2
SADC 7.3 1.3 7.5 7.8 2.8 8.5 0.4 8.6
UMA         
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 10.2 -0.7 10.4 11.0 1.6 10.5 -5.4 8.8
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 7.2 1.3 7.3 7.2 -0.2 6.8 -1.2 6.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 7.3 4.3 8.5 9.7 6.6 11.2 -2.3 11.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 7.1 0.7 7.3 7.3 -0.2 7.5 1.2 7.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 7.1 0.7 7.3 7.3 -0.2 7.5 1.2 7.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 6.9 6.5 8.8 9.6 4.7 10.7 -3.4 10.2
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 7.8 -0.5 7.6 7.9 1.7 8.3 0.3 8.4
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 8.3 5.6 9.3 8.6 -5.3 6.2 -3.3 5.8
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 9.0 0.0 9.2 9.7 2.3 9.6 -3.6 8.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2014.
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ANNEX 2f: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5B
TABLE L2.1.5B—YIELD, YAMS (metric tons per hectare)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2014)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 10.0 -0.5 10.2 10.6 0.3 9.3 -5.2 8.4
Central 7.4 0.0 7.2 7.7 3.3 8.3 -0.3 8.2
Eastern 4.4 0.2 4.3 4.2 0.8 7.6 22.5 11.9
Northern 6.3 -0.1 6.3 6.3 0.0 6.3 -0.1 6.2
Southern         
Western 10.3 -0.6 10.5 10.8 0.2 9.4 -5.8 8.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 8.7 1.6 9.1 9.6 2.2 10.3 1.6 10.6
More favorable agriculture conditions 10.2 1.8 11.1 11.3 0.4 13.0 4.2 14.7
Mineral-rich countries 7.0 -1.7 6.4 6.5 1.1 7.3 1.3 7.5
Middle-income countries 10.1 -0.7 10.3 10.6 0.3 9.2 -6.0 8.0
CEN-SAD 10.1 -0.6 10.3 10.7 0.2 9.3 -5.6 8.2
COMESA 4.6 -0.9 4.4 4.2 0.6 7.1 20.1 10.8
EAC 5.3 0.1 5.4 5.5 -1.1 7.9 14.8 11.5
ECCAS 7.4 0.0 7.2 7.7 3.2 8.3 0.0 8.3
ECOWAS 10.3 -0.6 10.5 10.8 0.2 9.4 -5.8 8.3
IGAD 4.4 0.2 4.3 4.2 0.7 7.6 23.0 12.0
SADC 5.8 -6.0 4.5 4.5 0.1 4.5 -0.1 4.5
UMA 6.3 -0.1 6.3 6.3 0.0 6.3 -0.1 6.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 10.4 -0.5 10.8 11.3 0.8 10.0 -6.2 8.7
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 8.8 -1.2 8.4 8.1 -2.3 6.7 -1.5 6.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 5.8 0.9 5.9 6.4 4.0 6.8 -1.5 6.5
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 5.3 0.2 5.3 5.4 0.2 5.4 0.1 5.4
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 5.3 0.2 5.3 5.4 0.2 5.4 0.1 5.4
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 5.2 -0.1 5.2 5.4 1.2 5.3 -1.5 5.1
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 7.3 -0.7 6.8 7.5 4.7 8.6 0.1 8.5
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 10.0 3.2 10.6 10.7 0.5 10.0 -3.1 9.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 10.2 -0.7 10.5 10.8 0.2 9.5 -5.4 8.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2014.
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ANNEX 2g: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5C
TABLE L2.1.5C—YIELD, MAIZE (metric tons per hectare)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2014)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.7 2.0 0.8 2.0
Central 1.1 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2
Eastern 1.6 0.2 1.6 1.5 5.2 1.9 4.1 2.0
Northern 5.5 3.7 6.1 6.3 0.6 6.5 1.4 6.7
Southern 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.9 2.2 1.1 2.2
Western 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.7 -1.7 1.6
Less favorable agriculture conditions 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.2 3.0 1.8 3.2 1.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 1.4 -0.4 1.3 1.3 4.0 1.6 3.2 1.7
Mineral-rich countries 1.0 -0.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.5 4.8 1.5
Middle-income countries 2.1 3.7 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 -1.9 2.6
CEN-SAD 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.1 0.6 2.1 -1.2 2.0
COMESA 1.8 0.5 1.8 1.9 2.6 2.3 3.1 2.4
EAC 1.6 -0.6 1.5 1.4 4.7 1.6 2.3 1.7
ECCAS 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.1 3.2 1.2
ECOWAS 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.7 -1.7 1.6
IGAD 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.8 3.9 2.2 5.1 2.5
SADC 1.5 0.9 1.5 1.5 3.6 1.8 1.1 1.9
UMA 0.6 3.3 0.8 0.7 -2.7 0.8 -1.1 0.7
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 4.2 1.9 0.5 1.9
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 1.4 -0.2 1.3 1.3 4.1 1.5 1.9 1.6
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 1.1 -0.9 1.0 1.0 -2.7 1.0 4.1 1.1
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 3.0 4.6 3.5 4.0 5.8 5.0 0.7 5.2
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 3.0 4.6 3.5 4.0 5.8 5.0 0.7 5.2
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 1.0 -2.5 0.8 0.8 -5.6 0.8 6.7 0.9
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 4.7 2.2 0.9 2.2
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 1.4 0.3 1.4 1.5 4.4 1.7 1.4 1.7
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Notes: Data are from 1995 to 2014.
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ANNEX 2h: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5D
TABLE L2.1.5D—YIELD, MEAT (indigenous cattle, kilograms per head)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2013)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2013) 2013
Africa 141.7 0.6 147.1 152.8 1.4 155.2 -0.4 153.8
Central 143.8 -0.8 139.7 139.3 0.2 141.5 0.6 143.4
Eastern 116.4 1.0 125.4 129.5 1.0 129.0 -1.1 125.6
Northern 176.0 1.4 185.3 212.7 6.1 238.0 0.1 238.6
Southern 211.6 0.5 214.5 223.4 1.2 227.3 -0.2 225.6
Western 124.3 -0.3 122.8 122.4 0.0 119.4 -0.6 118.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 123.1 -0.4 121.6 121.6 0.1 116.4 -1.0 114.4
More favorable agriculture conditions 122.2 0.8 130.3 135.1 1.2 134.2 -1.2 130.5
Mineral-rich countries 136.5 0.4 137.5 135.0 -0.2 139.0 0.8 140.7
Middle-income countries 164.8 0.7 170.1 181.4 2.5 192.5 0.4 193.3
CEN-SAD 131.8 1.0 141.4 149.5 2.2 153.2 -0.7 150.5
COMESA 131.0 1.3 143.1 153.1 2.4 158.8 -0.6 156.9
EAC 122.3 1.8 142.2 152.3 2.1 148.3 -2.6 139.1
ECCAS 148.7 -0.2 145.1 142.1 -0.4 142.6 0.5 144.1
ECOWAS 124.3 -0.3 122.8 122.4 0.0 119.4 -0.6 118.1
IGAD 118.0 1.7 132.1 137.6 1.2 138.2 -1.1 134.6
SADC 169.6 0.6 172.8 178.1 1.0 177.9 -0.6 175.1
UMA 179.8 1.5 187.0 187.5 0.5 187.9 0.5 190.0
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 121.0 -0.3 119.7 119.5 0.0 117.1 -0.5 116.2
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 124.7 1.0 136.1 142.1 1.5 141.9 -1.3 137.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 134.0 1.0 137.3 136.4 -0.1 137.0 0.3 137.8
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 191.8 0.8 199.8 219.9 3.9 240.1 0.2 239.9
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 191.8 0.8 199.8 219.9 3.9 240.1 0.2 239.9
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 133.4 1.1 137.3 136.4 -0.2 136.4 0.1 136.8
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 133.9 -0.2 132.4 130.8 -0.1 132.6 0.8 134.7
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 136.4 0.1 136.8 136.7 0.0 133.3 -0.4 132.3
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 118.4 0.4 125.0 129.2 1.1 128.7 -1.2 125.0
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2013.
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ANNEX 2i: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.1.5E
TABLE L2.1.5E—YIELD, MILK (whole fresh cow, kilograms per head)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2014)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 484.9 1.6 519.9 504.9 -0.5 514.8 1.8 536.4
Central 340.2 -0.5 334.8 338.1 0.6 348.4 1.1 361.9
Eastern 375.4 2.9 433.7 402.0 -2.4 379.3 0.0 376.2
Northern 1,067.4 3.9 1,198.7 1,357.0 5.0 1,717.0 4.0 1,847.0
Southern 1,036.6 -1.5 1,033.4 1,082.4 1.7 1,132.4 1.4 1,163.3
Western 208.3 0.0 208.5 215.4 1.8 225.8 0.8 235.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 303.0 -1.3 286.0 289.8 1.2 301.3 0.9 317.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 333.2 4.9 428.2 404.1 -2.4 372.8 -0.2 368.5
Mineral-rich countries 243.4 -0.3 240.5 237.8 -0.3 261.4 3.8 285.3
Middle-income countries 712.1 -1.0 674.7 673.8 1.3 806.7 6.1 920.3
CEN-SAD 476.9 1.5 496.2 480.8 0.2 519.8 1.9 541.2
COMESA 451.9 2.9 522.1 494.0 -1.4 470.0 -0.2 462.3
EAC 379.7 3.2 424.5 404.3 -1.3 430.9 1.7 444.6
ECCAS 391.2 -0.2 385.3 390.1 0.8 415.4 1.7 433.3
ECOWAS 208.3 0.0 208.5 215.4 1.8 225.8 0.8 235.1
IGAD 413.3 2.7 479.6 439.1 -2.6 406.8 -0.4 398.5
SADC 552.6 -0.8 531.6 524.2 -0.5 532.3 1.8 555.7
UMA 1,020.9 3.5 1,103.1 1,223.7 4.6 1,648.0 7.0 1,901.3
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 269.2 6.9 407.6 385.4 -2.9 310.2 -2.0 295.3
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 335.8 2.7 372.5 359.9 -1.0 380.7 1.7 393.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 416.4 -0.4 405.5 374.2 -1.9 367.1 0.3 368.4
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 1,152.7 1.6 1,211.6 1,318.8 3.5 1,549.6 3.2 1,640.2
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 1,152.7 1.6 1,211.6 1,318.8 3.5 1,549.6 3.2 1,640.2
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 412.3 -0.3 402.2 370.7 -1.9 362.2 0.1 362.0
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 319.7 -0.5 312.8 313.5 0.4 331.0 1.9 349.7
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 315.0 0.3 323.4 331.1 0.7 334.7 0.3 344.6
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 310.6 5.5 412.8 387.8 -2.5 355.5 -0.2 351.0
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 1995 to 2014.
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ANNEX 2j: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.1A




















Africa 601.4 -1.3 516.3 453.4 6.4 1,620.1 16.4 2,176.1
Central 27.7 5.9 34.5 38.8 3.3 34.2 -4.0 32.3
Eastern 300.3 -2.3 289.3 304.9 7.2 461.9 2.4 460.3
Northern 72.4 8.6 107.1 189.1 20.6 415.0 2.9 437.2
Southern 1,085.1 -1.3 952.5 852.7 4.9 2,901.6 13.8 3,648.0
Western 166.6 5.7 179.9 160.3 6.3 280.8 7.9 357.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 66.0 2.0 75.3 101.2 18.7 118.8 1.3 130.7
More favorable agriculture conditions 320.8 -4.7 267.5 255.8 6.1 387.0 3.4 400.5
Mineral-rich countries 103.5 24.9 186.5 252.4 13.0 415.8 9.1 508.8
Middle-income countries 680.6 -0.9 590.5 514.1 6.2 1,921.3 16.8 2,582.7
CEN-SAD 186.7 3.8 200.8 204.9 8.4 365.5 5.4 425.3
COMESA 275.8 -1.5 248.6 272.3 7.5 466.1 4.0 494.2
EAC 374.1 -0.6 365.6 368.1 5.5 508.9 1.0 504.5
ECCAS 26.9 5.0 30.8 32.6 -0.7 30.3 2.7 35.5
ECOWAS 166.6 5.7 179.9 160.3 6.3 280.8 7.9 357.3
IGAD 349.9 -2.2 334.1 368.8 8.8 583.3 2.4 583.8
SADC 1,044.8 -1.0 917.6 804.6 4.4 2,705.5 14.0 3,430.9
UMA 68.0 4.8 79.8 128.4 22.0 294.7 7.1 355.9
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 111.1 -0.5 113.1 93.9 13.3 201.3 6.0 216.7
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 279.6 3.4 284.5 284.8 1.9 359.6 3.2 408.7
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 235.6 -8.7 162.7 125.3 -0.8 122.0 6.0 132.9
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 1,070.7 -0.9 935.9 833.8 5.5 2,848.8 13.7 3,579.1
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 1,070.7 -0.9 935.9 833.8 5.5 2,848.8 13.7 3,579.1
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 276.9 -2.9 209.9 166.5 -5.5 144.7 4.8 157.6
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 49.6 3.5 55.4 78.6 9.4 66.2 -0.7 68.9
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 91.2 12.2 145.9 208.3 16.9 449.4 11.4 568.8
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 210.7 3.1 219.6 199.6 5.0 329.5 6.1 387.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Note: For regions and groups, level is weighted average per country, where weight is country's share in intra-African total exports for the region or group.
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ANNEX 2k: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.1B




















Africa 252.2 4.9 286.5 303.6 4.5 514.0 6.4 602.1
Central 114.8 -7.2 111.4 171.1 16.8 233.5 7.7 295.6
Eastern 107.1 4.7 143.9 174.1 7.3 254.9 -0.6 232.9
Northern 138.7 8.5 187.1 198.2 4.9 301.0 1.9 307.8
Southern 340.6 5.2 406.2 413.8 3.0 722.8 6.8 832.4
Western 189.6 7.0 195.6 240.8 8.5 344.9 1.3 383.2
Less favorable agriculture conditions 52.3 11.3 78.0 107.4 9.6 168.5 5.4 194.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 196.8 -2.5 232.6 330.9 16.2 413.5 -1.1 403.2
Mineral-rich countries 220.1 5.1 285.2 270.5 1.1 376.0 7.3 500.1
Middle-income countries 287.5 6.5 319.3 314.5 1.4 581.7 8.0 689.9
CEN-SAD 169.8 8.7 194.2 227.9 7.0 335.0 0.3 343.7
COMESA 237.1 1.9 286.9 340.5 9.7 431.0 0.4 443.4
EAC 107.4 5.2 146.3 190.3 8.9 269.6 -0.2 258.8
ECCAS 317.5 12.9 361.7 289.2 -8.7 276.4 4.7 345.2
ECOWAS 189.6 7.0 195.6 240.8 8.5 344.9 1.3 383.2
IGAD 125.3 9.3 177.6 221.9 8.4 319.4 -2.8 268.6
SADC 322.2 4.3 374.8 385.7 3.6 679.3 7.0 788.5
UMA 126.3 7.9 162.3 157.8 2.5 274.1 4.9 295.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 226.5 5.9 220.8 259.5 6.9 368.2 1.4 413.5
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 145.6 0.2 153.9 190.0 8.6 249.0 1.4 251.3
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 312.0 6.0 375.0 400.4 4.9 421.6 0.1 448.7
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 274.5 4.4 319.7 328.7 4.4 734.2 9.6 864.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 274.5 4.4 319.7 328.7 4.4 734.2 9.6 864.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 329.8 6.0 389.9 419.6 4.7 443.7 1.0 477.8
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 126.5 -8.3 125.5 206.1 22.8 319.3 -0.1 292.8
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 144.5 12.1 210.7 198.8 -0.4 271.2 10.4 406.2
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 199.5 5.3 206.3 242.5 6.2 361.0 2.2 404.7
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Notes: For regions and groups, level is weighted average per country, where weight is country's share in intra-African total imports for the region or group
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ANNEX 2l: Level 2—Agricultural Transformation and Sustained Inclusive Agricultural Growth, Indicator 2.2.2




















Africa 11.0  11.6 12.7 3.7 12.6 -11.0 10.6
Central 8.3  7.8 8.7 1.2 9.2 -4.9 6.7
Eastern 10.5  11.5 13.5 6.8 14.1 -14.7 10.7
Northern 6.0  8.7 10.2 7.6 11.4 -4.8 10.7
Southern 11.3  8.9 7.9 6.1 14.8 -21.1 8.2
Western 14.4  14.8 15.8 0.9 12.0 -6.7 11.7
Less favorable agriculture conditions 12.7  11.5 15.7 3.1 13.5 -8.2 11.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 11.8  12.8 14.7 6.3 15.1 -13.5 11.8
Mineral-rich countries 18.3  16.7 11.6 -5.2 8.9 -8.5 7.9
Middle-income countries 10.3  11.1 11.8 2.9 11.7 -10.2 10.2
CEN-SAD 11.0  12.5 14.0 3.6 12.4 -10.2 11.1
COMESA 8.6  10.7 12.9 8.1 14.7 -9.4 12.9
EAC 11.4  12.7 16.0 7.6 15.5 -17.7 11.0
ECCAS 18.6  10.9 9.2 -1.9 8.6 -4.9 7.3
ECOWAS 14.4  14.8 15.8 0.9 12.0 -6.7 11.7
IGAD 11.3  11.8 15.4 9.7 16.9 -15.7 13.4
SADC 10.3  9.6 8.5 3.8 12.9 -19.8 7.3
UMA 8.7  8.5 9.2 3.9 9.5 -2.5 8.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 13.5  14.1 15.1 1.0 11.5 -6.3 11.3
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 12.2  12.7 14.8 6.1 14.6 -13.7 11.9
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 15.6  10.4 8.1 -3.4 8.5 -6.1 5.9
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 6.1  8.0 9.3 8.4 13.1 -13.9 9.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 6.1  8.0 9.3 8.4 13.1 -13.9 9.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 20.1  12.4 8.4 -6.1 8.6 -5.6 6.2
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 9.8  9.6 9.2 -3.2 8.3 -12.2 5.6
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 15.8  14.4 17.5 4.3 15.7 -0.8 15.3
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 12.8  13.7 14.7 2.8 12.4 -10.8 11.2
Source: ReSAKSS based on FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 2000 to 2012. For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total food production for the region or group.
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ANNEX 3a: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.1
TABLE L3.5.1—PUBLIC AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE (million, constant 2010 US$)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 706.3 11.5 939.5 1,157.5 11.0 1,111.5 -4.8 929.2
Central 53.6 6.7 76.0 96.3 9.2 172.6 9.5 228.9
Eastern 198.1 5.8 276.5 331.0 6.5 398.7 -1.4 373.3
Northern 1,520.2 6.4 1,678.6 1,502.8 -5.9 1,741.3 7.5 2,240.3
Southern 437.6 19.9 711.1 941.5 12.2 925.9 -3.3 815.1
Western 576.1 20.1 910.5 1,367.9 23.0 1,222.3 -11.7 700.3
Less favorable agriculture conditions 101.5 4.9 142.4 178.5 2.9 192.1 4.2 215.9
More favorable agriculture conditions 172.2 4.2 227.9 279.6 7.8 363.7 0.2 356.0
Mineral-rich countries 48.2 8.1 62.5 100.7 19.8 166.3 4.1 202.6
Middle-income countries 919.9 11.3 1,181.7 1,467.5 11.6 1,404.8 -5.0 1,160.1
CEN-SAD 873.1 9.4 1,055.1 1,310.3 12.6 1,134.1 -9.1 758.1
COMESA 1,045.9 5.4 1,075.8 904.2 -8.3 725.5 0.9 775.9
EAC 186.1 3.5 235.0 211.4 -4.2 281.4 -4.0 220.4
ECCAS 80.7 3.4 92.4 223.9 34.9 313.1 -5.0 217.2
ECOWAS 576.1 20.1 910.5 1,367.9 23.0 1,222.3 -11.7 700.3
IGAD 229.1 5.5 311.9 393.5 9.3 472.3 0.7 472.6
SADC 343.9 18.3 556.1 708.6 10.7 693.3 -4.8 581.3
UMA 816.3 13.5 1,316.1 1,477.1 4.0 2,491.0 8.6 3,208.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 611.6 21.2 974.1 1,430.9 21.7 1,248.9 -11.4 735.4
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 146.2 0.0 163.0 161.1 0.3 255.8 2.2 248.4
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 91.3 1.1 95.0 222.4 34.2 310.1 -5.7 213.5
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 1,335.8 8.5 1,586.3 1,536.3 -2.3 1,760.2 5.9 2,188.8
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 1,335.8 8.5 1,586.3 1,536.3 -2.3 1,760.2 5.9 2,188.8
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 95.3 -1.8 82.5 259.2 45.1 339.0 -10.1 180.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 60.9 5.8 81.5 97.1 7.4 176.9 10.9 247.1
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 69.1 12.3 102.7 136.3 10.4 176.3 2.1 192.1
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 524.6 18.5 835.3 1,231.6 21.5 1,097.2 -11.1 655.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2015), World Bank (2017), and national sources.
Note: For regions or groups, level is weighted average per country, where weight is country's share in total agriculture value added for the region or group.
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ANNEX 3b: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.2
TABLE L3.5.2—SHARE OF AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (%)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.5 -1.7 3.0 -1.3 2.9
Central 2.0 -1.1 2.3 3.0 6.2 3.6 1.9 3.9
Eastern 5.7 -0.2 6.0 6.2 0.3 5.1 -10.3 3.3
Northern 4.6 2.8 4.6 3.9 -10.4 2.8 1.9 3.1
Southern 1.6 10.1 2.2 2.5 3.6 2.1 -2.4 2.1
Western 3.5 -2.0 3.5 3.9 5.9 4.1 1.0 4.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 10.7 -1.1 11.4 12.2 -2.5 9.1 -1.6 8.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 6.6 -2.8 6.4 6.9 3.3 6.6 -6.0 5.1
Mineral-rich countries 5.2 2.1 5.3 7.0 13.7 8.0 0.4 9.1
Middle-income countries 2.8 4.9 3.2 3.1 -2.7 2.5 -1.3 2.4
CEN-SAD 4.7 -1.1 4.3 3.9 -4.9 2.9 -2.1 2.7
COMESA 5.8 0.6 5.3 4.5 -7.3 2.9 -3.7 2.8
EAC 4.9 0.0 4.9 4.2 -6.5 3.7 -11.8 2.1
ECCAS 1.3 -4.2 1.3 2.1 14.9 1.8 -6.9 1.5
ECOWAS 3.5 -2.0 3.5 3.9 5.9 4.1 1.0 4.1
IGAD 5.9 0.7 6.5 7.2 2.6 5.7 -8.2 3.9
SADC 1.9 8.2 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.3 -3.8 2.1
UMA 3.5 5.6 4.2 4.2 -3.4 4.2 3.7 4.7
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 3.2 1.8 3.8 4.4 6.0 4.2 -0.1 4.2
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 5.3 -1.9 5.1 5.3 2.4 5.6 -2.9 4.8
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 2.0 -7.6 1.6 2.3 12.2 2.0 -8.8 1.6
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 3.1 6.6 3.5 3.1 -7.3 2.4 0.5 2.5
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 3.1 6.6 3.5 3.1 -7.3 2.4 0.5 2.5
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 2.0 -8.6 1.5 2.1 12.8 1.7 -11.2 1.2
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 4.2 -2.5 4.0 4.1 1.6 5.2 5.7 6.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 5.9 1.3 6.4 7.7 7.4 7.6 -1.7 7.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 3.7 -1.1 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.3 -1.5 3.9
Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2015), World Bank (2017), and national sources.
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ANNEX 3c: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, Indicator 3.5.3
TABLE L3.5.3—PUBLIC AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE AS SHARE OF AGRICULTURE GDP (%)
Region
Annual 
avg. level            
(1995–2003)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(1995–2003) 2003
Annual 
avg. level            
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg.  change                        
(2003–2008)
Annual 
avg. level            
(2008–2016)
Annual avg. change 
(2008–2016) 2016
Africa 5.6 3.5 5.8 6.2 2.7 5.5 -2.8 5.0
Central 2.0 2.4 2.6 3.1 4.8 4.2 6.8 5.0
Eastern 3.9 5.4 5.1 5.0 -1.8 3.8 -9.0 2.7
Northern 10.2 3.6 10.8 10.1 -3.2 9.7 1.6 10.0
Southern 8.7 8.8 11.2 14.9 9.5 14.3 -1.8 13.4
Western 3.2 0.6 2.8 3.3 9.5 2.8 -6.5 2.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 5.7 0.8 7.1 7.8 -3.3 5.8 -0.9 5.3
More favorable agriculture conditions 4.1 1.3 4.7 5.0 2.6 4.7 -4.5 3.9
Mineral-rich countries 4.3 -0.1 4.3 6.1 15.9 11.8 11.1 19.1
Middle-income countries 6.1 3.9 6.1 6.5 2.5 5.6 -3.0 5.0
CEN-SAD 5.3 -0.5 4.5 4.3 -0.6 3.3 -4.7 2.7
COMESA 7.0 1.7 6.9 6.3 -3.5 5.0 -2.0 4.9
EAC 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 -5.3 2.9 -11.4 1.7
ECCAS 3.1 -1.2 2.9 5.4 22.4 4.8 -8.9 3.0
ECOWAS 3.2 0.6 2.8 3.3 9.5 2.8 -6.5 2.1
IGAD 3.8 7.1 5.4 5.4 -0.9 3.8 -6.4 3.0
SADC 7.2 7.8 9.1 11.5 7.8 10.8 -3.6 9.5
UMA 10.7 8.4 14.2 15.8 6.1 17.4 -1.6 15.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 2.8 6.7 3.0 3.5 8.4 2.6 -8.6 1.9
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 4.1 -1.1 4.3 4.7 5.7 5.6 -0.4 5.4
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 4.8 -4.9 3.9 6.3 18.6 5.5 -10.6 3.3
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 10.3 6.1 12.0 12.4 0.1 12.0 0.9 12.2
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 10.3 6.1 12.0 12.4 0.1 12.0 0.9 12.2
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 6.7 -6.7 4.9 8.1 20.1 6.5 -13.7 3.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 3.0 1.5 3.4 3.4 0.4 4.4 6.8 5.4
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 3.9 6.5 5.1 6.1 6.6 6.7 2.0 7.8
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 3.2 2.0 3.1 3.6 7.6 3.0 -7.2 2.2
Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI (2015), World Bank (2017), and national sources.
192   resakss.org



















Second generation investment plan



















AFRICA* 42 33 28 17 30 8 13 4 52 31
Central Africa* 9 6 3 1 3 9 8
Burundi August 25, 2009 August 31, 2011 March 15, 2012 $30 Initiated yes yes
Cameroon July 17, 2013 August 22, 2014    yes yes
Central African Republic April 15, 2011 May 21, 2012 December 21, 2013   yes yes
Chad December 16, 2013     yes yes
Congo, Dem. Republic March 18, 2011 May 21, 2013 November 8, 2013  yes yes yes
Congo, Republic December 10, 2013 July 25, 2015   Initiated yes yes
Equatorial Guinea December 5, 2013     yes yes
Gabon May 10, 2013    yes
Sao Tome and Principe October 17, 2013 September 2, 2014    yes yes
Eastern Africa* 10 8 7 4 8 5 5 14 7
Comoros      yes
Djibouti April 19, 2012 November 22, 2012   Initiated  yes yes
Eritrea      yes
Ethiopia September 28, 2009 September 25, 2010 December 7, 2010 $51.5 yes yes yes Initiated yes yes
Kenya July 24, 2010 September 14, 2010 September 27, 2010 $30 yes yes yes Initiated yes yes
Madagascar October 21, 2013     Initiated yes yes
Mauritius July 23, 2015    Initiated  yes
Rwanda March 31, 2007 December 8, 2009 December 9, 2009 $50  yes yes yes
Seychelles September 16, 2011  Yes November 19, 2015  Initiated  Initiated yes yes
Somalia      yes
South Sudan yes
Sudan July 29, 2013 September 7, 2015 October 18, 2016   yes
Tanzania July 8, 2010 May 31, 2011 November 10, 2011 $22.9 yes yes yes yes yes
Uganda March 31, 2010 September 10, 2010 September 17, 2010 $27.6 yes yes yes In progress yes yes
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ANNEX 3d: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, continued



















Second generation investment plan



















Northern Africa* 1 1 1   4 1
Algeria      
Egypt      yes
Libya      yes
Mauritania July 28, 2011 February 16, 2012 March 21, 2012   yes
Morocco      
Tunisia      yes yes
Western Sahara
Southern Africa* 7 3 3 2 7 1 1 10 6
Angola August 5, 2014     yes
Botswana      yes yes
Lesotho September 4, 2013     Initiated yes yes
Malawi April 19, 2010 September 16, 2010 September 29, 2011 $39.6 yes yes yes   yes yes
Mozambique December 9, 2011 December 13, 2012 April 12, 2013  yes Initiated yes yes
Namibia      Initiated yes
South Africa      yes
Swaziland March 4, 2010   yes yes yes
Zambia January 18, 2011 March 15, 2013 May 30, 2013 $31.1 yes yes
Zimbabwe November 22, 2013    yes yes yes
Western Africa* 15 15 14 9 12 2 7 4 15 9
Benin October 16, 2009 September 25, 2010 June 7, 2011 $24 yes Initiated    Initiated  yes yes
Burkina Faso July 22, 2010 January 17, 2012 March 26, 2012 $37.1 yes Initiated    Initiated  yes yes
Cabo Verde December 11, 2009 September 25, 2010 November 17, 2010  Initiated  Initiated yes yes
Côte d'Ivoire July 27, 2010 June 20, 2012 September 14, 2012  yes yes yes yes
Gambia October 28, 2009 September 25, 2010 November 5, 2010 $28  Initiated yes yes
Ghana October 28, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010  yes yes yes yes yes
Guinea April 7, 2010 September 25, 2010 June 5, 2013   Initiated yes yes yes yes
Guinea Bissau January 18, 2011 June 3, 2011    Initiated yes
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Second generation investment plan



















Western Africa* cont'd 15 15 14 9 12 2 7 4 15 9
Liberia October 6, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 $46.5 Initiated Initiated yes
Mali October 13, 2009 September 25, 2010 November 5, 2010 $37.2 yes yes  Initiated  yes yes
Niger September 30, 2009 September 25, 2010 December 15, 2010 $33 yes yes  Initiated  yes yes
Nigeria October 30, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 Initiated yes yes  Initiated  yes
Senegal February 10, 2010 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 $40 yes yes yes yes yes
Sierra Leone September 18, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 $50  Initiated  yes yes
Togo July 30, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 $39 yes  Initiated    Initiated  yes
RECS** 5 3 1  2  
CEN-SAD  
COMESA November 14, 2014    
EAC June 23, 2017  Initiated 
ECCAS July 10, 2013 September 5, 2013  
ECOWAS November 12, 2009 June 9, 2010 June 17, 2010 yes 
IGAD October 21, 2013 August 30, 2016 
SADC In progress
UMA
Source: Authors' compilation based on NEPAD (November, 2015) and ReSAKSS (2017).
Note: a Biennial Review reporting is as of September 7, 2017.   
           * The item in this row are the number of countries in Africa of the subregion that have achieved the milestone.  ** The item in this row are the number of RECs that have achieved the milestone.  
 GAFSP=Global Agriculture and Food Security Program; JSR=Joint Sector Review
ReSAKSS-ECA ReSAKSS-SA ReSAKSS-WA
Burundi (COMESA, EAC, ECCAS)
Central African Rep. (Cen-SAD, 
ECCAS)
Comoros (CEN-SAD, COMESA)
Congo, D.R. (COMESA, ECCAS, 
SADC)
Congo, R. (ECCAS)




Ethiopia (COMESA, IGAD) 
Gabon (ECCAS)
Kenya (Cen-SAD, COMESA, EAC, 
IGAD)
Libya (CEN-SAD, COMESA, UMA)
Rwanda (COMESA, EAC, ECCAS)
Seychelles (COMESA, SADC)
South Sudan (IGAD)
Sudan (CEN-SAD, COMESA, IGAD)
Tanzania (SADC)




























Sierra Leone (CEN-SAD, ECOWAS)
Togo (CEN-SAD, ECOWAS)
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TABLE L 3(b)—PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING SYSTEMIC CAPACITY
Country/region 
L2.4.2-Existence of 
food reserves, local 
purchases for relief 
programs, early 
warning systems 
and food feeding 
programs**
L3.1.1-Existence of 
a new NAIP/NAFSIP 
developed 






mechanisms for mutual 
accountability and peer 
review 
L3.3.1-Existence of 







of a functional 
multisectoral and 
multistakeholder 











investments in the 
PPPs 
L3.4.6-Existence 
of an operational 
country SAKSS  
AFRICA* 38 15 21 28 22 16 16 14
Central Africa* 4 0 2 2 1  2 2 1
Burundi yes  yes yes yes Several PPPs €18 million  
Cameroon         
Central African Republic yes        
Chad         
Congo, Dem. Rep. yes  yes yes  Several PPPs Not stated  yes
Congo, Rep. yes        
Equatorial Guinea         
Gabon         
Sao Tome and Principe         
Eastern Africa* 12 7 5 8 7  6 6 5
Comoros yes        
Djibouti yes yes  yes  Several PPPs Not stated   
Eritrea yes        
Ethiopia yes yes yes yes yes Several PPPs Over $11 million yes
Kenya yes   yes yes Several PPPs Over $200 million yes
Madagascar         
Mauritius     yes    
Rwanda yes yes yes yes yes Several PPPs Over €8 million yes
Seychelles yes yes  yes yes    
Somalia yes        
South Sudan yes        
Sudan yes yes yes yes     
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ANNEX 3d: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, continued
TABLE L 3(b)—PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING SYSTEMIC CAPACITY
Country/region 
L2.4.2-Existence of 
food reserves, local 
purchases for relief 
programs, early 
warning systems 
and food feeding 
programs**
L3.1.1-Existence of 
a new NAIP/NAFSIP 
developed 






mechanisms for mutual 
accountability and peer 
review 
L3.3.1-Existence of 







of a functional 
multisectoral and 
multistakeholder 











investments in the 
PPPs 
L3.4.6-Existence 
of an operational 
country SAKSS  
Eastern Africa* cont'd 12 7 5 8 7  6 6 5
Tanzania yes yes yes yes yes SAGCOT with  several projects  $3.2 billion by 2030 yes
Uganda yes yes yes yes yes Several PPPs Over $314 million yes
Northern Africa* 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0
Algeria         
Egypt yes   yes yes Few PPPs in agric. $30.1 million  
Libya    yes     
Mauritania         
Morocco         
Tunisia         
Western Sahara
Southern Africa* 10 1 6 7 2 4 4 2
Angola yes        
Botswana yes   yes     
Lesotho yes   yes     
Malawi yes yes yes yes    
Mozambique yes  yes  yes Two Not stated yes
Namibia yes        
South Africa yes  yes yes     
Swaziland yes  yes yes  Three Not stated  
Zambia yes  yes yes   One Not stated  
Zimbabwe yes  yes yes yes  Several PPPs Not stated yes
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TABLE L 3(b)—PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING SYSTEMIC CAPACITY
Country/region 
L2.4.2-Existence of 
food reserves, local 
purchases for relief 
programs, early 
warning systems 
and food feeding 
programs**
L3.1.1-Existence of 
a new NAIP/NAFSIP 
developed 






mechanisms for mutual 
accountability and peer 
review 
L3.3.1-Existence of 







of a functional 
multisectoral and 
multistakeholder 











investments in the 
PPPs 
L3.4.6-Existence 
of an operational 
country SAKSS  
Western Africa* 11 7 8 9 11 3 3 6
Benin yes yes yes  yes   yes 
Burkina Faso yes yes  yes yes   yes
Cabo Verde         
Côte d'Ivoire    yes yes Two Not stated  
Gambia yes  yes yes yes    
Ghana Yes  yes  yes yes   yes
Guinea yes yes  yes     
Guinea-Bissau         
Liberia         
Mali yes yes yes yes yes Two Over 10 billion CFA franc yes
Niger yes yes yes yes yes    
Nigeria yes    yes    
Senegal yes yes yes yes yes Two $798 million yes
Sierra Leone yes   yes  yes    
Togo yes yes yes yes yes   yes
Note:   * The item in this row are the number of countries in Africa of the sub region corresponding to each indicator. 
           ** This indicator is from level 2 of the CAADP Results Framework.
SAKSS=Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
ANNEX 3d: Level 3—Strengthening Systemic Capacity to Deliver Results, continued
 continued
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PERIOD WHEN CAADP COMPACT WAS SIGNED LEVEL OR STAGE OF CAADP IMPLEMENTATION REACHED BY END OF 2015
2007–2009 2010–2012 2013–2015 Not signed
LEVEL 0 





Level 1 plus NAIP 
LEVEL 3




Level 3 plus  
other external 
funding source 
CC1 CC2 CC3 CC0 CL0 CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4
Benin Burkina Faso Angola Algeria Algeria Angola Cameroon Burundi Benin 
Burundi Central Afr. Rep. Cameroon Botswana Botswana Chad Cabo Verde Gambia Burkina Faso 
Cabo Verde Congo, Dem. Rep. Chad Comoros Comoros Congo, Rep. Central Afr. Rep. Liberia Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia Côte d'Ivoire Congo, Rep. Egypt Egypt Eq. Guinea Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Ethiopia 
Gambia Djibouti Eq. Guinea Eritrea Eritrea Gabon Djibouti Niger Ghana 
Ghana Guinea Gabon Libya Libya Lesotho Guinea Sierra Leone Kenya 
Liberia Guinea Bissau Lesotho Morocco Morocco Madagascar Guinea Bissau Togo Malawi 
Mali Kenya Madagascar Namibia Namibia Mauritius Mauritania Uganda Mozambique 
Niger Malawi Mauritius Somalia Somalia Seychelles S. T. & Principe Zambia Nigeria 
Nigeria Mauritania Sudan South Africa South Africa Sudan   Rwanda 
Rwanda Mozambique S. T. & Principe South Sudan South Sudan Swaziland   Senegal
Sierra Leone Senegal Zimbabwe Tunisia Tunisia Zimbabwe   Tanzania
Togo Seychelles        
 Swaziland        
 Tanzania        
 Uganda        
Zambia        
Count
13 17 12 12 12 12 9 9 12
AgShare in GDP (%)
26.1 23.2 22.2 7.5 7.5 19.7 22.1 25.5 25.5
Note: NAIP = national agricultural investment plan. There are three external funding sources considered—Grow Africa, New Alliance Cooperation, and the Global Agriculture and Food   Security Program (GAFSP).  
AgShare in GDP is the average share of agricultural GDP in total GDP for 2003–2016.
ANNEX 4: Distribution of countries by year of signing CAADP compact and level of CAADP 
implementation reached by end of 2015
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Annual avg. change 
(2008–2015) 2015
Africa 3.8 3.6 3.1 5.8 5.0 6.8
Central 2.1 2.2 19.9 3.2 11.5 4.0
Eastern 4.6 4.2 -1.9 6.2 5.1 7.5
Northern 3.8 3.6 -3.0 4.8 5.7 5.9
Southern 2.9 3.5 3.9 5.6 6.2 6.3
Western 5.2 4.2 1.5 7.3 2.6 8.2
Less favorable agriculture conditions 6.7 6.0 -2.0 8.0 2.2 8.2
More favorable agriculture conditions 5.0 5.1 -1.9 6.8 2.9 7.5
Mineral-rich countries 1.5 2.1 24.9 3.3 5.4 3.8
Middle-income countries 3.3 2.6 0.9 5.1 8.3 6.7
CEN-SAD 4.8 3.8 -1.2 6.2 4.0 7.2
COMESA 3.2 3.4 6.8 5.8 8.8 7.9
EAC 4.3 5.0 6.0 6.2 1.7 6.8
ECCAS 2.0 2.3 24.6 4.1 10.3 5.2
ECOWAS 5.2 4.2 1.5 7.3 2.6 8.2
IGAD 4.4 3.8 -2.3 6.2 8.0 7.8
SADC 2.8 3.5 9.4 4.9 3.9 5.6
UMA 5.0 3.9 -10.5 4.7 1.7 3.7
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 4.2 3.5 -0.2 7.1 5.1 8.2
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 3.8 4.5 10.4 5.8 3.4 7.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 3.8 2.8 -4.3 5.4 10.5 6.3
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 3.5 3.2 -6.6 3.9 8.9 5.0
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 3.5 3.2 -6.6 3.9 8.9 5.0
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 3.8 3.0 -3.5 5.6 10.1 6.7
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 2.7 2.7 14.0 3.0 1.4 3.1
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 4.2 5.0 7.0 7.5 2.6 7.6
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 4.5 4.0 1.1 6.8 4.5 8.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on OECD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Note: Data are from 2002 to 2015.
ODA refers to gross disbursements.
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Annual avg. change 
(2008–2015) 2015
Africa 80.5 75.7 -5.7 67.7 5.6 79.9
Central 73.0 79.7 12.5 68.0 -0.5 70.6
Eastern 73.4 78.3 -3.3 74.8 0.4 76.0
Northern 116.5 70.5 -19.7 72.6 17.8 96.0
Southern 85.2 89.3 -1.7 84.6 1.5 100.0
Western 84.2 75.1 -7.5 65.3 6.1 75.8
Less favorable agriculture conditions 91.8 85.5 -6.5 73.4 -0.3 66.3
More favorable agriculture conditions 79.5 83.2 0.9 78.7 -3.7 72.8
Mineral-rich countries 65.5 86.6 13.1 88.8 -0.4 112.0
Middle-income countries 81.0 70.9 -12.9 65.7 17.1 98.6
CEN-SAD 86.1 67.3 -8.8 64.6 9.6 80.4
COMESA 76.3 79.2 -5.3 70.7 1.7 78.2
EAC 60.6 84.8 15.2 82.9 -1.9 72.8
ECCAS 75.3 78.8 6.4 74.3 2.3 82.0
ECOWAS 84.2 75.1 -7.5 65.3 6.1 75.8
IGAD 67.6 75.7 -5.7 72.7 1.5 74.1
SADC 80.0 85.6 1.3 84.3 -0.7 91.7
UMA 99.3 77.1 -22.5 104.2 31.5 166.5
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 79.3 74.9 -10.7 74.1 0.1 69.8
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 74.0 84.8 7.1 72.5 3.7 86.6
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 91.0 77.5 -10.2 69.4 4.8 78.1
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 123.5 88.8 -25.7 75.0 22.1 107.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 123.5 88.8 -25.7 75.0 22.1 107.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 80.2 72.5 -11.2 75.5 7.2 91.4
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 83.9 88.7 6.9 76.1 -6.6 75.0
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 79.5 99.6 -0.7 75.7 -2.3 65.5
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 76.6 71.0 -2.4 68.9 4.5 80.6
Source: ReSAKSS based on OECD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Note: Data are from 2002 to 2015.
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Annual avg. change 
(2008–2015) 2015
Africa 4.4 4.7 -1.7 4.6 -4.8 4.1
Central 1.7 3.0 27.2 5.1 0.7 5.0
Eastern 9.9 10.9 -8.1 8.8 -5.6 8.1
Northern 1.1 1.6 9.5 1.4 -9.5 1.0
Southern 4.2 3.5 1.1 2.4 -15.8 1.3
Western 0.9 0.8 -7.7 1.7 22.6 2.2
Less favorable agriculture conditions 4.3 5.1 -14.7 6.4 6.6 6.0
More favorable agriculture conditions 5.4 6.0 -4.9 4.8 -12.4 3.2
Mineral-rich countries 1.8 2.2 12.1 2.7 2.6 3.3
Middle-income countries 5.5 5.1 -2.8 4.6 -2.0 4.8
CEN-SAD 3.8 4.8 6.6 5.7 -1.9 5.5
COMESA 7.3 9.3 3.5 8.5 -5.8 7.9
EAC 3.2 3.7 -1.9 3.1 -9.2 2.2
ECCAS 3.9 3.3 1.2 4.3 0.1 4.1
ECOWAS 0.9 0.8 -7.7 1.7 22.6 2.2
IGAD 15.2 16.4 -9.3 12.7 -4.6 12.3
SADC 2.6 2.5 10.1 2.3 -13.2 1.5
UMA 1.1 1.6 9.5 1.4 -9.5 1.0
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 5.7 4.5 -15.7 4.3 -2.6 4.0
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 1.6 2.2 9.9 2.5 -2.4 2.4
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 11.9 12.3 4.9 12.3 -12.5 7.3
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 5.4 4.2 -46.1 3.3 55.2 7.3
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 5.4 4.2 -46.1 3.3 55.2 7.3
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 15.4 15.4 5.1 13.8 -13.3 7.9
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 1.3 2.1 20.8 3.4 3.0 4.0
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 3.0 3.0 -9.5 3.2 12.2 4.1
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 3.7 3.5 -10.1 3.3 -7.9 2.5
Source: ReSAKSS based on OECD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
Note: Data are from 2002 to 2015.
ODA and food aid refer to gross disbursements.
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Africa 63.9 -3.7 51.1 32.4 -18.1 23.1 3.6 26.4
Central 125.6 -3.9 93.8 56.1 -22.0 19.2 -4.7 18.1
Eastern 92.4 -3.2 82.3 51.6 -21.4 35.4 1.6 35.1
Northern 48.2 -6.1 38.5 27.2 -15.3 18.3 2.0 19.8
Southern 45.3 -2.5 36.7 28.0 -7.0 34.6 7.8 43.6
Western 83.2 -3.0 62.1 30.6 -30.6 11.4 1.3 13.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 101.0 -0.7 85.8 52.1 -21.2 34.1 3.6 38.2
More favorable agriculture conditions 73.7 -2.2 67.5 46.8 -19.0 30.6 3.2 35.2
Mineral-rich countries 204.0 0.9 176.0 103.2 -22.1 30.6 -10.8 23.9
Middle-income countries 57.2 -4.4 44.6 28.2 -17.4 21.7 4.4 25.0
CEN-SAD 69.8 -3.2 57.4 35.0 -20.6 19.8 0.9 20.9
COMESA 76.6 -2.9 68.4 46.1 -17.9 28.4 0.6 29.5
EAC 62.4 -2.6 58.0 37.2 -21.9 22.9 2.9 25.3
ECCAS 124.8 -6.6 84.5 47.9 -25.1 20.3 0.3 23.3
ECOWAS 83.2 -3.0 62.1 30.6 -30.6 11.4 1.3 13.1
IGAD 98.4 -2.5 90.3 56.3 -21.3 35.1 -0.5 32.6
SADC 54.6 -3.0 43.4 31.8 -9.9 34.8 6.8 42.7
UMA 55.8 -6.4 40.2 25.7 -17.6 18.6 2.4 19.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 75.0 -3.0 56.8 25.1 -38.9 7.6 5.7 9.5
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 116.7 -2.3 96.9 63.6 -18.6 34.6 -1.5 35.9
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 111.2 -5.5 83.9 50.9 -21.2 36.6 4.9 42.4
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 37.4 -3.9 31.6 24.6 -7.8 24.9 5.1 28.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 37.4 -3.9 31.6 24.6 -7.8 24.9 5.1 28.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 114.0 -5.1 87.1 53.3 -20.3 39.7 5.0 46.0
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 144.4 -2.4 114.0 74.1 -19.5 27.9 -8.6 22.0
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 119.8 1.4 112.9 63.3 -25.2 29.3 1.6 34.7
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 79.2 -3.9 59.5 30.1 -30.9 12.8 3.2 15.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on ADB (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Africa 23.8 2.5 25.2 25.8 0.7 23.5 -2.0 21.6
Central 18.2 4.5 20.8 25.7 8.2 24.8 -2.8 22.2
Eastern 15.6 2.4 18.2 19.1 -0.5 16.5 -2.5 15.3
Northern 26.4 -0.3 26.3 28.9 4.4 27.8 -2.6 25.4
Southern 26.1 0.5 25.6 27.6 3.3 29.2 -0.3 29.2
Western 22.3 10.6 27.4 23.0 -8.6 15.7 -2.7 13.1
Less favorable agriculture conditions 17.7 3.5 20.7 22.5 2.5 22.1 0.6 21.8
More favorable agriculture conditions 19.0 -0.2 19.8 19.2 -3.5 18.8 1.3 19.3
Mineral-rich countries 14.4 1.8 16.1 15.8 -1.0 16.9 1.1 17.1
Middle-income countries 24.8 2.6 26.2 26.9 1.0 24.3 -2.4 22.1
CEN-SAD 21.6 3.8 23.7 22.5 -2.4 18.7 -2.4 17.9
COMESA 19.9 -1.7 19.8 20.6 1.3 19.5 -1.8 19.2
EAC 18.0 0.7 19.0 19.4 -0.8 18.3 0.2 18.4
ECCAS 26.4 3.2 26.6 31.7 7.2 30.5 -4.2 26.5
ECOWAS 22.3 10.6 27.4 23.0 -8.6 15.7 -2.7 14.6
IGAD 15.5 2.7 18.7 19.2 -1.0 16.1 -3.1 14.8
SADC 24.6 0.7 24.4 26.3 3.1 27.6 -0.4 26.6
UMA 28.5 2.0 30.3 33.3 4.1 31.9 -2.7 29.5
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 22.7 12.3 28.4 23.5 -9.5 15.4 -3.0 12.6
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 18.3 0.6 19.2 19.5 -0.8 19.3 1.0 19.8
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 24.2 2.1 25.0 28.8 5.0 26.8 -4.2 22.3
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 25.3 0.0 25.2 27.5 4.0 27.9 -1.2 27.1
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 25.3 0.0 25.2 27.5 4.0 27.9 -1.2 27.1
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 25.7 1.7 26.2 29.5 4.2 27.7 -4.3 23.0
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 13.3 5.2 16.0 19.1 4.0 18.1 0.0 17.8
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 19.1 1.5 20.2 20.5 -1.2 18.4 0.6 18.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 21.9 9.1 26.5 22.6 -8.0 16.3 -2.0 14.2
Source: ReSAKSS based on ADB (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Africa 11.4 -3.1 8.4 9.0 0.8 9.3 0.2 4.6
Central 5.1 -0.7 3.1 9.6 2.9 0.7 0.2 -10.2
Eastern 14.2 -4.0 7.6 11.0 1.4 12.8 -1.2 7.5
Northern 6.6 -1.3 5.8 8.4 1.1 6.5 0.2 2.6
Southern 9.0 -0.7 8.7 7.2 0.5 6.8 -0.2 5.9
Western 21.5 -9.0 13.7 10.9 0.1 14.7 1.3 6.4
Less favorable agriculture conditions 6.1 -1.5 4.0 7.7 1.5 3.6 0.0 -0.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 9.2 -1.4 7.2 9.7 1.5 9.9 -1.5 7.5
Mineral-rich countries 16.2 -1.0 14.0 14.7 -0.9 8.9 0.0 7.2
Middle-income countries 11.7 -3.4 8.6 8.9 0.8 9.4 0.4 4.3
CEN-SAD 13.9 -5.1 9.2 9.2 0.6 11.9 0.5 6.2
COMESA 9.8 -2.1 8.4 10.0 1.0 12.0 -1.0 7.8
EAC 10.8 -1.1 6.3 10.9 1.1 9.4 -1.6 7.2
ECCAS 5.4 -0.8 3.5 9.8 2.7 1.1 0.2 -9.2
ECOWAS 21.5 -9.0 13.7 10.9 0.1 14.7 1.3 6.4
IGAD 15.0 -4.7 7.5 10.7 1.5 14.8 -1.5 8.3
SADC 9.3 -0.8 8.7 7.6 0.6 6.8 -0.2 5.9
UMA 7.3 -1.7 4.9 7.7 1.1 3.2 0.7 -1.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 23.3 -9.9 14.8 12.0 0.2 15.9 1.2 7.1
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 8.9 -1.2 6.0 7.5 1.0 6.8 -0.7 5.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 11.4 -4.0 6.7 9.6 1.7 8.3 -0.7 -1.6
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 7.4 -0.9 6.8 7.7 0.9 6.5 0.1 4.0
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 7.4 -0.9 6.8 7.7 0.9 6.5 0.1 4.0
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 12.7 -4.4 7.6 10.7 1.8 9.6 -0.3 -0.1
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 4.3 -0.7 3.3 5.5 0.6 2.5 -1.7 -4.6
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 10.6 -1.4 8.1 8.3 0.5 8.3 -2.0 5.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 20.5 -7.8 13.1 11.4 0.4 14.3 1.0 7.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017).
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Africa 11.1 -3.4 9.5 7.4 -7.7 9.4 7.3 12.7
Central 5.2 -9.2 3.3 2.7 -4.7 3.1 1.1 3.9
Eastern 45.8 -7.0 33.3 28.5 -5.8 34.2 7.8 42.7
Northern 6.0 -7.1 4.6 4.5 0.1 7.3 10.2 11.1
Southern 11.0 -1.8 10.1 7.7 -9.4 8.4 4.5 9.9
Western 11.6 1.1 11.8 8.0 -11.7 10.6 9.4 16.0
Less favorable agriculture conditions 22.4 -6.5 15.0 11.2 -2.8 12.3 2.6 15.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 49.9 -3.0 41.2 37.9 -2.2 38.3 0.7 40.0
Mineral-rich countries 7.1 1.1 7.8 7.8 -5.5 7.5 3.4 9.0
Middle-income countries 8.6 -2.6 7.7 5.8 -8.5 7.6 7.6 10.5
CEN-SAD 12.8 -2.4 11.1 8.3 -8.7 11.2 9.8 17.0
COMESA 21.7 -6.4 14.1 11.0 -7.3 16.5 12.2 25.0
EAC 56.7 -3.9 44.5 43.0 -0.5 42.4 1.1 45.4
ECCAS 3.1 -9.4 2.0 1.5 -8.6 1.7 4.0 2.3
ECOWAS 11.6 1.1 11.8 8.0 -11.7 10.6 9.4 16.0
IGAD 48.5 -8.9 31.7 26.0 -7.7 35.1 11.0 46.5
SADC 12.4 -2.0 11.4 8.9 -9.2 9.4 4.4 11.1
UMA 5.6 -8.7 3.9 3.6 -0.4 5.7 12.6 9.4
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 6.6 2.1 7.4 5.4 -11.4 8.1 11.1 12.5
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 42.4 -1.3 37.1 32.4 -4.3 29.5 0.2 31.4
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 9.6 -6.3 7.2 4.4 -16.8 4.0 7.2 5.4
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 7.7 -3.9 6.6 5.6 -3.5 8.2 7.3 11.0
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 7.7 -3.9 6.6 5.6 -3.5 8.2 7.3 11.0
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 9.9 -5.8 7.4 4.5 -17.4 3.8 7.1 5.0
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 17.5 -2.4 16.1 14.4 -5.3 14.6 1.5 18.2
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 18.7 1.9 20.6 20.6 -0.4 18.6 -1.5 19.3
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 15.8 -0.8 14.6 10.7 -8.9 14.5 9.6 21.3
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Africa 15.2 -0.4 14.7 13.4 -3.4 14.0 0.8 14.1
Central 17.1 -1.5 16.9 17.0 -1.3 16.3 2.1 17.9
Eastern 15.1 0.3 14.7 13.0 -3.4 14.0 -0.7 13.3
Northern 20.1 -3.0 17.7 15.7 -2.3 16.1 0.8 16.0
Southern 9.3 1.2 9.6 8.6 -3.6 9.7 1.1 10.4
Western 17.0 3.0 18.0 16.4 -5.1 16.6 1.5 16.5
Less favorable agriculture conditions 21.7 -0.8 19.8 20.4 -1.8 18.4 -1.2 17.7
More favorable agriculture conditions 13.9 0.1 14.8 14.0 -2.3 13.4 -1.4 13.0
Mineral-rich countries 15.8 0.3 16.7 14.4 -3.2 12.9 -1.7 12.5
Middle-income countries 15.1 -0.5 14.5 13.1 -3.5 14.0 1.2 14.2
CEN-SAD 16.7 -0.1 16.1 14.7 -3.2 15.7 0.9 15.4
COMESA 17.6 -0.5 17.2 15.4 -2.6 16.7 0.1 16.0
EAC 13.6 -2.6 12.2 11.6 -2.1 11.5 -1.0 10.8
ECCAS 20.2 -0.5 19.5 17.9 -3.8 16.8 1.9 18.1
ECOWAS 17.0 3.0 18.0 16.4 -5.1 16.6 1.5 16.5
IGAD 14.6 0.9 14.0 12.3 -3.7 13.7 -1.4 12.9
SADC 10.1 0.7 10.5 9.5 -3.4 10.4 0.8 10.9
UMA 19.6 -3.9 16.5 14.8 -1.3 14.8 1.1 15.3
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 15.8 3.2 16.6 15.2 -5.7 15.1 1.3 14.9
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 17.9 -0.3 17.6 16.0 -2.6 14.6 -1.9 13.9
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 17.3 0.7 17.6 16.0 -2.5 17.9 2.1 19.1
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 13.8 -2.3 12.8 11.6 -2.4 12.6 0.9 12.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 13.8 -2.3 12.8 11.6 -2.4 12.6 0.9 12.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 17.5 0.8 17.7 16.0 -2.8 18.1 2.5 19.4
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 22.0 -0.4 21.8 21.2 0.3 20.8 -1.4 20.4
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 14.8 -0.5 15.2 13.4 -4.7 11.5 -1.1 11.4
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 16.2 2.4 16.6 15.1 -5.0 14.7 0.2 14.2
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Africa 0.8 -1.2 0.8 0.7 -5.6 0.6 1.4 0.7
Central 0.5 -6.7 0.4 0.3 -3.7 0.3 -7.4 0.2
Eastern 1.6 -5.3 1.3 1.2 -5.2 1.1 3.7 1.3
Northern 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.4
Southern 1.3 -3.0 1.1 0.9 -4.2 0.9 1.8 0.9
Western 1.0 -0.8 1.1 0.8 -10.8 0.8 1.8 0.9
Less favorable agriculture conditions 0.5 -8.3 0.4 0.4 3.4 0.5 2.0 0.5
More favorable agriculture conditions 2.1 -3.4 1.7 1.4 -5.4 1.3 2.5 1.4
Mineral-rich countries 0.5 -6.4 0.4 0.5 3.0 0.5 2.6 0.6
Middle-income countries 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6 -6.4 0.6 1.0 0.6
CEN-SAD 0.8 -0.4 0.8 0.7 -8.4 0.6 1.6 0.7
COMESA 0.9 -1.7 0.8 0.7 -5.4 0.6 2.8 0.7
EAC 2.2 -1.9 2.1 1.8 -6.6 1.4 1.2 1.7
ECCAS 0.3 -9.5 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 -4.6 0.2
ECOWAS 1.0 -0.8 1.1 0.8 -10.8 0.8 1.8 0.9
IGAD 1.7 -7.0 1.3 1.1 -4.1 1.1 3.8 1.2
SADC 1.3 -2.9 1.1 0.9 -4.8 0.9 2.3 1.0
UMA 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.4 2.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 0.6 -0.3 0.7 0.6 -10.1 0.6 2.3 0.7
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 2.0 -2.7 1.7 1.5 -4.8 1.4 1.1 1.5
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 0.8 -5.4 0.6 0.5 -10.0 0.3 -0.9 0.3
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 0.5 1.8 0.5 0.5 -2.5 0.5 1.9 0.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 0.5 1.8 0.5 0.5 -2.5 0.5 1.9 0.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 0.8 -4.4 0.6 0.5 -10.1 0.3 -1.0 0.3
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 0.9 -7.2 0.6 0.6 -4.8 0.5 -0.2 0.6
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 0.9 -1.4 0.8 0.9 6.1 1.1 0.0 1.1
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 1.3 -2.5 1.3 1.0 -8.4 1.0 2.6 1.1
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Annual avg. change 
(2008–2014) 2014
Africa 23.0 22.4 -1.2 24.4 3.7 26.5
Central 5.7 4.1 -1.6 4.4 4.6 4.6
Eastern 8.0 8.6 6.5 12.7 4.8 13.4
Northern 99.6 102.7 -1.2 107.9 2.4 114.0
Southern 35.3 33.7 1.1 35.0 1.8 37.1
Western 6.6 7.4 -0.2 9.7 13.6 12.8
Less favorable agriculture conditions 4.5 6.2 41.1 6.7 17.3 9.2
More favorable agriculture conditions 11.3 12.0 4.5 15.0 3.9 16.2
Mineral-rich countries 9.3 7.6 7.5 10.0 5.3 11.6
Middle-income countries 33.1 32.5 -1.9 35.8 3.7 38.9
CEN-SAD 26.4 26.3 -2.7 28.2 3.5 30.5
COMESA 37.0 35.1 -1.2 37.6 1.3 38.8
EAC 9.4 10.4 1.9 11.6 -0.8 10.9
ECCAS 4.8 4.1 5.2 5.6 7.0 6.2
ECOWAS 6.6 7.4 -0.2 9.7 13.6 12.8
IGAD 8.7 9.3 8.0 14.7 5.4 15.7
SADC 25.0 22.6 0.4 23.2 1.5 24.3
UMA 37.2 37.2 -1.1 38.4 6.9 43.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 6.2 7.4 9.0 11.3 11.4 14.0
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 9.8 9.8 0.3 10.9 3.8 12.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 8.6 7.7 -2.7 10.8 7.1 12.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 81.8 83.2 -0.4 86.8 1.8 90.7
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 81.8 83.2 -0.4 86.8 1.8 90.7
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 8.3 7.5 -2.2 11.2 7.5 12.8
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 5.1 3.7 -2.4 3.8 3.1 3.7
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 6.6 7.7 7.8 9.0 11.5 11.5
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 9.3 10.4 4.2 14.4 7.8 16.9
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and FAO (2017).
Note: Data are from 2002 to 2014.
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Africa 16.1 0.0 16.3 15.4 -2.0 15.5 0.6 15.5
Central 23.5 -4.6 18.8 18.4 -1.3 17.6 0.0 18.0
Eastern 34.2 -2.5 30.0 27.6 -3.1 28.6 2.0 30.0
Northern 13.2 -1.2 12.5 11.4 -4.2 11.2 0.8 11.7
Southern 5.5 -1.9 4.9 4.5 -1.7 4.0 -2.7 3.7
Western 24.9 3.0 28.3 25.8 -2.4 24.0 -1.0 23.4
Less favorable agriculture conditions 39.0 -1.5 34.2 37.4 4.1 37.7 -0.2 37.5
More favorable agriculture conditions 30.4 -2.8 27.7 27.7 0.1 28.7 -0.2 28.3
Mineral-rich countries 32.0 -4.2 25.5 23.5 -2.4 19.4 -4.5 16.3
Middle-income countries 13.3 1.3 14.2 13.1 -2.9 13.1 0.7 13.5
CEN-SAD 22.0 1.1 22.9 21.3 -2.6 20.4 0.1 20.7
COMESA 23.9 -2.0 21.4 19.9 -2.9 19.3 0.6 19.6
EAC 31.6 -3.4 27.6 25.9 -3.1 27.4 1.7 28.9
ECCAS 19.6 -1.5 19.7 19.2 -1.8 18.3 0.1 18.6
ECOWAS 24.9 3.0 28.3 25.8 -2.4 24.0 -1.0 23.4
IGAD 36.7 -2.1 31.8 29.0 -3.3 30.3 2.6 32.5
SADC 8.4 -3.7 7.3 6.8 -1.6 6.7 -0.8 6.6
UMA 11.6 -1.8 10.9 9.8 -5.2 10.5 3.2 11.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 26.6 2.5 29.7 27.2 -2.1 25.5 -0.9 24.9
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 28.2 -2.7 25.1 23.4 -2.7 23.1 -0.5 22.7
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 21.0 1.6 22.5 20.6 -4.0 19.8 3.0 22.0
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 8.7 -1.0 8.3 7.5 -3.6 7.4 0.3 7.6
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 8.7 -1.0 8.3 7.5 -3.6 7.4 0.3 7.6
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 20.6 2.1 22.4 20.2 -5.0 19.1 3.5 21.6
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 29.7 -4.8 23.8 22.7 -0.5 21.9 -2.2 20.5
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 31.5 -2.4 27.2 26.3 -0.6 25.0 -1.1 23.6
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 26.2 1.6 28.4 26.2 -2.4 25.0 -0.6 24.6
Source: ReSAKSS based on UNCTAD (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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Africa 64.8 3.2 77.2 92.7 7.0 127.1 4.0 143.6
Central 11.7 -0.3 12.3 14.1 5.3 20.2 6.3 24.6
Eastern 16.3 4.2 19.3 23.3 7.9 35.5 6.4 43.7
Northern 98.3 4.3 115.3 131.0 5.4 174.1 3.7 196.8
Southern 106.0 2.2 116.2 130.3 4.9 153.3 1.6 161.1
Western 86.2 3.7 111.7 145.3 9.5 217.1 4.8 248.6
Less favorable agriculture conditions 3.6 5.0 4.5 5.3 6.2 7.7 5.7 9.1
More favorable agriculture conditions 12.3 3.5 14.2 16.8 7.6 27.0 7.5 34.0
Mineral-rich countries 10.5 -1.4 10.7 12.5 6.3 19.0 6.9 23.5
Middle-income countries 110.9 3.6 134.4 162.8 7.2 223.6 4.0 252.3
CEN-SAD 78.3 3.9 97.5 121.1 8.0 173.4 4.5 198.1
COMESA 38.5 3.4 43.6 49.7 5.8 67.0 4.0 76.8
EAC 15.7 3.6 18.3 21.4 6.4 31.3 6.0 37.9
ECCAS 14.1 1.0 15.2 19.5 10.7 30.4 5.5 36.2
ECOWAS 86.2 3.7 111.7 145.3 9.5 217.1 4.8 248.6
IGAD 18.2 4.1 21.4 25.8 8.1 39.6 6.4 48.7
SADC 64.4 1.9 69.9 78.1 4.8 92.8 2.0 99.0
UMA 71.1 3.9 83.8 94.2 4.2 119.5 3.9 135.8
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 77.0 3.6 99.3 129.3 9.6 195.8 5.1 226.0
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 12.6 2.1 14.0 16.2 5.9 23.4 6.2 28.6
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 19.7 4.4 23.0 28.7 10.0 41.5 3.7 47.1
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 132.9 3.6 152.8 171.6 4.6 212.5 3.2 235.5
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 132.9 3.6 152.8 171.6 4.6 212.5 3.2 235.5
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 20.1 4.3 23.4 29.8 10.9 43.7 3.6 49.4
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 12.0 -0.4 12.5 14.3 5.3 20.5 6.5 25.3
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 6.1 5.2 7.5 8.9 7.1 13.4 5.4 15.8
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 62.6 3.6 80.1 103.7 9.4 156.5 5.1 181.4
Source: ReSAKSS based on World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
Notes: For regions or groups, level is weighted average, where weight is country's share in total population for the region or group.
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Africa 36.8 -1.8 33.9 32.1 -2.4 27.2 -2.7 24.6
Central 43.0 -1.4 40.4 38.9 -1.5 34.5 -2.1 31.9
Eastern 46.8 -2.1 42.5 39.8 -3.0 33.2 -2.8 29.8
Northern 16.0 -1.8 15.0 14.3 -1.9 12.5 -2.2 11.5
Southern 36.5 -1.6 33.9 32.2 -2.2 27.9 -2.4 25.5
Western 41.2 -2.2 37.5 35.2 -2.6 29.1 -3.2 25.8
Less favorable agriculture conditions 49.9 -2.0 45.6 42.7 -3.1 36.0 -2.4 32.8
More favorable agriculture conditions 46.2 -2.1 42.0 39.3 -3.0 32.9 -2.8 29.6
Mineral-rich countries 47.2 -1.2 44.5 43.1 -1.3 38.9 -1.9 36.2
Middle-income countries 29.1 -1.9 26.8 25.4 -2.1 21.6 -2.9 19.3
CEN-SAD 34.0 -1.9 31.4 29.8 -2.2 25.3 -2.8 22.7
COMESA 38.9 -1.8 35.9 33.9 -2.4 28.9 -2.6 26.2
EAC 34.8 -1.6 32.0 30.3 -2.3 25.8 -2.7 23.2
ECCAS 48.3 -1.9 44.2 41.7 -2.6 35.3 -2.7 31.9
ECOWAS 41.2 -2.2 37.5 35.2 -2.6 29.1 -3.2 25.8
IGAD 49.2 -2.4 44.3 41.1 -3.3 33.4 -3.3 29.5
SADC 37.6 -1.5 35.1 33.4 -2.1 29.4 -2.1 27.1
UMA 15.2 -2.4 13.7 12.7 -3.6 10.3 -3.0 9.2
CAADP Compact 2007–09  (CC1) 45.7 -2.4 41.1 38.2 -3.2 30.8 -3.4 27.0
CAADP Compact 2010–12  (CC2) 32.4 -1.7 29.8 28.2 -2.3 24.2 -2.5 22.0
CAADP Compact 2013–15  (CC3) 32.3 -1.4 30.1 28.8 -1.9 25.6 -2.0 23.7
CAADP Compact not yet    (CC0) 14.6 -1.8 13.6 13.0 -1.7 11.4 -2.2 10.5
CAADP Level 0    (CL0) 14.6 -1.8 13.6 13.0 -1.7 11.3 -2.2 10.5
CAADP Level 1    (CL1) 31.0 -1.3 29.1 28.0 -1.7 25.2 -1.7 23.6
CAADP Level 2    (CL2) 16.5 -1.9 15.0 14.0 -2.9 11.6 -3.1 10.3
CAADP Level 3    (CL3) 40.4 -1.7 37.4 35.3 -2.5 30.4 -2.3 27.9
CAADP Level 4    (CL4) 44.4 -2.3 40.2 37.5 -2.9 30.7 -3.3 27.2
Source: ReSAKSS based on IFPRI, WHH, and Concern Worldwide (2016), World Bank (2017) and ILO (2017).
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